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Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprdgen-das ist der hochste 
Wille zur Macht. Zwiefache Fdlschung, von den Sinnen her und vom 
Geiste her, um eine Welt des Seienden zu erhalten, des Verharrenden, 
Gleichwertigen usw. DasAlles wiederkehrt, ist die extremste Anndherung 
einer Welt des Werdens and die des Seins: Gipfel der Betrachtung. 
To stamp the character of Being onto Becoming - that is the highest will to 
power. Two-sided falsification, starting from the senses and [starting] from 
the spirit, in order to hold on to a world of beings, of persistence and 
equivalence and so on. That everything recurs is the extreme 
approximation of a world of Becoming to that of Being: peak of the 
meditation. 
Nietzsche, KSA 12, 7 [54], Wille zur Macht 617, 1883-1885. 
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... INTRODUCTION 
My aim in this thesis is to investigate the concept ofBecoming in Nietzsche's 
philosophy.1 It will be argued here that Becoming is one of the most central concepts of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. l will assert that Nietzsche deyelops a metaphysics ofBecoming 
by eliminating teleology from his account of Becoming and reality. Heidegger has 
claimed that will to power is a way in which Nietzsche re-thinks the concept of 
Becoming. According to this reading, will to power is the Seing of beings, but it is also 
essentia and Becoming as opposed to Being which is associated with the eternal 
recurrence of the same. l grant Heidegger's thesis that will to power is a re-thinking of 
Becoming, but 1 belieyc that this interprctatiye moye stillleaycs some questions 
unanswered. Some of these questions relate to the problem of permanence and 
impermanence in Nietzsche's account ofBecoming and reality. 
To situate the discussion ofBecoming in Nietzsche's philosophy, it should be 
remembered that Becoming is originally conceptualized in Aristotle's Physics and 
Metaphysics in terms of energeia, entelecheia and dunamis. It might be agreed that the 
culmination of the thought of Becoming is reached in Nietzsche's philosophy as he 
expresses Becoming qua dunamis in terms ofwill to power. It will be seen that will to 
power is thought in tcrms ofBecoming as energeia and dunamis although a priority 
should be ascribed to dunamis oyer energeia. lt is well-known that Aristotle also thinks 
Becoming in tcrms of en-te/echeia and en-te/os. The rclationship between Seing and 
Becoming is difficult to discern in Nietzsche's thought but it is my beliefthat a doctrine 
1 Since Plato and perhaps Parmenides, the verb es/in (to be) has taken a particular importance in Western 
metaphysics and logic. Consequently it has become habitua! to spell the concept of "Being" with an upper-
case letter. Nietzsche has sought to re-habilitate the concept ofBecoming (Werden) in the face ofBeing. 
This is why 1 have chosen to spell "Becoming" with an uppercase lettcr. 
." , 
ofBecoming in general is intelligible as is proven by Aristotle's Physics and 
Melaphysics. In fact 1 will use Aristotle's work as a methodology and a heuristic to the 
concept ofBecoming in order to try to shed light on Nietzsche's doctrine ofBecoming. 
Becoming is not one of the major rubrics ofNietzsche's philosophy such as will to 
power, eternal recurrence, nihilism and the Übermensch. Yet, it is my thesis that 
Nietzsche's philosophy can be explained entirely in terms ofthis concept. This is the 
task that 1 have set for myself in the present work. 
The first section is a historico-philological analysis of the occurrences orthe term 
"Becoming" and "teleology" in Nietzsche's work as a whole. This section is much more 
philological and it constitutes a close reading of the Nietzschean corpus and an analysis 
of how the concept of Becoming is devcloped in that corpus. 
Section two deals with the issue of Becoming in Nietzschean scholarship. The 
lirst chapter is devoted to an analysis and a critique of Heidegger's interpretation or 
Nietzsche. [ take [-leidegger's interpretation to be fundamental for any understanding of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. To put it bluntly, Heidegger has changed the map in Nietzsche 
studies. There has been a tendency in more recent scholarship to want to go beyond this 
reading. 1 think this is perfectly legitimate as progress is al ways both possible and 
necessary. The originality ofmy dissertation can indeed be seen in great part in the way it 
challenges the l-leideggerian reading. ln a way, r make lise of Müller-Lauter's critique of 
I-Ieidegger's reading. l claim that Nietzsche at once completes and de-constructs 
metaphysics as onto-theology. 
Müller-Lauter has already shown that in Nietzsche's thought metaphysics is un-
donc l'rom within metaphysics. This is in a way what 1 am claiming as weil. Nietzsche is 
at once wUMn the onto-theological edifice and outs;de il. But my thesis is developed by 
looking at how Nietzsche removes teleology from within Becoming. lt is only through 
this removal that Nietzsche de-constructs onto-theology. Nietzsche's relation to onto-
theology is ambiguous not unlike his relation to atheism. My thesis is that Nietzsche is 
caught within onto-theology insofar as he accepts, to a certain extent, the identification of 
God with Being as permanent presence that is characteristic of Western onto-theology 
since Augustine. But insofar as Nietzsche describes the "death of God", he has also 
managed to think transcendence within immanence and to inscribe Becoming within the 
Being of God. In this way, Nietzsche has fluidified and made im-permanent the concept 
of Being and Becoming. Nietzsche believes that Being is Becoming and that Being is a 
fiction. By thinking Being (Becoming and time) in terms of its im-permanence, Nietzsche 
has already anticipated the thinking of Being in terms of time. 
The second section of the dissertation attempts to summarize the most important 
post-I-leideggerian (Lukacs and Jaspers are also discussed and their interpretations 
chronologically precede I-Ieidegger's lecture-courses on Nietzsche) contributions to 
Nietzschean scholarship. There are, as 1 see it, two main currents: the Anglo-American 
one (Danto, Schacht, Nehamas, Clark, Richardson, Leiter) and the Continental one 
(Heidegger, Jaspers, Lukacs, Müller-Lauter, Habermas, Deleuze, Vattimo, Figl, Stack, 
Abel, Gerhardt, Salaquarda, I-Iofmann, Franck). 1 will try to do justice to both these 
currents as l develop my own position. 
At the end of section two there is also a theoretical methodology for analyzing 
Nietzsche's concept of Becoming. Nietzsche's understanding of Becoming is examined 
against the background of Aristotle's \=.:.=:.:..=::.::-:~/ and Hegel's (Excursus 2) respective 
accounts of Becom ing. 
The last section of the dissertation will situate this notion ofBecoming in the 
COntext ofNietzsche's lhought. In section 3.1, Ideal with Nietzsche's suspicion towards 
truth and melaphysics and his analysis of the influence of language on thought. Section 
3.2 attempts to olTer a general summary of the relationship of the main rubrics of 
Nietzsche's thought, will 10 power, eternal recurrence of the same, nihilism, and 
Ühermensch, to the concept of Becoming. Seetion 3.3 deals with historicism and its 
intluence on Nietzsche's thought: it also analyzes how history and Becoming are relatcd 
in Nietzsche's thought. A comparison is donc between Nielzsche's understanding of 
history and Hans-Georg Gadamer's conception of history and historicity. This 
comparison is justified by the fact that Gadamer has been one of the most acute students 
of historicism of the twentieth century. Finally, section 3.4 addresses with Nietzsche's 
epislemology. The conclusion oflhat section is thal without being a naturalist writ large 
(this assertion is complicaled by the fact that Nietzsche possesses a metaphysics 
something which does not necessarily cohere with naturalism), Nietzsche's epistemology 
does show signs of naturalistic and pragmatist tendencies. 
1 Historico-Philo1ogical Analysis of the Concept of 
Becoming in the Nietzschean Corpus 
1.1 Philological and Chronological Analysis of References to Becoming in 
the Writings ofNietzsche's Early Period (1872-1877) 
ln this section, 1 examine the early writings and the Nach/ass that surrounds il. 
My thesis will be that the young Nietzsche is still very much influenced by 
Schopenhauer. Nietzsche is not worried at this point to rem ove teleology from within 
Becoming. He is still influenced by the negative lelos that operates within 
Schopenhauer's philosophy and that is constituted by the increase of suffering in the 
totality of the world-Will (We/I-Wille) that is embodied in each orthe actions ofhuman 
subjects. It is only with the beginning of the so-called positivistic or "Aujklarer" phase of 
Nietzsche's thought which starts with the publication of Human, All-too-Human in 1878, 
that the preoccupation with a naturalistic epistemology and a critique of a metaphysical 
beyond starts to dawn on Nietzsche. 
11 will be the aim of my dissertation to investigate and research whether there is a 
radical change or a deep conti nuit y in Nietzsche's concept ofBecoming across the vast 
Nietzschean corpus. 1 can already say that 1 favor the continuist thesis and it will be my 
aim to show how Becoming plays the role of holding Nietzsche's philosophy together 
across the three periods that are attributed to his thoughl. In my opinion, this Heraclitean, 
anti-metaphysical aspect ofNietzsche's thought has been neglccted by Heidegger's 
reading of Nietzsche as last Western metaphysician. 
In the following citation, Nietzsche does a sort of summary of the history of the 
concept ofBecoming in Greek philosophy. This passage occurs in the context of the 
writings on the Pre-Socratics and shortly before the publication of the Birth of Tragedy: 
Erste Periode. Das Werden erregt das 8au~L(iÇElV. Jonische 
Philosophen. Zweite Periode. Das Problem des Werdens wird 
erkannt. Metaphysik. Dritte Periode. Die Teleologie, der Zweck 
des Werdens. Vierte Periode. Die Dialektik aIs das Sicherste. 
Ohne Erkenntnis keine Tüchtigkeit. Die Philosophie wird 
reformatorisch und imperativisch und aggressiv. 
2 
ln this history the introduction of teleology within the concept of Becoming is seen as the 
third phase and interestingly it cornes before the establishment of the dialectic as a formaI 
tool establishing true knowledge. This might perhaps seem strange since although Plato 
introduces the dialectic, it is only with Aristotle that a rational teleology is introduced in 
the concept of Becoming. 
The following passage of 1873 shows Nietzsche's early affinity with Heraclitus. 
Reality (Wirklichkeit) is a pure activity (Wirken) that is de void of Being: 
Wer sie vor Augen hat, muss aber auch sofort zu der Heraklitischen 
Consequenz weitergehen und sagen, dass das ganze Wesen der 
Wirklichkeit eben nur Wirken ist und dass es für sie keine andre Art Sein 
'b 2 gl t ... 
For Nietzsche, in the early writings, Becoming is unique and eternal. Reality on 
the other hand, is totally inconsistent in its activity. Nietzsche writes that Becoming is 
associated to life but is not reducible to it. However, 1 would like to defend a position 
that does not make of Nietzsche a mere Lebensphilosoph. 3 1 believe that Nietzsche, and 
1 KSA 7, 14 [29]. 
è "Die Philosophie il71 Iragischen Zeilaller der Griechen ", KSA l, 824. 
3 As Bollnow, O .. (Die Leben.l'philo.l'ophie, Berlin, Springer, 1958) shows, Nietzsche is doubtless also a 
Lehen.l'philosoph. What 1 am opposed to is a reduction ofNietzsche's thought to Lebensphilo.l'ophie. 1 
helicve Nietzsche's philosophy to he so rich that more can be made out of il. But this has already been 
shown by 1-Ieideggcr's remarkable interpretation of Nietzsche. SOllle later scholars (Deleuze, Müller-
Lauter) have decided to focus on the bodily and vitalistic aspects ofNietzsche's philosophy in order to gain 
sorne distance from the strong Heideggerian read ing. 
this accords with his own self-interpretation, is as rigorous a thinker as Aristotle.4 For 
these reasons, 1 believe that it would be perhaps more fruit fui to explore how will to 
power radicalizes the concept of Werden (gignesthai) rather than claiming that will to 
power and life are purely co-extensive. 
The sentence quoted above with respect to the fact that the essence of reality is 
wholly activity is problematic. One must differentiate carefully between actuality, 
activity and permanence. At this point, 1 will discuss the problem of the relationship 
between quality and quantity. This relationship is essential to an understanding 0[' how 
Nietzsche sees Becoming and how he develops what 1 call a metaphysics of Becoming. 
This is the case because it seems that for Nietzsche the explanation of the relationship 
between quality and quantity must be clarified if we are to get at his understanding of 
Becoming. ln his discussion of Becoming in Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der 
Griechen, Nietzsche goes on to assert the following: 
Dies erreichte Heraklit durch eine Beobachtung über den 
eigentlichen Hergangjedes Werdens und Vergehens, welchen er 
unter der Form der Polaritat begrifj~ ais das Auseinandertreten 
einer Kraft in zwei qualitativ verschiedne, entgegengesetzte und 
zur Wiedervereinigung strebende Thatigkeiten. Fortwahrend 
entzweit sich eine Qualitat mit sich selbst und scheidet sich in ihre 
Gegensatze wicder zu einandcr hin. 5 
Further, concerning the problem of qualities, Nietzsche writes: 
Die entsetzliche Consequenz des Darwinismus, den ich übrigens 
für wahr halte. Alle unsre Verehrung bezieht sich auf Qualitaten, 
die wir für ewig halten: moralisch, künstlerisch, religios, usw. Mit 
den Instinkten kommt man keinen Schritt weiter, um die 
3 
.j It is true that Heidegger is the first that has attempted to claim that Nietzsche should be taken as seriously 
as Aristotle, but Nietzsche had already anticipated this comparison as we can see l'rom the unpublished KSA 
9, 15 140]: "Meine Gedanken betrefTen zu hohe und ferne Dinge, sic konnten nur wirken, wenn der sUirkste 
personliche Druck hinzukame. Vielleicht wird der Glaube an meine Autoritat erst durch Jahrhunderte so 
stark, um die Menschen zu vermogen, ohne Beschamung, das Buch dieser Autoritat so streng und Ernst zu 
interpretiren, wie einen alten Classiker (z.B. Aristoteles).-". 
5 "Die Philosophie im lragischen Zeilaller der Griechen", KSA 1,824. 
Zweckmassigkeit zu erklaren. Denn eben diese Instinkte sind 
bereits das Erzeugniss end los lang fortgesetzter Prozesse. 6 
Nietzsche thus understands Becomingin this early text, in terms of the 
differentiation of qualitative aspects of force (Kraft). This characterization will fade as 
such in the later unpublished fragments in which Nietzsche treats of Becoming 
. 1 7 extensIve y. 
Nietzsche goes on to claim that Anaximander took refuge l'rom un-determined 
qualities in the lap ofhis concept of apeiron (apeiron is also translated as in-detenninate 
or un-determinate). Nietzsche mentions that Becoming could be seen as the struggle of 
eternal qualities: "sollte es jetzt aber nicht scheinen, ais ob das Werden nur das 
4 
Sichtbarwerden eines Kampfes ewiger Qualitaten ist ?"X Nietzsche refuses the dialectical 
aspect of the relationship between quality and quantity, but the question then becomes 
how does Nietzsche view the relationship between quality and quantity ? 
These questions of the relationship between quality and quantity bring us to the 
concept of movement. This is the case because, as Aristotle has ciassically claimed, there 
is only motion with respect to quality, quantity and place. For the early "Heraclitean" 
Nietzsche movement and change are the ultimate fact that can be reached. There is never 
stability and permanence, we live in world of perpetuai change and movement. The 
question is how can movement and permanence (or rest) co-exist? Do they not 
contradict themselves? And what contradicts itself, is it movement or permanence (or 
rest) or the relationship between them ? Once it has been granted that there is a 
contradiction between movement and rest, how can we progress beyond this 
contradiction? 
6 KSA 7,19 [132]. 
7 KSA /J, 38 [12], KSA /2,2 [91],2 [1101,2 [151], 2 [165], 6 rll], 7 [54], 9 [62], 9 [63], 9 [89], 10 [57], 
KSA 13,11 [73], 11 [74], 11 [82],14 [18], 14[31], 14 r1221.15 [53l 
} 
5 
Nietzsche appeals to intuition and he is persistently opposed to any conceptual 
and rational understanding of Becoming. This is problematic as has correctly been 
pointed out by Gyorgy Lukacs in his Zerstdrung der Vernunfi (The Destruction al 
Reason). Lukacs writes: 
Das Sein, soweit sein BegrifTnur die leisesten Spuren einer 
Beziehung zu der von lInserem Bewllsstsein unabhangigen 
Wirklichkeit in sich enthalt, muss durch das Werden (gleich 
Vorstellung) verdrangt werden. Das Sein je do ch, von diesen 
Schlacken befreit, rein ais Fiktion, rein ais Produkt des Willens zur 
Macht aufgefasst, kann für Nietzsche nunmehr zugleich auch eine 
noch hohere Kategorie ais das Werden sein: Ausdruck der 
intuitiven Pseudoobjektivitat des Mythos. 9 
A question that needs to be clarified is whether Lukacs is right to claim that in 
Nietzsche's philosophy the relationship between Being and Becoming is only expressed 
as an insoluble antagonism and an eclectic amalgam. Even without subscribing to 
Lukacs' economical and historical determinism that posits the impossibility of a 
relationship other than a dialectical one between Being and Becoming, it does seem that 
Lukacs makes an important point when he claims that the relationship between Being and 
Becoming in Nietzsche, (and this claim holds for the totality ofNietzsche's philosophy, 
not just his early phase), is ultimately unclear and perhaps a bit confused. 1o 
Something that has to be explained in the analysis ofNietzsche's philosophy is 
the rollowing. If Becoming, like space and time is related only to intuition (this is the 
case because in his early philosophy, Nietzsche links Becoming, space and time, 
l'ollowing Schopenhauer, to intuitive representations) is it not the case that the concept or 
Becoming lacks determination in Nietzsche's thought? If it is the case, as Hegel claims 
8 "Die Philosophie im Iragischen Zeilaller der Griechen", KSA 1,827. 
q Lukacs, G., Die Zerslorung der Velï1/1nji, p.344, Neuwied, Berlin, Luchterhand, 1962-1986. 
10 Lukacs is not the only one to think that there is a conl'usion in Nietzsche's usage orthe categories or 
l3cing and Becoming. In Nielzsche.I' Tolalisl71l1s (De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1983, p.255), Walter 
Gebhard writes the following: "'Die Selbstauflosung der inconsistent gebrauchten Begri ffe 'Sein' und 
'Werden' ist vielfach in Nietzsches Notizcn, Aphorismcn und Systcmwürfen nachzuweisen," 
6 
that "there is nothing in the sky and on the earth that is not at once mediated and 
immediate,,11 is Nietzsche's discussion of Becoming only in terms ofimmediate intuition 
justified? Here wc must differentiate: it might be the case that Nietzschc's concept of 
Becoming is purely intuitive and linked to Schopenhauerian will and rcpresentation in the 
early phase ofNietzsche's philosophy but this linkage to Schopenhauer is definitely 
jettisoned in the later philosophy. 
The lack of determination in Nietzsche's early understanding of Becoming must 
be understood in relation to the concept of" contradiction. Contradiction is the reality or 
the real that gives itself over to a finite understanding. 13ecoming is both ironie and 
tragic: it is shot through with contradiction. Nietzsche cannot posit Becoming as a new 
ideal, as a new absolute point ofview from which he would articulate the truth. 
Becoming is only a perspective among many. Nietzsche is weil aware ofthis and he 
claims that Becoming and knowledge exclude each other. 12 Knowledge is always 
knowledge ofBeing. 
Beeoming is not taken to possess qualitative determination by Nietzsche in the 
early writings most notably in "Philosophie im /ragischen Zei/alter der Griechen". Tt can 
play the role of not being determined in terms of its ability to express the true and the 
good. The true and the good necessitate a stability and a permanence that 1S afforded by 
the concept ofBeing. Trucness and goodness would not be possible without the ability to 
predicate that is given by the third person singular of the verb to be. S "is" P forms a 
determination P of S (il is the basis of the first logic developed in Western civilizatÎon: 
Il "Hier mag daraus nur dies angel'ührt werden, dass cs Nichls gibl. nichls im Himmel oder in der Natur 
oder im GeÎsle oder wo es sei, was nicht ebenso die Unmillelbarkeil enlhal! ais die Vermilliung. so dass 
sich diese beiden Bestimmungen ais ungelren~lund unlrennbar und jener Gegcnsatz si ch ais ein Nichligcs 
sich zeigl." Hegel, G.-W.-F., Wissenschaft der Logik l, Werke 5, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wisscnsehan, 
FrankFurt Am Main, 1969, p.66 , From now on this book will be referred to as Logik. 
1: KSA 12,9[89]. 
7 
Aristotle's syllogistical theory of logic) that is not possible when expressed as S becomes 
p. 13 
Nietzsche claims in "Die Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen P, that 
ArÎstotle Îndicts Heraclitus in front of the tribunal of reason for having sinned against the 
principle of contradiction. Nietzsche believes Heraclitus' thought ofBecoming can be 
understood in terms of intuition. Nietzsche's reading of Heraclitus is in itself interesting 
since it seems to go against and contradict the picture or Heraclitus that Hegel possessed. 
lt is worthwhile to remember that Hegel had claimed that there was Ilot one sentence of 
Heraclitus that he had not taken up in his Wissenschafi der Logik (Science of'Logic) 
which is factually t'aIse. The struggle ta clarify the modern concept ofBecoming then 
might hinge upon who, of Nietzsche or Hegel, has better understood Heraclitus. This 
question might ultimately be undecidable. 
But let us return to the analysis of Becoming as it is given by Nietzsche in "Die 
Philosophie im tragischen Zeitaller der Griechen". Nietzsche refers to Heraclitus' c1aim 
that "Alles hat jederzeit das Entgengengesetzte an sich." 14 But strangely enough when it 
cornes to explaining the concept of intuition, Nietzsche relers ta Kant's notion of the a 
priori. Nietzsche discusses time and space and calls them pure in themselves (an sich) 
and means by this the facl that the y can be apprehended immediately. The fact that this 
Immediate apprehension oftime and space is not purely Kantian, but is mediated by 
Schopenhauer becomes apparent when it is made clear that time and space are understood 
n01 as sensible intuitions but as intuitive representa/ions. In Nietzsche's early works, the 
philosopher has not yet found his own language when it cornes 10 discussing the problem 
14 ln the statement S "becomes" P, the substrate S transforms itselfinto the entity P. Ali qualities and 
quantities of Sare changed. In the statement S "is" P, P can express a quantity and a quality that is 
pred icatcd of S but the essential substrate S does not change. 
14 "Die Philosophie im Iragischen Zeifaller der Griechen", KSA 1, p.823. 
of Becoming. Rather, Nietzsche still falls back upon the Schopenhauerian conceptuality 
ofwill and representation to dcscribe Becoming as thc following show: "lm Werden zeigt 
sich die Vorstellungsnatur der Dinge: es giebt nichts, es ist nichts, alles wird, das heisst 
ist Vorstellung,,15 For, Nietzsche, who follows Schopenhauer's le ad here, Becoming is 
likened to representation. By starting From representation, Schopenhauer assumes that 
this basic, representation, is more fundamental than both the components it includes of 
subject and object. Representation is closer to Becoming and to the the phenomena than 
the subject and the object are. It is true that will and representation are opposed in 
, Schopenhauer, but it is precisely this dualism which Nietzsche is beginning already to 
question here in his carly unpublished fragments. l1ecoming will be the key concept that 
will help Nietzsche overcome Schopenhauer's dualism orwill and representation. 
Nietzsche continues 10 use the language of Schopenhauer insofar as he connects 
Becoming to Wille: "Wir, die wir genothigt sind, alles unter der Form des Werdens, das 
heisst aIs Willcn zu verstehen, verfolgen jetzt die Geburt der drei verschiedensartigen 
(îcnien in der uns al1ein bekannten Erscheinungswelt ... " 16 By joining Becoming to both 
Wille and Vorstelfung, Nietzsche's already trying to bring together the two fundamental 
concepts that Schopenhauer wants to keep apart into the more basic concept of 
Becoming. 
ln Nietzsche's early Nachlass, he identifies a le/os but this le/os is a political one: 
the state should have as its aim and pllrpose to breed the genius: "seincm letzten Zweck 
nach, cine Schutz und Ptlegeanstalt für Einzelne, für den Genills zu sein scheint, so wenig 
auch dcr grausame Ursprung und das barbarische Gebahren desselben auf Ziele 
15 KSA 7, 7 [203l 
16 KSA 7, 10 [1]. 
hindeutet.,,17 This idea of breeding reappears in the later works and Nachlass when 
Nietzsche writes of the possibility of breeding the Obermensch. In the early works 
however, Nietzsche was still inl1uenced by this idea of the genius that had been 
popularized by Kant's third Critique and that was re-activated by Schopenhauer. 
In the following passage Nietzsche alludes to the distinction that he has made 
famous in the Birlh ofTragedy belween the Apollonian and the Dyonisian: 
Wahrend aber der apollinische Einze\ne var nichts so sehr gehülel 
wird ais vor der entsetzlichen Erkenntnis, dass jenes Wirrsal von 
leidenden und 8ich zerl1eischenden Wesen in ihm sein Ziel und 
seinen Zweck habe, benutzl der dionysische Wille gerade diese 
Erkenntnis. um seine Einzelnen zu einer noch hoheren Stufe und 
sich in ihn~n zu verherrlichen. 18 
'l'he ApolJonian protects itself From the "horrifying knowledge" (entselzlichen 
Erkenntnis) of the suffering and self-dismembering being (sich zer.fleischenden Wesen) 
whereas the Dionysian will (here again the influence of Schopenhauer is unmistakable 
9 
but the transformation of Wille into dionysischer Wille is already an original insight of the 
young Nietzsche) uses the knowledge of suffering and self-dismemberment ta individuate 
itself and transfigure itself into a higher level of actuality, In reference to this duality 
between Apollonian and Dionysian, Nietzsche writes further: "Das gemeinsame 
Geheimniss ist namlich, wie aus zwei einander feindlichen Principien etwas neues 
enstehen konne, in dem jene zwiespaltigen Triebe ais Einheit erscheinen ... ,,19 
He asks himselfhow From the two antagonistic principles (of the Apollonian and 
the Dionysian) something new can arise and be created in which the two antagonistic 
drives appear as a unity. From this unit y will arise the tragic spirit orthe Greeks. Here 
Nietzsche is still caught in a dialectical way of looking at Greek CÎvilization (and by 
17 KSA 7,7[121}. 
18 KSA 7,7[122]. 
19 KSA 7,7[123]. 
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extension at German culture which he understands as modeled or as if it should model 
itsell'on Greek civilization especially what Nietzsche characterizes as the Tragic Epoch 
of Greek thought). He himselfwas aware of the problematic nature ofhis endeavor and 
in the later corpus he gives up the notion of the Apollonian to deepen his original insight 
of the Dionysian. 
In the following citation, Nietzsche writes that the intellect is an organ of the will. 
This reminds one ofNietzsche's later expressions in which he c\aims that the intellect is 
an organ of knowledge and that our organs of knowledge radically determine the kind of 
knowledge that we can possess. 
Wir haben uns hier zu erinnern, dass der lntellekt nur ein Organ 
des Willens ist und somit in allem seinen Wirken auf das Dasein, 
mit nothwendiger Gier, hindrangt und dass es sich bei seinem Ziele 
nur um verschiedene Formen des Daseins, nie aber um die Frage 
nach Sein oder Nichtsein handeln kann. Für den Intellekt giebt es 
kein Nichts ais Ziel somit auch keine absolute Erkenntnis. weil 
diese dem Sein gegenüber ein Nichtsein ware.20 ' 
For the intellect there is not nothingness as goal and that absolute knowledge does not 
exist because it would be a non-being in opposition to Seing. 
Nietzsche brings into his discussion the concept of the Ur-Einen that is inherited 
from Schopenhauer. According to Nietzsche the totality of the empirical world has to be 
understood as a reflexion of the Ur-Einen and as a Dionysian work of art. Here, in this 
carly work, Nietzsche points out that world-history is not a unitary process and that its 
purpose is reached perpetually or in every moment. 21 This distinguishes Nietzsche's 
vision radically l'rom that of a Hegel for whom world-history is conceived as a process 
that continually or perpetually actualizes within itselfthe idea of freedom and rationality. 
20 KSA 7,7[125]. 
21 "Die WeltgeschichlC isl kein einheilicher Prozess. Das Ziel derselben isl forlwahrend errreichl", KSA 7, 7 
[145[. 
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Nietzsche evokes the fact [hat the will is something metaphysical and he relates 
this fact to what he calls Urvisionen (originary visions). This position ofNietzsche's is 
transcended in the later philosophy where, as mentioned previously, Nietzsche will go as 
rar as claiming that there is no such thing as the will. Nietzsche relates again the concept 
of Ureinen to the concept or Becoming. The essence of the Ureinen is contradiction, 
semblance (Schein), Becoming and pleasure. "Wenn das Ureiene den Schein braucht, so 
ist sein Wesen der Widerspruch. Der Schein, das Werden, die LUSt.,,22 This concept of 
the Ureinen is ultimately mysterious. Nietzsche inherited it from Schopenhauer but the 
role it plays in his early philosophy (The Birlh of'Tragedy) and the Nachlass surrounding 
it is not clear. Il seems to be a metaphysical concept, but this metaphysics is not a rational 
metaphysics like that of Hegel but a Romantic metaphysics inlluenced by Schopenhauer. 
In Nietzsche's early works the concepts of Being and Becoming are constantly 
referred to the Schopenhauerian concept of the Ureinen: 
Die Visionen des Ureinen konnen ja nur adaquate Spiegelungen 
des Seins sein. Insolèrn der Widerspruch das Wesen des Ureinen 
ist. .. Die Erscheinung ais werdende. Das Ureine schaut den 
Genius an, der die Erscheinung rein ais Erscheinung sieht: dies ist 
die Verzückungsspitze der Weil. .. Aiso ist auch das Schaffen des 
Genius Vorstellung. Diese Spiegelungen im Genius sind 
Spiegelungen der Erscheinung nicht mehr des Ureinen: ais 
Abbilder des Abbildes sind es die reinsten Ruhemomente des 
Seins ... Das Sein befriedigt sich im vollkommen Schein. 23 
The concept of the Ureinen is related to the concept of the genius that is very important 
for Schopenhauer and the carly Nietzsche. Being is al ways associated to semblancc 
(Schein) in the early works. I-Iere Nietzsche claims that Being finds its satisfaction in 
perfect semblance. 
:2 KS;J 7,711521, 
23 KS;J 7, 7 [157]. 
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The Ureinen seems to be an originary metaphysical principle from which aIl 
reality and ail semblance is derived. It is not, of course the rational hen of the neo-
platonists but a Romantic concept. The Ureinen seems to secrete representations, 
semblances and ultimately reality itself. Reality and semblance arc derived l'rom the 
Ureinen throllgh the principle olïndividllation and this is another sign 01' Schopenhauer's 
deep inOuence on the young Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche' s early Nachlass continues to show signs of a romanticism with which 
he will take his distances in the second phase orhis thinking (the so-called positivist or 
"11 t!/klarer" phase) and to which he does not return even in the last phase of his thought. 
Characteristic of this romanticism is the cIaim that ail Being is su[fering and that the true 
nature of life is suffering. This can be seen in the following quote: "lm Werden muss 
auch das Geheimniss des Schmerzes ruhen ... Der Schmerz, der Widerspruch ist das 
wahrhafte Sein. Die Lust, die Harmonie ist der Schein.,,24 Suffering and contradiction 
are true Being according to the previous quote. Pleasure and harmony arc only a 
semblance. 
Nietzsche points to the fact that the will not only surfers but that it bears 
semblance in evcry minute moment. 
das Fühlen ist nicht ohne Objekt moglich, das Objekt-Sein ist 
Anschauung-Sein ... VolI aIs Erscheinung wahrnehmbar ist die 
Welt nur für der einen Willen. Er ist also nicht nur leidend, 
sondern gebarend: er gebiert den Schein in jedem kleinsten 
Moment: der aIs das Nichtreale au ch der Nichteine, der 
Nichtseiende, sondern Werdende ist. 25 
I-Iere, Nietzsche's terminology gets a bit confusing. It seemed at first that he 
wanted to associate Being with semblance and Becoming with reality. But it turns out 
that Becoming is also associated with semblance. In the philosophy of German Idealism, 
24 KSA 7,7[165]. 
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Being is dialectically related to semblance. In Hegel's Grea/er Logic, in the book of 
Wesen there are two sub-sections that de al directly with Schein. But sembIance or Schein 
is always dialectical and related to the determinability of Being in the Logic. For 
Nietzsche, Schein is reIated to Being and to Becoming but Schein and Becoming are not 
dialectically over-determined and subverted in order to facilitate Being's determination of 
itself. 
Nietzsche's attempt to think through the relationship between Being, Becoming, 
contradiction and semblance is important fDr the investigations conducted in this thesis. 
Contradiction and semblance seem to be the root of ail Being as for the German 
Romantics who have influenced Nietzsche's conceptions: 
Wenn der Widerspruch das wahrhafte Sein, die Lust der Schein ist, 
wenn das Werden zum Schein geh6rt - so heisst die Welt in ihrer 
Tiefe verstehen den Widerspruch verstehen. Dann sind wir das 
Sein - und müssen aus uns das Schein erzeugen ... Der Schein ais 
Vater des empirischen Seins: das also nicht das wahre Sein iSt. 26 
This is the case because in this quote Nietzsche claims that semblance is the father of 
empirical Being and that this empirical Being is not true Being. We see that at this early 
stage in his development, Nietzsche has not worked out his critique of the dichotomy 
between the true world and the apparent world. He still believes that there is a world of 
Being other than the empirical world. 
1 repeat that it is not clear what semblance is for Nietzsche, f3eing or Becoming. 
Perhaps both are semblance and that is the way in which Nietzsche manages to think their 
unit y at this early stage ofhis philosophy. On this reading both Being and Becoming 
would be individuated or secreted from the Ureinen and transformed into semblance 
è5[Nictzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA 7,7[1681. 
:'6 KSA 7,7[169]. 
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through the principium individuationis. There would be a te/os to reality but this would 
be to individuate Being and Becoming into semblance. 
According to this early Romantic formulation ofNietzsche's there would be no 
truth or reason or harmony, but only semblance and semblance of semblance (Schein des 
Scheins). This idea of a te/os of the will which is articulated in its representations (the 
expression of representations being the ultimate aim of the will) is intrinsically 
Schopenhauerian and Nietzsche has not abandoned this way of writing and thinking at the 
early stage of his development. Schopenhauer, it is true, does not have a strong concept 
of the te/os and this is due to his reaction to Hegel's optimistic teleology. However, the 
will does express a negative te/os in Schopenhauer. The will is never the will of agents, 
the will of actors, but it is the expression of a primordial will that acts through the agents 
and actors by generating the intellect of the actors. The expressions and representations 
of this will are filled with sufTering and each time the will acts, blindly, through the 
intermediary of the human intellect it only increases suffèring. This increase of suffèring 
is thus a negative te/os orthe will. It is the aim (the telos) orart to console humans rrom 
the horrible and tragic aspects of art. According to Schopenhauer, we can calm suffering 
in ourselves through the contemplation of art and by acting morally. This consoling 
power of art still influences the young Nietzsche especially when he claims that art is the 
great consoling power of life or that existence is justified only aesthetically. 
The next citation is important because it throws light on the relation between the 
concepts of semblance and Becoming: 
!.7 KSA 7, 10 III 
In dieser Welt des Nicht-Seienden, des Scheines muss alles 
werden: und so wird auch der Genius, indem in einem 
Menscheitscomplexe, in einem grosseren Individuum jene 
dammerende Lustempfindung des Traumes si ch immer mehr 
steigert, bis zujenem dem Genius eigen1.hümlichen Genussc 1 ... ]27 
1 
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Thus we can see that at this early stage in his philosophy, Nietzsche's concept of 
Becoming is associated to the concept of Schein that he inherits [rom Schopenhauer. In 
Nietzsche's early writings, the concept ofBecoming is articulated in terms of the key 
concepts of Schopenahauer and the pre-Socratics. The most frequent occurrence of the 
concept of Becoming in Nietzsche's carly works is in the text on "Philosophy in the 
Tragic Age of the Greeks". 
In the following, Nietzsche talks about the question of who is the first Western 
philosopher and the relation between this question and the problem ofBecoming: 
Immer willkürlich ZlI sagen, der und der ist der erste Philosoph. 
Thales ist genommen, weil er ein Princip aufstellt. Das ist aber ein 
viel spaterer Standpunkt, erst den Systematiker gelten zu lassen 
(Bestimmung der platonisch-aristotelischen Sphare). Voraus geht 
cine Menge einzelner Weltblicke: das Problem des Werdens hat 
schon cine lange Geschichte unter mythischen Hüllen ausgedrückt, 
auch die Kraft des Systematisirens ist schon da. 2x 
Nietzsche attracts the attention to the fact that the concept of Becom ing has a long history 
that precedes both Thales and the conceptualizations of Plato and Aristotle. This long 
history is expressed through myths. Nietzsche is perhaps thinking here orthe story or 
Saturn (time) who devours his children. or course, Becoming and time cannot be 
identified, but an idea of coming-to-be and passing-away was already present in the 
Greek myths ofI-Iesiod and Homer and it was only rationalized by Thales and 
Anaximander. 
Nietzsche points out that Becoming consists in the inherent negativity of13eing. 
Things arc, but they come out or non-Being and they eventually return to this non-Being: 
"Es muss durchaus zu zeigen sein, das alles Vorhandene und Seiende irgendwann nicht 
28 KSA 7, 14 [27]. 
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war und deshalb auch irgendwann nicht sein wird. Das Werden l-Ieraclits.,,29 Of course, to 
explain the problem ofBecoming it is necessary to explain the identity that is present 
within difference: particular things come-into-being and pass-away but the tot~lity 
against which these movements and changes are perceived and contrasted subsists and 
makes possible the awareness of change in the first place. 
ln "Philosophy in the Tragic Age or the Greeks", Nietzsche analyzes how 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Anaxagoras strugg\c with the concept of 
1 
Becoming. But Nietzsche has not yet achieved a clear position on Becoming. He does 
, 
seem to show a preference for Heraclitus' philosJphy over that orparmenides but his 
1 
1 
position is nuanced. ln the later Nachlass or arollnd 1885-87, Nietzsche arrives at a more 
originallinderstanding or Becoming. Becoming is understood in constant oppositionto 
, 
Being in these later writings. The concept that is:opposed to Being is not Non-8eing as 
has traditionally been asserted (even in I-Iegel's Logic since pure Being immediately 
moves into determinate Being and then into pure·and determinate non-Being) but 
1 
Becoming. The early writings on the pre-Socratics are helpful here to make sense of the 
, 
later writings. In the part that deals with Parmenides, Nietzsche asserts that Parmenides 
observes that there are opposite qllalities in naturt and that one orthe qualities is derived 
l'rom the other through a negalion. In the later wl:itings, Nietzsche claims that Being is 
derived from Non-Being throllgh a negation. Thys, Nietzsche denies the positivity or 
Seing in his later works in favor or the natllral and innocent Ilow or Becoming. 
Bere, Nietzsche mentions the concept 01' pllrpose (Slaalszweck): 
è9 KSA 7, 19 [1 19]. 
Deshalb ist es geradezu lInvermeidlich, dass solche Menschen 
einen grossen Einfluss auf den Staat gewinnen, weil sie ihn aIs 
1 
Mittel betrachten dürfen, wahrend aile Anderen unter der Macht 
jener unbewussten Absichten des Staates selbst nur Mittel des 
Staatszwecks sind. 3o 
Nietzsche distinguishes in his carly writings and Nachlass between a political 
purposefulness and a metaphysical one. Men are educated with a plll·pose by the State. 
This purpose is to serve the State and its institutions. But for Nietzsche the true purpose 
of education is be to breed the genius and and to inake possible the coming of another 
Genialen-Republik as the one that he takes to hav.e existed from Thales to Socrates 
(through Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democrites, " .). 
The political and metaphysical purpose seem to coincide again as the goal is to 
breed the genius that can then educate the masses: 
17 
jeder Mensch, mit seiner gesammten Thatigkeit, hat nur so viel 
würde al cr, bewusst oder unbewusstes Werkzeug des Genius ist; 
woraus sofort die ethische Consequenz zu erschliessen ist, dass der 
"Mensch an sich", der absolute Mensch, weder Würde, noch 
Rechte, noch Ptlichten besitzt; nur aIs vbllig determinil1es, 
unbewussten Zwecken dienendes Wesen kann der Mensch seine 
1_· . 1 Id' 31 .:xIstenz entsc 1U 1gen. 
This aspect of the education of the masses by the genius is tied in the previous quote with 
Nietzsche's contempt for liberalism and the philosophy of equal rights. Men are 
determ ined by unconscious purposes and they do not possess an intrinsic worth or rights 
or duties. 
Nietzsche's Nachlass shows strong traces or individualism. I-Iowever, this 
individualism is not the same as the one prevalent in the modern liberal democratic State. 
For Nietzsche the Einzelnen is a creator of great art and great culture not so much 
someone who can rationally exercise his judgment to vote and to follow his private 
interests: "in den grossen "Einzelnen', den Heiligen und den Künstlern liegt das Ziel, also 
wcder vor noch hinter uns, sondern ausserha!b der Zeit. Dieses Zie! aber weist durchaus 
30 KSA 7, 10 [1]. 
18 
über die Menschheit hinaus".32 Nietzsche deduces from this : "Aus alledem wird klar, 
dass der Genius nicht der Menschheit wegen da ist: wahrend er allerdings derselben 
Spitze und letztes Ziel ist,,33 These passages are reminiscent of the Second Untimely 
Meditation where Nietzsche identified the saint, the artist and the philosopher as the three 
types that could be Überhistorisch. Thus in this phase of his thought Nietzsche has 
perhaps not given up the belief in a metaphysical beyond and this belief is mediated by 
Schopenhauer's philosophy of' the will as noumenon and placed outside of time and 
space. 
According to political theory, Nietzsche is a realist: he rejects the idealism and the 
liberalism ofmost modern Western societies. This is in tune with the Romantic prote st 
already begun by Schopenhauer: the way to escape the mediocrity of modern political life 
is through an escape into the realm of art, music and philosophy at least for the young 
Nietzsche. Education has an inherentlypolitical purpose (and probably much more, but 
this is open to debate) and its purpose is to breed the metaphysical genius. Nietzsche's 
politics is located, in the corpus, in his early and middle writings. The writings on the 
Greek State, on tragedy, on Homer and on "The Future of our Educational Institutions" 
are strongly political and they show the musings of a cons~rvative authoritarian. But 
thcse writings are paired with metaphysical and aestheticalmusings and they stand in 
opposition to them. 
Becoming is metaphysical because it is the counter-concept (this is one of 
Nietzsche's great originalities) to Being. The Western metaphysical tradition had always 
considered that non-Being was the opposite of Becoming, but Nietzsche shows that Being 
31 KSA 7,10 [1]. 
3: KSA 7, Il [1]. 
33 KSA 7, Il ri]. 
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is obtained Crom a generalization of non-Becoming. 34 Thus Becoming is always related to 
the concept of Being and is a highly metaphysical concept. 
Nietzsche mentions a possible teleology of humanity: 
Von einem unbewuJ3ten Ziele der Menschheit zu reden 
halte ich für falsch. Sie ist kein Ganzes wie ein Ameisenhaufen. 
Viellcicht kann man von dem unbewuJ3ten Ziele einer Stadt, eines 
Volkes reden: aber was heil3t es. von dem unbewul3ten Ziele aller 
Ameisenhaufen der Erde zu red~n!35 
As 1 have ascertained, Becoming mediates in modern thought between history and nature. 
Thus 1 will also be interested in this section in examining thoses passages ofNietzsche's 
Nachlas.~· which refer to a historical goal or purpose for humanity. As sorne of the 
passages below will show, Nietzsche conceives his critique in contrast to Hegel himsel f 
or to neo-Hegelians such as Eduard von Hartmann and Eugen Oühring. In the previous 
passage, Nietzsche thus asserts that humanity as a whole cannot possess a goal. This is 
the case according to him because of the complexity of humanity that is composed of 
different nations and states (we can give this loose interpretation to what Nietzsche calls 
the ant nests (Ameisenhaufèn)). 
Nietzsche attempts to understand Parmenides' doctrine ofBeing: 
34 See KSA 12,9 [63]. 
35 KSA 7, 19 [160]. 
36 KSA 7,23 [121. 
Oreierlei nicht mit Parm[enides] Seinslehre zu verwechseln: 1) die 
Frage: ki::innen wir einen Inhalt im Oenken finden, der im Sein ist? 
[ ... 1 Wenn er die Sinne für ungültig erkHirt, dann kann er das Sein 
nicht aus Lust- und Unlustempfindungen beweisen: diese sind 
dann auch Schein. Oenken und Sein muJ3 dasselbe sein: denn sonst 
würde es das Sein nicht erkennen. lm Oenken giebt es also keine 
Bewegung: eine starre Seinsanschauung. Soweit das Oenken sich 
bewegt und von anderen Oingen erfüllt ist, ist es schon nicht mehr 
Sein. sondern Schein.-Aber die Oialektik des Oenkens? ist doch 
Bew~gung?36 
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Here, Nietzsche struggles with Parmenides' doctrine of Being. Nietzsche acknowledges 
that Parmenides rejects the testimony of the senses and that he cannot derive Being from 
pleasure and pain sensations (Lust- und Unlustempftndungen). But this has as a 
consequence that there would be, according to Parmenides, no movement in thought but 
only Being-intuition (Seinsanschauung). Nietzsche contrasts Seing to semblance 
(Schein). But Nietzsche claims (in the form of a question) that the dialectic of thought 
introduces movement into thought. This is a curious passage since in his published 
writings, Nietzsche, has a very negative evaluation of the dialectic and its inventor which 
he claims to be Socrates. I-Iowever in another passage from the Nachlass, Nietzsche 
claims that his unique adversary and the one against which he is constantly struggling is 
Socrates. The next guote is also important becausc it treats of Nietzsche' s understanding 
of Being. For Nietzsche, as r have argued elsewhere, the logical opposite of Being is not 
B · b B . 37 non- emg ut ecommg. 
Nietzsche identifies Being with breathing and life: '''Sein' ist die Übertragung des 
Athems und Lebens au/'al1e Dinge: Seilegung des menschlichen L,ebensgefLihls." 38 
The previous guote is important because it shows Nietzsche's identification of Being with 
breathing (Athem) and life. Nietzsche continues here his claim that we believe in Being 
and substance because we believe in ourselves and in our consciousness. Nietzsche 
claims that the stability of substance and Being is obtained through a psychological 
pro.iection from the (alleged or experienced) stability of our consciousness and sel 1'-
consc IOusness. 
Nietzsche gives the !'ollowing characterization of the di fference between pre- and 
post-Socratic philosophy: 
,7 Sec KSI! 12,91631. 
,g KSI! 7,21 [131. 
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Schlu!!: das Denken der Griechen im Iragischen Zeilaller ist 
pessimislisch oder künsllerisch oplimislisch. lhr Urtheil über das 
Lehen besagt mehr, Das Eine, Flucht vor dem Werden. Aul Einheit 
aul künstlerisches Spie!. 1 ... ] Mit Sokrates beginnt der 
Oplimismus, der nicht mehr künstlerische, mit Teleologie und dem 
Glauben an den guten Gott; der Glaube an den wissenden guten 
Menschen. 39 
This passage is also important because it establishes the cesura that Nietzsche secs in 
Greek thought between the pre-Socratics and Socrates. In the carly philological writings, 
Nietzsche identifies with the pre-Socratics (ail ofthem but with l-Ieraclitus in particular) 
and sees in their philosophies a pessimistic or an aesthetical optimistic aspect that he 
identifies with his own views. With Socrates and the moral revolution in philosophy, 
Nietzsche secs the first symptoms of decadence and optimism that will come to 
characterize Western civilization as a whole. 'T"his optimistic view is inherently 
connected to the belief in progress or the existence of a historical teleology that guides 
humanity as il whole. This teleology is introduced, according to Nietzsche, at the same 
time as the dialectic by Socrates. 
Nietzsche believes that science is oriented towards Becoming. This cames in 
conflict with a passage from the later Nachlass in which Nietzsche opposes Becoming 
and knowlcdge: "Alle eudamonistischen Triebe erwecken Glauben an die Wahrheit der 
Dinge, der Welt so die ganze Wissenschaft - auf das Werden gerichtet, nicht auf das 
Sein.,,4o It seems that later in his philosophical career, Nietzsche will change his mind 
and claims that knowledge and Becoming mutually exclude each other ("Erkennen und 
Werden schliessen sich aus ... " III and that knowledge is only possible of Seing, 
39 [Nictzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA 7, 23 [35J. 
40 KSA 7,29 [18]. 
41 KSA /2,9[891. 
• 
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The early Nietzsche expresses his position with respect to Hegel's and 
Hartmann's conceptions ofhistory and development: 
[ ... ] In andrer Art bandigte und streckte Hegel die Geschichte, er, 
der recht eigentlich der deutsche "Genius der Historie" zu nennen 
ist; denn er fühlte sich auf der Hbhe und am Ende der Entwicklung 
und damit auch im Besitz aller ehemaligen Zeiten, ais deren 
ordnender nous. Jeder Versuch, das GegenwCirlige ais das 
H6chsle zu begreijèn, ruinirl die Gegenwarl, weil el' die 
vorbildliche Bedeulung des Geschichl/ichen leugnel. [My 
emphasis, P.C.] Die schrecklichste Formel ist die I-Iartmannsche 
"sich dem Weltprozess hinzugeben". Wohin cs führt, die 
Geschichte ais einen Prozess anzusehen, zeigt E. von Hartmann 
[ ... ] Die historische Ansicht verbrüdert sich hier mit dem 
Pessimismus: nun sehc man die Consequenzen!42 
The allusions to Hegel and Eduard von Hartmann are important. Hartmann attempted to 
do a synthesis between I-1egel's logical optimism and Schopenahauer's metaphysical 
pessimism in his 1869-publishcd Philosophy o.lthe Unconscious. 
Nietzsche thought Hartmann to be an important contemporary writer and even 
recommended the reading of Philosophy olthe Unconscious to his friends, but Nietzsche 
could not stand the mixture ofpessimism and optimism that was present in I-Iartmann's 
philosophy. Especially, Nietzsche did not believe that the individual had to be sacrificed 
to the world-process (sich dem Weltprozess hinzugeben) which would ultimately be 
embodied in the history of states or in the will of a social collectivity. As Nietzsche 
asserts in KSA 7, 29 [51] , every attempt to view the present as the highest, ruins the 
present because it avoids the exemplary aspects 01' the past. This is an illustration of 
Nietzsche's classicism. 
Even though Nietzsche rejected the possibility of establishing history as a firm 
and rigorous science comparable to mathematics, he still believed that Antiquity (and 
specifically the Greece of the pre-Socratics and of the tragic poets Aeschylus and 
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Sophocles that precedes Attical Enlightnment or classicism) could be and should be taken 
as a mode!. Nietzsche never reliquinshed the beliefthat the Greeks were the unique 
Genialenvolk of history. But he opposes the idea of an old age of history and humanity 
(Greisenalter) in which we would be wiser than in our infancy. This old age could be t'ull 
ofillusion and not an age ofwisdom as Nietzsche takes Hartmann's position to be: 
Hartmann ist wichtig, weil er den Gedanken eines Weltprozesses 
todtmacht, dadurch dass er consequent ist. U m ihn zu ertragen, legt 
er ais telos zu Grunde die bewusste Erlosung und Freiheit von 
lliusionen und das Wtihlen des Unterganges. Aber das Ende der 
Menschheit kann jeden AlIgenblick durch eine geologische 
Umwalzung da sein: und jene lilusionsiosigkeit setzte eine hohere 
Entwicklung der moralischen und intellectuellen Krafte voraus: 
was ganz unwahrscheinlieh ist: vielmehr durften, wenn diese ait 
würden, die TI1l1sionen nur immer machtiger werden und das 
Greisenalter mit einem Kindischwerden sehliessen. Trostlich ist 
somit das Ietzte Resultat keinesfalls und konnte gewiss nicht ais 
telos bezeiehnet werden.43 
1 take Weltprozess and Becoming to be almost interchangeable in the previolls quote. The 
tact that the Weltprozess does not possess a telos is alillded to in this previous citation. 
The argument that Nietzsche invokes comes in part from natural science: a geological 
catastrophe could put an end to humanity at any world-historical moment and this would 
not entail that this state when the world ended would be the highest one attained by 
humanity. On the other hand, Nietzsche considers psychological and historical arguments 
lor the claim that there is no telos to the human and physieal world-proeess. The laet that 
a higher state of moral and intel1ectllal powers is not necessarily attained through the 
world-process is claimed by Nietzsche in virtue of the faet as the world-process 
progresses, more illusions could be accumulated by hllmanity as a whole and a regression 
or Kindischwerden cOllld be the end-result orthe Beeoming orthe world-process. 
~2 KSA 7,29 [51]. 
43 KSA 7,29 [52]. 
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Despite the strong reservations towards Hartmann, Nietzsche is influenced by him even 
in the later years (at least Nietzsche argues in a way that, primafacie, seems similar to the 
way Hartmann and perhaps, even Dühring, argue4/') whcn he invokes arguments for the 
state of equilibrium of forces and the intial state and final state of Becoming in order to 
prove the eternal recurrence of the same. The following passage proves this: 
Hartmann sagt p. 637: "So wenig es sich mit dem Begriff der 
Entwicklung vertragen würde, dem Weltprozess eine unendliche 
Dauer in der Vergangenheit zuzuschreiben, weil dann jede irgend 
denkbare Entwicklung bereits durchlaufen sein müsste, was doch 
nicht der Fal! ist (!! !), ebensowenig konnen wir dem Prozess eine 
unendliche Dauer für die Zukunft zugestehn; beides hobe den 
Begriff der Entwicklung zu einem Ziele auf und ste lite den 
Weltprozess dem Wasserschopfen der Danaiden gleich. Der 
vollendete Sieg des Logischen über das Unlogische muss also mit 
dem zeitlichen Ende des Weltprozesses, demjüngsten Tage 
zusammenfallen(! !)".45 
Hartmann does not believe in an infinite duration in the past and this duration is in fact 
rejected by Nietzsche explicitly in a latcr passage of the Nachlass46 but there Nietzsche 
takes Dühring to be the representative ofthat view. At the same time that Nietzsche 
rejects the impossibility of an infinite duration in the past, he accepts l-Iartmann's alleged 
impossibility of an infinite duration in the future as an absurd progressus in infinitum. 
As Müller-Lauter points out in his Nietzsche, His Philosophy o(Contradictions and the 
Contradictions o.fHis Philosophy, there is a problem in this argument from the state of 
equilibrium which appears in the early Nietzsche but will re-appear in the late phase of 
Nietzsche's thought, that relates to the infinity oftime and to the problems ofa regressus 
in infinitum and a progressus in infinitul11. Eternal recurrence as a scientific and 
,1'1 Hartmann's influence is obvious when one considers the stages of illusion regarding the state of 
happiness which are described in the l'hi/osophy of the Uncol1scious. These stages inlluenced Nietzsche 
directly when he described the stages of the history of European nihilisill. As for Dühring's influence it is 
even more pervasive. The fa ct that Dühring used revenge to ground his legal theory certainly influence 
Nietzsche in the theory of ressentiment that he developed in the Genea/ogy of MoraIs. Finally the concept 
of definite number (bestimmte Zahf) influenced Nietzsche in his cosmological proofs of eternal recurrence. 
45 INietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA 7,29 r52]. 
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cosmological theory rests on the pre-supposition of the possibility ora regressus in 
infinilum. Nietzsche pre-supposes that a regression into infinity is possible and that 
through this regression no first-state would be attained because ail is in movement and no 
end-state is attainable starting backwards ex nunc 
For Nietzsche, history has to be understood, at this stage in his philosophy, in 
terms of the great individual and not the development of the consciousness or 
unconscious, pace Hartmann, orthe masses. This eliminates according to Nietzsche the 
processual aspect ofhistory and in so doing it creates an "eternal" dialogue between the 
great historical individuals who are, so to speak, immediately contemporaneous ("sie 
leben gemeinsam und gleichzeitig") with each other: 
Wir wollen uns ja aller Constructionen der Menschheitsgeschichle 
enthalten und überhaupt nicht die Massen betrachten, sondern die 
überall hin zerstreuten Einzelnen: diese bilden eine Brücke über 
den wüsten Strom. Diese setzen nicht etwa einen Prozess fort; 
sondern sie leben gemeinsam und gleichzeitig, Dank der 
Geschichte, die ein solches Zusammenwirken zulasst. Es ist die 
"Genialen-Republik". Die Aufgabe der Geschichte ist, zwischen 
ihnen zu vermitteln und so immer wieder zur Erzeugung des 
Grossen und Schonen Anlass zu geben und Kraft zu verleihen. Das 
Ziel der Menschheit kann nicht am Ende liegen, sondern in den 
hochsten Exemplaren, die, zerstreut durch .Jahrtausende, zusammen 
aile hochsten Krafte, die in der Menschheit verborgen sind, 
reprasentiren. Überdies: Weltprozess!! Es handelt sich doch nur 
um die Lumperei der menschlichen Erdflohe!'17 
This view ofNietzsche's seems to still be conditioned by one possible form of 
historicism which claims that we can replace ourselves in the Zeitgeist or an author in 
order to understand him perfectly l'rom his perspective. 
Nietzsche criticizes the Hegelian world-process and contrasts it with his 
understanding of historical Becoming: 
·16 KSA /3, 14 [1881. 
·17 KSA 7, 29 152]. 
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Der Hegelsche "Weltprozess" verlief sich in einen felten 
preussischen Staat mit guter Polizei. Das ist alles verkappte 
Theologie, auch bei Hartmann noch. Wir vermogen aber Anfang 
und Ende nicht zu denken: so lassen wir doch diese "Entwicklung" 
auf sich beruhen! Es ist sofort Hicherlich! Der Mensch und der 
"Weltprozess"! Der Erdfloh und der Weltgeist!48 
Here, Nietzsche understands Hegel's philosophy of history through the prism of 
Hartmann's interpretation. Il must be said that the idea that the world-development and 
world-process ended with the corn ing-to-be of the Prussian state is a highly caricatural 
and reductive understanding of Hegelian philosophy. Il is similar to the ironic critiques 
that have been attempted or Hegel 's philosophy of absolute knowledge by Bruno Bauer 
and Karl Marx. The fixation and rest ortheory in absolute knowledge has been criticized 
by some as an inadequacy of l-legelian thought to a reality that keeps evolving and 
changing. But some more sympathetic interpreters of Hegel 's philosophy have attempted 
to claim that absolute knowledge could be removed as a pure end-point or finality while . 
preserving the ability or I-legelian thought to describe reality. 
Nietzsche polemicizes with Hegels's view of history. Nietzsche claims that the 
stories of a world-process are swindles (Schwindel): 
... wir fordern Erzahlungen nur mit Zwecken: aber wir fordern gar 
keine Erzahlungen yom Weltprozess, weil wir es für Schwindel 
halten, davon zu redcn. Dass mein Leben keinen Zweck hat, ist 
schon aus der Zulàlligkeit seines Entstehens klar; dass ich einen 
Zweck mir setzen kann, ist etwas anderes. Aber ein Staat hat 
keinen Zweck: sondern nur wir geben ihm diesen oder jenen." 49 
Nietzsche polemicizes with Hegel on the f'act that there is a necessary goal for 
history. Hegel, more than Hartmann, believed that absolute Spirit incarnated itself in the 
will of a nation-state. The world-historical individuals also play an important role in 
l-Iegel's philosophy, but ultimately their personalities are destroyed in the world-historical 
4S KSA 7,29 [53]. 
49 KSA 7, 29 [72]. 
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actualization ofreason and freedom in the State. For Nietzsche, the State is something 
contingent, to be used by the great individual to manipulate the masses: it cannot be a goal 
of history but only a means lor the great individual. For Nietzsche contingency is 
transformed into necessity through the affirmation of thefalum and through the affirmation 
of the thought of eternal recurrence. 
This idea that the State is only a means for the genius and that one cannot speak of 
the goal of the State or of the history of States is often repeated by Nietzsche. Nietzsche 
claims that the history of States is the history of the egoism of the masses. He 
polemicizes persistently with Hegel's view of history and the goal of history as related to 
the actualization of freedom in the State or of the goal of the nation-States to affirm the 
march offreedom in history. It is important to note however, that Nietzsche is nol a 
political anarchisl as his virulent polemics with the Hegelian concept of the State might 
prove. Nietzsche does believe in aState that could actualize will to power instead of 
freedom. I-Ie is a gradualist insofar as he believes that social change should be achieved 
through reforms of institutions and not through the over-throwing of the state through 
civil disobedience or violent political revolution. 
Nietzsche repeats the assertion that the historical sense is a theology in disguise 
(verkappte Theologie). This is a direct attack on I-Iegel's interpretation or historicity and 
the rational nature of historicity: "Der historische Sinn ist nur eine verkappte Theologie 
"wir sollen es noch einmal herrlich weit bringen! ,,50 In the following passage, Nietzsche 
again takes position against Hegel's understanding ofhistory and rational historicism: 
50 KSA 7,29 [89]. 
Alle Geschichte ist bis jetzt yom Standpuncte des Erfolges und 
zwar mit der Annahme einer Vernunft im Erfolge geschrieben. 
Auch die griechische Geschichte: wir besitzen noch keine. 1 ... ] 
Deutschland ist die Brutstatte für den historischen Optimismus 
geworden: daran mag Hegel mit Schuld sein. Aber durch nichts 
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hat die deutsche Cultur verhangnissvoller gewirkt. Alles durch den 
Erfolg Unterdrückte baumt sich allmahlich auf; die Geschichte ais 
der Hohn der Sieger; servile Gesinnung und Devotion vor dem 
Faktum "Sinn für den Staat" nennt man's jetzt: ais ob der noch 
hatte gepflanzt werden müssen! Wer nicht begreift, wie brutal und 
sinnlos die Geschichte ist, der wird auch den Antrieb gar nicht 
verstehn die Geschichte sinnvoll zu machen. [ ... ]51 
This passage shows Nietzsche to be in a certain sense a precursor of'Benjamin 
and his Theses on His/ory. History for Nietzsche could be conceived as something other 
than the Hahn der Sieger or as the rationality of success and those who have succeeded. 
As Nietzsche notes everything that is represscd by history eventually rebels (aufbaümen). 
This seems paradoxical given Nietzsche's ravour orthe master morality over and above 
the slave morality, but it shows even at this early stage in Nietzsche's philosophical 
career that he was concerned with alternate views of history, with understanding history 
as a series of partial, mutually exclusive and even contradictory histories. This 
understanding was in great part developed against Hegel's understanding ofhistory as a 
grand narrative that completes itselfin absolute knowledge and that can be explained as a 
series of successive overcomings and em bodiments of a rational Spirit. 
51 KSA 8, 5 [58]. 
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Conclusion 
At the early stage of his philosophy, up to and before Dawn especially in the Birlh 
of1'ragedy, Schopenhauer as Educalor and in the Nachlass of that period, Nietzsche has 
not broken l'rom the Schopenhaurian mOLdd. There is an ambiguity with respect to how 
Nietzsche treats the concepts ofBecoming and teleology in this early stage ofhis 
philosophy. On the one hand and from a metaphysical point ofview, we can say that the 
telos of Becoming is maintained. Nietzsche preserves the Schopenhauerian teleology of 
the will, which is to increase sufTering in the world totality. Art is conceived as having a 
metaphysical aim or te/os, which consists in consoling hllmans l'rom the tragic and 
horrible aspects of existence. On the other hand, from a political and cultural point of 
view, the telos is removed from Becoming. This is the case because the State has no 
purpose, no aim but it can t'reely be maniplliated by the genius. There is a po1emic here 
with both Hartmann and Hegel who see the Weltprozess as aiming at something, as 
fult'illing the past in the present. Nietzsche is thoroughly opposed to such a conception. 
With the reflections of the so-called "positivist" period, which is the next period of 
Nietzsche's thought that l will deal with, Nietzsche begins to find the language of the will 
and of a silencing of suffering through the contemplation of morality problematic 
(Schopenhauer still functions with an altruistic, un-egoistic concept ofmorality that will 
be very much contested by Nietzsche). 
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1.2 Philological and Chronological Analysis of References to Becoming in 
the Writings ofNietzsche's Middle Period (1878-1882) 
The concept of Becoming almost entirely vanishes from Nietzsche's middle 
writings. There are however sorne references to it in this period. An important question 
l'or Nietzsche scholarship is why the concept of 8ecoming vanishes Irom the writings of 
the middle pcriod. Another important question is one that 1 have already alluded to and is 
the following: does Nietzsche's concept of Becoming change across what have come to 
be acknow\edged (at least from a heuristic point ofview) as the various periods of his 
thought? More concretely, 1 will be interested in ascertaining in this section whether 
Nietzsche undertakes his criticism of the concept of Becoming and whether he claims that 
te\eology (enlelecheia) must be removed Irom Becoming. 
Nietzsche writes: 
Wie hoch die Menschheit sich entwickelt haben mage und 
vielleicht wird sie am Ende gar tiefer, ais am Anfang stehen! es 
giebt für sie keinen Übergang in eine hahere Ordnung, so wenig 
die Ameise und der Ohrwurm am Ende ihrer "Erdenbahn" zur 
CJottverwandtschaft und Ewigkeit emporsteigen. Das Werdcn 
sch\eppt das Gewesensein hinter sich her: warum sollte es von 
diesem ewigen Schauspiele eine Ausnahme für irgend ein 
Sternchen und wiederum für ein Gattungchen auf ihm geben! Fort 
mit solchen Sentimentalitaten!52 
Nietzsche alludes to something that r will comment on more extensively in 
section 2.3: the fact that the development of humanity is not teleological. This is the case 
because "das Werden schleppt das Gewesensein hinter sich her [ .. .]". From the 
teleological aspect ol'Becoming, i.e. l'rom the l'act that it ultimately iixes itsellïnto a 
stable end-state or end-point (Aristotle's energeia, actuality), Nietzsche claims that the 
5: M. 49 (KSA 3, 54). 
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mctaphysical tradition has dcrived a transcendent and stable beyond. This beyond 
constitutes the true world of Being and is constantly contrasted by the tradition to the 
world of appearances and of Becoming. Nietzsche's understanding of teleology and his 
criticism of it is related to his reception of the neo-Hegelians Dühring and Hartmann 
(Philosaphy afthe Uncanscious). 
The following passage is important since it claims that the fact that something 
remains stable (/3!eibendes) in 8ecoming is a kind of illusion caused by our 
consciousness: 
Unser BewuBtsein hinkt nach und beobachtet wenig auf einmal 
und wahrend dem pausirt es für Anderes. Diese 
Unvollkommenheit ist wohl die Quelle, daB wir Dinge glauben und 
im Werden etwas Bleibendes annehmen: ebenso daB wir an ein !ch 
glaubcn. Liefe das Wissen so schnell wie die Entwicklung und so 
statig, so würde an kein "lch" gedacht. 5J 
This association of consciousness with the concept ofBecoming, is characteristic for 
Nietzsche since we believe in Being and a Bleibendes according to him. This is the case 
because we believe in consciousness. We project, according to Nietzsche, the concept of 
subject onto the outside and create the conccpts 01' substance and J3eing. But this creation 
of stability and Being in turn then allows us to believe in a stable principle l'rom which 
wc can observe the se concepts and this is the "1". 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter has noticed that there could be some problems with 
Nietzsche's affirmation of a philosophy of pure Becoming. He writes the following: 
53 KSA 9, 6 [340]. 
Den ungeheuren Schwierigkeiten der Aufgabe, die Nietzsche in 
seiner Philosophie des Werdens auf sich niml11t, steht vielerlei 
entgegen. So wehrt sich das Sebstbewusstsein des Menschen trotz 
der am Anfang dieses Abschnitts genannten Unmoglichkeit einer 
fest-stellenden Selbstbeobachtung gegen die Radikalitat einer 
Autlosung allen Seins in das Werden. lm Selbstbewusstsein liegt 
immer auch, dass es Beharrendes 'gibt', das viel G1eichheit und 
Âhnlichkeit 'da ist'. Ohne solches 'Gegebensein' waren nicht 
einmal Unterscheidungen moglich. 54 
This may weil be. But the Nietzsche of the "positivist period" in fact criticizes 
the point ofview of self-consciousness (Selbslbewusslsein) in order to achieve the more 
['undamental point of view or will to power. Will to power and its constructs of 
domination (Herrschaflsgebilde) precede the epiphenomenal point of view of self-
consciousness. There are differentiations that can be made (Unterscheidungen) and a 
sense of the given (Gegebensein) can be achieved but this cannot be done by regressing 
behind the point ofview ofwill to power. Will to power, however, is essentially 
connected to the concept of Becoming. The (ormations of power that are achieved and 
stabilized are only temporary configurations of Becoming. Thus it seems Müller-
Lauter's argument against a Nietzschean philosophy of pure Becoming does not take 
enough into account the connection between will to power and Becoming. 
Nietzsche mentions an image of Becoming (Bild des Werdens): 
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Wir haben da ein viel l'aches Nacheinander aufgedeckt, wo der 
naive Mensch und Forscher alterer Culturen nur Zweierlei sah, 
"Ursache" und "Wirkung", wie die Rede lautete; wir haben das 
Bild des Werdens vervollkommnet, aber sind über das Bild, hinter 
das Bild nicht hinaus gekommen. Die Reihe der "Ursachen" steht 
viel vollstandiger in jedem Falle vor uns, wir schliessen: diess und 
das muss erst vorangehen, damit jenes folge, aber begriffen haben 
wir damit Nichts. 55 
The fact that ideas are associated to the truth and Being and that Becoming is associated 
with opinion and image goes back to Plato's Timaeus and Republic. However for 
Nietzsche what we modems have achieved is just this perfection (vervollkol11l11net) of the 
image ofBecoming but we are still caught in an image and have not managed to go 
5·1 Müller-Lauter, W., Oher Werden und Wi/le zur Machl, De Gruyter, Berl in, New York, 1999, p. 198, from 
now on this book will be referred to as Obel' Werden und Wi/le zur Machl. 
55 FW, 112 (KSA 3,472). 
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beyond the image. Thus it seems here, at least, that Nietzsche maintains that in order to 
go beyond the "mere" image of Becoming we would have to be able to understand it 
conceptually. Nietzsche writes: 
[ ... ] Emancipiren wir uns von der Moral der 
Gattungs-ZweckmaBigkeit! -Offenbar ist das Ziel, den Menschen 
ebenso gleichmaBig und l'est zu machen, wie es schon in BetrelT 
der meislen Thiergallungen geschehen ist: sie sind den 
Verhaltnissen der Erde usw. angepafil und vcrandern sich nicht 
wesentlich. Der Mensch verandert sich noch ist im Werden 56 
Nietzsche criticizes the notion of a natural purpose of the species (Gallungs-
ZweckmajJigkeil). For him the only aim ofthis type oftheory is to stabilize man (j'est zu 
machen), man, who Nietzsche considers to be the "noch nicht festgestellte Tier", the 
unfinished animal. For Nietzsche the l'act that man becomes excludes any type of stability 
within his essence. Thus we see that Nietzsche opposes a natural purpose of Becoming 
even in his middle phase. We have mentioned that Becoming is often reduced to 
evolution by sorne translators of Nietzsche such as Hollingdale. 
Nietzsche attracts attention to the relationship between Becoming, life and death: 
Wir konnen uns das Werden nicht anders den ken ais den Übergang 
aus einem beharrenden "todten" Zustand in einen anderen 
beharrenden "todten" Zustand. Ach, wir nennen das "Todte" das 
Bewegungslose! Ais ob es etwas Bewegungsloses gabe! Das 
Lebende ist kein Gegensatz des Todten, sondern in Spezialfal1. 57 
This passage is interesting because it characterizes Becoming as a transition From a dead 
state to another dead state. The idea that Becoming can only be understood as a transition 
(Übergang) from an enduring "dead" state (beharrenden "IndIen" Zusland) to another 
enduring dead state is developed here. This idea is important since in the later period of 
Nietzsche's thought, Becoming will be instrumentalized to prove that there is no end or 
final-state and that eternal recurrence follows necessarily From this. This end or final-state 
56 INictzschc's cmphasis, P.c.], KSA 9, Il [441. 
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could be thought of as a "calorific" death of the the uni verse and there is evidence as 
Müller-Lauter shows that Nietzsche was familiar with thermodynamic principles and that 
he was thinking of the problem of the final-state ofBecoming in this way. 
Nietzsche connects the concept of Becoming to the concept of Kreislm!f In this 
citation, Nietzsche cmphasizcs that the Kreis/auj'does not have an aim (Ziel) and also that 
it is nothing that has become (nichts Gewordenes). The idea that ail Becoming operates 
within the Kreislaufïs crucial: 
I-Iüten wir uns, diesem Kreislaufe irgend ein Streben, ein Ziel 
beizulegen: oder es nach unseren Bedürfnissen abzuschatzen ais 
langweilig, dllmm usw ... I-IOten wir uns, das Gesetz dieses 
Kreises ais geworden Zli denken, nach der ralschen Analogie der 
Kreisbewegung innerhalb des Ringes ... Der Kreislauf ist nichts 
Gewordenes, cr ist das Urgesetz, so wie die Kraftmenge 
Urgesetz ist, oh ne Ausnahme und übertretung. Alles Werden ist 
innerhalb des Kreislaufs und der Kraftmenge; also nicht durch 
falsche Analogie die werdenden und vergehenden Kreislaufe z.B. 
der Gestirne oder Ebbe U11d Fluth Tag und Nacht Jahreszeiten zur 
Charakteristik des ewigen Kreislaufs zu verwenden. 58 
ln the elaboration orthe thought of eternal recurrence, Nietzsche writes that what 
recurs infinitely is the Kreis/auf59 The Cact that the Kreis/aufis nicht geworden is 
criticized by sorne commentators su ch as Lukacs60 to claim that Nietzsche's philosophy is 
ultimately a form ofPlatonism since its fundamental structures do not become but are 
eternal. It is probable, however, that Lukacs' reading on this precise point is too punctual 
and does not take into account enough ail ofNietzsche's writings on the nature of the 
Kreislaufand its relation to Becoming. This passage is interesting because it makes use 
of the concept of Kreislaulthat was so prevalent in Schelling's and I-Iegel's nature 
57 KSA 9, Il [150]. 
58 KSA 9, Il [157]. 
59 See KSA /3, 14 [188]. 
60 See Lukacs, Zers/ürul1g der Verl1lll~ft, p,333, Neuwied, Berlin, Luchtcrhand, 1962-1986. 
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philosophies. 61 But these are not the only references that have to be kept in mind when 
considering the concept of Kreislauj'and its influence on Nietzsche's understanding of 
l3ecoming. Nietzsche was 1~lmiliar with Molleschott's materialistic account orthe 
organic world in the 1 850-published book Kreislm(j'des Lebens·62 and this had an 
influence on his understanding of the Kreislauf 
The Kreislaufis the process whereby the inorganic becomes conscious and self-
conscious in Schelling's nature philosophy. ft is also the way in which nature becomes 
aware of itsel rand develops a history according to the great teachings of German 
Idealism. ft is interesting that for Nietzsche, the Kreislaufis "nichts Gewordcnes". This 
means that Nietzsche wishes to differentiate between the Kreislau(and Becoming, which 
seems at least intuitively strange. This is the case because the Kreislaufis what becomes 
what changes, yet stays the same. ln any case, Nietzsche mentions that the Kreislaufïs 
eternal and that it has no purpose. This characterization is rcminiscent of the early 
Nietzsche's understanding ofBecoming in which Nietzsche claimed that Becoming was 
absolute and eternal. 
Nietzsche draws attention to the fact that an infinite Becoming is a contradiction: 
Das unendlich neue Werden ist ein Widerspruch, es würde eine 
unendlich wachsende Kraft voraussetzen. Aber wovon sollte sie 
wachsen! Woher sich ernahren, mit ÜberschuB ernahren! Die 
Annahme, das Ail sei ein Organism, widerstreitet dem Wesen des 
Organischen.63 
61 One among many referenccs to the Kreislalljïn Schelling's work can be found in Ersler Ent1VlII./eines 
Systems der Naturphilosophie (/799). III, p.53 quoted l'rom Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Samtliche 
Schrijien, 14 8de. hrsg. v. K. F. Â. Schelling, StullgartlAugsburg 1856 fI'. (zitiertl - XIV), for Hegel, the 
main and Illost famous reference to the Kreisla/!/is the one given in Chapter 4 of the Phenol71enology 01 
Spirit. 
c,:: This familiarity ofNietzsche's with Kreislauj'des Lebens is proved by the fact that this book was on his 
rcading list in the text notes for his projected doctoral dissertation called Die Teleologie seil Kanl. 
63 KSA 9, II [213]. 
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Here, Nietzsche refers to an important argument which he uses in connection with the 
eternal recurrence of the same and which 1 will examine more closely in section 2.3. This 
argument claims that forces cannot be infinite or grow infinitely. Similarly, Nietzsche 
argues l'rom the fact that the quantity of matter and states in the uniyerse is finite and that 
time is infinite to giye a cosmological justification of the eternal recurrence of the same. 
The structure orthe whole passage is also important because it shows how Nietzsche 
argues for eternal recurrence: since an infinitely new Becoming is a contradiction 
(Widerspruch), this will entail that ail Becoming has to reyert back on itself and recur 
indefinitely. 
The next citation conceptualizes Becoming in tenns of the related notions of 
succession (Nacheinander) and co-existence (Nebeneinander): 
lm absoluten Werden kann die Kra11. nie ruhen, nie Unkra1t sein: 
"Iangsame und schnelle l3ewegung derselben" mif:\t sich nicht an 
einer Einheit, welche da fehlt [ ... ] Ohne Nacheinander und ohne 
Nebeneinander giebt es f'ür uns kein Werden, keine Vielheit wir 
konnten nur behaupten, jenes continuum sei eins, ruhig, 
unwandelbar, kein Werden, ohne Zeit und Raum. Aber das ist 
eben nur der menschliche Gegensatz.1i4 
Nietzsche also mentions here the possibility oran absolute Becoming (absolu/en 
Werden). Nietzsche claims that Becoming cannot be constituted by a moyement of 
points or by Ruhes/recken. Rather the moyement of Becoming has to be compared to that 
of a wheel. There are in a wheel two different moyements: that of the outer periphery and 
that of the inner periphery. The inner periphery moyes l'aster than the outer periphery, but 
both are always in moyement as long as the wheel moyes. The notion of absolute 
Becoming which is present in the early period of Nietzsche's thought especially in the 
"Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks", is used to explain lhat forces are always at 
play in Becoming and that there cannot be a non-force (Unkrafi). Becoming thus seems 
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even more complicated than first explained by the wheel analogy since Nietzsche claims 
that there is no unit y in Becoming that would allow us to measure the faster and slower 
movement (of the wheel that is in Becoming). Nietzsche aftirms that in order for there to 
be Becoming there has to be succession (Nacheinander) and coexistence 
(Neheneinander). Finally Nietzsche claims that there could not be any Becoming without 
spacc and time. But this is, according to him, only a human antithesis (Gegensa/z). 
Nietzsche writes about the connection between the concepts of identity, Becoming 
and error: 
Denn Übel und Schmerz sind nur Foigen des Vorstellens, und da/3 
das Vorstellen eine ewige und allgemeine Eigenschaft alles Seins 
ist, ob es überhaupt dauernde Eigenschaften geben kann, ob nicht 
das Werden alles G\ciche und B\cibende ausschlieBt, auBer in der 
Form des Irrthums und Scheins, wahrend das Vorstellen selber ein 
Vorgang ohne Gleiches und Dauerndes ist? Ist der Irrthum 
entstanden ais Eigenschaft des Seins? Irren ist dann ein 
fortwahrendes Werden und Wechseln? 65 
Nietzsche connects his thesis about Becom ing to what is identical and what stays the 
same (Gleiche and Bleihende). He does not make an assertion about identity and 
Becoming but rather asks a question: whether Becoming does not exclude al1 that is 
identical and stays the same? This problem of the logical identity will be dealt with at 
greater length in section 2.1. The previous passage has a similar structure to another66 in 
which Nietzsche claims that knowledge and Becoming mutually exc\ude each other 
(schliessen sich aus). But here the connection between Becoming and identity remains 
open l'or decision because of the structure used which is that of the question. Another 
reason why this text is important, is bec au se Nietzsche connects Becoming to the concept 
of error. Nietzsche believes that our knowledge is fundamentally fallibile and dependent 
6~ KSA 9. 1 1 r281]. 
(,5 KSA 9. 11 [3211. 
(,6 KSA 12,9 r89]. 
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on the nature ofour organs of perception. This is what will1ead me to affirm that 
Nietzsche seems possesses a naturalistic epistemology although his epistemology cannot 
be qualified as purely naturalistic. 67 The idea of the error as morc fundamental th,ln truth 
in the theory or knowledge is thus very important. 
Conclusion 
As 1 mentioned in the introduction to this section, the concept of Becoming is 
present although it appears a lot Jess frequently in the second period ofNietzsche's 
writings. The traces of the concept ofBecoming that are still identifiable are associated 
with a natural Becoming that is not unlike Darwin's evolution. This is not surprising in 
itselr since, as many scholars have argued,6R the second phase ofNietzsche's thought is 
associated with more positivistic and naturalistic considerations. However, Nietzsche is 
not a straight-out Darwinist. The resem blances to Darwin are somewhat superficial. 
Lukacs has argued in his Destruction oj"Reason,69 that Nietzsche's philosophy could be 
construed as an inverted form of Darwinism, a form of survival or the "weakest". 1 think 
67 See section 1.4 Nietzsche 's EQistelllology. 
68 There are too many names to quote here in connection to this hypothesis: Müller-Lauter, Danto, Leiter 
and Richardson are only a few names that may be associated with this position. There is a virtual 
consensus in the contemporary N ietzsche-I iterature that Nietzsche's thought can be d ivided into three 
phases, with the middle one being Al(jk/arerisch and positivistic. 
6'J Lukacs, op.cil., pp.324-326. 
that Lukacs underestimates, perhaps, Nietzsche's polemic with Herbert Spencer who is 
the prime representative of Social Darwinism. But for my purposes the debate as to 
whether Nietzsche is a Social Darwinist (or an inverted one) is not so important. 
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As far as the concept of Becoming is concerned, Nietzsche does begin to remove 
the idea of purpose in nature 11'0111 his account of Becoming. This is seen in his rejection 
of the two-world metaphysical scheme that he still accepted in the first phase of his 
thought and which was inherited From Schopenhauer. In the second phase of his thought, 
Nietzsche is definitely opposed to such a two-world or back-world theory (Hinterwelt). 
I-Iowever, what we still need to clarify is whether Nietzsche does not merely rem ove 
teleology from Becoming qua physical and natural process at this point in his analysis. 
This thesis has to be moderated by the l'act that there is a reference to Hegel in this part or 
Nietzsche's writings. Thus, Becoming is also conceived in terms or history even in this 
second phase ofhis writings which is allegedly more positivistic and natllralistic. It is 
im portant to notice that the notion of the dead-state (lodten Zustand which will become 
the End-Zustand) of Becoming which will play such a predominant part in the third phase 
or Nietzsche' s thOllght in the proofs or eternal recurrence already makes its appearance 
here in KSA 9, 11 [150]. 
ln this case we have to examine the possibility of a form of continuity between the 
first, Romantic phase ofNietzsche's thought and the third more mature phase of this 
thought. 
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1.3 Philological and Chronological Analysis of References to Becoming in 
the Writings ofNietzsche's Late Period (1883-1888) 
In this section, 1 will be interested in analyzing Nietzsche's magnum opus Thus 
Spoke Zaralhuslra, the writings and the Nachlass that surround it in terms of the 
fundamental category ofBecoming. 1 will also examine the totality of the published 
writings of the late period ol'Nietzsche's thought and the Nachlass that is associated with 
it. In speaking of a late period ol'Nietzsche's thought, 1 follow the division that is 
traditionally accepted in Nietzsche scholarship,70 although as 1 claimed before, 1 believe 
that these divisions should be taken heuristically and not absolutely.71 
a) Becoming in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
The starting point for the analysis of Zara/hus/ra is the thought of eternal 
recurrence. 1 believe this thought to be the center around which ail of ZaJ'(/lhus/ra 
gravitates. The aim of the thought of recurrence is to redeem humans from revenge. To 
heal hum ans from the rift oftime and its "It was" lies at the heart oCNietzsche's great 
thinking and intellectual adventure. But to redeem hum ans from "metaphysical" revenge 
(Heidegger) and their inability to will backwards is to set humansfi·ee. Elernal 
recurrcnce sets humans l'l'ce insofar as it transfigures rcality. This reality is no/ but 
becomes. This brings us to Becoming. It is my thesis that Nietzsche articulates a 
"metaphysics" ofBecoming. Nietzsche completes the Western projcct known as 
mctaphysics (Heidegger) but he undoes this project at the same time as he completes it. 
70 See Nietzsche entry for Allas de la phil()s()phie, pp. J 77- J 79, Peter Kunzmann, I~ranz-Peter I3urkard and 
Franz Wiedman, Librairie Générale Française, Paris, 1993. 
71 See pp.44 and J 46 a f th is dissertation where 1 also make this c laim. 
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In order to step beyond Plato and the Western metaphysical tradition, Nietzsche must 
give up Seing in favor of Secoming. Seing is over-charged with two thousand rive 
hundred years of moral and metaphysical sediment. Thus Nietzsche recurs to Becoming 
in order to free up thought l'rom its fetters. 
Thus spoke Zarathustra is Nietzsche's magnum opus. lt is Gianni Vattimo's 
thesis 72 that Nietzsche does not come into his own until Zarathustra. For Vattimo, 
l-hl/l1 an, All-too-Human and even the Genea/ogy oj'Mora/s are still intent on recounting a 
history of the West that does not l'ully overcome I-legelian phenomenologico-dialectical 
clements. With Zarathustra, Nietzsche achieves a breakthrough as his correspondence 
bears witness: "Inzwischen, im Grunde, in ganz wenig Tage, habe ich mein bestes Buch 
geschrieben ... ,,73 
It will be thc aim or this section tn determine what Nietzschc's breakthrough 
consists in. Wc will analyze this breakthrough by considering how it sheds light on the 
fundamental category of Becoming. Nietzsche writes: 
Aber so will's mein schaffender Wille, mein Schicksal. Oder, dass 
ich's euch redlicher sage: solches Schicksal gerade will mein 
Wille. Alles Fühlcnde leidet an mir und ist in Gefangnissen: aber 
mein Wollen kommt mir stets aIs mein Befreier und Freudebringer. 
Wollen befreit: das ist die wahre Lehre von Willc und Freiheit - so 
lehrt sie euch Zarathustra. 74 
Heidegger believes that the eternal return or the same is the culmination or a metaphysics 
of the will that eternally wills its own will. This last thesis al\ows Heidegger to reduce 
Nietzsche's position to that of Schelling in the Phi/osophica/ Investigation Concerning 
the Nature ofHuman Freedom and its Object. Nietzsche places in the mouth ofhis 
7è Vattimo, G., Il sogel/o e la mClschera, pp.78-79, 130mpian i, Mi lano, 1974. This who le thcme is dcvcloped 
in thc cssay MClafisica et smaschcramcnto. 
n "In between, actually in a very few days, 1 have written my best book, ... " N ictzsche to Franz Overbeck, 
1. Februar 1883, Sam/liche Briefe, Kri/ische S/udien Ausgabe, Band 6, de Gruyler, Berlin, New York 1986, 
BricrJ 72, p.324. 
74 Za Il, Auf dcn gli.ickseligen Inseln, (KSA 4, p.III). 
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purest and greatest advocate the following statement: "Denn dass der Mens'ch er/ost 
werde von der Rache: das ist mir die Brücke zur hochsten Hoffnung und ein Regenbogen 
nach lange Unwettern,,,75 We can take Zarathustra to be the Fürsprecher ofNietzsche76 
and we ean claim that for Nietzsche the ultimate, "metaphysical" goal is to free humans 
l'rom revenge, But this freeing of hum ans l'rom revenge is achieved Ihrough the teaching 
orthe doctrine oreternal recurrence and orthe overman, l3y willing the eternal 
recurrence orthe same, hum ans free themselves from the arrow ortime and manage, in a 
way, to reverse the flow oftime, 
writes: 
A bit further in the second part of Zarathustra (Von der ErlOsung), Nietzsche 
Wille -so heisst der Ben'eier und Freudebringer: also lehrte ich 
euch, meine Freunde! Und nun lernt diess hinzu: der Wille selber 
ist noch ein Gefangener. Wollen be/TeiL aber wie heisst das, was 
auch den Befreier noch in Ketten schlagt ? 'Es war': also heisst des 
Willens Zahneknirsche und einsamste Trübsal. Ohnmachtig gegen 
das, was gethan ist - ist er allem Vergangenen ein bosen 
Zuschauer. Nicht zurück kann der Wille wollen; dass er die Zeit 
nicht brechen kann und der leit Begierde, - das ist des Willens 
einsamste Trübsal [",1 Also wurde der Wille, der Befreier, ein 
Wehethater: und an allem, was leiden kann, nimmt er Rache dafür, 
dass el' nicht zurück kann, Diess, ja diess allein ist Rache selber: 
des Willens Widerwille gegen die leit und ihr 'Es war', 
Time flows forward and this constitutes humanity's fundamental slavery, the inability of 
its will to will backwards in time. Revenge is conceived metaphysically in Nietzsche as a 
human's willing to avenge himself against time and its "it was". But the eternal 
recurrence of the same is not the highest manifestation of the will. By willing the eternal 
recurrence orthe same, hum ans exert their will but this will wills simultaneously l3eing 
75 [Nietzsche's cmphasis, P,C.], Za Il, Von den Taranteln , (KSA 4, p, 128), 
76 It is truc that this transition From Zarathustra's point orvicw to Nictzschc's own views is not as 
straightrorward as might scem. It pcrtains to the problem orthe authorship or Zara/hus/ra and orthe 
narrative voices that arc at play in Nictzsche's Opl/S, My thesis can th us bc reduced to the claim that when 
Zarathustra speaks or the redemptiol1 or humans From revenge he is actually speaking/or Nietzsche and 
with N ictzsche 's authorial authority, 
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and Becoming and is shattered as unitary, primordial will. The free Becoming of the will 
is characterized in relation to the coming and going of ail things. Becoming is a coming 
and going oftime that is willed by the will. But what the will wills according to 
Nietzsche is this pure Becoming. 
The return of the moment is what is desired but the will to recurrence cannot 
arrest the will in Being. Will is not primaI Being but infinite Becoming. Ifthis infinite 
Becoming must bring back the moments of a finite existence, it brings them back as both 
Being and Becoming. Nietzsche is a thinker of Being and Bccoming although a priority 
is ascribed by him to Becoming. Will as will to power becomes free to will the eternal 
recurrence of its Becoming. This is the case because in the moment when hum ans will 
recurrence they simultaneously will that Becoming return (as Deleuze says "Revenir, 
l'être de tout ce qui devient.,,77) and that this Becoming be transformed and transfigured 
into something higher: into Being. But the two moments are equally important: there is 
J3eing, stability and permanence as a result of eternal rccurrence but there is also 
Becoming, change and impermanence that is lodged in the core or eternal recurrence. 
As Nietzsche writes, and this makes Heidegger's reference to a primai J3eing that 
eternally wills the eternity of its own will problematical: 
Von Ohngefahr'- das ist der tilteste Adel der Welt, den gab ich 
allen Dingen zurück, ich erlèiste sie von der Knechtschaft unter 
dem Zwecke. Diese Freiheit und J-limmel-I-Ieiterkeit stellte ich 
gleich azurner Glocke über aile Dinge, ais ich lehrte, dass über 
ihnen und durch sie kein 'ewiger Wille' -will. 7R 
Ultimately, the eternal recurrence is about both Being and Becoming but 1 believe that a 
priority should be ascribed to Becoming. The repetition or recurrence of an event or a 
structure pre-supposes a moment of stabiJity or so it seems. It is my suggestion that we 
77 Delcuze, G., Op.cil., p.54. 
78 Za III, Vor Sonncn-J\urg~(KSA .:J, p.209). 
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should try to conceptualize recurrence in terms of dynamism and Becoming rather than 
stability, aetuality and Being. This is what 1 mean when ) claim that a priority should be 
ascribed to the concept of Becoming when trying to understand what eternal recurrence 
means. In l'act this anticipates my discussion on p.173 of the way Aristotle gave priority 
to actuality as opposed to potentiality in his discussion ofBecoming. Tt is my belief that 
Nietzsche inverts Aristotle's categories to a certain extent and thinks recurrence from the 
potential aspect of Becoming. This does not mean that the recurrence is not eternal of 
course: what recurs eternally is the dynamic, and changing nature of Becoming. 
Eterna') recurrence mediates between the concepts of Being and Becoming in 
Nietzsche's thought although, ultimately, for Nietzsche, Becoming is more important 
than Being. ln the eternal recurrence of the same, man encounters his own will both as an 
illusion and as that through which the ultimate freeing can be attained. Nietzsche's 
concept of freedom is related to his notion of "creation". It is perhaps the case that far 
Nietzsche (read along with Sartre) the "death of God" represents the historiaI event that 
l'orces and determines man to be free. 
Nietzsche writes, in the section called Von der Selbst-Überwindung of 
laralhuslra: "Euren Willen und eure Werthe setzet ihr auf den Fluss des Werdens; einen 
alten Willen zur Macht verrath mir, was vom Volke ais gut und base geglaubt wird." 
Thus the will is essentialized and projected onto the river of Becoming as a valuation 
according to Nietzsche. Good and evil, the will and the highest values are traditionally 
associated with the concept of Being. But l'or Nietzsche, the positing of values out of will 
to power amounts to a projection onto Becoming (or the river orBeeoming to use the 
language orlaralhuslra). Nietzsche writes a bit further in laralhuslra (Von der Selbst-
Überwindung ): "Nicht der Fluss ist eure Gefahr und das Ende eures Guten und Basen; 
ihr Weisesten: sondern jener Wille selber, der Wille zur Macht-der unerschapfte 
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zeugende Lebens-Wille." Thus will to power is understood as a lire-will that is 
distinguished l'rom Becoming (the river). This seems to go against Heidegger's thesis 
that will to power is a way for Nietsche to re-think the concept of Becoming. There is 
evidence for this anti-I-Ieideggerian position in Nietzsche's Nachlass: "der Wille zur 
Macht, nicht ein Sein, nicht ein Werden, sondern ein Pathos ist die elementarste 
Thatsache aus der sich erst ein Werden, ein Wirken ergiebt ... ,,79 Heidegger famously 
associated will to power to Becoming and eternal recurrence to Being and then tried to 
unify the se thoughts in order to complete the Western project known as metaphysics. 80 
It is true that will to power is associated with life and Becoming as the following 
quote testifies: "Wo ich Lebendiges fand, da rand ich Willen zur Macht; und noch im 
Willen des Oienenden l'and ich den Willen, Herr zu sein."Sl 1 do not believe, however, 
that it is plausible to reduce will to power, life and Becoming to the same thing. 
Nietzsche develops a metaphysics ofBecoming. Insofar as he uses the concepts oflife 
and will to power to articulate the concept of Becoming and to oppose it to the traditional 
metaphysical concepts of inside, transcendence and ultimate reality, it is practical to use 
lhese concepts to c lari l'y the concept of Becoming. ]-Iowever, we must di tTerentiate 
carefully between life, will to power and Becoming. 
The thesis that ultimately Being is higher than Becoming in Nietzsche's 
philosophy has been defended by both Jaspers and Lukacs it is possible that Jaspers 
innuenced Lukacs since his work appeared first in 1935. This can be clearly seen in the 
following passage l'rom Jaspers' Nietzschebuch: 
79 KSA /3,14 [79] 
Philosophically, Nietzsche's view of becoming must be understood 
as a way of thinking in which ail determinateness is transcended 
RO Ernst Behler, Nietzsche-Derrida. Derrida-Nietzsche. Confronta/ions, p.23, Stanford University Press, 
Stanrord, 19S5. 
RI la Il. Von der Selbst-Oberwindung,jKSA cl, p[1.147-148). 
and in which space itself and ail forms of objective being are 
absorbed by time, while time becomes synonymous with being 
itself so that it alone is left as it were. 82 
This reading operates by ascribing a priority to the eternal recurrence of the same over 
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will to power and by making use of the following statements enunciated by Nietzsche in 
the fragments of the Will 10 Power: "to stamp onto Becoming the character ofBeing that 
is the highest will to power" and "that everything recurs is the closest approximation of a 
world of Becoming to a world of Being: - high point of the meditation"S3 1 discuss this 
quote more in sub-section e) orthis chapter. Some specifications should be given about 
permanence and stability and how J understand these terms. To put it simplistically 
permanence refers to "Iastingness" through time. Similarly stability refers to the relative 
duration in time of a given process. These are not necessarily metaphysical absolutes 
although the way this terminology has been handed down to us from the metaphysical 
tradition does imply a certain connection to a spatial and temporal absolute. 
This quote functions in such a way as to emphasize the permanentization of 
Becoming into Being. Becoming is Ilxed and shaped into the permanence and stability 01' 
Being through the stamping and the application of the will to power. Thus will to power 
and the eternal recurrence must be related to the fundamental concept of the 
permanentization of Becoming. 
T'he experience of eternal recurrcnce is an experience of Being for Jaspers and this 
is why ultimately Being has priority over Becoming according to him. While there is 
sorne plausibility to this claim, 1 believe that it places Nietzsche too much within the 
Western metaphysical tradition that he was combating. IfBeing is superior to Becoming 
8" Jaspers, K.,op. cil., p.350. 
8J Will 10 POIlle,., 617 (KSA 12,7154]). This is the famolls C]lIote that is lIsed hy Heidegger to establish the 
relationship between will to power and eternal reclirrence. Peter Gast added the title of /?ekapilll/aliol1 to 
this passage and Heidegger was lInaware ofthis at the time ofhis interpretation which makes some scholars 
sllch as D'iorio et Krell dOllbt the philological grollnding of Heidegger's interpretation. 
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for Nietzsche, what is to differentiate him l'rom Plato and the rest of the Western 
metaphysical tradition? There are clements in the Nietzschean CO/ïJUS that suggest that 
he believed that knowledge ofBecoming was impossible and that knowledge was only 
possible based on a beliefin Being. 84 
But 1 think that Nietzsche went beyond the Platonic tradition and did not merely 
remain entrenched in Platonism. Insofar as he does this, Nietzsche must give up Being 
because it is overcharged with centuries ofmctaphysical, historical and moral sediments. 
Being has been thought and re-thought in history: it is perhaps the hidden ground of 
Western history. Insofar as he has broken with the ontological tradition, Nietzsche has 
freed thought for the realm of Becoming. But this freeing up of thought still leaves us 
with sorne problems. Once Becoming and impermance get affirmed, how are wc to find 
stability in reality? Nietzsche has been incapable of providing a critique of Becoming 
because he was liberating Becoming and the tradition from Being. But the task arter 
Nietzsche becomes to criticize the concept of Becoming and see what consequences it has 
for ontology and history. 
Heidegger has managed to unify the concepts of wi II to power and eternal 
recurrence in at least two ways. The first focuses on an association between will to 
power and essenlia and eternal recurrence and exislenlia. This is the move that has been 
attacked the most vigorously in the secondary literature. 85 But the more interesting 
84 KSA 12, 9 1891. 
85 This attack has mainly been put l'orlh by Müller-Lauter. Müller-Lauter's critique ol'Heidegger's 
conceptualizalion ol'will 10 power and elcrnal rccurrcnce in tCrlns of'essenlia and exislenlia is subtle. Thus 
he writcs: "Hcidcgger sucht darzulegcn. 'wie in Niel/sehes Metaphysik der Unterschied von essentia und 
existcntia verschwindet, warulll el' verschwinden IllUSS am Ende der Metaphysik. wie glcichwohl gerade so 
die wciteste Entl'ernung VOIll Ânf'ang errcicht ist" (Nietzsche. a.a.O. IÂnm. 13\, II, 476) ... lm 
Zusaillmenghang seiner Illetaphysikgeschichtlichen 13etrachtungen vcrsteht Heidegger den Willcn zur 
Macht ais essenlia, die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleiehen ais exislentia. l ... ] Wenn es sieh Ulll ein 
'Versehwinden' handelt, dann gilt allerdings Heideggers im zitierten Zusalllillenhang vorgebraehter Salz, 
dass sieh ein solehes Versehwinden 'nur zeigen' lasse, 'indelll versueht wird, den Unlersehied siehtbar zu 
machen'." Wolfang Müller-Lauter, Nielzsehes Lehre des Willens zur Maeht, in Über Werden und Wille zur 
Machl, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1999, note 64, pA7. 
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attempt at unification between will to power and eternal recurrence rocuses on what 
Heidegger has termed the "permanentization of Becoming". Will to power and eternal 
recurrence are metaphysically unified because they both refer alternatively to the 
"permanentization ofBecoming". What does il mean that Becoming must be and 
become permanentized? For Heidegger the permanentization of Becoming is thought in 
tcnns or the question of Being. 
ln his work of maturity, Nietzsche articulates his fundamental doctrines of will to 
power, the eternal recurrence orthe same and the Übermensch. Zarathustra is at once the 
teacher ofwill to power, the eternal recurrence of the same and the Übermensch. But the 
teaching of the eternal recurrence is perhaps the most difficult teaching that must be 
taught by Zarathustra and this is effectively dramatized by Nietzsche in his magnum 
opus. 
l see in the teaching of the eternal recurrence a teaching that is not selective as is 
sometimes affirmed by Nietzschc,R6 but a teaching that affirms human frecdom. ln the 
cternal recurrence of the same, the will encounters itselras unit)' and singularity, but at 
the same time as illusion. The fiction and illusion ofrecurrcncc is affirmative of 
freedom. Every single individual encountcrs his destiny in the thought ofrecurrence and 
at the same time feels impelled to create this destiny, this fatum, l'rcely. 
For Nietzsche what is eternal or immutable (Unvergangliche) is only an allegory 
or a parable: "Alles Unvcrgangliche das ist nur ein Gleichniss! Und die Dichtcr lügen 
zuviel. - Aber von Zeit und Werden sollen die besten Gleichnisse rcden: cin Lob sollen 
sie sein und eine Rechtfertigung aller Verganglichkeit!" 87 Nietzsche believes that these 
allegories about the immutable arc duc to the lies of the pocts. But he cIaims that the best 
Sb KSA 10, 24 f7]. WP 1058. 
X7 Za /l, Auf den gliickseligel1 Inscln. (KSA -/, p.1 10). 
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allegories should speak about time and Becoming. These allegories should be according 
to Nietzsche a praise and a justification of everythi ng that passes away. 
The following citation is important because it establishes a relationship between 
the concepts of Becoming and those of purposc and absence of purpose: 
"Dass ich Kampfsein muss und Werden und Zweck und der 
Zwecke Widerspruch: ach, wer meinen Willen erriith, en'iith wohl 
auch, aufwelchen krummen Wegen er gehen muss! "Was ich auch 
schaffe und wie ich's auch liebe, bald muss ich Gegner ihm sein 
und meiner Liebe: so will es mein Wille. 88 
The context of this passage is important. Zarathustra recounts that these arc the words 
that lire spoke to him once. lt is acknowledged in this passage, that life must be purpose, 
Becoming, and absence of purpose ail at the same time. 
Nietzsche connects the concept of Becoming indirectly with dancing gods and the 
supreme dancing god, which is represented by Dionysos: 
Wo alles Werden mich Gotter-Tanz und Gotter-Muthwillen 
dünkte, und die Welt los - und ausgelassen und zu sich selber 
zurückfliehend: - ais ein ewiges Sich-tliehn und -Wiedersuchen 
vicier Güter, ais das selige Sich-Wiedersprechen, Sich-Wieder-
horen, Sich-Wieder-Zugehoren vicier Gotter:[ ... ] X9 
The linguistic structure of this passage is reminiscent of the passage in Will 10 Power 
1067.90 That passage (Will 10 Power 1(67) is chronologically subsequent to the 
publication ofZarathustra (according to Kaufmann's chronology it is dated of the year 
1885). ln that passage it is the world that is a chaos of self-contradiction. 
While 1 believe that Nietzsche in fact develops a metaphysics of Becoming, there 
are passages in Nietzsche's corpus that could make one believe that he ultimately wishes 
to ascribe an ascendancy to Seing over Becoming. This is apparent in the following 
citation: " ... gesetzt Alles ist Werden, so ist Erkenntnis nur moglich auf Grund des 
~R INictzsche's cillphasis, P.c.], Za ff, Von der Sclbst-Oberwindung, (KSA 4, p.148). 
89 Za fff, Von alten und neuen Tafeln, l, (KSA 4, pp.247-248). 
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G1aubens an Sein.,,91 Bere Nietzsche explicitly claims that knowledge is only possible on 
the basis of a belief in Being. Thus this citation also confirms that knowledge is 
connected to Being and that Being might have priority for Nietzsche over Becoming. 
b) Becoming in On a Genealogy qlMorals 
The next passage is very famous and it problematizes the existence of Being as 
opposed to Becoming. As Nietzsche claims there is only the deed, there is no "doer" 
(subject) behind this deed: 
Aber es giebt kein solehes Substrat; es giebt kein "Sein" hinter 
dem Thun, Wirken,Werden ; "der Thater" ist zum Thun bloss 
hinzugedichtet, das Thun ist Alles. Das Volk verdoppelt im 
Grunde das Thun, wenn es den Blitz leuchten lasst, das ist ein 
Thun-Thun: es setzt dasselbe Geschehen einmal ais Ursache und 
dann noch einmal ais deren Wirkung. 92 
Nietzsche makes the claim that there is no Being behind Becoming. Thus this passage 
provides evidence for the reading according to which Being is thoroughly given up in 
favor of Becoming in Nietzsche's thought. Yet, as 1 have argued elsewhere, there are 
also passages that seem to indicate that Nietzsche wants ta preserve the concept of' Being 
in his philosophy. But at the end of the examination of aIl the passages in Nietzsche's 
published works and in the Nachlass, we will have to decide which one of the se readings 
is more substantiated. My position is that Nietzsche returns to I-Ieraclitus and the concept 
or Becoming. ln this way, Nietzsche has already stepped behind the Platonic arfirmation 
ofBeing as Idea. Unlike Heidegger, 1 do not believe that Nietzsche remains entrenched in 
90 KSA Il,38 [12]. 
91 KSA /2,2[91]. 
92 CM, Erste Abhandlung, 13, (KSA 5, p.279). 
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Platonism and only completes the Western concept of Seing. When Nietzsche affirms: 
"Sofern die Sinne das Werden, das Vergehn, den Wechsel zeigen, lügen sie nicht .. . Aber 
dami! wird Herakli! ewig Recht behalten, dass das Sein eine leere Fiktiol1 ist. Die 
"scheinbare" Welt ist die einzige: die "wahre Welt" ist nur hinzugelogen,,93 
He undoes the stamping of Being unto Bccoming as the supreme will to power. The 
supreme will to power affirms the eternal reccurrence or Becoming since Seing is "cine 
leere Fiktion". 
This is the major tlaw in Heidcgger's reading of Nietzsche: he reads him starting 
l'rom Parmenides and Plato instead of starting From Heraclitus. The concept of 
Secoming, as a non-teleological and anti-dialectical notion allows us to think through the 
unit y ofNietzschc's thought. Instead of focusing on concepts such as the eternal 
recurrence and the will to power which appcar only late in the Nietzsche's opus, 
Becoming allows us to understand Nietzsche's ontological preoccupations which werc 
therc in the beginning with "Philosophy in the Tragic Age orthe Greeks" and which are 
also there at the end ofhis philosophical career. orcourse, 1 am not claillling 1hat eternal 
recurrence and will to power have to be dismissed as Nictzsche's fundamental concepts. 
But much is to be gained by focusing on Becoming and seeing how it relates to the other 
Nietzschean fundamental concepts. 
Nietzsche associates the concept of the ascetic ideal with a longing away 
(Ver/angen hinweg) from Becoming: 
Man kann sich schlechterdings nicht verbergen, was eigentlich 
jenes ganze Wollen ausdrückt, das yom asketischen Ideale her 
seine Richtung bekommen hat [ ... ] dieses Verlangen hinweg aus 
allem Schein, Wechsel, Werden, Tod, Wunsch, Verlangen 
selbst das Alles bedeutet, wagen wir es, dies zu begreifen, einen 
Willen zum Nichts, einen Widerwillen gegen das Leben, eine 
C)) 1 italies my cmphasis. undcrlincd is Nictzsehe's cmphasis, P.c.!, CD, ~"--:..==~~=--'-"'-'-'==,,==, 
2 (KSA 6. p.75). 
Auflehnung gegen die grundsatzlichsten Voraussetzungen des 
Lebens, aber es ist und bleibt ein Wille! ... Und, urn es noch zum 
Schluss zu sagen, was ich Anfangs sagte: lieber will noch der 
Mensch das Nichts wollen, ais nicht wollen ... 94 
Thus, Nietzsche asserts that belief in the ascetic ideal constitutes a desire (Verlongen) 
away from Becorning and a willing of nOlhingness. This willing of nothingness is onen 
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associated in Nietzsche's thought with the concept of nihilisrn. Nietzsche claims that the 
opposite ofBeing is not non-Being, as has been claimed almost universally in the 
Western metaphysical tradition, but non-Becoming. 95 
c) Becoming in Twilight afthe Ida/s' 
Nietzsche claims that our senses betray us with respect to the "true" world. Given 
what we know about Nietzsche's position in the History of an Error, we should perhaps 
interpret this passage ironically: 
Diese Sinne, die ouch sonsl S() unn1o/'olisch sind, sie betrügen uns 
über die wahre WeIl. Moral: loskommen von dem Sinnentrug, 
vom Werden, von der Historie, von der Lüge, Historie ist nichts 
ais G1aube an die Sinne, Glaube an die Lüge. Moral: Neinsagen zu 
Allem, was den Sinnen Glauben schenkt, zum ganzen Rest der 
M hh ' . d . AIl ' V Ik" 96 ensc elt. as Ist· es" 0 . 
Here, Nietzsche's "phenomenalism" comes into view. Nietzsche believes that insofar as 
philosophers have distrusted the senses lhey have "l'alsified" knowledge. 97 Insolàr as 
philosophers have held that there is a world of Being that does not become, they have 
defended a false belief. Nietzsche thinks that there is another falsification ofknowledge 
that occurs. 11 is true that the senses show us that there seems to be sorne stability. A 
94 GM, Dritte Abhandlung, 28, (KSA 5, pAI2). 
95 Sec KSA /2, 9 [63]. 
96 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], GD, Die "Vernullrt" in der PhilosoQhie, l, (KSA 6, pp.74-75). 
97 This term is not used here and in the following passages in a way similar to Popper's technical usage or 
the term. 
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river flows but the existence of the river and that the entity river perdures is a fact. Il is 
this faet which Nietzsche takes to be a "falsilication" of our senses. 
According to him, there is only a Heraclitean flux and no stability or permanence. 
While it is true that for Heraclitus the natural and metaphysieal opposites are unified by 
and in the logos, it is also true that "War is the father of ail things". The strife of Being 
and Becoming is radical. Reality is a flux that exists and proeecds withoug determination. 
The claim that Nietzsche is a l-leraclitean is fmther attested by the following passage: 
"Sofern die Sinne das Werden, das Vergehn, den Wechsel zeigen, lügen sie nicht .. .liber 
damit wird Heraklil ewig Recht beha/ten. dass das Sein eine leere Fiktion ist. Die 
"scheinbare" Welt ist die cinzige: die "wahre Welt" ist nur ===:...::::..t:::.=..::..:c This idea that 
Being is an empty fiction sustains my thesis that Nietzsehe's is a philosophy of 
l3ecoming. Also this quote that invokes I-Ieraclitlls 15 years aner the lInpublished text 
"Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks", may lead us to think that there is a deep 
eontinuity between the early phase ofNietzsche's thought and the late phase ofhis 
thought. The problem with the early phase is that Becoming is associated with semblance 
and that Being is the semblance of semblance (Schein des Scheins). fn the early phase of 
his thought Nietzsche still accepts a dualistic, two-world theory that is inherited from 
Schopenhauer. The world is will and representation. Will is Becoming and 13eing is 
representation. As Nietzsche's thought evolves, the world of Being, of truth is criticized 
and given up, and this is donc through a radicalization of the concept of Becoming. ln the 
late philosophy, Nietzsche attains a metaphysical monislll ofBecoming despite 
Heidegger's claim the will to power is the ground of Seing. 
98 [italics my emphasis, underlined is Nietzsche's emphasis, P.C.], GD, Die "Vernunft" in der Philosophie, 
2 (KSA 6, p.75). 
d) The Stamping of Being onto Becoming: Falsification (Fèilschung) and 
Stamping (Prèigung): KSA 12, 7 [54] 
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An important passage that Heidegger makes use of is Will/o Power 617 (KSA 12, 
7 [54]) and that is of the utmost relevance for our inquiry is the following: 
Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins au{zuprdgen - das ist der hochste 
Wille zur Mach/. Zwiefache n.i!schung, von den Sinnen her und yom 
Geiste her, um eine Welt des Seienden zu erhaltcn, des Verharrenden, 
CJleichwertigen lISW. Das Alles wiederkehr/, is/ die ex/rems/e Anndherung 
einer Wei/ des Werdens (lnd die des Seins: Ciplet der Be/rach/ung. 
This quote functions in [-Ieidegger's reading in such a way as to emphasize the 
"permanentization", as it were, ofBecoming into Being, Becoming is fixed, shaped and 
stamped into the permanence and stability ofBeing through the stamping and the 
application ofwill to power. Thus again will to power and the eternal recurrence must be 
related to the fundamental concept of the permanentization ofBecoming. 
1 believe that Heidegger has one-sidedly understood the Fàlschung because he 
assimilates it to a Be-standigung des Werdens. But Becoming is not permanent 
(bes/dndig) for Nietzsche as Heidegger wants to affirm. This permanence that Heidegger 
derives l'rom Becoming, starting From the circularity of eternal Bccoming (the periodicity 
of the circlc pre-supposes according to him some form of sameness and constance) is 
what 1 cali into question. What returns in the eternal recurrence of the same is not the 
permanence or Becoming but Becoming as Becoming. There is no sameness and no 
identity in Becoming, but only change, transformation and transfiguration. 
ln relation to this, Heidegger affirms that the will to power fixes itself goals that it 
always overcomes. But he concludes that the will to power must be t'inite: "Das ziel-Ios 
ewige Machten des Willens zur Macht ist nun aber zugleich in seinen Lagen und 
Gestalten notwendig endlicll ... (XII, 53)"(Quoted by Heidegger, Cesam/ausgabe 6/2, 
p.256 [My emphasis, P.C.]) 
But 1 believe that we can affirm that for Nietzsche Becoming, though not 
permanent, is in-fini te, absolute and eternal. But this infinity of Becoming has 
consequences for the will to power. The will to power is the infinite ironic play of 
interpretations and perspectives of Mach/-centren, Kraji-cen/ren, Wil/ens-
jJunk/a/ionen 99 , Mach/-wi/len, Kraji-quan/en and Mach/-quun/en. lt is in this inJinite 
ironic play of interpretations that consists the Falschung. This interpretative physics 
(which could even be called a physical hermeneutics) is very present in Nietzsche and 
Heidegger neglects it in favor of the unification and identification of the will to power 
with the eternal recurrence of' the same. 
ss 
The point that needs to be made clearly is that l'or Nietzsche, the character of 
Being and the stamping (Pragung) is a falsification, a fictionalization. Becoming is 
contradictory and non-totalizable: it possesses no unity. Becoming is only made of 
multiplicities, and the identities and unities that seem to occur within Becoming are only 
illusory: they are the mirages which are conjured up by the will to power. 
What recurs is the eternal recurrence orthe Becoming orthe will to power. With 
Becoming we can synthesize the will to power and eternal recurrence, but this synthesis 
is only a fragmented, broken, contradictory and inconsistent synthesis. Such is the nature 
or Becoming in Nietzsche's thought that it is always opposed to a pure and unitary Being. 
1 f we can aJlirm that for Nietzsche Being is Becoming, this affirmation, which seems to 
predicate Becoming of Being, immediately moves into its opposite as soon as an instant 
has gone by: Being is, becoming becomes. Being does not become and Becoming isn't. 
These expressions are not merely sophistic or casuistic. They express rather the 
comp\exity of the relationship between Being and Becoming in Nietzsche's thought. This 
complexity is always brought back to contradiction, self-contradiction and perhaps even 
99 See KSA 13, Il [731. 
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incoherence. Insofar as coherence pre-supposes the "sticking together" and articulation of 
a whole, it may be said that Becoming is in-coherent in Nietzsche's philosophy. This is 
again a way in which Nietzsche attempts to detach and stake out his position as opposcd 
to Hegel. For Hegel, the whole and the system must stick together: the y must articulate 
and divide themselves into particular determinations which are further subsumed into 
higher unities and syntheses. But for Nietzsche the Whole and Becoming is fragmented 
and in-coherent, it is both adiaphoristic (in-determined and in-different) and chorismatic 
(separated, dis-united, and dis-integrated). 
Being is Becoming, but Being and Becoming do not stick together unitarily. They 
are only conceivable as a contradiction and a self-contradiction that does not resolve itself 
and does not pass into its opposite. In this sense, this passage which J have already 
evoked in section 1.1, is crucial: 
Dies erreichte Heraklit durch eine Beobachtung über den eigentlichen 
I-Iergang jedes Werdens und Vergehens, welchen er unter der Form der 
Polaritat begriff, aIs das Auseinandertreten einer Kraft in zwei qualitativ 
verschiedne, entgegengesetzte und zur Wiedervereinigung strebende 
Thatigkeiten. Fortwahrend entzweit sich eine Qualitat mit sich selbst und 
h 'd . h' '1 G .. . d . dl' 100 sc el et SIC m 1 1re egensatze wle er zu eman er lm. 
This idea that Becoming has to be understood as a polarity of forces that split themselves 
into two activities (Thdligkeilen) that are qualitatively differentiated is quite important. 
For Nietzsche these activities and qualities split themselves up perpetually, indefinitely 
(jortwdhrend) and infinitely. This is already the force-point world of the later physicalist 
conception that appears in the 1880's as 1 have documented it in section 1.3. Becoming is 
absolute, infinite and eternal in its perpetuai transformations and transfigurations. But 
despite these transformations and transfigurations, no unit y and identity is attained. 
100 "Die Philosophie im /ragischen Zei/al/er der Griechen", KSA J, 824. 
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Becoming is shot-through with multiplicitics (Viethei/en) and will-punctuations (Witten.\'-
punktuationen). Temporary unities are attained, but these unities never last. They are 
always transformed, transfigured, differentiated and split up into never-ending, indeiinite 
and in-finite multiplicities. 
This infinity of Becoming must be related to the Romantic concept of irony. 
Becoming is ironic and does not give itself over sim ply to Being. The fragmentation, self-
contradiction, in-coherence and inconsistency ofBecoming in Nietzsche's thought does 
not prevent us from predicating certain things of Becoming. Somc things can be said of 
Becoming, despite the fa ct that it is a-teleogical and illogical in Nietzsche's formulations. 
Becoming is inlinite, absolute and eternal. These attributes might seem curious 
when predicated of Becoming. We usually associate iinitude with Becoming and ev en 
Being (especially) after Heidegger. But it is my claim that ifwe are to progress beyond 
I-Ieidegger's reading of Nietzsche, we must recover the infinite, absolute and eternal 
concept of Becoming that Nietzsche sought to think. These aspects of the iniinite, eternal 
and absolute Becoming are especially present in the early philosophy.'o, I-Iowever, it is 
my daim that the notion of eternal recurrence of the same has to be conceived starting 
l'rom Becoming and impermanence and not l'rom Being and presence. 
What recurs is the infinite Becoming of the will to power. Through Becoming we 
can make sense of ail four of the rubrics ofNietzsche's thought. Wi Il to power establishes 
conligurations in Becoming. These conligurations translorm and transfigure themselves 
but also recur as configurations of Becoming. The Übermensch is the man that realizes 
that he is shot through with Becoming: he accepts to project himself onto the 
101 Müller-Lauter has a section in Über Werden und Wi//e zur Mach/, called Über den Menschen in einer 
WeI/ des 'absolu/en' Werdens. Nietzsche writes: "Die Natur ist nach innen ebenso uncndlich ais nach 
ausscn: wir gelangenjetzt bis zur Zclle u. zu den Theilen der Zellc: aber giebl cs gar kcine Grenze, wo man 
konnte, hier ist der IClzte Punkt nach innen, das Wcrdcn hort bis ins Unendliche Kleine nie aur. Aber auch 
im Grossten giebt es nichts absolut Unveranderlichcs." Die Vorpla/onischen fJ/lilosophen: KGW 114,2691'. 
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configurations ofBecoming and transforms and transfigures himselfby choosing and 
freely shaping the configurations which he hi111sel f chooses to be. Finally nihilis111, is the 
realization that Becoming aims at nothing, that it has no goal and no le!os. Byaccepting 
and affirming the fact that Bec0111ing aims at nothing, it is possible to overcome and leave 
behind metaphysics which always aimed at something, this something ultimately being 
domination. 
]-Iowever, it is only by accepting the contradictions and self-contradictions of 
l3ecoming that 111etaphysics can be left behind. As long as l3ecoming is shaped into 
Being, there is still a fe/os and this le/os is the shaping. When we come to accept that the 
shaping (Pragung) is a falsification (Falschung), then we must be \cd to the conclusion 
that the shaping has no le/os, no purpose. l3y accepting falsification as the highest plastic 
power of the artist-metaphysician, Nietzsche leaves behind the metaphysics of the will 10 
power and of the will-to-will which is imputed to him by Heidegger. 
Nietzsche derives the concept of substance from the subject through a "psycho-
ontological" development: 
Ehemals nahm man die Veranderung, den Wechsel, das Werden 
überhaupt aIs l3eweis für Scheinbarkeit, aIs Zeichcn dafür, dass 
Etwas da sein müsse, das uns irre l'ühre. Heule umgekehrt sehen 
wir, genau sa weit aIs das Vernunlt-Vorurtheiluns zwingt, Einheit, 
Identitat, Dauer, Substanz, Ursaehe, Dinglichkeil, Sein 
anzusetzen, uns gewissermassen verstrickt in den Irrthum, 
. . 1 h IOJ necessllirf zum rrt um; -
Thus, Nietzsche believes that the concept of Being follows from the concept of 1 
(or ego). This "1" is further reduced to the will and then the concept of the will is itself 
questioned as mere semblance or liction. This is Nielzsche's epistemological pragmatism 
and epi-phenomenalism. Nietzsche claims that it is a prejudice ofreason (Vernunfi-
102 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.C.], GD, Die "Vernunft" in der Philosophie, 5, (KSA 6, p.77). 
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Vorurtheil) that forces us to assert the existence 0[' unit y, identity, duration, substance, 
cause, thing-ness and Being. This in turn pushes into error. This idea oF necessitation into 
error (necessitirf zum /rrthum) is a very important concept ofNietzsche's epistemology. 
Müller-Lauter has commented on it extensively in connection with the concept of 
1" /'b 10] I~ N' 1 h k' d' . k h '.,l/1ver el ung. 'or letzsc le, uman In 111corporates many mlsta es over t e 
generations. Those who cannot incorporate these essential mistakes and errors into their 
memories and bodies die ofC The creator of Zarathustra's goal is to help the humans or 
free spirits to incorporate the teaching of eternal recurrence into their bodies and spirits. 
That is Nietzsche's highest task and responsibility. 
ln the same passage, Nietzsche writes: 
Das sieht überall Thater und Thun: das glaubt an Witten aIs 
Ursache überhaupt; das glaubt an's "Ich", an's Ich aIs Sein, an's Ich 
aIs Substanz und projicirf den Glauben an die Ich-Substanz auf aIle 
Dinge - es scha.ffi erst damit den Begriff "Ding" ... Das Sein 
wird überall aIs Ursache hineingedacht, unfergeschoben; aus der 
Conception "Ich" folgt erst, aIs abgeleitet, der Begriff "Sein"I04. 
This passage shows that Nietzsche be\ieves that the concept of Being is derived l'rom the 
concept of the 'r or the subject. But this concept of 1 is itself a fiction. This implies that 
the concept of Being is also a fiction and that there can be no sfamping of Being onfo 
Becoming that occurs. The stamping is a Fdlschung, a fictionalization of Being onto 
Becoming. A full, coherent notion of Being is rejected in principle by Nietzsche. 
For Nietzsche a very important concept is the concept oFthe innocence oF 
I3ecoming. The Western metaphysical tradition has ontologized and moralized Becoming 
by transposing and transforming it into Being. This transformation had theological 
underpinnings according to Nietzsche since freedom 0 l' the will was invented to better 
10, Müller-Lauter, W., Oher Werden IInd Wille :wr Machl, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1999, pp.298-301. 
10·1 INietzsche's emphasis, P.C.I, GD, Die "VernunA" in der Philosophie, 5, (KSA 6, p.77). 
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enslave and throw into l'Ctters the disciples who followed this (mainly Christian) belief. 
Thraugh the invention offreedom of the will, the concept ofresponsibility was also 
braught into existence. Since we are free, we have responsibility and not the other way 
around: this is the claim of Christian theological doctrine according to Nietzsche. Let us 
hear what Nietzsche has to say in his own words : 
frrthum vom freien Willen. Wir haben heute kein Mitleid mehr mit 
dem Begriff "freier Wille": wir wissen nur zu gut, was er ist - das 
anrüchigste Theologen-Kunststück, das es giebt, zum Zweck, die 
Menschheit in ihrem Sinne "verantwortlich, zu machen, das heisst 
sie von sich ahhangig zu machen ... lch gebe hier nur die 
Psychologie alles Verantwortlichmachens. Überall, wo 
Verantwortlichkeiten gesucht werden, ptlegt es der Instinkt des 
Stralen- und Richten-Wolle/1.\· zu sein, der da sucht. Man hat das 
Werden seiner Unschuld entkleidet, wenn irgend ein So-und-so-
Sein auf Wille, auf Absichten, auf Akte der Verantwortlichkeit 
zurückgeführt wird: die Lehre yom Willen ist wesentlich erfunden 
zum Zweck der Strafe, das heisst des Schuldig-finden-wollens. I05 
This next passage also brings out the concept of the innocence ofBecoming 
which plays such an important ralc in Nietzsche's philosophy. For our own concerns the 
concept of the innocence of l3ecoming is important because, by eliminating teleology 
from Becoming, Nietzsche l'rees it from its transposition into the concept of Being: 
Alles Geschehen, aile Bewegung, alles Werden ais ein Feststellen 
von Cirad- und Krartverhaltnissen, ais ein Kampl[ ... ] Sobald wir 
uns Jemanden imaginiren, der verantwortlich ist dafür, daJ3 wir so 
und so sind usw. (Gott. Natur), ihm also unscre Existenz, unser 
Cilück und Elend ais Absicht zulegen, verderben wir uns die 
Unschuld des Werdens. Wir haben dann Jemanden, der durch uns 
und mit uns etwas erreichen will. DaJ3 die anscheinende 
"Zweckmdjfigkeit" (n die aller menschlichen Kunst unendlich 
überlegene Zwcckm~iBigkcit") bloJ3 die Foige jenes in allem 
Geschehen sich abspie1enden Willens zur Machl ist daJ3 das 
Starkerwerden Ordnungen mit sich bringt, die einem 
Zweckmal3igkeits-Entwurfe ahnlich sehen, daJ3 die anscheinenden 
Z k . 1 b b' h . . d 1- -1 106 wec e mc 1t ea SIC tlgt sm , ... _ 
1115 INietzsehe's emphasis, P.C.I, GD, Die vier grossen IrrthLimcr, 7(KSA 6, r.95). 
10(, INictzsehe's emphasis, P.c.1, KSA /2,9191]. 
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Nietzsche c\aims that as soon as we imagine someone that is responsible for the 
Cact that we are constituted in thc way we are, we spoil Cor ourse Ives the innocence of 
Becoming. Nietzsche goes on to claim that utility or finality (Zweckmafiigkeit) is a 
consequence of the will to power. This is an important c\aim since it amounts to saying 
that the apparent aims or goals (Zwecke) are only a by-product of the will to power. Thus 
there is no aim in the world-Becoming but a constant aggregation and disaggregation of 
power-wills and force centers (Kraficentren). This substantiates my thesis that 
Nietzsche's great achievement is to have removed teleology l'rom within Becoming. This 
discussion is a bit more complex th an might first seem. If Being involves "Iastingness" 
through time and permanence, th en could we not say that Being and Becoming aim at 
temporary formations and configurations or power? 1 am not necessarily opposed to such 
an account. On this reading, teleology is not global but local. There are local foci and 
nodes that aim at power, but the se formations and configurations are always transformed 
and transfigured into new formations and configurations. 
Perhaps it is not enough to c\aim that teleology is only local and not global. 
Traditionally philosophers distinguisth between an internai teleology and an external 
teleology. But it is precisely this dilTerence between the internai and the external that is 
relativized in Nietzsche's epistemology when he rejects inner sense as more privileged 
than ouller sense. Nevertheless what seems to be le ft out of the traditional distinction 
between internai and external teleology is a form of inner and local teleology. But it is 
precisely the internai and external teleology that Nietzsche has relativized and reduced to 
the same through the fact that he does not ascribe priority to the inner sense ovcr the 
outter sense. This perhaps a regression onto Heidegger's position of interpreting the will 
to power as a single metaphysical grounding principle, but it seems consistent with 
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Nietzsche's thought and it is attributable to the tension between the doctrines orthe will 
to power and that of nihilism. 
The next quote is important because it is reminiscent ofNietzsche's early 
Nachlass surrounding the Birlh ofTragedy: 
In der Mysterienlehre [orthe tragic age of the Grecks, P.c.] ist der 
S'chmerz heilig gesprochen: die" Wehen der Gebarerin "heiligen 
den Schmerz überhaupt, alles Werden und Wachsen, alles Zukunft-
Verbürgende bedingl den Schmerz ... Damit es die ewige Lust des 
Schaffens giebt, damit der Wille zum Leben sich ewig selbst 
bejaht, muss es auch ewig die "Quai der Gebarerin" geben [".] 
Dies Alles bedeutet das Wort Dionysos: ich kenne keine hühere 
Symbolik ais diese griechische Symbolik, die der Dionysien. 107 
Nietzsche connects the concept of Becoming to the concept of the suffering and to 
the myth of Dionysos that is so important for him. There is no will to lire without the 
sufTering of birth-giving. Growth and Becoming condition pain and suffering. This 
wording and passage, althollgh late in Nietzsche's Nachlass. is reminiscent of the early 
Romantic Nietzsche's treatment ol'Becoming as the ecstasies and sufferings of the Ur-
einen and of Dionysos. We will thus have to consider in light ofstatements such as these 
and others, whether Nietzsche's concept of Becoming has really evolved and radically 
changed since his early writings. 
e) Becoming in Book V of The Gay Science 
The relationship between his and Hegel 's respective positions is qualified by 
Nietzsche, showing that Nietzsche is not entirely opposed to Hegel's historicism and 
interpretation of Becoming as the mediating factor in the concept of history: 
Wir Deutsche sind I-Iegelianer, allch wenn es nie einen Hegel 
gegeben hatte, insofern wir (im Gegensatz zu allen Lateinern) dem 
Werden, der Entwicklung instinkliv einen tieferen Sinn und 
reicheren Werth zumessen ais dem, was "ist"; wir glauben kaum 
an die l3erechtigung des Begriffs "Sein" -; ebenfalls insofern wir 
'1J7 lN ictzschc's emphasis, P.c.1. GD, Was ich den Alten vcrdanke, 4, (KSI1 6, pp.159-160). 
unsrer menschlichen Logik nicht geneigt sind einzuraumen, dass 
sie die Logik an sich, die einzige Art Logik sei (wir mochten 
vielmehr uns überreden, dass sie nur ein Spezialfall sei, und 
vielleicht einer der wunderlichsten und dümmsten _).108 
ln this text, Nietzsche acknowledges his proximity to Hegel and to the tradition 0[' 
German Idealism. It is a fact that the concept of Werden as an essential component 01' 
their respective philosophies is common to Schelling, Hegel and Nietzsche. But 
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Nietzsche's concept of Becoming is different Irom Hegel 's insofar as it is not dialectical 
and teleological. \t is one of'the theses ofthis dissertation, that Nietzsche develops his 
own original concept of Becoming partly in opposition to Hegel and partly in opposition 
to Aristotle in order to de-ontologize Becoming by removing dialecticity and teleology 
l'rom il. 
Nietzsche writes: 
Von vornherein mochte sich eine andre Unterscheidung mehr zu 
empfehlen scheinen sie ist bei weitem augenscheinlicher-
namlich das Augenmerk darauC ob das Verlangen nach 
Starrmachen, Verewigen, nach Sein die Ursache des Schaffens ist, 
oder aber das Verlangen nach Zerstürung, nach Wechsel, nach 
Neuem, nach Zukunft, nach Werden. Aber beide Arten des 
Verlangens erweisen sich, tiefer angesehn, noch aIs zweideutig, 
und zwar deutbar eben nach jenem vorangestellten und mit Recht, 
. . h d" k S h 109 wle mlc un t, vorgezogenen cerna. 
The ambiguity that Nietzsche refers to is important since he claims that the need 
for destruction, change and Becoming can be the expression 01' an over-['ull lorce that is 
full of possibilities for the futurc. But this necd for destruction that cJcvates itsclf against 
what perdures and Being can also be the expression or manifestation of what Nietzsche 
calls the Schlechtweggekommenen ("those who have lost out") and which he associates 
with the pol itical movements of socialism and anarchism. 
iOX FW, 357 (KSA 3,599). 
109 FW, 370 (KSA 3, 621-622). 
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In the same way as the will to change and Becoming is ambiguous, so is the will 
to eternity or to eternalization. The will to eternalization can develop out of the gratitude 
and love. Nietzsche is thinking here or Goethe and Hall. However, this will to 
eternalization can also express itselfaccording to Nietzsche, out of the tyrannical will o['a 
tortured being that wants to stamp its suffering into a binding law and obligation. 
The previous passage gives different criteria for establishing if a form of life is 
positive i.e. life-affirming. Previously in the Western metaphysical tradition a concept 
would be judged worthy and good il' it affirmed the value or Being and not that or 
Becoming. Nietzsche attempts to reverse this assessment to a certain extent insofar as he 
claims that Becoming is more rundamental than Being. 
But the distinction between Being and Becoming must give way to a more 
fundamental distinction: that of the active and reactive. These concepts of the active and 
reactive are not present explicitly in the above passage. ln ract, Nietzsche speaks of active 
and reactive when it cornes to the concept of classical and romantic art: "Ob nicht der 
Gegensatz der Aktiven und Reaktiven hinter jenem Gegensatz von Classisch und 
Romantisch verborgen liegt ? .. "IIO Nietzsche also uses the distinction between active and 
reactive with respect to nihilisl11. An active nihilism affirms life while a reactive (or 
passive) nihilism is the one espoused by the proponents or the slave morality. Thesc 
proponents of the slave morality are, politically, the socialists and the anarchists as the 
quote [rom the Gay Science demonstrales. 
f) Becoming in the Nachlass of the Late Period (1883-1889) 
ln the later writings, the concept oC Becoming is connected to the liberation of the 
world of the hic el nunc from the order of Being. Nietzsche operates a de-
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transcendantalization of the world of appearances and liberates it from a world of Seing. 
For Nietzsche, there is no final purpose and no final state in Becoming: "Wenn die 
Weltbewegung einen Zielzustand hatte, so müf)te er erreicht sein". This is the case 
because Nietzsche believes that the present moment is preceded by an in finit y oftime and 
that ifthere were a Zielzustand for the world-movement (Weltbewegung) such a final-
state would have been reached already. The argument is couched in two premisses, time 
is an infinite magnitude and space and matter are finite magnitudes. Given the finitude of 
space and matter, there are only a finite number of configurations of space-matter that can 
exist. But since time is infini te, this means that a final-state would already have been 
reached eventually. However, here Nietzsche inserts a third argument: we empirically 
observe that there is no final-state or equilibrium and that things are in movement, change 
and Becoming. This observation happens through our senses and through the fact that we 
see that the world of Secoming is one or change. I-Iowever, here some might want to 
invoke against Nietzsche that there is also stability that can be observed in the world of 
I3ecoming through our senses. So why claim that our senses can be trusted when they 
show change, movement and impcrmanence and that they cannot be trusted when they 
witness rest, stability and permanence? 
Müller-Lauter has observed that Nietzsche's observations on the end-state and 
final-state of Becoming could be understood in the context of the discussions that were 
occurring in the field orthermodynamics. According to Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche was 
làmiliar with the laws or thermodynamics. ll' The end-state could then be conceptualized 
as a state of 'calorific' death of the universe. Nietzsche is opposed to this physical 
conception and he argues by using the concepts of the finitude of space, force and matter 
110 KSA 12,91'112]. 
III Sec Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, I-lis f1hilosophy o(Contradictions and the Contradictions o(N;s 
• 
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and the infinitude of time . 
Let us continue with Nictzsche's argument: since we do not observe a final-state 
and since an infinity oftime has already passed, Nietzsche concludes that there does not 
exist a final-state or a purpose in Becoming. Becoming has to be explained without 
having recourse to final purposes and Becoming has to be appear justilied in every 
moment. Nietzsche writes : "das Werden hat keinen Zielzustand, mündet nicht in ein 
'Sein,,,.112 Jt is clear thus that for Nietzsche, there is a cesura between Being and 
Becoming. Nietzsche does not identiCy Being and Becoming dialectically as Hegel does. 
ln the late Nachlass, the connection between 13ecoming, [king and Sc/win is transformed 
with respect to the early Romantic phase where both Being and Becoming seemed to be 
secreted by the Ureinen. This is testified to by the following passage: "das Werden ist 
kein Scheinzustand; vielleicht ist die seiende Welt ein Schein." 113 In the same passage 
Nietzsche afTirms : "das Werden ist werthgleich in jedem Augenblick: die Summe seines 
Werthcs bleibt sich gleich: anders ausgedrückt: es hat gar keinen Werth, denn es fehlt 
etwas, woran es zu messen ware, und in Bezug worauC das Wort 'Werth' Sinn hdlte.,,114 
This passage helps us understand Nietzsche's cosmological proof of eternal recurrence of 
the same. Heidegger has operated an essentialization and an ontologization oCthis proo!' 
by claiming the finitude or matter and spa cc amounts to a finitude of" Being and 
13ecoming. This ontologization is perhaps fruitful but we have to be textually more 
precise when interpreting Nietzsche. The previous text has ta be compared with and 
understood in relation to the following quote which chronologically belongs in section 
1.2 but which l analyze here given its thematic similarity to the qllote that refers to the 
Phi/o.l'ophy, Berlin, New York, University of Illinois Press, 1999, p.lll. 
1 1 è KSA /3, 1 1 /72 J-
113 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA /3,11 [72]. 
114 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA /3, Il [72]. 
Zielzustand. Nietzsche writes: 
Ware ein Gleichgewicht der Kraft irgendwann einmal erreicht 
worden, so dauerte es noch: also ist es nie eingetreten. Der 
augenblickliche Zustand widerspricht der Annahme. Nimmt man 
an, es habe einmal einen Zustand gegeben, absolut gleich dem 
augenblicklichen, so wird diese Annahme nicht durch 
den augenblicklichen Zustand widerlegt. 115 
But why should the momentary state (augenblicklichen Zustand) cancel or refute 
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(widerlegt) astate that is absolutely identical (gleich) to the momentary ? ls this because 
what is momentary (augenblicklich) exists and must be unique and non-identical ? Does 
every moment seem unique in its time-space configuration so that this refutes the 
existence of an identical "other" momentary state ? Nietzsche claims that there are 
infinite possibilities (unendlichen Moglichkei/en) and the identical momentary state must 
have existed since, according (0 Nietzsche, an infinity has already elapsed starting 
backwards. 
Unter den unendlichen Moglichkeiten muJ3 es aber diesen Fall 
gegeben haben, denn bis jetzt ist schon eine Unendlichkeit 
verilossen. Wenn das Gleichgewicht moglich ware, so müJ3te es 
eingetreten sein. - Und wenn dieser augenblickliche Zustand da 
war, dann auch der, der ihn gebar und dessen Vorzustand 
zurück daraus ergicbt sich, daB er auch ein zweites drittes Mal da 
sein wird -unzahJige Male, vorw~irts und rückwarts. D.h. es 
bewegt sich alles Werden in der Wiederholung einer bestimmten 
Zahl vollkommener gleicher Zustande. 116 
We can see from the previous passage something l wi Il allude to later in this thesis: 
Nietzsche is inlluenced by Dühring's finitism and his theory of determinate number 
(hes/imm/er Zahl). This is apparent l'rom Nietzsche's claim that "es bewegt sich alles 
Werden in der Wiederholung einer bestimmten Zahl volkommener gleichen Zustande". 
115 KSA 9, Il [245]. 
116 KSA 9, 11 [245]. 
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The following passage is also related to the two previous ones. Although 
chronologically it belongs to the period 1880-1882, and thus should be placed in section 
2.2, l place it here given its thematic similarity and re1evance to the other two quotes: 
"Man gehe einmal rückwarts. Hatte die Welt ein Ziel, so müf3te es erreicht sein: gabe es 
für sie einen (unbeabsichtigten) Endzustand, so müf3te er ebenfalls erreicht sein.,,117 This 
passage is crucial for my claim that Nietzsche removes teleology l'rom within Becoming. 
Here, the passage refers to the world (WeIt) but world and Becoming and world-process 
arc onen used inter-changeably in Nietzsche's usage. 
The next part of the passage speaks of a few key-terms that recur in Nietzsche's 
attempt to l.hink through the concept of Becoming: 
Ware sic [die Welt, P.c.] ewig neu werdcnd, so ware sic damit 
gesetzt ais etwas an sich Wunderbares und Frei- und 
Selbstschopferisch-Gottliches. Das ewige Neu werden setzt 
voraus: daf3 die Kraft sich selber willkürlich vermehre, daf3 sic 
nicht nur die Absicht, sondern auch die Mittel habe, sich sel ber vor 
der Wiederholung Zl1 hüten, in cine alte Form zurückzugerathen, 
somit in jedem Augenblick jede Bewegung auf diese Yermeidung 
zu controliren oder die Unfahigkeit, in die glciche Lage Zl1 
gerathen: das hicf.k, daf3 dic Kraftmenge nichts Festes sei und 
ebenso die Eigenschaften der Kraft. Etwas Un-Festes von Kraft, 
etwas Undulatorisches ist uns ganz undenkbar. IIR 
The possibility of novelty within Becoming which Nietzsche seems to reject (in this 
passage at least he does this cl carly). Here Nietzsche is consistent: ifthere were eternal 
novelty then that would preclude the recurrence of the same. This idea that eternal 
novelty is connected with the existence or God is repeated in KSII J J, 36 r 15]: 
117 KSA 9, 11 [292]. 
IIX KSA 9, 1 1 [292"]. 
Die Welt, wenn auch kein Gott mehr, solI doch der gottlichen 
Schopferkraft, der unendlichen Yerwandlungs-Kraft fahig sein; sic 
soli es sich willkürlich verwehren, in eine ihrer alten formen 
zurückzugerathen, sic soll nicht nur die Absicht, sondern auch die 
Mittel haben, sich sel ber vor jeder Wiederholung zu bewahren; 
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! Nietzsche claims that recurrence counteracts this thought of the existence of God 
Another important aspect in this passage is Nietzsche's claim that force (Kraft) must be 
something stable. He claims that an un-stable (Un-Festes) l'oree is unthinkable. This may 
seem strange given Nietzsche's aversion to stability and permanence, but it seems that 
Nietzsche does need to fix sorne of his concepts in order to prove the eternal recurrence 
of the same and to clarify his concept of Becoming. Nietzsche writes in connection to the 
concept of l'oree: 
die Welt, ais Kraft, darI' nicht unbegrenzt gedacht werden, denn sie 
kann nicht so gedacht \Verden wir verbieten uns den Begri freiner 
unendlichen Kraft ais mit dem BegrifT "Kraft" unvertraglich. Also 
fehlt der Welt auch das Vermogen zur ewigen Neuheit. 119 
The concept of force cannot be thought of as un-limited. Therefore the force must be both 
finite and fixed. Again, in the previous passage, Nietzsche claims the world does not have 
the capacity for eternal novelty. 
This idea that the world cannot experience eternally new states is important. 1 l' 
there is no state of equilibrium that can ever be reached, it seems that we are forced to 
conclude that there will be eternal novelty in the world. But Nietzsche surprisingly claims 
that no eternal novelty of the states of the world is possible. This is surprising. lt is 
possible here ta suspect the consistency or coherence ofNietzsche's thought. In a way he 
is forced ta admit that no eternal novelty of the world is possible since, ifthere were 
eternal novelty, that would preclude the possibility of an eternal recurrence of the same. 
But the thought of eternal recurrence is paradoxical and self-contradictory. It exists at the 
limits of coherence. As a fantasmatic thought-experiment or an existential fable there is 
no coherence-problem. But if we expect to describe eternal recurrence as a scientific 
119 KSA Il,36 [15]. 
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doctrine (something Nietzsche was committed to as weil), consistency and coherence are 
principles to which we must hold Nietzsche accountable. 
The previous passage is closely related to KSA 9, Il [245], where Nietzsche 
claims that a Gleichgewichl of force is never attained. Nietzsche's premises is that if a 
state ofequilibrium (of forces and of the world-process) were to be attained, then we 
could empirically (through our senses perhaps, Nietzsche does want to restore to them the 
credibility that most of the philosophical tradition has refused them but the important 
citation Will 10 Power 617 (KSI1 12,7 [54]) claims that there is a zwiefàche Falschung 
one that is generated by the senses and one that is generated by the intellect) establish the 
existence of such an equilibrium. But since our senses show us that the world is in 
movement and not in stasis, we have to reject this hypothesis of equilibrium. 
Nietzsche writes: "Hatte die Welt ein Ziel, so müf3te es erreicht sein. Gabe es IUr 
sie einen unbeabsichtigten Endzustand, so müf3te er ebenlàlls erreicht sein." 120 The 
argument for this claim is the one 1 have repeatedly invoked: through our senses we 
observe that no state of equilibrium has been attained and since an infinity oftime or an 
eternity of time has elapsed, we are forced to conclude that a slale of equilibrium does nol 
exisl. Further in the same passage, Nietzsche writes: "Ware sie [die Welt, P.C.I 
überhaupt eines Yerharrens und Starrwerdens, eines 'Seins' 11hig, hatte sie nur Einen 
Augenblick in allem ihrem Werden diese Fahigkeit des 'Seins', so ware es wiederum mit 
allem Werden langst zu Ende, also auch mit allem Oenken, mit allem 'Geiste' .,,121 This 
passage is a strong affirmation or the fact that Becoming is not stamped with Seing, but 
that the only thing that perdures is an eternal and absolute Becoming. There is no 
possibility, according to Nietzsche of ev en a single instant (einen Augenblick) of Being 
120 KSA Il,36 [15]. 
121 KSA Il,36 [15). 
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within Becoming. Ifthis were the case, if Becoming stopped for an instant and froze itself 
in Being, this would entail the destruction ofBecoming, ofthinking and of the spirit, 
according to Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche claims that there is a tendency to interpret the absence of goal and telos 
as another telos of the world. This is wrong according to him. For him this amounts to the 
old religious-Christian mistake and is a religious way of looking at Becoming: 
... sie [die Welt, P.c.] solI somit injedem Augenblickjede ihrer 
Bewegungen auf die Vermeidung von Zielen, Endzustanden, 
Wiederholungen hin controliren und was Alles die Folgen einer 
solchen unverzeihlich-verrückten Denk- und Wunschweise sein 
mogen. Das ist immer noch die alte religiose Denk- und 
Wunschweise, eine Art Sehnsucht zu glauben, daf3 irgendworin 
doch die Welt dem alten geliebten, unendlichen,unbegrenzt-
schopferischen Gotte gleich sei daf3 irgendworin doch der alte Gott 
no ch lebe ... 122 
The argument that Nietzsche presents in both these quotes is very important. l 
have already alluded to this argument in section 2.2. Nietzsche c\aims that no state of 
equilibrium of the world (Zielzusfand or El1dzusfand) can be reached since an infinity of 
time has passed and no such statc has been reached. Thus, since we can think backwards 
and examine the state of the world, we can go back l'rom state to state until we would reach 
an Endzusfand or a Zielzustand. But this is precisely what, according to Nietzsche, we 
cannot do. The grounds for his argument have to do with the configurations of force, 
matter and time and 1 will examine the structure ofthis argument a bit further down, but it 
is important to see the radicality ofNietzsche's c\aim and the target that he is aiming al. 
This target in my opinion is Aristotle. 
Aristotle argued that wc could always ftnd causes in nature that would explain 
phenomena. By regressing along the chain of efficient causes, we would eventually reach 
lè2 KS;1 J J. 36 /15/. 
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astate that was unconditioned. This unconditioned state is what Aristotle caBs the prime 
moyer in the Melaphysics. Aristotle's elaim is that logic preyents us From thinking an 
infinite regress of causal explanations: thus there must be astate that does 'not have a cause 
that causes it: this state of the prime moyer is in might be what Nietzsche calls the 
EndzuSland or the Zielzustand. Of course the unmoyed moyer in Aristotle is not identical 
to Nietzsche's Endzusfand, but Nietzsche's way ofarguing when he discusses the 
Endzustand is cJearly physico-cosmological. 
Another aspect of the infinite regression backwards must be taken into account. It 
must be remembered that Kant, in the first antinomy showed that, on the one hand, the 
uniyerse had no temporal beginning and that, on the other hand, (the anti-thesis) the 
uniyerse had an absolutc beginning in time. Thus Nietzsche, by claiming that there is an 
infinite duration in time (that the uniyerse has no absolute beginning in time), adopts only 
one side or the antinomy (the thesis or the anti-thesis) and can be thought to regress 
behind the Kantian position into a Fonn or dogmatic metaphysics. 
Nietzsche writes in connection to this: 
.123 KSA /3, 14 [188]. 
[ ... ] Man hat neuerdings mehrlàch in dem Begriff Zeit-
Unendlichkeit der WeIt nach hinten einen Widerspruch finden 
gewollt: man hat ihn selbst gefunden, um den Preis freilich, dabei 
den Kopf mit dem Schwanz zu yerwechseln. Nichts kann mich 
hindern, yon diesem Augenblick an rückwürts rechnend zu sagen 
,,ich werde nie dabei an ein Ende kommen": wie ich yom glcichen 
Augenblick yorwarts rechnen kann, ins Unendliche hinaus. Erst 
wenn ich den t'ehler machen wollte ich werde mich hüten, es zu 
thun diesen correkten Begriff eines regressus in infinitum 
gleichzusetzen mit einem gar nicht yollziehbaren Begriff eines 
unendlichen progressus bis jetzt, wenn ich die Riehtung (yorwarts 
oder rückwarts) aIs logisch indiffèrent setzte, würde ich den Kopf, 
diesen Augenblick, aIs Schwanz zu f'assen bekommen: das bleibe 
·rh "b 1 . 1 l 0"1' , 173 nen li el' assen, mell1 ~ err ulnng .... -
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The reference to Eugen Dühring is important. Nietzsche was certainly interested 
and to a certain extent under the influence of Dühring's works as the many references to 
him in the Nach/ass testify.12'1 Dühring's position on the infinity oftime backwards is 
ciearly criticized by Nietzsche but the idea that the the number of world-bodies at any 
given moment is a particular determinate number is preserved by Nietzsche and used in 
his argument for the eternal recurrence of the same (the number ofstates of the quantity 
of matter in the world is finite and determinate and space is also a finite magnitude, time 
is intlnite, therefore the states ol'the world must repeat and recur an infinite number of 
times). But this thesis that matter and space are only understandable in terms of a finite, 
definite number which Nietzsche seems to be operating with as well, due to Dühring's 
influence, has been contradicted by ulterior developments in the physical cosmology that 
have been developed thanks to Einstein's theory ofrelativity.125 
This is relevant to the thesis of 8ecoming in Nietzsche's philosophy insofar as 
Nietzsche believes in some way that Becoming is eternal, infinite and absolute in the 
early part of his work (in the 1870's). But what becomes, what changes, are the space-
12,1 KS;t 8, 8 [11, 8 r31. 8 [4],9 [II, 2918], KSA 9,21771. JC/J, 204 (KSA 5. p.131), CM, Zweite 
Abhand lung, 1 1 (KSA 5, p.3 1 0), Dritte A bhand lung, 14 (KSA, p.370), 26 (KSA, p.406) KSA 10, 7 1211, 7 
178], 7 [84], 9 [481,9 [501, 10[91. Il [9], 18155], 241241. KSA Il,2512111,25 r2651, 26 1481, 26[511. 26 
[233], 26 [382],26 [383],27 [23], 27 [75],34 [99J, 34 [207],3412151. 3613], 37 rlll, KSA 12, 1 [226], 14 
[188], 19 f10]. 
125 ft is perhaps anachronistic to compare Nietzsche's considerations on the nature or space-time with those 
or Einstein. This is the case because Nietzsche had no way or knowing about the relativistic revolution in 
modern physics that wou Id occur in the twentieth-century. But Nietzsche does attempt to prove recurrence 
scientifically. Thus we must scrutinize his vicws with the help of the most devcloped, advanced theories or 
modern physics which include the relativistic revolution in physical cosmology. Nietzsche claims that 
there configurations or matter-space arc finite. Time is infinite. 'l'hus in an infinite time, ail the possible 
matter-spaee states would be efTectively l'un through and an eternal reccurrence orthe same would follow. 
But this claim is contradicted, at least intuitively, by thc hypothesis of modern physical cosmology that we 
are only living in one or possible infinite number or universes. Modern relativistic cosmology considers the 
universe in virtue of space-time-matter configurations. There is no consensus as of yet among physicists as 
to whether the space-time-matter configurations are infinite (geometrically open), finite (geometrically 
c1osed) or simply something in between which they cali "flat". Of course the fact that the universe (that is 
the SUIll of the space-time-matter configurations) might be neither infinite nor finite creates great logieal 
difficulties. 
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time-matter configurations. 'This is true but it only dawns on Nietzsche as he attempts to 
prove the logical and scientific necessity of the eternal recurrence of the same. The fact 
that Nietzsche attempts to think at the same time the in:/initude andfinilude of Secom ing 
is something that points to a possible inconsistency or contradiction of his philosophy 
(Müller-Lauter). The question is to know whether Nietzsche was aware ofthis 
contradiction. 
The argument for the repetition of states in Becoming is used by Nietzsche to 
attempt to prove eternal reCUITence. Since Aristotle, eternity has been associated with the 
circle. lt is clear that each passing temporal moment could not recur or return unless it 
described a circle. But no matter how large the circle is, its periodicity means that any 
point on its circumference will recur even ifan inlinite amount oftime has passed. 
Nietzsche does not see any problems with a Zeil-Unendlichkeil reckoned 
backwards l'rom the instant (Augenblick), something which according to my 
understanding of Aristotle would seem logically inconsistent. Nietzsche distinguishes 
between an infinite regress and an infinite progress. According to him, only the infinite 
regress is possible whereas the infinite progress is a "gar nicht vollziehbaren Begriff'. 
'l'hus when we think of an infinite time that flows backwards there is no contradiction, the 
contradiction occurs when we reverse the perspective and start [rom an initial state and 
attempt to come l'rom it to the present. In this case, that is unthinkable according to 
Nietzsche, and we could never leave the Final state or initial state to reach our present 
state. 
The following passage is important because it deals with Becoming and the role it 
plays in the proofofNietzsche's concept orthe eternal recurrence: "Die Welt besteht; sie 
ist nichts, was wird, nichts, was vergeht. Oder vielmehr: sie wird, sie vergeht, aber sie 
7S 
hat nie angefangen zu werden und nie aufgehort zu vergehen sie erhalt sich in 
Beidem ... ,,126 This passage is similar to the one in Gdtzendammerung in which 
Nietzsche claims that "Was ist wird nicht; was wird ist nicht... ".127 The point that 
Nietzsche is focusing on in this passage is that the world has never begun to become and 
has never stopped to pass away: it maintains itsell' between the two states. This is the 
problem that l have already discussed or an initial-state for world-Becoming. Müller-
Lauter has dealt with this problem in his Nietzsche interpretation. 128 
ln the same passage Nietzsche writcs: "Der letzte Versuch, cine Welt die 
élllfangt, zu concipiren, ist neuerdings mehrfach mit HO\le einer logischen Prozedur 
gemacht worden zumeist, wie zu errathen ist, aus einer theologischen Hinterabsicht. .. ,,129 
The problem of an initial-state of Becoming has theological pre-suppositions according to 
Nietzsche. As l have written elsewhere, 1 am not sure that Nietzsche is aware that he may 
be regressing behind Kant's point ofview (and into dogmatic metaphysics) who in his 
l'irst antinomy showed that the question orthe beginning of the world: whether it came 
into existence at a l'inite time in the past or whether the world had no beginning in time 
was a question that was beyond the scope of pure reason' s competence. 
l believe that Nietzsche is in fact open to the attack that claims that there is an 
infinite regress in his position with respect to Becoming. Curiously he cven 
acknowledges the possibility of the infinite regress but sees nothing wrong with il. He 
distinguishes the infinite regress from an intinite progress and claims that only the 
progress is logically inconsistent or incoherent. 
1:(, KSA 13, 1411881. 
1:7 C;mzen-Dill71l71erung, Die "Yernunl't" in der PhilosoQhie, l, (KSA S, p.74). 
12R See Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, I-lis Phil()s()phy olCol1tradicti()ns and the COl1trodic1ions oll-lis 
Philosophy, Berlin, New York, University of Illinois Press, 1999, pp.84-121. 
1:9 KSA 13,14 [188]. 
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\ One attempt to save Nietzsche From the regress is to claim that we can conceive of 
an infinite regress but not rationally as Kant is correct to claim. This possibility of an 
infinite regress would have to do then with the possibility orthe will ofwilling 
backwards which is not explicable rationally but veers into an existential or mythical 
fable. Reason is conceived dualistically and dialectically in Kant, as a spontaneity that 
wills outside of the naturalistic series ofcausally interrelated events, and as a passivity 
that is inserted into the naturalistic series. But it is precisely this dualism which Nietzsche 
rejects according to my reading. 
Where Kant finds a spontaneity that comes into existence to escape the regress, 
Nietzsche brings forth the notion of an irrational will that is united in its desire to 
transform the past into the future. It may thus be argued that an infinite regress that helps 
bring the thought or the past existence or the world into thc present and into the future is 
facilitated by the fable of eternal recurrence of the same. 
, Nietzsche speaks of the fact that he had found the thought of eternal recurrence by 
other, earlier thinkers, but that it was always connected to theological presuppositions. 
Thus, Nietzsche's breakthrough with respect to eternal recllrrence would be that he had 
detached it l'rom its theological pre-suppositions: "Ich bin auf diesen Gedanken bei 
früheren Oenkern gesto/3en: jedes Mal war er durch andere l-lintergedanken bestimmt 
( . hl' h Gd" ),.130 melstens t eo Oglsc e, zu un sten es creafor spJrlfus . 
Nietzsche writes about the fact that the world cannot stop to become. The world 
does not reach a state or equilibrium (Gleichgewichr). This statement by Nietzsche is 
repeated by Nietzsche in many other places in his corpus and thus we are forced to take it 
seriously. The stamping of Being onto Becoming does not result in an equi librium but in 
a Falschung. Becoming does not 1l0w or lead (münden) into Being or into non-Being as 
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the metaphysieal tradition (Hegel being the last great representative ofthis tradition) 
elaims. Beeoming and Being must remain detaehed and separate: 
Wenn die Welt überhaupt erstarren, vertroeknen, absterben, Niehts 
werden kbnnte, oder wenn sie einen Gleiehgewiehtszustand 
erreichen kbnnte, oder wenn sie überhaupt irgend ein Ziel hatte, 
das die Dauer, die Unveranderliehkeit, das Ein-für-alle-Mal in sich 
schlbsse (kurz, metaphysisch geredet: wenn das Werden in das 
Sein oder ins Nichts mUnden kbnnte) so mUJ3te dieser Zustand 
erreieht sein. Aber er ist nicht erreicht 1 ... ] 131 
Although, faseinated by mechanism throughout his philosophieal eareer, it is quite 
plausible to think with Staek and Müller-Lauter 132 that in the end, Nietzsche rejeets this 
world-view in favor of a dynamis111 and energetic relativism under the influence of Roger 
Boscovich. This is what is apparent l'rom the next passage: 
Das ist unsere cinzige Gewir3heit, die wir in den Handen halten, 
um aIs Correktiv gegen eine grof3e Menge an sich mbglicher Welt-
}-Iypothesen zu dienen. Kann z.B. der Mechanismus der 
Consequenz eines Finalzustandes nieht entgehen, welche 
Thompson ihm gezogen hat, so ist damit der Mechanismus 
l' 1 widerlegt. J, 
Further Nietzsche writes in connection to mechanism and this seems to confirm his 
critique ofthat world-view: 
IJO KSA 13, 14 [1881. 
ni KSA 13,14 [1881. 
Diese Conception ist nicht ohne weiteres eine mechanistische: 
denn ware sie das, so würde sie nieht eine unendliche Wiederkehr 
identischer Falle bedingen, sondern einen Finalzustand. Weil 
die Welt ihn nieht erreicht hat, muf3 der Mechanismus uns aIs 
unvollkol11111ene und nur vorlaufige Hypothese gelten [ ... 1134 
m Müller-Lauter quotes a letter by Gast that sketches Boscovich's innllence on Nietzsche. Sec Nietzsche, 
His Philosophy 01 Contradictions and the Contradictions ol/-lis Philosuphy, Berlin, New York, University 
of Illinois Press, 1999, Chapter 7, note 88. Stack (Lange and Nietzsche, De Grllyter, Berlin, New York, 
1983) devotes a whole chapter ofhis book (Chapter IX, A Force-Point World) to analyze the innuence of 
Boscovich upon Nietzsche both via Lange and directly. There is evidence that Nietzsche took out and 
studied Boscovich's book Philosophia Natllralis fi'orn the Basci University library sometillle in 1873, see 
I.Llnge /lnd Nietzsche, p.227. 
1.1.1 KSA 13. 14 r1881. 
1.1" KSA 13, 1411 88 1. 
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The notions of Kreislal~fthat 1 have already mentioned is important insofar as it 
connects the notions of Becoming and eternal recurrence of the same. What repeats itself 
infinitely is world as Kreislaul Another aspect of the citation is its emphasis on a finite 
number of"combinations" of the matter-space configurations. This emphasis on 
combinations shows that Nietzsche might have an elemcntary acquaintance with 
mathematical statistics and that he thought that this knowledge could be used to prove the 
eternal recurrence of the same: 
Wenn die Welt ais bestimmte Grbl3e von Kraft und ais 
bestimmte Zahl von Kraftcentren gedacht werden darf und 
jede andere Vorstellung bleibt unbeslimml und lolglich 
unbrauchbar so folgt daraus, dal3 sie eine berechenbare Zahl 
von Combinationen, im groBen Würfelspiel ihres Daseins, 
durchzumachen hat. In einer unendlichen Zeit würde jede 
mbgliche Combination irgendwann einmal erreicht sein; mehr 
noch, sie würde unendliche Male erreicht sein. Und da zwischen 
jeder "Combination" und ihrer nachsten "Wiederkehr" alle 
überhaupt noch mbglichen Combinationen abgelaufen sein mül3ten 
und jede dieser Combinationen die ganze Folge der Combinationen 
in derselben Reihe bedingt, so ware damit ein Kreislauf von 
absolute identischen Reihen bewiesen: die Welt aIs Kreislauf der 
sich unendlich on bereits wiederholt hat und der sein Spiel in 
. fi . . 1 13;; II1 1111 t um SpI ct.· 
Nietzsche's cosmological position is intluenced here by the conception of determinate 
number that is developed by Dühring's position on the idea that the the number ofworld-
bodies at any given moment is a particular ueferminafe nUl77ber (besfiml71fe Zahl). This 
idea is preserved by Nietzsche and used in his argument for the eternal recurrence of the 
same (the number of states of the quantity of matter in the world is finite and determinate, 
time is infinite, therefore the states of the world must repeat and recur an infinite number 
oftimes.) But this thesis that all infinity must be countable, which Nietzsche seems to be 
operating with as weIl, duc to Dühring's inlluence, has been contradicted by ulterior 
developments in the foundations of mathematics and particularly by Georg Cantor's work 
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on the order of infinities and on the concept of transfini te number. Cantor distinguishes 
between a countable inlinity associated with the natural numbers and an un-countable 
infinity associated with the integers and the real numbers. This does not show that 
Dühring is necessarily wrong, since he could argue that the infinity of the real numbers 
exists only theoretically and in our heads, as a product of our representations, and not as 
sllch in the natural, physical world. 136 
But Cantor's theory of sets is generally accepted by most modern mathematicians 
as grounding the differential and integral calculus in terms of the clarification of the 
notions of continuity and discreteness and {his calcul us can be experimentally validated, 
vcrified and falsified in the natural, physical world. Thus it might seem that ifNietzsche's 
theory or attempt at proving the eternal recllrrence of the samc is dependent on Dühring's 
theOl'y of definite number, even if critically modified by Nietzsche in terIns of a form of 
reversaI of Dühring's argument (Nietzsche believes in an infinity of time backwards 
whereas Dühring only believes in an infinity oftime forwards), then we might have 
reason to criticize Nietzsche as weil if we reject the relationship which he sees at work 
between the finite and the infinite. Cantor's theory is not a purely mathematical theory, it 
has philosophical implications since it deals with the philosophical grounds of 
mathematical logic and with the mathematico-logical grounds of philosophy. These 
critiques ofNietzsche's positions have to take into account his hostility towards the 
purely mathematical which he conllates with the logical and which he criticizes under the 
m KSA 13, 14 ri Il gl. 
I~(' Cantor writes about Dühring: "The proofs of Dühring against the propcrly-inlinite could be given in 
Illuch fewer words and appear to me to amountto this, either that a definite linite number, however large it 
Illay be thought to be, can never be an infinite number, as follows immediately fromthe concept of it, or 
else that the variable, an unlimitedly large finite number, cannot be thought with the quality oFdefiniteness 
and thereFore not with the quality oF existence, as Follows again From the nature of variability. That not the 
least is hereby established against the conceivability oftransfinite number, 1 feel certain; and yet, those 
prooFs are taken as proofs against the reality oftransfinite number. To me this mode of argumentation 
appears the sa me as if, From the existence oF innumerable shades oF green, we were to conclude that there 
principle of logical unit y and identity. It is not useful to delve into the implications this 
might have for logic or philosophy of mathematics further at this point. 
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Nietzsche's cosmological proo/CS of eternal recurrence th us need to be re-
examined in terms orthe philosophical implications of Cantor's ground-breaking work in 
the loundations of mathematics. 1 do not think that Nietzsche was familiar with Cantor's 
work and it has been acknowledged that Nietzsche's genius was un-mathematical. But 
this does not mean that implication of Cantor's work should not make us re-consider 
Nietzsche's cosmological proofs of eternal recurrence. 
What Nietzsche most reproaches Dühring with the most is his belief in an initial 
state of the universe. For Nietzsche, this initial-state of the universe or of world-
Becoming does not seem to exist. The theory of the initial state l'ollows, according to 
Dühring, from his concept of delerminale number. It must be sa id that Dühring is here 
intuitively closer to the theory of the "Big Bang" around which there seems to be 
consensus in the astro-physical community ofour day. I-Iowever, both Nietzsche's and 
Dühring's respective positions seem to posit only one side ofKant's tirst antinomy and 
thus seem to regress behind Kant's position and into dogmatic metaphysics. 
This is misleading especially with respect to Nietzsche. As r have argued earlier, 
the dualism and dialectical aspect of reason is rejected by Nietzsche in favor of a unit y of 
thc will that can will backward into an Infinite regress. It is here that eternal recurrence 
becomes mythical and existential and resists a purely logical and rational analysis. 
lt would be helpful to examine the concept ofprocess in view of the previous 
discussion. A process derives its meaning [rom the fact that it has a beginning or initial 
state, a direction and an end or linal statc. Without the final state, there is no closure to 
can be no l'cd." Georg Cantor, C/'lInd/agen einCl' a//gel71eine Mannic/?/à/ligkeil.l'/eh/'e, Leipzig, 1883, p.44 
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the process and this lack of closure prevents the process from possessing any meaning. 
The final or end state is projected (hinprojecirt) according to Nietzsche's analysis of 
nihilism onto a beyond. This final state becomes the true world or J3eing that is devoid of 
any Secoming. This beyond has been dilTerently interpreted, whether in the Platonic or 
the Christian tradition. lt could mean the realm 0 f the Ideas, heaven or the Godhead of the 
divinity itself. Thus, according to Nietzsche we derive l'rom the world of appearances a 
concept of purpose which is then stabilized, cleansed of the notion or change inherent in 
it and then we project it onto the beyond, thus splitting the world of phenomena into two: 
a true world of Seing and a world of appearanees and Becoming. Nietzsche is conscious 
of the appearanee of circularity in this form of argument: first the world of appearances 
exists and th en through the derivation of something (the end-state) l'rom the world of 
appearanees, the dichotomy between the world of Being and the world of appearances is 
first brought to consciousness. I-Iowever, Nietzsche is aware that the world of 
appearances disappears as weil in the I-listory or an Error. So he is aware that the world or 
appearances cannot function as an absolute basic or posit l'rom which the world of Being 
might be derived. 
But the problem is that the world of appearances and of Becoming disappears as 
weil. Thus, Nietzsche eliminates teleology l'rom Becoming and this is what constitutes his 
progress with respect to AristotJe and Hegel. I-Iere the notion ofprogress must not be 
understood as re-introduction ofteleology in the line of evolution from Aristotle and 
Hegel to Nietzsche. Progress means just that: change and evolution but a directedness and 
sense (meaning) - schema l'rom Aristotle and Hegel to Nietzsche that could again re-
interpret a progressive movemcnt ofclarilication of the concept ofBecoming from these 
philosophers to Nietzsche is ruled out. 
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That God is eliminated l'rom the equation, at least primafacie cr have already 
alluded to Nietzsche's ambiguous relation to atheism). means that no one is responsible 
for I3ecoming. It means that Becoming does not aim at anything higher than itself. 
Becoming aims at nothing and nothing is reached through Becoming, not even power. 
There is a tension here between the doctrines orthe will to power and that ofnihilism. It 
is truc that wills are aimed, individually at power, but the doctrine of nihilism teaches that 
Becoming as who1e does not aim at anything and this includest the lelos of power. Power 
exists but the nihilative aspects of Becoming, its radical transformation and flux destroy 
the "reality" ofpower. 
The configurations of power and the power-wills that exist in the world of 
I3ecoming or in life give rise to aggregations and disaggregations or power. Therc is no 
global aim that cou Id be constituted by an increase in the sum of power or will to power 
in world-Becoming or in life. 
In this sense, Becoming is related to the concept of nihilism. The problem of 
nihilism consists in the fact that Becoming has no ultimate transcendent meaning that it 
aims al. There is no higher purpose, no telos that can be attained through Becoming. The 
aim is lacking. This is the case becausc the highest values (Being, truth, good, l'reedom. 
purpose, unit y, identity) have lost their value as grounds. 
The problem of the te1eology of I3ecoming is complicated by the faet that this is 
not simply a metaphysical problem. 11 is a moral one as weil. In l'act, it is Nietzsche's 
great originality and fine psychological instinct to have detected behind the metaphysical 
scheme a moral problem. The l~\ct that Becoming moves l'rom actuality to potentiality 
through an entelechicaI movement is not really a purely ontological or metaphysicaI 
problem. Rather the entelechical scheme has been borrowed by Aristotle, perhaps 
unconsciously, l'rom his moral philosophy. 
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The next passage is important because it establishes a relationship between the 
feeling of power and perfection and Becoming. Nietzsche establishes a connection 
between Becoming and the feeling ofpower whichjustifies ail Becoming. Sorne like 
Heidegger have argued that will to power was a way in which Nietzsche attempted to rc-
think the concept or Becoming. Others,1J7 have interpretcd will to power as closer to 
Nietzsche's concept or life. While [ think Heidegger is on to something when he thinks 
ofwill topower as a re-articulation ofBecoming, 1 do not believe that these two concepts 
are simply interchangeable. In either case, this is something that is attested in Heidegger's 
interpretation. This is the case because a tension is left lInresolved in his reading: he 
wants to interpret will to power both as the Being ol'beings and at the same time as a re-
articulation of Becoming. 
The following passage still invokes, as late as 1884, the authority of the pre-
Socratics in order to think through the concept of Becoming: 
Die grof3en Problemc yom Werfh des Werdens gestellt durch 
Anaximander und l-leraclit also die Entscheidllng darüber, ob eine 
moralische odcr eine asthetische Schatzung überhaupt erlaubt ist, 
in Bezug aur das Ganze.Das grof3e problem, welchen Antheil der 
Zwecke-sefzende Versfand an allem Werden hat von Anaxagoras. 
Das grof3e Problem, ob es ein Sein giebt von den Eleaten; und was 
alles Schein ist. Alle grof3en Probleme sind vor Socrates gestellt: 
Socrates: die Einsicht aIs Mittel zur moralischen Besserung, das 
Unvernünftige in den Leidenschaften, das UnzweckmdfJige im 
Schlecht-sein. IJ8 
'fhus, it can be seen, that as latc as Summer-Spring 1884, Nietzsche was still claiming 
that the pre-Socratics had discovered aIl the important problems of Wc stern philosophy. 
And furthermore, Nietzsche also claimed that the purposeful lInderstanding (Zwecke-
sefzende Versfand) in relation to ail Becoming had been discovered by Anaxagoras. 
1,7 Simmel, Deleuze and Müller-Lauter are the Illost important names that come to mind. 
l1X [Nietzsche's eillphasis, P.C.I, KSA Il,26 [64]. 
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Finally, Nietzsche emphasizes that Socrates had reinforced this teleological 
understanding ofBecoming when he had decreed that the morally bad (Schlecht-sein) 
was the un-purposeful (Unzweckmassige). 
ln the next passage, just as in Diefi'ôhliche Wissenschafi, 357, Nietzsche 
acknowledges a closeness to Hegel in terms oFtheir common high valuation of history. 
Of course the se conceptions ofhistory are radically different. But Nietzsche has in 
common with Hegel (and according to Nietzsche with German Idealism and the German 
Geisl in general) this idea ofhistory as deve/opmen/al (although, ifone is precise, one has 
to acknowledge that for Nietzsche history is more cyclical than devclopmental and 
linear): 
Was uns ebenso von Kant, wie von Plato und Leibnitz trennt: wir 
glauben an das Werden allein auch im Geistigen, wir sind 
historisch durch und durch. Dies ist der groBe Umschwung. 
Lamarck und I-Iegel. Darwin ist nur eine Nachwirkung. Die 
Denkweise Herakli/'s und Empedokles' ist wieder erstanden. IJ9 
For Nietzsche, as we can tell l'rom the next passage God is considered to be the 
most annihilating and most life-inimical idea. Attention has been attracted by many 
scholars (among whom Heidegger might be the most illustrious) however that Nietzsche 
relationship to "atheism" is highly ambiguous: 
Ich habe insgleichen ein umgekehrtes Ideal gesucht eine 
Denkweisc, welche die übermüthigste lebendigste und 
weltbejahendste aller moglichen Denkweisen ist: ich l'and sie im 
Zuendedenken der mechanistischen Weltbetrachtung 1: ... ] 
SchlieBlich ergab sich für mich, daB die weltverneinendste aller 
moglichen Denkensarten die ist, welche das Werden, Entstehen 
und Vergehen an sich schon schlecht heiBt und welche nur das 
Unbedingte, Eine, Gewisse, Seiende bejaht: ich lànd, daB Goll der 
vernichtendste und lebensfeindlichste aller Gedanken ist [ ... ] 140 
139 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.C.], KSA /1,341731. 
140 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.!, KSA /1,34 l2041. 
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As r have claimed throughout this section, Becoming is to a certain extent 
instrumentalized by Nietzsche to prove etcrnal recurrence. Somc things have to be 
clarified. Nietzsche's relationship to mechanism and thermodynamics and why he 
thought that Becoming and eternal recurrence could be conceived in relation to the se 
concepts. Mechanism as a cosmology has been overcome by Einsteinian relativity-
cosmology, so what does that do to Nietzsche arguments about Becoming and eternal 
recurrence. 
Nietzsche writes:" Die Philosophie, so wie ich sie allein noch gelten lasse, aIs die 
allgemeinste Form der Historie, ais Versuch das Heraklitische Werden irgendwie zu 
beschreiben und in Zeichen abzukürzen (in cine Art von scheinbarem Sein gleichsam zu 
iibersefzen und zu mumisiren).,,141 The passage is important because it shows that, as l ' 
pointed out, as late as 1884, Nietzsche was still appealing to the authority of Heraclitus to 
ground his understanding of'history and Becoming. The passage is ambiguous though, 
because Nietzsche speaks of foreshortening Becoming into signs and mummifying it into 
a kind of semblance (scheinbarem) ofBeing. Again, the question 1 am asking throughout 
this section is one which ascertains whether the concept of Becoming evolves or changes 
radically with respect to the carly and middle phase oCNietzsche's thought. 
ln my opinion there is no radical change but sorne scholars 1:12 believe that there is 
a permanentization and the introduction of an epoch concept into l3ecoming starting with 
the appearance of eternal recurrence in Nietzsche' s discourse and conceptuaJ ity in the 
Gay Science, Aphorism 341. The majority orthe passages which 1 have been considering, 
in this section, however show that Nietzsche rejected a state of' equilibrium of world-
Becoming. This fact also makes sense from the perspective of my own more general 
141 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.C.], KSA Il,36 [27]. 
J'lè Heidegger is the most famous example who comes to mind. He has introduced this idea of the 
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thesis that the totality ofNietzsche's philosophy can be understood as a philosophy of 
Becoming. In Nietzsche's philosophy, Becoming is finally thought in its greatest 
radicality in the Western metaphysical tradition: without any reference to finality or 
dialecticity. 
The l'ollowing passage is one oCthe most l'amolls in ail ofNietzsche's Nachlass 
and it used to be listed as fragment 1067 in the Will 10 Power. 1 quote t'rom it extensively 
despite its length: 
Und wiBt ihr auch, was mir "die Welt" ist? [ ... ] ais ein Werden, 
das kein Sattwerden, keinen ÜberdruB, keine Müdigkeit kennt-: 
diese meine dionysische Welt des Ewig-sich-selber-Schaffens, des 
Ewig-sich-selber-Zerstürens, diese Geheimnil3-Welt der doppelten 
WollUste, diel3 mein jenseits von Gut und Bose, ohne Zie!. wenn 
nieht im Glück des Kreises ein Zielliegt, olme Willen, wenn nicht 
ein Ring zu sich sel ber guten Willen hat, wollt ihr einen Namen l'Ur 
diese Welt? Eine LdslIl1g l'Ur aIle ihre Rathsel? ein Lichl auch für 
euch, ihr Verborgensten, Starksten, Unerschrockensten, 
Mitternachtlichsten? Diese Weil isl der Wilfe ZlIJ' Machl und 
nichls allf3erdem!" Und auch ihr selber seid dieser Wille zur 
Macht und nichts aul3erdem! 143 
This passage, aside l'rom its rame, is also very important insofar as it ililistrates 
Nietzsches's general outlook on cosmology. The world is a worId of perpetuai change 
that perpetually returns without ever satisfying and fulfilling itself. The only purpose for 
such a worId, ifthere is a purpose at ail, is the happiness of the cirele (Gliick des 
K/'eises). 
The following passage is j~tmous since in it Nietzsche asserts that performs the 
ultimate aet of interpretation is not the human subject but the entity known as will to 
power. "Man darf nicht fragen: "wer interpretirt denn?" sondern das Interpretiren selbst, 
aIs eine Form des Willens zur Macht, hat Dasein (aber nicht ais ein "Sein", sondern ais 
permanent presence and "permanentization" of Beeoming in his Nietzsche lectures. 
I,I~ INietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA Il,38 [12]. . 
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ein ProzejJ, ein Werden) aIs ein Affekt." 144 This interpretation that is construed as will to 
power has existence, according to Nietzsche, but this existence is not something that 
shollld be understood as a form of Being but rather as a process or as Becoming. 
ln general, Nietzsche claims his proximity to I-Iegel's historicization or 
philosophy throllgh the concept Becoming. 145 But here, Nietzsche claims that Hegel's 
philosophy despite its emphasis on history is still too Platonic: 
Der I-Iegelische Allsweg, im Anschllll3 an Plato, ein Stück 
Romantik und Reaktion, zugleich das Symptom des 
historischen Sinns, einer nellen Krafi: der "Geist" selbst ist das sich 
enthüllende und verwirklichende Ideal, im "Prozcf)", im "Werden" 
ofTenbart sich ein immcr Mehr von diesem Ideal, an das wir 
glauben -, also das Ideal verwirklicht sich, der Glaube richtet sich 
auf die Zukunjl, in der er seinem edlcn Bedürfnisse nach anbeten 
kann. Kurz, 
1) Gott ist uns unerkennbar und unnachweisbar -
Hintersinn der erkenntniJ3theoretischen Bewegung 
2) Gott ist nachweisbar, aber aIs etwas Werdendes -, und 
wir gehoren dazu, eben mit unsrem Drang zum Idealen-
I-lintersinn der historisirenden Bewegllng 
bei derselbe historische Sinn, in die Natur übertretend, 
h l, '1 146 al ... 
ln the previous passage we encounter again the relationship between Nietzsche and 
Hegel, his great predecessor. I-Iowever, Nietzsche finds lInacceptable Hegel's theory that 
the absolute idea "realizes" itselfprogressively in history through the rational 
development or Becoming. In connection to this, Nietzsche identiJies some aspects or the 
theological underpinnings ol'I-Iegel's absolute Idealism. At first it seems that God is 
unprovable because of (Kant's) epistemological theory (erkennlnislheorelischen 
Bewegung). Or, it may seem as though I-legel's position is that wc may be able to prove 
the existence of God but not as something that is but as something that becomes. For 
1,1·1 IN ietzsche 's emphasis, P.c. J, KSA 12, 2 [151]. 
1~5 See KSA 7,29 [51]. 
146 fNietzsche's emphasis, P.C.l, KSA 12,2 [165]. 
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Nietzsche this theological attitude orHegel's is due to the innuence of the historical 
sense that oversteps into the realm ofnaturc. Finally, Nietzsche claims that }-Iegel's 
philosophy never achieves a deep critique or the ideal (as handed down f"rom the Platonic 
tradition) and this is perhaps why he claims in the beginning of the passage that in 
connection to Plato's philosophy, Hegel's philosophy is a form ofreaction or perhaps 
even a Romantic regression. 
Nietzsche claims that the Western metaphysical tradition has opposed Being to 
non-Being rather than to Becoming and that this has 1ed to nihilism: "Die logische 
Weltverneinung und Nihilisirung folgt daraus, da/3 wir Sein dem Nichtsein 
1 
entgegensetzen müssen, und da/3 der BegrilT "Werden" geleugnet wird ( .. elwas wird") 
wcnn das Sein---" 147 Note that this passage is fragmentary as the three lines at the end 
indicate (This is the convention that the KSA cditors have adopted). so that wc cannot 
rely on it as much as on a fully published passage that might have been approved by 
N· h ç bl" 148 letzsc e lor pu lcatlOl1. 
1'17INietzsche's emphasis, P.e. l, KS;1 12,9162]. 
14X 1 have 'not discussed the problem ot'the Nachlass extensively but here is my philosophy concerning it: 1 
do not take the Nachlass to be quite as reliable, philosophically, as Nietzsche's published works. We must 
always double-check affirmations in the Nachlass against the published corpus. It'there is ambiguity, the 
published corpus must be the decisive ractor invoked. However, some topics such as nihilism and 
l3ecoming are overwhelmingly t'ound in the Nachlass. In that case, because we do not have the choice, the 
passages of the Nachlass must be given priority and trusted as much as the published corpus. The deeper 
reason for such an interpretative philosophy has to do with the influence ot'the schools ofhermeneutics and 
deconstruction on our interpretative practice. lt is my opinion that these schools have shown that the mens 
al/cloris shou Id not be the most important factor in an interpretative reconstruction ot' an author's thought. 
Thus, the t'act that the mens aucloris is not as strongly represented in the Nachlass as in the published 
corpus is not a strong enough argument to disregard the passages in Ihe Nachlass, especially t'or the themes 
that are under-represented in the published corpus. This problem ot'the how to treat the Nachlass, 
melhodo logically in an interpretation ot' Nietzsche' s thought, has been characterized by Karl Sch lechta as 
the problem of the "Iumpers" and "splitters". The "Iumpers" accept the Nachlass as being as "valid" as the 
published works to develop fertile and legitimate interpretations ofNietzsche's thought. The "splitters" on 
the other hand accept as having interpretative normativity only the published works and are very suspicious 
of any attempts to use the Nachlass in order to develop legitimate interpretations ofN ietzsche's thought. 
According to the previous characterization ofmy position, 1 would have to be characterized as a 'quasi'-
"Iumper". However, throughout this dissertation, 1 have considered the totality of the Nachlass, something 
that is unavoidable given the frequency of the repetition of the concept of Becoming in the Nach/ass. 
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The previous passage is nevertheless important because as 1 have argued before, 
Nietzsche believes that the negation and nihilation of the world cannot come to pass 
because we have opposed to the concept of Seing that the concept of non-Seing, instead 
of opposing to it the concept of Becoming. By opposing the concept of Becoming to the 
traditional Western concept ol'Seing, Nietzsche undermines the whole Western 
metaphysical edifice and in a sense turns it upside down. Heidegger has claimed that this 
inversion ofPlatonism in which Nietzsche seems to merely replace Being with Secoming 
in order to affirm the second term is in fact a mere entrenchment in Platonism and in 
metaphysics. 149 This is where my reading significantly parts ways with Heidegger's 
reading.l believe that Nietzsche develops through his concept of 13ecoming a 
metaphysics of 13ecoming that does not merely replace and invert the philosophy or 
Seing but that rather overcomes and deconstructs ail fonns of Seing. 
Nietzsche wants to oppose Becoming to Seing (since Seing is understood as a 
generalization of (Verallgemcinerung) or not-8ecoming (nichl-werdend» in order to 
criticize the Western metaphysical tradition: 
"Sein" aIs Verallgemeinerung des Begriffs "Lcben" (athmen) 
"beseelt sein, "wollen, wirken" "werden" Gegensatz ist: 
"unbeseelt sein", "nichl-werdend"; "nichl-wollend". Also: es wird 
dem "Seienden" nicht das Nicht-seiende, nichl das Scheinbare, 
auch nicht das Todte entgegengesetzt (denn todtsein kann nur 
d k 150 etwas, as auch leben ann) ... 
This move by Nietzsche is a constant in his attempt to describe the concept of Becoming. 
Nietzsche opposes Secoming to Seing and claims that the Western metaphysical tradition 
has been mistaken in claiming that the opposite ofBeing was non-Being. By putting the 
emphasis on Becoming, Nietzsche deconstructs the concept of Being as permanent 
1,19 "l)ie Umkehrung beseitigt die 1)latonische Grllndstellllng nichl. sondern verfestigt sie gerélde dllrch den 
Ânschein, élis sei sie beseitigt." Heidegger. Niel::.Ic:he 1, r.469. Verlag Günther Ncske. Pflillingen. 1961. 
150 INietzsche's eillphasis, P.e. L KSA 12,91631. 
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presence avant la lettre. The idea that time and space are a perpetuaI becoming already 
anticipates, to a certain extent, I-Ieidegger's claims that the Western philosophical 
tradition has conceived Being as permanent presence. But Becoming is also an essential 
concept when it is related and helps to explain the concept of the ego. 
The next passage shows that Nietzsche believes that the concept of the ego has 
been lifted out of the perpetuaI change and instability of Becoming and projected onto 
Being. Typically, Nietzsche believes that the concept or metaphysical substance is 
something that is psychologically derived l'rom the concept of the ego. We believe in a 
stable ego out of practical survival needs and despite the testimony of our senses and out 
ofthis stability we derive the whole substance-metaphysics: 
Der psychologische Irrthum, aus dem der Gegensatz-Begrirr 
"moralisch" und "unmoralisch" entstanden ist. "selbstlos", 
"unegoistisch", "selbstverleugnend" - alles unreal, fingirt. 
Fehlerhalter Dogmatism in l3etrefT des "ego": dasselbe aIs 
atomistisch genommen, in einem !'alschen Gegensatz zum "Nicht-
ich"; insgleichen aus dem Werden herausgelost, aIs etwas 
Seiendes. Diefalsche Versubstanzia/isirung des !ch: diese (in 
dem Glauben an die individuelle Unsterblichkeit) besonders unter 
dem Druck religios-moralischer Zucht zum Glaubensartikel 
151 gemacht... 
ln the next passage, Nietzsche's concept o!'value is essentially linked to lire and 
13ecoming. Being and beings are "hineingelegt", posited inside 01' Becoming by us. 
Nietzsche also alludes in this passage to two more important concepts for the 
understanding of his fundamental concept of will to power: the Herrschaf/sgebilde 
(constructs of domination) and the Willenspunktationen (punctuations of the will): 
Der Gesichtspunkt des "Werths" ist der Gesichtspunkt von 
Erha/tungs-Steigerungs-Bedingungen in Hinsicht aur complexe 
Gebilde von relativer Dauer des Lebens inrierhalb des Werdens: es 
giebt keine dauerhaften Ietzten Einheiten, keine Atome, keine 
151 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA 12,10 [57]. 
• 
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Monaden: auch hier ist "das Seiende" erst von uns hineingelegl, 
(aus praktischen, nützlichen perspektivischen Gründen): 
"/-Ierrschafts-Gebilde"; die Sphare des Beherrschenden 
fortwahrend wachsend oder periodisch abnehmend, zunehmend; 
oder, unter der Gunst und Ungunst der Umstande (der Ernahrung) 
"Werth" ist wesentlich der Gesichtspunkt für das Zunehmen oder 
Abnehmen dieser herrschai1lichen Centren ("Vielheiten" 
jedenfalls, aber die "Einheit" ist in der Natur des Werdens gar 
nicht vorhanden) ein Quantum Macht, ein Werden, insofern nichts 
darin den Charakter des "Seins" hat;152 
This passage is crucial because it brings together many ofNietzsche's theses. 
According to Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche has a whole "doctrine" (Lehre) 0[' 
I-1errschaftsgebilde. 153 Similarly, the Willenspunklalionen play a very important role in 
Nietzsche's explanation of the nature orthe wi1l to power. What [ want to focus on, 
however is how these concepts relate to the concept or Becoming. The idea that the point 
orview (Gesichlspunkt) of value is that ol'prescrvation-enhancement-conditions 
(Erhallungs-Steigerungs-Bedingungen) in light of complexes of power-formations 
(Gebilde)154 of relative duration oflife within Becoming. 
Thus the power-formations of lire can enhance and "aggregate" themselves within 
Becoming or they can lose power and go under, in which case the y "disaggregate" 
thcmsclves. 'l'hus, increase in power cannot be an aim or a lelos Il'om Becoming sincc 
there is both aggregation of power-structures and disaggregation of these same structures. 
This tension appears in Nietzsche between a wills to power that individually will power 
and the absence of a general, hypostasized goal for the totality of Becoming that is a 
consequence of the teaching or nihilism. 
IS2 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.e. ], KSA 13, 11 173]. 
ISJ Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche, His Philosophy of Contradictions and the Contradictions of His Philosophy, 
De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1999, p.325. 
IS4 "Gebilde" is a complex German word that can be translated into English as "structure", "figure" and 
even ·'image". 
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The power structures that disaggregate themselves constantly go under and re-
surface in new aggregations but the world-totality and Becoming do not aim at anything. 
Nothing is achieved and nothing is reached in Becoming and this is a direct result of the 
teaching ofnihilism. 
Another important aspect of the previous passage is the notion that beings (and 
the meaning ofbeings) is hineingelegt by us. This idea orthe "I-lineinlegung" ofBeing 
and of meaning is important for an important debate that has occurred in the secondary 
1 iterature and which seeks to understand whether Nietzsche can be retrieved for the 
project of philosophical hermeneutics. Hofman and figl 155 have mainly led the discussion 
of the possible hermeneutical affiliations and consequences ol'Nietzsche's thought. ror 
Heidegger and Gadamer who are the main representatives of' philosophical hermeneutics 
in the twentieth-century Being and meaning are ausgelegt, interpreted and discovered 
rather than hineingelegt and created as they seem to be for Nietzsche. 
insolèrn die Ausdrucksmittel der Sprache sind unbrauchbar, um 
das Werden auszudriicken: es gehbrt zu unserem unah/6slichen 
Bedürfnif1 der Erhaltung, bestandig die eine grbbere WeIt von 
B/eibendem, von "Dingen" usw. zu setzcn. Relativ, dürfen wir von 
Atomen und Monaden reden: und gewif3 ist, daJ3 die k/einste 
Web an Dauer die dauerhafteste ist ... es giebt keinen Willen: es 
giebt Willens-Punktationen, die bestandig ihre Macht mehren oder 
verlieren. 156 
The concept of Willens-Punktationen is very important and must be put in relation to 
Nietzsche's concepts or Kraficentren and Machtwi/len. The quantas of power are 
distributed in world-Becoming according to a matrix of centre of l'orce and power-
centers, These centers of force are also what Nietzsche caUs punctuations of the will 
(Willens-Punktationen). These configurations ofpower-wills and wills to power are so 
155 Johann Figl, Interpretation ais phi/osophisches Prin:::ip, De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1982, and 
Johann Nepomuk I-Iof'man, Wahrheit. Perspektive. Interprelalion. Nietzsche und die philosophische 
I-Iermeneulik, de Gruytcr, Berlin, New York, 1994. 
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distributed that the y exist only in their expression. They are, practically speaking, so 
infinitely small and so chaotically distributed that they only exist through the dynamic 
expression oftheir activity. 
Nietzsche writes: "Der Sinn des Werdens muB in jedem Augenblick crfüllt, 
erreicht, vollendet sein.,,157 The meaning or Becoming has to be fulfilled, realized and 
perfected in every instant (Augenblick) as is clearly asserted by Nietzsche. So here, 
Nietzsche admits that Becoming has a meaning when he speaks of the "Sinn des 
Werdens". This contradicts KSA J 3, Il [991, where Nietzsche claims l.hat Becoming ail11s 
at nothing and that the meaning or Becoming is only hineingeJegl. It is important to 
clari1'y the problem of the "meaning o1'Becoming" in Nietzsche's thought since this will 
allow us to understand if Nietzsche can be claimed for the hermeneutical project as sorne 
commentators (Horman and Figl mainly) have done. 
KSA J 3, Il [82.1 is related to KSI1 J 3, Il r72] in which Nietzsche claims that: 
"das Werden mliB gerechtrertigt erscheinen in jedem Augenblick (oder lInabwerthbar: 
was auf Eins hinausHiuft); es darf absolut nicht das Gegenwartige UI11 cines Zukünfligen 
wegen oder das Vergangene um des Gegenwartigen willen gerecht1'ertigt werden." The 
notion ofajustiJication is related to the one ormeaning and fultillment. Ir the meaning of 
I3ecoming is ful1illed in every moment (l1ugenblick) then it is possible to believe that it is 
also justi fied in every moment. The three aspects of time, the past, the present and the 
future must exist according to Nietzsche's vision as per1'ectly independent 1'rom each 
other. They are not exstatically unified. Each aspect exists independently: the past does 
notjustify the present and the present does notjustify the future. 
ln the next citation, Nietzsche contrasts the will to semblancc, illusion and 
156 [Nielzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA /3,11 [73]. 
157 KSA /3, Il [821. 
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Becoming with that to truth and l3eing, and argues that the former is deeper and more 
mctaphysical th an the will to truth and to l3eing: "Der Wille zum Schein, zur Illusion, zur 
Tauschung, zum Werden und Wechseln ist tiefer, "metaphysischer" aIs der Wille zur 
Wahrheit, zur Wirklichkeit, zum Sein: die Lust ist ursprünglicher aIs der Schmerz; der 
Ietztere ist selbst nul' die Folge cines Willens zur Lust" 158 This passage is not so 
surprising given what we know ofNietzsche's l'irst Romantic period, but it is surprising 
that ev en so late in his philosophical carcel' (1887-1889), Nietzsche still preserves this 
evaluation orthe couples semblance, Becoming and truth, Seing almost unchanged. For 
Nietzsche reality/actuality (Wirklichkeit) is inconsistent and false. This makes difficult 
and problematic the identification of will to power and eternal recurrence that is claimed 
b Il . d' l' h /. [' . 159 Y - CI egger 1\1 terms o· t e aClualing. aclua Ily 0 eterl1lty. 
Nietzsche alludes to the circular nature of Becoming. The fact that Becoming is 
intcrpreted as a ring and as something that can be stabilized by the concept of eternal 
recurrence of the same is instrumental in I-leidegger's reading of Nietzsche: 
Wenn das Werden ein groBer Ring ist, so ist Jegliches gleich werth, ewig, 
nothwendig ... In allen Correlationen von.Ta und Nein, von Vorziehen und 
Abweisen, Lieben und Hassen drückt sich nur cine Perspektive, ein 
Interesse bestimmter Typen des Lebens aus: an sich redet Alles, was ist, 
160 das .Ta. 
This passage is important because it shows that the circularity of Bccoming, its ring-likc 
nature makes everything equal, eternal and neccssary. This circularity of Becoming is 
connected to the circularity ofeternal recurrence orthe same in which the rotation of 
I3ecoming creates a "permanentization" of I3ecoming. This is I-Ieidegger's reading of 
158 KSA /3,14 [18]. 
159 "Die Augenblicklichkeit des Schafrens ist das Wesen der wirklichen, wirkenden Ewigkeit, die ihre 
hochste Scharfe und Weite gewinnt ais der Augenblick der Ewigkeit der Wiederkunft des Gleichen." 
Heidegger, op. cil. p.467. "The' momentary' character of creation is the essence of actual, actuating 
eternity, which achieves its greatest breadth and keenest edge as the moment ofetcrnity in the return orthe 
same." Heidegger, Nielzsche 2, p.203. 
160 KSA 13, 14 [3 1]. 
Becoming which ta a certain extent reifies the Iluid and impermanent Becoming of 
Nietzsche's thought. 
Conclusion 
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What differentiates the usage of the concept or Becoming in the late works and in the 
Nachlass of that period, is the fact that Becoming is instrumentalized in order to prove 
the doctrine of the eternal recurrence orthe same. In the early writings, Becoming is 
associated with a romantic metaphysics that still believes that sulTering is the essence or 
aIl Being. Being and Becoming are both a semblance (Schein) 1ha1 is secreted l'rom the 
Schopenhauerian Ureinen. Teleology is not ye1 removed l'rom Becoming in the early 
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writings. The negative telos of the early works is the increase in suffering. The will is still 
accepted as noumenon and Nietzsche has not yet criticized the two-world theory that 
Schopenhauer inherits l'rom Kant (the dichotomy Ding-an-sich, phenomenon) and Plato 
(ldea, beings). ln the late works, the two-world theory has been completely given up and 
the telos has been removed l'rom Becoming. This is a result of the critical middle-phase in 
which Nietzsche becomes aware of the problematic nature of the Ding-an-sich, 
phenomenon dichotomy. (See Hal-l, Book l, Chapter 1) ln the late phase ofNietzsche's 
thought, Becoming is the thought that is used at once to prove etemal recurrence and also 
to bridge the gap between the will to power and eternal recurrence. 
Nietzsche claims that the telos of Becoming is used to find a stable end-state. 
From this end-state, a second, metaphysical world is projected on the beyond. By 
opposing the end-state ofBecoming, Nietzsche manages to definitively criticize 
metaphysies: this is the les son of the History ofan Error. But there is a paradox here. 
Eternal recurrence is a highly metaphysical concept. Every moment recurs and yet passes 
on. By attempting to think through the mystery of time, eternal recurrence sinks into the 
core of metaphysical thought. The only way every time-instant can recur and at the same 
time pass, is iftime is thought on the model ofa circle and by opposing it to the linear-
spatial time arrow or series. Eternal recurrence can only be conceived i [time is spatially 
understood as circular (see Zarathustra). But lime in Nietzsche is al ways tied to the 
concept of Becoming. Becoming is constituted by the configuration of time, space and 
matter. This is the cosmological and quasi-physical aspect ofBecoming, which is absent 
from Nietzsche's early works. The strongest argument for eternal recurrence is that time 
being infini te (and circular), space being finite, matter being finite i.e. the sum or the 
space-time configurations are finite. Since the world-Becoming passes through ail the 
possible space-matter configurations in an infinite time, this entails the eternal-recurrence 
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or ail space-matter con figurations. This argument is purely cosmological and physical but 
it has mctaphysical implications. 
98 
Section 2: Critical Analysis of the Secondary Litterature 
2.1 Critique of Heidegger's Interpretation of Nietzsche 
Heidegger's essential insight into Nietzsche's metaphysics can be seen to be the 
thesis of the unit y orthe eternal recurrence and will to power. This insight is important 
because it allows us to see Nietzsche's philosophy in a systematic light that was 
previously unavailable to us. Heidegger complements this thesis with a second 
alTirmation which pertains to the dialectical nature ofNietzsche's thought and this allows 
Heidegger to reduce Nietzsche to the thought of his great predecessor and antipode, 
Hegel. Despite such an honor for Nietzsche, it still does not do justice to his originality 
with respect to Hegel. Deleuze has already pointed out the problematical nature of such a 
reduction.\6\ 
However, J believe that it is worthwhile to return to examine the Heideggerian reading 
because even though Deleuze has clearly identified what distinguishes Nietzsche l'rom 
Hegel, Deleuze's reading has not focused enollgh on clarifying how Nietzsche views the 
concept of Becoming differently th an Hegel. 
My thesis in this section will be that the unification of the thoughts of eternal 
recurrence and will to power is done through what Heidegger calls a "permanentization" 
or 13ecoming. This permanentization or 13ecoming is to a certain ex te nt a reification\62 or 
Nietzsche's more ll11id concept or Becoming but I-Ieidegger's interpretation is 
nonetheless fruitful and productive. This is the case because Heidegger claims that 
161 Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, p.280, PUF, Paris, 1973. 
16è Reification is not understood in Marx's (the most famous uses are in the Critique o(Poli/ical Econol11y 
and in 7he Eco/1omie Manuscrisp/s) and Lukaes' lamous re-apropriation from 1923 in His/ory and Class 
Consciousness. Il is rather understood as a fixation and a stripping of dynamism that does evoke the 
originalmeaning ofreification i.e. the turning ot'something abstract or fluid and dynamic into a eoncrete 
and stab le th ing. 
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Nietzsche is still operating, despite his tluid concept ofBecoming, with the traditional 
metaphysical concept of time that is conceived in terms of the temporality of the present. 
Heidegger's fundamental contribution to the debate that was going on in the 
1930's in Nietzsche scholarship around the relationship between will to power and the 
eternal recurrence of the same is to have established that there must be a unit y between 
these two coneepts. 'T'his fact has been contested in the literature after Heidegger's 
interpretation, On the one hand Derrida's reading of Nietzsche is explicitly anti-
Heideggerian insofar as it refuses to see in the eternal recurrence of the same and in 
Nietzsche's thought in general any trace oftotality, even the totality of fragments or of 
aphorisms,163 On the other hand, Müller-Lauter has altracted attention to the fact that 
thinking the inner unit y of will to power and eternal recurrence of the same by associating 
them to essentia (will to power) and exÎsfenfia (eternal recurrence of the same) is highly 
problematical. 164 
The thesis of the unit y of eternal recurrence and will to power is most clearly set 
out in a text from 1939 ca lied the Elernal Recurrence o./the Sarne and the Will 10 Power. 
'This text made up the lwo concluding texts to the lecture the Wille zur Machl ols 
Erkenntnis l65 but was never dclivcred. The unit y orthe two concepts is also apparent in 
Heideggcr's essay Nietzsche 's Melaphysics and so this text will also serve as a basis for 
the construction of my rcading. 
Will to power is made up of sorne fundamental aspects. These aspects arc truth, 
play of forces, conditions of enhancemcnt and preservation, life and art. 1 will try to 
indicate as much as possible what Heidegger says about Nietzsehe's philosophy when 
1", See Derrida, Spurs. Nietzsche 's St y/es, quoted in Ernst l3ehler. Nietzsche-Derrida. Derrida-Nietzsche, 
Confrontations, p. 113, Stanford University Press, Stan fard. 1988. 
16,1 Wolfang Müller-Lauter, in Oher Werden und Wille zlir Macht, 
Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1999, note 64, p.47, 
165 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche 1. 
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the se claims are not obvious l'rom a Nietzschean point of view. Heidegger believes 
Nietzsche to be a thinker of a single thought. For him, this single thought is the thought of 
will to power as what constitutes the basic character of beings. 166 Furthermore, Heidegger 
claims that Nietzsche is a thinker who sa ys that ail being is ultimately will to power. In 
order to show that will to power is Nietzsche's single thought, Heidegger notoriously 
decides to focus his reading on the posthumously published Will /0 Power. 
Heidegger begins by stating that will and power are, for Nietzsche, two aspects of 
the same thing. Will is somelhing which seeks to increase itselr, to overcome itself Will 
always wills to be more. Similarly, power is something which is inherently oriented 
towards its own enhancement. Power is viscerally oriented towards more power, towards 
its own expansion. 
lt is important to understand that l'or Heidegger, will to power, which he interprets 
as the concept of Being, is an ontological notion. Insofar as Heidegger wishes to 
understand will to power both as an ontological notion and as Nietzsche's one and only 
thought, he must, to a certain extent, reduce Nietzsche's thought to ontology. But it is not 
obvious that this can be done without disregarding important aspects ofNietzsche's 
thought. 
The second part of my summary olî-leidegger's Nietzsche interpretation deals 
with Heidegger's analysis ofNietzsche's eternal recurrence and its relationship to will to 
power, as expounded both in the lecture given during the summer of the year 1937 called 
the E/erna! Recurrence oj'/he Same. The sections of the, Derna! Recurrence oj'the Same 
166 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche /, p.12, (Heidegger, M., Nietzsche, Vol.l , pA) Whether Nietzsche 's one and 
essential thought is will to power or the eternal recurrence orthe same is not altogether clear in l-Ieidegger's 
work. There does seem to be a stronger emphasis on the eternal recurrence orthe same as Heidegger's 
Interpretation progresses. This is what makes a definitive evaluation of Heidegger's work on Nietzsche so 
difficult. Heidegger's Interpretation is highly evolutive and even at times approaches Incoherence. ln Was 
heissl Denken, it seems like the eternal recurrence has attained a certain pre-eminence over will to power. 
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lecture which J consider to be key to summarizing Heidegger's interpretation are sections 
12, 13, and 14, and accordingly, 1 have focused my reading on them. 
1 will analyze the reconstruction given by Heidegger in the lecture course entitled 
The E/erna/ Recurrence of/he Same. This reconstruction does not focus so much on the 
notion or will to power. Will to power is, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche's original 
way of re-thinking the concept of Becoming. Heidegger begins by asserting that the 
general character of force yields the finitude ofBeing and its Becoming. It must be said 
that Nietzsche never explicitly writes this. At most Nietzsche c1aims that the generaI 
concept or lèHce is finite and that the concept of matter is finite but he never conc1udes 
that Being and 8ecoming are finite as Heidegger c1aims. 
I-Iowever, from the thesis orthe finitude of8eing and 8ecoming it follows 
according to Heidegger that the advance and progress of cosmic occurrence into infinity 
is impossible. This in turn implies that the world's l3ecoming must turn back onto itsel[ 
But a thesis identi l'ied by Heidegger in Nietzsche's Nach/as.\' (this thesis is also expressed 
poetically in Yom Gesicht und rUitsel in 7hu.\' SjJoke Zara/hus/ra) implies that the world's 
becoming runs backward and forward in endless (infinite) time as real time. Again this 
thesis is more or less grounded in Nietzsche's Nachlass. Nietzsche c1aims in the Nachlass 
that an infinite regress is not an impossibility whereas an infinite progress is something 
illogical and unthinkable and he relers to Eugen Dühring critical1y in this context. 167 
1"7 "1 ... 1 Man hat neuerdings mehrfach in dem 13egriff Zeit-Unendlichkeit der Welt nach hinten einen 
Widerspruch lïnden gewollt: man hat ihn selbst gefunden, um den Preis freilich, dabei <dell> Kopfmit dem 
Schwanz ZlI verwechseln. N ichts kann m ich hindern, von d iesem A ugenb 1 ick an rückwarts rechnend zu 
sagen "ich werde nie dabei an ein Ende kommen": wie ich yom gleichen Augenblick vorwarts rechnen 
kan n, ins Unendliche hinaus. Erst wenn ich den Fehler Illachen wollte - ich werde mich hüten, es zu thun-
d iesen correkten Begri ff eines regressus in in fin itum gleichzusetzen III it einem gar nicht vollziehbaren 
l3egrilTeines unendlichen progressus bisjetzt, wenn ich die Richtung (vorwarts oder ri.ickwarts) ais logisch 
indifferent setzte, wi.irde ich den Kopr, diesen Augenblick, ais Schwélnz zu fassen bekommen: das bleibe 
Ihnen überlassen, mein Herr Dühring l " KSA /3, 14 IlS8\. The following translation is given by Kaufmann 
in Will/o Powel' 1066: "Lately on has sought several times to find a contradiction in the concept "temporal 
infinit)' of the world in the pas!" (regressus in infinitulll): one has even round il. although at the cost of 
confusing the head with the tail. Nothing can prevent me l'rom reckoning backward l'rom this moment and 
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However, Heidegger claims that the finite Becoming which runs its course in such 
infinite time must have achieved some kind of homeostasis or equilibrium since the unite 
possibilities ofBecoming must be exhausted in the infinite 1l0w ofreal time. This claim 
by Heidegger is also problematical since Nietzsche, at least in the early works on the pre-
Socratics (most notably in "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks") states that 
becoming is eternal, infinite and absolute. It is possible that in the later Nachlass, a 
finitization and permanentization of Becoming could be produced through the application 
or the character 0[' Being onto 13ecoming. But this thesis pre-supposes that Becoming can 
be ultimately reduced to the thought or Being in Nietzsche's thought. This is not obvious 
from a Nietzschean point of view. 
Nietzsche affirms that since no homeostasis of the state of Becoming has been 
achieved, this means that no such state or equilibrium can ever be achieved. This implies 
that the world is in permanent Becoming: it turns back on itselCand llows into an eternal 
becoming. But since this cosmic Becoming takes place continuously and does not cease 
whenever its finite possibilities are exhausted this pre-supposes that it must have repeated 
itself and that this repetition has occurred an infinite number oftimes. Since this 
I3ecoming is permanent, it will continue to repeat itsellïn the future. But sincc the world 
totality is l'inite in the configurations of its f3ecoming as asscrted in another thesis found 
by Heidegger in Nietzsche's Nachlass, the possibilities of transformation in its collective 
character are finite as weIl. Because the nexus of effects among the various processes of 
Becoming is a closed nexus, every single process of Becoming must draw the entire past 
in its wake. Alternatively, since the process of Becoming works its effects ahead, it must 
saying "1 shall never reach the end"; just as 1 can reckon lorward t'rom the same moment into the inlinite. 
Only il' 1 made the mistake-I shall gllard against it-ot'eqllating this correct concept ofa regresslls in 
infinitum with an utterly unrealizable concept of a linite progressus IIp ta this present. only it' 1 suppose the 
that the direction (fOl'ward or backward) is logically a matter ot' indit'ference, would 1 take the head-this 
moment-for the tail: 1 shailleave that to you, my dear I-Ierr Dühring!-" 
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propel ail things forward. This in turn entails that every process of' Becoming must 
reproducc itselr. Thus the eternal recurrence of the totality of world Becoming must be a 
recurrence of the sam e. 168 
There is a tension in the previous argument. On the one hand, Nietzsche believes 
that there is no equilibrium in the state of world-movement (or world-Becoming). This 
means that what returns or recurs is becoming and not Being. I-Jowever, Heidegger is 
interested in showing that Being and Becoming are finite and that a permanentization or 
Becoming is operated through the thought of the eternal recurrence. This argument has 
been contested in the literature on Nietzsche, mainly by Gilles Deleuze in Nietzsche et la 
philosophie. 169 [ will elaborate in Section 3.4 on how Deleuze criticizes Heidegger. 
J wOl..lld like now to critically examine I-Ieidegger's interpretation of the unit y 
between will to power and the eternal recurrence orthe same and show how this unit y is 
grounded in the "permanentization" of Becoming. Heidegger's thesis about this unit y is 
not explained very thoroughly in his Nietzsche lectures. Heidegger writes: 
Der Wille zur Macht wird jetzt begreifbar ais Bestandigung der 
Überhohung, d.h. des Werdens, und somit ais gewandelte 
Bestimmung des metaphysischen Leitenentwurfs. Die ewige 
Wiederkehr des Gleichen tragt gleichsam ihr Wesen ais standigste 
Bestandigung des Werdens des Standigen vor sich her. 170 
16~ How does the previous dialectic oFwill to power and eternal recurrence (because that's the way 
Heidegger treats it, in dialectical Fash ion, wh ich in itsel F might be a dislorl ion of Nietzsche's thought) fit in 
with the Nietzschean argument that there cannot be an equilibrium in the state orthe world quoted by 
Heidegger in vo!'1 : 
1) iFthere had been a state or equilibriulll in the world it would have been reached by now 
2) it has not been reached (What kind oFcritcria need to be applied here logical, phenomenological, 
scientifico-empirical 7) hence 
3) there cannot be such astate oFequilibrium 7 
169 Deleuze, G., op.cil., p.81. 
170 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche Il, p.14. (Heidegger, Nietzsche, VoU, p.167). "Will to power may now be 
conceived ofas the permanentizing oFsurpassment, that is, ofbecoming; hence as a transformed 
determination oFthe guiding metaphysical projection. The eternal recurrenee oFthe same unfurls and 
displays its essence, so to speak, as the most constant permanentizing of the becoming oF what is constant." 
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The fact that will to power may be conceived as the permanentizing of surpassment 
(Überhohung) and as a transformed determ ination of the guiding metaphysical projection 
is what is truly revolutionary in Nietzsche's philosophy according to Heidegger. The 
permanentization ofBecoming and the fact that it grounds the unification ofwill to 
power and the eternal recurrence of the sa me is what allows Heidegger to claim that 
Nietzsche completes the Western metaphysical tradition. However, insofar as Nietzsche 
still thinks time as presence and as permanence, he stands clearly, according to 
Heidegger, within Western metaphysics. 
This idea of permanentization of becoming is related by Heidegger to the concept 
of "presencing". Presencing and the permanentization of presencing (Anwesenheit) 
correspond to the concept of time that metaphysics operates with. Thus Heidegger 
identifies in Nietzsche's philosophy a reification of the concept ofBecoming and of the 
concept of time that he sees present in the metaphysical tradition as a whole. This 
reification of lime and Becoming in Nietzsche's philosophy is even more clearly 
articulated by l-leidegger in Was heisst J)enken where Heidegger claims that Nietzsche 
still operates with the discrete concept of time-instants (jetzt-Zeit) of the tradition. 171 
Heidegger does something like a genealogy of the Was-sein (what-Being) and the 
Dass-sein (that-Being) in the history of metaphysics (especially in Plato and Aristotle). 
Heidegger shows the unification that he operates between will to power and eternal 
recurrence of the same in the following way: 
lm voraus sind die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen und der Wille 
zur Macht ais Grundbestimmungen des Seienden im Ganzen und 
aIs solchen begrifTen, und zwar der Wille zur Macht aIs die 
endgeschichtliche Pragung des Was-seins, die ewige Wiederkehr 
des G1eichen aIs die des Dass-seins. 172 
171 Heidegger, M., WC/s heisst f)enkcn, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1954, p.78, fi'om now this book 
will be referred to as Was heisst f)cnkcn. 
17:' Heidegger, M., Nietzsche Il, p.14. (Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.3, p.168). "Trom the outset, the eternal 
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If l understand Heidegger's position correctly, will to power and eternal 
recurrence constitute a unit y because these two thoughts both constantly refer to aspects 
of Being and Becoming. Heidegger sometimes scems to want to identify will to power 
with Becoming and the eternal recurrence with Being. But what allows Heidegger to 
affirm that will to power and eternal recurrence say the selfsame thing is the fact that 
there is a relation between will to power, eternal recurrence and the permanentization of 
l3ecoming. 
H' will to power seems to be sOl11ctimes identificd with Bccoming, it also is the 
"Being of beings" according to Heidegger's reading. Eternal recurrence seems to be 
identified with Being ("that everything recurs is the closest approximation of a world of 
becoming to a world ofBeing,,173 as Nietzsche puts its) but it is also an attempt, 
according to Heidegger, by Nietzsche to unite Being and Becoming, action and reaction 
into a single thought. l'hus we cannot clearly map Becoming to will to power and Being 
to eternal recurrence. This would also be surprising since will to power corresponds to 
essen/ia and eternal recurrence to exis/en/ia and it seems that Being and essen/ia and 
Bccoming and exis/enlia should be paired together rather than the opposite.1 74 The only 
way to unify the two thoughts together secms to be alTorded by noticing that they both 
refer to the permanen/iza/ion or Becoming. 
recurrence of the same and wi Il to power are grasped as fundamenta 1 determinations or 13eings as such and 
as a whole-will to power as the peculiar coinage or 'what-13eing' at the historic end, and eternal recurrence 
orthe same as the coinage or'that-Being'." 
m For German original sec KSA 12, 7 [54]. For English translation, see Wi// la Power, 617. 
174 Heidegger would like to identify the origin orthe distinction between essenlia and exislenlia. He 
analyzes the Aristotelian distinction between ollsia. morphe and hy/e but concludes that the distinction 
between essenlia and exislenlia cannot be simply traced back to these Aristotelian distinctions. Heidegger 
wishes to point out that the distinction between essenlia and exis/en/ia vanishes and is destroyed at the end 
ormetaphysics. The problem is that such a distinction cannot be Illaintained in the wake orthe being, 
which we ourselves arc and which Heidegger calls Dasein. Irthe substance or Dasein is existence, 
Heidegger wants to characterize this word and concept as a productive-intentional comportillent and not in 
the way that the medieval Scholastics understood exislenlia. When it comes to the whatness or essenlia of 
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ln fact it is my thesis that Heidegger ultimately identifies will to power with 
etcrnal recurrence in order to develop his concept of onto-thcology. 
Heidegger's Nietzsche reading is without a doubt strong. What makes it so 
fascinating is that at the same time as it sheds unprecedented light on Nietzsche's 
philosophy, it also manages to show how this philosophy is an Auseinandersetzung with 
ail orthe Western philosophical and metaphysical tradition. But an important question 
that needs to be answered is how, within Nietzsche scholarship, we can progress with 
respect to I-Ieidegger's Nietzsche reading ? 
1 have already mentioned at the beginning ofthis section that Heidegger believes 
he can criticize Nietzsche because Nietzsche still functions with a reified, traditional 
concept oCtime that conceives ol'temporality as presence. Surely, there are traces of 
"permanentization" and "presencing" in Nietzsche's thought. This permanentization is 
introduced in Nietzsche's conceptuality through the thought of eternal recurrence of the 
same. But for Nietzsche what recurs as such is becoming as infinite and impermanent 
and not Being. This has been identified by Deleuze when he c1aims that "Revenir, l'être 
de tout ce qui devient".1?5 The same that recurs in eternal recurrence is not the identical. 
Heidegger has c1arified the distinction between the same and the identical in The Onto-
Theological Constitution orMetaphysics 176 , he writes: 
But the same is not the merely idcntical. In the merely identical, 
difference disappears. ln the same, the difference appears and 
appears ail the morc pressingly, the more resolutely thinking is 
concerned with the same matter in the sa me way. 
Heidegger, Lukacs and Jaspers ail believed that ultimately the eternal recurrence 
of the same had to point to the priority of Being in Nietzsche's thought over becoming. Il 
Dasein, Heidegger again specifies that this term cannot apply to Dasein. Rather Dasein can be 
characterized by its "whoness" not by its "whatness". 
175 Deleuze, G., op. cil., p.54. 
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is only with Deleuze that Nietzsche scholarship advanced beyond thinking the eternal 
recurrence of the same in terms ofBeing. 
An important aspect ofDeleuze's reading is his clarification of the problem of the 
critique of the initial state and final state ofworld-movement or world-becoming. This 
problcm is one of the most interesting rocuses or potential research on the concept or 
Becoming in the Nietzschean Nachlass. 177 With this problem Deleuze reconstructs 
Nietzsche's conception of the eternal recurrence in an entirely original way with respect 
to Heidegger. For Deleuze returning is the Being ofbecoming. ("Revenir, l'être de tout 
ce qui devient.,,178) Thus, Deleuze manages to show against Heidegger (and indirectly 
against Lukacs and Jaspers) that the l.hought of eternal recurrence is not a thought that 
pertains to Seing or to the question of Being but to Becoming. To become is to recur or 
return and to return or to recur is to become: this is Nietzsche's fundamental teaching of 
eternal recurrence of the same. 
Heidegger writes in WC/.\' heis.\'1 denken: "Der Wille wird li'ei yom Widrigen des 
"Es war", wenn cr die sHindige Wiederkehr von allem "Es war" will. Der Wille ist cria st 
vom Widerwillen, wenn er die standige Wiederkehr des Gleichen will.,,179 But this 
transition that Heidegger makes From the "Es war" (it was) to the "Gleichen" (same) is 
not logically justified. The "it was" is neither fixed nor fixable and does not possess the 
permanentizable structurc orthe same that mediates between the concepts of unit y and 
idcntity. 
176 Heidegger, M., The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics, in Iden!i!y and Difference, Harper 
& Row, New York, 1969, translation Stambaugh, J., ppA2-76, pA5. 
177 See Nietzsche, F., KSA 13, 1111521 and KSA 13, Il 1721. 
178 Deleuze G., op.cil.. p.54. 
17q Heidegger. M., Was heiss! Denken, pA3, "The will becomes free fromlhe contrariety orthe 'it was' 
when il wills the constant recurrence orall 'it was'. The will is redeemed l'rom ill-willing when it wills the 
constant recurrence 0 f the same. 
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1 believe that Deleuze has made some fundamental progress with respect to 
Heidegger when he claims that what returns is not the same as Being but Becoming as 
difference. This Deleuzian construal has the disadvantage ofbeing perhaps a bit more 
distant from Nietzsche's original lormulation of his thought as the eternal recurrence or 
the same, but 1 believe that it makes more sense l'rom the point of view of the 
Nietzschean conceptuality. 
Nietzsche's analysis ofhuman psychology is operated through a critique of the 
historical phenomenon or Christian morality. The discussion or nihilism is also 
developed starting l'rom this critique. Nietzsche operates what he calls a genealogy of 
morals. Nietzsche's great struggle is to liberate humanity l'rom the straits and bounds of 
Christian morality also described as the morality of pit y in his language. The meaning of 
the eternal recurrence ofthe'same is to l'Tee man l'rom his existential culpability. Man is 
guilty in virtue ot'the finitude ofhis existence. !-le owes something to himselfin virtue of 
the lact that he possesses a future: he is, ek-sistant, but he has to become. He is torn in 
his fundamental state of ek-sistant between the past and the future: he must in a certain 
way co-exist between the two temporal extremes of the pa st and the future. There seem 
to be two variants of Nietzsche' thought on guilt : an ontological one and an existential 
one. 
Nietzsche criticizes the transcendence that is present in both the Christian world-
vicw and in the socialist utopian and revolutionary world-view by uniting them in the 
concept of Transzendenz. Heidegger himself seems to have criticized Nietzsche for his 
immanentism. This immanentism that seems to install will to power as technological 
will-to-will is elaborated starting ['rom the concepts ofli[e and position or values. It is 
not clear whether Heidegger had l'ully overcome this Nietzschean immanentism as early 
as Being and rime (since the philosophy expounded in that text sought to preserve certain 
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transcendental moments) but it is clear that the rest of his philosophy arter the thirties ( 
and especially in the Beilrâge zur Philosophie) is an effort to recover a transcendenee 
that, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche's philosophy had partially annihilated. As an 
excellent Heidegger commentator has put it : 
This alone suggested that it was Christianity once again that 
challenged the thought of this man (Heidegger, P.c.) and he Id him 
in suspense; it was once again the old transcendence and not the 
modern worldliness (Diesseitigkeif) that spoke through him. 180 
Thus, value-positing is definitely criticized by Heidegger in Nietzsche's word : God is 
dead when Heidegger asserts that thinking in values does not let T3eing be ("das Denken 
im Werte Idsst nicht das Sein sein "). The concept of life ( Leben ) is highly problematic 
and seems to succumb to J-Ieidegger's critique ofNietzsche's biologism. This is not 
clearly indicated in Heidegger but it must be retained that the openneness of Being and 
truth as aletheia elaborate a Heideggerian transcendence. There is no doubt that 
Nietzschean immanence or immanentism is aimed at by Heidegger when he criticizes the 
will-to-will, the Gestel! and the Bes/and. The Being oftechnology is already articulated 
by Nietzsche according to Heidegger and this Being is conceptualized starting solely 
l'rom immanence. As a brilliant Heidegger commentator has put it : 
... as Heidegger makes Nietzsche's words his own, he substitutes , 
within the' history of Being , the contemporary technological 
moment for the Nietzschean moment ( ... ) the evidence for it is to 
be round throughout J-Ieidegger's texts on Nietzsche: they speak 
formally about Nietzsche but materially about technology as the 
closing field in the history of presence, as ' the release of being 
into machination', but they do so with the help or the vocabulary 
taken fi'om Nietzsche. IRI 
180 Gadamer, H.-G., Heidegger's Ways, Being, SRirit,God, translated by Stanley, J., Albany, State 
University of New York Press, 1994, p.182. 
181 Schürmann R., Heidegger on Being and Acting: From Principles la Anarchy, p.182. Heidegger also 
develops his vocabulary about technology through the intercourse with Ernst ]ünger's works (Der Arbeiter, 
Die lolale Mobilmachung) which he was reading with some ofhis students in the early 30's at f'reiburg 
University. 
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We can perhaps affirm that Heidegger does not give an accurate portrayal ofNietzsche's 
philosophy as such. But he might be right in seeing in him the completion of 
metaphysics. The l'act that Heidegger does not completely do justice to Nietzsche's 
philosophy has bcen clearly brought out in the interpretation that has been proposed by 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter. 
Thus Heidegger's reading is brilliant because it inserts Nietzsche's thought in the 
context of the Western tradition which according to Heidegger is completed by 
Nietzsche. However, his interpretation does not read Nietzsche only from within 
Nietzsche's text and conceptuality, as Müller-Lauter consistently does. 
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Conclusion 
Heidegger was right in seeing in Nietzsche a great metaphysician to a certain 
extent. His was an original reading of Nietzsche. But Heidegger inevitable historicized 
Nietzsche. He pushed Nietzsche into his his metaphysical-hermeneutical frame of 
interpretation because he had an agenda. This agenda was the overcoming of his 
particular understanding of metaphysics as onto-theology. However as 1 have tried to 
show elsewhere in this dissertation, there are moral and political theses as weil in 
Nietzsche and this aspect has been neglected by Heidegger. Ultimately, however, 1 also 
believe that Nietzsche has to be read as an anti-speculative, anti-Hegelian, anti-idealistic, 
anti-metaphysical thinker. This is due to Nietzsche's deep Heracliteanism which 1 think is 
missed byHeidegger. 
The idea that Nietzsche possesses an (anti-metaphysical) metaphysic and that this 
(anti-metaphysical) metaphysics completes Western metaphysics is certainly interesting. 
But in my opinion the object ofthis metaphysics is not so much will to power as the 
concept of Becoming. Because l3ecoming is ultimately contradictory and in-coherent, this 
mctaphysics of Bccoming contradicts itsel rand moves into its immediate opposite which 
is an anti-metaphysics. 
Will to power may be the ultimate factum to which we come as is claimed by 
Nietzsche but Becoming, change and movement are certainly more important facts for 
Nietzsche's philosophy. 1 have sought throughout this dissertation to show that Nietzsche 
eliminates the concept of teleology t'rom within Becoming. This move puts him at odds 
with his great predecessors of German Idealism, Schelling and Hegel. But this move also 
cornes into conflict with Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche that sees a conti nuit y between 
the absolute subjectivity of Idealism and the inverted and complete subjectivity which is 
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at work in Nietzsche's philosophy. This is the case because the absolute subjectivity of 
idealism only completes and stabilizes itselfthrough teleology. Nietzsche's inverted 
subjectivity of wi Il to power is in constant movement and change and this change has no 
ultimate goal or purpose: there is no completion of subjectivity in Nietzsche. At most 
thcre exists an inversion but this inversion is an inversion of an inversion. The inversion 
is infinite in Nietzsche: it is not arrested in Being but becomes indefinitely. 
Müller-Lauter writes: 
Heidegger has thus made the will to power a metaphysical 
principle unfolding out ofitself, although remaining by itselfand 
indeed returning to its own origin. He seeks thereby to 
demonstrate "the inner relation ofNietzsche's will to power to 
Aristotle's dunal11is, energeia, and enlefecheia." He thinks he re-
discovers in Nietzsche's concept of power, first potency, in the 
sense of dunal11is; secondly the exercise of power in the sense of 
energeia; and thirdly the above-mentioned coming-to-itself (in 
the simplicity of essence) in the sense of enlefecheia. 182 
The completion of metaphysics that Heidegger ascribes to Nietzsche is accompli shed 
through the fact that the will to power unfolds out olïtsel f by actual izing itsel r in beings 
(thuss the energeia or the exercise ofpower which can only take place in concrete beings 
and not in the will to power understood as a hypostasized entity) and th en returning to 
itself entelechically, that is, purposefully. According to this reading, the lelos of 
L1ecoming would be an increase in power: there would be no transition From one state of 
Becoming to another state of Becoming wilhout an increase in power. The purpose orany 
transition in World-becom ing would be an increase of power. But this le/os of increase of 
power is ultimately untenable. The centres of force which occur in World-becoming 
sometimes lose power locally even though there might be sorne gain in power elsewhere. 
'fhere is no overall gain in power in the uni verse according to Nietzsche. The World-
IX2 Idem, p.20. 
• 
• 
becoming is like a closed system, the quantity of power is in it is constant, but locally, 
there are gains and losses that are experienced at each power-node or center of lèHce. 
Heidegger can close the metaphysical circle in his Nietzsche interprctation because he 
claims that the wi Il to power returns to itsel f in the simplicity of its essence. Thus, the 
will to power has the same circular structure as the eternal recurrence of the same. 
Through their circulatory movements, Heidegger manages to identify both the will to 
power and eternal recurrence orthe same. But the will to power which is Nietzsche's 
attempt to re-think Becoming, lacks a le/os . 
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2.2 The Status of Nietzsche Scholarship 
a) The Continental Interpretations of Nietzsche 
Besides Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche to which r have devoted an 
important place in this thesis, the other two perhaps most influential readings of 
Nietzsche in the twentieth century belong, historically, to Jaspers and Lukùcs. They are 
both milestones of Nietzsche interpretation and of Nietzsche's reception in the German 
speaking countries. Jaspers' reading had, unlike Lukâcs', a direct influence upon 
Heidegger's. Although Heidegger often polemicized with Jaspers, Jaspers' reading was 
very important for the development ofI-leidegger's interpretation o[Nietzsche. This is the 
case because Jaspers already put forth the thesis that 8eing had to be ascribed a priority 
over 8ecoming in Nietzsche's philosophy through the interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence of the same. This idea that 8eing corresponds to eternal recurrence and 
8ecoming corresponds to will to power has been taken up by Heidegger integrally. 
i) Ernst Bertram 
Ernst Bertram has written a very beautiful and thoughtful book on Nietzsche 
called Nietzsche, Versuch einer Mythologie. /83 Particularly relevant to this dissertation is 
the chapter on German Becoming. Bertram correctly points out that Nietzsche thought 
that for the German people the concept or Becoming had a deeper meaning than that of 
8eing. In contrast to the Latin intellectuality [or whom the concept ofBeing was more 
normative and important (one can think of Augustine as the prime representative o[this 
intellectuality), [or the Germans who were marked by the Reformation and by Luther's 
I~, Bcrlram, C., Nietzsche. Versuch einer Mythologie, Georg Bondi, l3crlin, 1929. 
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theology and philosophy, the concept of Becoming would be more evident. In this sense 
the following passage from Luther's Second Article from An Argument-In Defense of Aff 
the Articles of Dr. Martin Luther Wrongly Condemned in the Roman Buff, is relevant: 
Dies Leben ist nicht ein Frommsein, sondern ein Frommwerden. 
nicht ein Gesundsein, sondern ein Gesundwerden, überhaupt nicht 
ein Wesen, sondern ein Werden, nicht eine Ruhe, sondern eine 
Übung. Wir sind's noch nicht, wir wcrdcn's aber, es ist noch nicht 
getan und geschehen, es ist aber im Schwang, es ist nicht das Ende, 
es ist aber der Weg ... 
Although 1 do not think one can limit Nietzsche's concept of Becoming to its 
"Gcrman" nature, [ think that Bertram shows sorne insight into Nietzsche's concept or 
Becoming. 
What matters for my purposes, is that [ follow Bertram's thesis that Heraclitus 
was one of the most important influences on Nietzsche's thought. As Bertram writes in 
connection to this: 
Jene Betonung, jenes l-[eraustreiben des deutschen, und gerade des 
deutschen Werdens hat die Bedeutung einer Selbstzergliederung, einer 
Selbstkritik: im deutschen 'Werden', mit radikalcr Ablehnung auch selbst 
des Begriffs 'Sein', muss er unter allen Umstanden ein ihm Yerwandtestes 
anerkennen, muss er sich selbst wiedererkennen; wic er sich selber am 
moisten in [-[eraklit wieder findet, so das deutsche Wesen im 
heraklitischcn Werden-so sich im deutschen Wesen. IX4 
1 stress this again and again: Nietzsche was not only interested in Heraclitus in his early 
philological writings but also in the late Nachlass of 1884-1888. His philosophy can 
wholly be understood by referring to the concept of Becoming. 
Becoming is the middle term between the eternal recurrence and the will to 
power. For Nietzsche, Becoming affords an insight and a synthesis ofboth the nature or 
his most fundamental concepts of eternal recurrence and the wi Il to power. Bertram' s 
184 Idem, p.79. 
116 
German Becoming must be transformed, transfigured and sublated into Nietzsche's 
universal, eternal, absolute and infinite Becoming. 
ii) Karl Lowith 
Karl Lowith authored a classic study on Nietzsche's concept of eternal recurrence 
of the same called, Nietzsche.l· Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen. 185 ln 
this book Lowith, analyzes what he calls the zweif'achigen aspect of the eternal recurrence 
of the same. 
For Lowith, the eternal recurrence of the same has two aspects: an ethical-
religious one (here Lowith follows Ewald and Simmel to a certain extent since they were 
the nrst to bring out and explain the ethical aspect of eternal recurrence by comparing it 
to the Kantian categorical imperative) which attempts to replace the Christian doctrine of 
immortality and a modern-physical aspect which attempts to replace and overcome 
Ancient cosmology. 
These two aspects of the doctrine of eternal recurrence come together in Lowith's 
main thesis with respect to eternal recurrence: for him this Nietzschean doctrine attempts 
to repeat at the peak of a decadent Christian modernity an anti-Christian Antiquity. 
Although,I find Lowith's reading ofeternal recurrence in particular and of 
Nietzsche in general very deep, r disagree with his reading of eternal recurrence of the 
same. This is the case because 1 read eternal recurrence of the same starting From 
Nietzsche's word "God is deacl'", This is only possible if'we re-think aIl of'Nietzsche's 
philosophy starting l'rom the essential concept or Becoming. 
185 Lowith, K., Nietzsches Philosophie der ewigen Wiederkehr des Gleichen, 1956, (first published in 
1935) Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1956. . 
iii) Eugen Fink 
Along with Heidegger, Jaspers, Lowith, Müller-Lauter and Lukacs, Fink is 
perhaps one the most important interpretcrs of Nietzsche in the twentieth century. 
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The quality ofFink's reading stems from his deep understanding of the Western 
philosophical tradition. It must be said however that it is not clear to what extent Fink 
acquires full independence l'rom his great teacher Heidegger when it cornes to the 
interpretation of Nietzsche. This is apparent in his conception oftime which he calls the 
"Macht des Sein-las sens" in direct reference to Heidegger's concept of letting-be. 
Another, more direct and perhaps deeper influence of Heidegger's on Fink 
concerns his interpretation of the eternal recurrence of the same and of Nietzsche ' s 
concept ofBeing. Fink cJaims, lüllowing Heidegger, that Nietzsche still thinks 8eing as 
permanent presence (as the Sldndig). 186 
11 has been one of the aims ofthis dissertation to show that both Being and eternal 
recurrence are to be fundamentally understood in Nietzsche's philosophy starting l'rom 
the concepts of 8ecoming and im-permanence. Thus we cannot follow Fink who, in the 
wake of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche, cJaims that permanent presence still operates 
within the thought of Nietzsche. 
Through his concept of radical Becoming, Nietzsche manages to think the 
recurrence of the same. This same recurs as the pure Becoming of the eternal recurrence 
of the will to power. 8ecoming and im-permanence are lodged within the essence of 
Nietzsche's concept of eternal recurrence of the same and within his concept 0lî3eing. 
Despite these disagreements with Fink's reading of Nietzsche, it must be stated 
that he does not remain merely dependent of Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. ln the 
IX() hnk, E., Nie/::.sches Philosophie, p.188-189, W. I(ohihallllllcr Vcrlag, Stuttgart, 1960 
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final chapter of Nietzsches Philosophie, Fink claims that Nietzsche has to a certain extent 
overcome and notjust completed the Western metaphysical tradition as Heidegger does. 
This overcoming of the Western tradition according to Fink, is brought about 
through Nietzsche's concept of Dionysian play. lt is perhaps no coincidence that 
Nietzsches Philosophie was published in 1960 which is also the year ol'publication of 
Wahrheil und Methode. The idea ofplay that is so important for Gadamer also has a 
central role in Fink's reading of Nietzsche. 
1 agree whole-heartedly with Fink's claims that when he invokes the play between 
I3eing and Becoming, Nietzsche has to a great extent stepped beyond the Western 
metaphysical tradition. 1 leave the last words to Fink: 
iv) Karl Jaspers 
Wo Nietzsche Sein und Werden aIs Spiel begreift steht er nicht 
mehr in der Befangenheit der Metaphysik; dort hat auch der Wille 
zur Macht nicht den Charakter der Vergegenstandlichung des 
Seienden für ein vorstellendes Subjekt, sondern den Charakter der 
apollinischen Gestaltung, und andererseits wird in der ewigen 
Wiederkunft des Gleichen die allumlangliche, alles-bringende und 
alles-tilgende Spiel-Zeit der Welt gedacht. IX7 
Jaspers has a complex and interesting reading of Nietzsche. It is rooted in Jaspers' 
deep knowledge of psychology, psychiatry and also in his own original existential 
philosophy. For Jaspers, Nietzsche philosophizes l'rom the depth 01' his being, of' what 
Jaspers calls his Existenz. l3ecause or this deep passion for knowledge, Nietzsche argues 
according to what Jaspers calls, alternately, a "real" and an "immanent" dialectic. 
Nietzsche's thought does not attain a position according to Jaspers. It is characterized by 
the absence of a determinate position. The real dialectic proceeds through contradictions 
and oppositions (Jaspers influences and anticipates Müller-Lauter's interpretation of 
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Becoming in Nietzsche in this respect), but it never attains a logical or methodological 
understanding orhow the se contradictions are organized. Nietzsche's thought is in 
perpetuai movement and it never lixes itself upon a determinate thesis or position. 
Positions are posited and ascribed, only to immediately move into their op-posite 
positions. 
Despite this apparent inconsistency, Nietzsche reaches into the nook of truth. This 
is the case because he manages to criticize the concept or transeendence in an 
unprecedented way. Jaspers is referring here, to Nietzsche's word "God is dead" that 
also played an important role in Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. The idea that eternal 
recurrence corresponds to Being and that will to power corresponds to Beeoming already 
anticipates f-leidegger's understanding ofNietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position 
in terms of the unit y of the will to power (Becoming, Was-sein, 10 li eslin) and eternal 
recurrence or the same (Being, Dass-sein, 10 eslin). Jaspers already senses the dangers of 
the nazi political appropriation of Nietzsche (the one that misled Heidegger as he himself 
acknowledges, however "idealized" Heidegger's notion ofNational-Socialism, was in 
1933 in the Recloral Address) and in this sense, he claims that Nietzsche is an in-
complele thinker as the IDllowing citation testifies: 
187 Idem, p.188-189. 
Only within the world-in knowledge or determinate objects, in 
working for distinct purposes, in acting so as to promote ddinite 
goals - is communicable decision and definiteness not only 
possible but even necessary as a condition of ail meaningful 
acl ivily. But suh aClivily itse 1 f must be encompassed by an 
awareness orthe being of Existenz, for this is the foremost bearer 
of ail expressible meaning. Such awareness of being attains clarity 
through agitated communication with the original thinkers - Ihose 
who are nOlfinal and complele - and, at the same time, through a 
movement of thought that ne ver comes to rest in any 
proposition.1 88 
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Above ail Jaspers analyzes the role ofhistoricity in the thought of Nietzsche. Jaspers does 
this to show that Nietzsche had an ambivalent relationship to historicity and historicism. 
For Nietzsche the historical sense is what makes up for the three different types of 
histories described in the Second Untimely Meditation: monumental, antiquarian and 
critical. But the historical conscience is also responsible for the rise ofhistoricism. 
Analyzing the sacred texts philologically and hermeneutically, in a word historically, we 
come to the realization that a "temporal" science separates us from the divine. 
Historicism can thus be held responsible for the Nietzschean affirmation that "God is 
dead" and the ensuing nihilism. 
ln this regard, Jaspers provides us with a subtle analysis or the affirmation of the 
dcath of God. He claims that Nietzsche's relation to thc affirmation "(:Iod is dead" is 
ambivalent. Jaspers writes: "It may also be said that this statement initiates a new and 
higher human reality conceived as a way ofthinking that impels man upward, or it may 
serve to arouse us to do aIl the more resolutely anything that will rel~ute it and thus gain 
1 h G d . d d ,.IH'! Ile assurance t at 0 IS not ea .. 
For Jaspers, although Nietzsche criticizes the belief in a transcendent world, a 
Platonic hinterwelt, Nietzsche does this by first criticizing the belief that the world or 
Becoming aims at anything. Thus, the critique of the true world, the world of ideas, is a 
function of the removal ofteleology from within Becoming according to Jaspers. l am in 
fundamental agreement with this thesis and 1 have tried to show this in detail in Section 2 
orthis dissertation. 
But for Jaspers, Nietzsche does not leave man with Nothing. Nietzsche does not 
sacrifice God to the Nothing. Nihilism has to be overcome and Nietzsche proposes 
IHS rMy cmphasis, P.C.I Jaspers, K., op.eil., p.449. 
1 ~') 1.1 aspers' empilas is, I)c'], ihidell1. p.246. 
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concrete ways to overcome nihilism. For Jaspers the ways to overcome nihilism are the 
"great politics", Nietzsche's "world-interpretation" and the doctrine of "eternal 
recurrence of the same". In Nietzsche scholarship the eternal recurrence of the same has 
been often identil'ied as the way in which Nietzsche proposes to overcome nihilism. 
Heidegger even claims the eternal recurrence 0 l' the same is a theological thought for 
Nietzsche.\90 But the great politics has not traditionally been singled out as a way out of 
nihilism insofar as Nietzsche's conceptuality is concerned. 1 believe that Jaspers had 
cOl1crete, historical and political reasons lor al'firming that the great politics was a way in 
which nihilism cou Id be overcome. 
ln the section that 1 will devote to Lukacs' interpretation of Nietzsche, 1 will show 
that Nietzsche was at best a strategie ally of the Bismarckian pseudo-democracy. 
Nietzsche was never in fact a thorough and fervent supporter of democracy. Thus, these 
analyzes by Jaspers reCerring to the great politics are, textually and conceptually 
incorrect, but they are understandable as attempts to "rescue" Nietzsche Irom the Nazi 
interpretations. Jaspers writes in conclusion to his Nie/zschebuch: 
To philosophize with Nietzsche means to be constantly taking 
issue with him. In the tire of his thought, one's own existence can 
become purif'ied to the point of awareness of genuine self-being 
when tested by the bound\ess honesty and danger ofNietzsche's 
critical qucstioning. Such self-being can only be experienced as 
something that passes, not into existence, and not into objectivity 
or subjectivity oC world-being, but rather into transcendence. 
Nietzsche does not lead one to this at once - he tries rather to free 
one from il. But the earnestness of the total surrender that 
Nietzsche achieves is - in spite Qf his rejection of transcendence-
like an unintended simile and archetype that expresses profound 
experience of being consumed through transcendence. One grows 
shy in the presence of this incomprehensible one who is 
transparent to the source but not to us. \9\ 
190 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche l, p.J48. 
191 Idem, p.458. 
Jaspers obviously projects his own philosophical concepts of Existenz, 
l'ranszendel1z and communication onto the Nietzschean conceptuality. But his reading 
remains one of the leading interpretations of the twentieth ccntury. He has a balanced 
122 
and fair approach to his interpretation of Nietzsche and he does justice to the concepts of 
opposition and contradiction that seem to be an enduring aspect ofNietzsche's thought. 
This aspect of the contradictions ofNietzsche's philosophy will taken up again by 
Jaspers. Above ail his, interpretation of the death of God and his approach to historicity 
in Nietzsche's thought makes oLlaspers' reading one orthe dcepest and most challcnging 
ones of the twentieth century. 
v) Gyorgy Lukacs 
Lukacs' reading of Nietzsche has proved to be an inlluential reading of Nietzsche 
despite its definite ideological and polcmical attitude versus Nietzsche. Lukacs has 
influenced a whole generation oi'Marxists who have followed him in their negative 
evaluation of Nietzsche. Lukacs' reading of Nietzsche functions with the following 
methodological hypothesis. Nietzsche has to be read as a fundamentally "political" 
thinker. This is something that contrasts with I-Ieidegger's and Jaspers' (Heidegger's 
being more metaphysical and Jaspers' more existential) readings. There are political 
implications to the readings ol'J-Jeidegger and Jaspers but thesc two commentators do not 
necessarily see Nietzsche as a fundamentally political thinker. For Lukacs, Nietzsche's 
philosophy as a whole can be understood as a mobilization against the ideological and 
political opponent that is constituted by "socialism". This might not even have been 
conscious for Nietzsche himseli' according to Lukacs. But any philosophy is determined 
according to Lukâcs' orthodox Marxist thesis, by the c1ass struggles that exist during the 
immediate historical situation in which it is created. This is true of Nietzsche as weil 
according to Lubcs. 
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Thus Nietzsche's philosophy would be determined according to Lukacs by the 
struggle of the bourgeoisie against its new class enemy: the socialist movement and its 
political ideology. or course this blanket term "socialis11l"' has to be contextualized. It is 
not obvious that "socialism" means the sa11le thing in the 191h , 20lh and 21 SI centuries. 
This ambiguity itself might be one of the weaknesses ofLukacs's reading. 
Lukacs reads and criticizes Nietzsche from within his own philosophical, political 
and ideological position as one of the main proponents of20lh century communism (and 
cven Stalinism, although Lukacs's position is quite labile and cannot be easily subsumed 
under the ideology known as "Stalinism''). At times Lukàcs even a11lalgamates the Nazi 
appropriation with the American liberal one and this is clearly problcmatic as the main 
commentator that is criticized and taken as a modcl by Lukacs is Walter Kauffman. It is a 
wcll-known fact that Kauff11lan explicitly combated the Nazi appropriation of Nietzsche. 
Lukàcs attracts the attention to one of Nietzsche's important clai11ls l'rom the carly 
Nachlass. This claim is that slavery is necessary for any real culture. Nietzsche writes the 
following: "Und wenn es wahr sein sollte, dass die Griechen an ihrem Sklaventum 
zugrunde gegangen sind, so ist das andere viel gewisser, dass wir an dem Mangel des 
Sklaventums zugrunde gehen werden.,,192 Lukàcs claims that Nietzsche's second phase, 
the one that begins with the publication of Human, All-Ioo-Human, is characterized by a 
rapprochement with liberalis11l, political evolutionism and democracy. This is determined 
according to Lukàcs by the political and historical context that determines Nietzsche even 
if unconsciously. 
1<)2 "Der griechische Slaal", KSA 1, p.769. 
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Nietzsche's philosophy is not easily reducible to that of bourgeois 19lh century 
ideology. Georg Wilhelm Hegel has been often characterized as the antipode of 
Nietzsche. Lukacs' whole book (in which the critique and polemic with Nietzsche 
occurs), Die Zersfijrung der Vernunfi. proceeds l'rom the thesis that with the late's 
Schelling's critique ofI-legel's idealism, German thought becomes somehow irrational 
and perverted and prepares the way (mediated by Nietzsche's further "irrationalization" 
of philosophical and political thought) for the German political catastrophe of 1933. 
'1'0 get back to Lukùcs' analysis ofNietzsche's ethics we can say that for Lukacs 
Nietzsche's emphasis and attcmpt to naturalize the "bad" affects ofselfishness, brutality 
and instinct, is only a way to mobilize an activist bourgeoisie so that it has the good 
conscience for brutal and violent actions in the face of the proletariat. The rising violence 
and lèrocity of social relations which is embodied by the Paris Commune of 1871 is 
somcthing that both terrified and horrified Nietzsche. In this sense the following excerpt 
l'rom a letter to von Gersdorff is important: 
Wir dürfen wieder hoffèn! Unsre deutsche Mission ist noch nicht 
vorbei! [ch bin mütiger aIs je: denn noch nicht alles ist unter 
franzosich-jüdischer Verflachung und 'Eleganz' und unter dem 
gieriegen Treiben der '.Jetztzeit' zugrunde gegangen. Es gibt doch 
noch Tapferkeit, und zwar deutsche Tapferkeit, die etwas innerlich 
anderes ist ais der élan unserer bedauerungswerten Nachbarn. CI ber 
den Kampf der Nationen hinaus hat uns jener internationale 
Hydrakopfîthe international socialist-communist movement 
embodied in the Paris Commune, my emphasis, P.c.] erschreckt, 
der plotzlich so furchtbar zum Vorschein kam aIs Anzeiger ganz 
anderer Zukunftskampfe. 193 . 
Here, in this passage, Nietzsche clearly shows his revulsion towards the Paris Commune 
and the international socialist-communist movement that was associatcd with it. This 
193 Nietzsche ta Carl von Gersdorrr, 21 Juni 1871, op.e/I., Band 3, Brier 140, p.203. 
aversion towards the Commune goes some way to substantiate Lukacs' thesis that 
Nietzsche's prime opponent was, politically, the international socialist movement. 
Another interesting aspect of Lukacs' reading of Nietzsche is his daim that 
ultimately Nietzsche's racialism can be reduced to the racialist theories of the Third 
Reich. Lukacs is aware that there is a difference between the Nietzschean concept of 
master race and the Nazi concept that is developed by Houston Chamberlain (the key-
concept here being that of "arian" race). But he invokes the authority of Lenin to claim 
that these concepts are identical. [ think that on this point, Lukacs' reading is purely 
ideological. 
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Lukacs also interprets, in reading Nietzsche, his so-called atheism. 1 have already 
mentioned my position on the ambivalence orNietzsche's atheis111. 1 believe with 
Heidegger that Nietzsche is the "letzten leidenschartlichen Gott-sLlchenden Philosoph".194 
But, to get back to Lukacs' interpretation ofNietzsche's atheism, it may be said that 
Lukacs believes Nietzsche's atheism to be ambiguous as weil. I-Ie claims that Nietzsche 
supports a form of"religious" atheism. This religious atheism has a political agenda. This 
is the case because Lukacs correctly claims that for Nietzsche, Christianity and socialism 
are inherently linked. Nietzsche believed the socialism ofhis epoch to be a l'orm orneo-
Christian political expression. for Lukacs the critique of Christianily is merely a veiled 
crititque of socialism. This makes sense f'rom Lukacs' general strategy to totalize ail or 
Nietzsche's philosophy around the idea or an ideological mobilization against socialism. 
Is it not rather the case lhat Nietzsche is suspicious of socialism bccause it is an 
embodiment orthe morality ol'pity and charity that is derived l'rom Christian moral 
teaching? Lukacs argues that Nietzsche is suspicious of bolh Christianity and socialism 
because the ideo!ogy of equa! rights is built into both these world-views or be!ief 
structures. Lukâcs argues that previous Enlightenment thinkers sought to undermine 
belief in Christianity because they were fïghting the feudal-absolutist ideological 
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structure that the Christian clergy was publicly defending. For Lukàcs, Nietzsche Îs trying 
to oppose Christianity in order to help for111 the reactive and reactionary ideology of the 
bourgeoisie in its struggle against socialism (Nietzsche is not a fascist or a proto-fascist 
according to Lukâcs but fascism and National-Socialism are pre~flgul'ed in his 
philosophy). 
In my opinion, Lukacs' reading is not precise enough at this juncture. He does not 
take into account, Nietzsche's concept ofnihilism. Nietzsche thinks that socialism is a 
l'onn of nihilism, but not that nihilism is a form of socialism. for Nietzsche the concept 
of nihilism is more fundamental than the concept 01' socialism. Nihilism is constituted by 
the death ofGod and the factthatthe highest values lose their value. But the highest 
values lose their value because of the problem ofhistoricism as r have tried ta show in 
section 1.4. Values are posited, hold sway for a while and then, inevitably go under and 
lose their value. Nihi lism is a l'unction or historicism and historicity. 
Lukâcs cJaims that Nietzsche is in l'oct not opposed ta Darwin but that Nietzsche 
believes in a form of "inverted" social Oarwinism in which the many, the weak are the 
ones that get the upper-hand and in which the strong, the aristocratie and noble nature is 
repressed. This makes sense in my opinion and there is sorne textual evidence for it as I 
have tricd to show in section lA. 
Lukâcs' reading of Nietzsche is related ta the interpretation of the eternal 
recurrence orthe same and orthe concept of Becoming that is central to this dissertation. 
For Lukâcs, Nietzsche's concepts ofBecoming and of the eternal recurrence of the same 
are inherently related. They are developed in such a way as ta preclude the possibility of 
l'M Heidegger, M., Die Selbstbehaufllung der deutschc Univcrsitat, Gesamlausgahe /6, p. III. 
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the occurrence of something "new" in history. Leo Strauss will also be concerned with 
this aspect of the novelty of history in his reading of Nietzsche and 1 will deal with him in 
the part b) of this section that discusses the Anglo-American interpretations of Nietzsche. 
For Lukacs the eternal recurrence and the Becoming of history according to Nietzsche are 
non-teleological in order to show that history has no goal. This lack of goal of history 
allows Nietzsche to affirm, indirectly, that bourgeois-capitalist society is "eternal" and 
"permanent". This aspect of permanentization of the eternal recurrence of the same has 
already been identilied by Heidegger belè)re Lukacs. But Heidegger claims that eternal 
recurrence permanentizes Becoming and amounts to thinking Being as permanent 
presence. In my opinion, Nietzsche's removal ofteleology From within Becoming allows 
Nietzsche to criticize the notion ofBeing as permanent presence. This is the case beeause 
it is only through the introduction of entelecheia within Becoming starting with Aristotle, 
that metaphysies as onto-theology is completed for the lirst time. By removing teleology 
l'rom within 13ecoming, Nietzsche de-constructs onto-lheology avan/la lel/re. 
But Lukacs does make sorne interesting points with respect to Nietzsche's critique 
oftranscendence and Becoming. For Lukacs, Nietzsche has to be read in connection to 
the epistemology ofMachism as a critic of Transzendenz in favor of Immanenz. This 
critique of transcendence by Nietzsche amounts to a covert critique or material iSll1 
according to Lukacs. Nietzsche criticizes the transcendence that is present in both the 
Christian world-view and in the socialist utopian and revolutionary world-view by uniting 
them in the concept of Transzendenz. 
Despite it systemacity, its depth and its influence, Lukacs' reading of Nietzsche 
does not really attain to the core ol'Nietzsche's philosophy. This core is as r have tried to 
point out throllghollt this dissertation, Nietzsche's attempt to redeem hUll1ans from 
revenge by removing teleology l'rom within Becoming. Nietzsche attempts to think 
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through this redemption through his thought of the death of God and the eternal 
recurrence of the same, and his re-evaluation of Becoming and each passing moment of 
Becoming. 
vi) Gilles Deleuze 
Gilles Deleuze has provided an inlluential Nietzsche interpretation. 195 Aner 
l-Ieidegger's reading of Nietzsche and along with Müller-Lauter, Deleuze was perhaps 
the most interesting Contintental Nietzsche commentator of the second hall' of the 
twentieth century. Deleuze has insistently polemicized with Heidegger's reading of 
Nietzsche. What Deleuze objects to is I-Ieidegger's rapprochemenl between Nietzsche 
and Hegel. Heidegger's I-Icgelianization and metaphycization of Nietzsche is 
objectionable according to Deleuze. Deleuze has attracted attention to the làct that 
Nietzsche's philosophy is decidedly anti-dialectical. 
For Deleuze, Nietzsche's philosophy is affirmative and rejects the negativity of 
the "sad" affects of suffering that characterize Hegel's dialectic. The Hegelian dialectic is 
propelled by suffering and this is something that is irreconcilable with Nietzsche's 
anirmative and playful side. Deleuze has pointed out that the fundamental difl'erence in 
Nietzsche's understanding ofhistory and morality is the differcnce between the active 
and the reactive. This distinction between the active and the reactive is already present in 
I-lcidegger's Nietzsche lectures, 196 but Heidegger never mentions it in relation to the 
moral-pol itical categories or the mas ter and the slave but only in terms of Nietzsche' s 
Hsthetic discussion or Romanticism and in terms of how Nietzsche sees the distinction 
between Being and becoming. 
195 Deleuze, G., Nietzsche et la philosophie, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962. 
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One question that cornes to mind when we read Deleuze's interpretation of 
Nietzsche is whether with respect to its metaphysical core this reading has really 
substantially go ne beyond Heidegger's reading. This can be readily grasped when we see 
that Deleuze accepts the unit y that Heidegger posits between will to power and eternal 
recurrence. Deleuze writes: "C'est pourquoi l'éternel retour doit être pensé comme une 
synthèse: synthèse du temps et de ses dimensions, synthèse du devenir et de l'être qui 
s'affirme du devenir, synthèse de la double affirmation.,,197 This formulation is 
astonishingly similar to Heidegger's interpretation of the eternal recurrence. However, it 
is undeniable that Deleuze has "progressed" somewhat with respect to Heidegger. 
First, Deleuze has managed to show that it was rruitl'ul to read Nietzsche in 
conjunction with Spinoza. He has success[ully challenged one of the most difficult 
aspects ofHeidegger's reading of Nietzsche : his rapprochement of Nietzsche to Hegel. 
Along with Deleuze,198 1 believe that this conti nuit y between Nietzsche and Hegel 
must ultimately be rejected. Nietzsche, despite his at times hyperbolic affirmation oCwil1 
to power, does not possess a strong concept orthe will. This can be seen in Nietzsche's 
rejection and critique 01' Schopenhauer's concept orthe will. The concept that Nietzsche 
does examine thoroughly and that he has in corn mon with German Idealism is the 
concept ofI3ecoming. However I3ecoming is thought dialectically and teleologically in 
German Idealism (especially in Hegel). ln the last analysis, Nietzsche goes beyond and 
deconstructs Idealism, rather than remaining entrenched in it, by radicalizing and thinking 
Becoming both un-dialcctically and non-teleologically. In làct, this will perhaps be 
Dcleuze's legacy in Nietzsche scholarship : the emphasis on the structural, non-
dialectical and non-teleological aspects ofNietzsche's philosophy. 
1<)1, Heidegger, M., Nietzsche l, p.156, (Nietzsche, Vol.l, translation Krell, p.133). 
l'n Deleuze, G., op.cit., p.55. 
'( 
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An important aspect of Deleuze's reading is his identification of the problem of 
the critique of the initial state and final state. 1 have analyzed this critique extensively in 
section 1.3. With this prob\cm Deleuze reconstructs Nietzsche' s conception or the 
eternal recurrence in an entirely original way with respect to Heidegger. For Deleuze 
returning is the Being of Becoming. ("Revenir, l'être de tout ce qui devient,,'99). Thus, 
Deleuze manages to show against Heidegger (and indirectly against Lukâcs and Jaspers) 
that the thought or eternal recurrence is not a thought that pertains to Being or to the 
question or I3eing but to I3ecoming. '1'0 become is to recur or retllrn and to retllrn or to 
recur is to become: this is Nietzsche's fundamental teaching or eternal recurrence or the 
same. 
This is what my reading shares with Deleuze's above ail: 1 believe that what 
recurs in the thought of the eternal recurrence of the same is Becoming itself. My thesis is 
that what recurs is the eternal recurrence orthe Becoming of the will to power. In this 
way we can uniry the will to power and eternal recurrence through the concept or 
Beeoming. So with Heidegger and against Müller-Lauter, 1 believe that Nietzsche's 
thought does possess a certain unity. This unit y is afforded to it by the self-propelling yet 
contradictory movement of 13ecoming. Through Becoming ail the major concepts of 
Nietzsche's philosophy can be brought together and it is my aim to show that in this 
thesis. 
But despite its unit y, Becoming is also a-diaphoristic and charismatic. It is a 
broken, fragmented totality and Nietzsche's dialectic is akin to the broken dialectic of 
Kierkegaard. Against the system, the individual invokes the broken totality and the 
broken dia\cctic. Becoming eonstitutes a system given in aphorisms. The Being 01' 
10H Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, p.280, PUF, Paris, 1973. 
199 Deleuze, G., op. cil , p.54. 
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Becoming is fragmented, in-complete. It is for this reason that Nietzsche cannot complete 
Western thought, because his philosophy is essentially non-finite, in-finite, un-closed, 
dis-closed and open. This openness is the openness of modernity that is an essentially in-
complete project. Through his thollght of infinite, non-dialectical and a-teleological 
Becoming, Nietzsche has definitely taken his distance from Hegel. 
Deleuze is perfectly correct on this last point. But the absolllteness and eternal 
aspect ofBecoming cOllld perhaps be re-conciled with J-Iegel's lInderstanding of Being. 
l-lowever as the through I-Ieraclitean that he is, Nietzsche still favors Becoming of over 
Being: in this the reconciliation with Hegel remains impossible. 
vii) Jürgen Habermas 
Jürgen Habermas is an important philosopher of the end or the twenticth century 
and beginning oftwenty-first century. }-Ie has written on Nietzsche in different places or 
his corpus. Habermas sees Nietzsche as the entry point into post-modernity. Modernity 
had been placed according to Habermas under the sign of "subjective freedom". This 
political freedom had metaphysicalunderpinnings that were furnished in part by l-legcl's 
system of absolute Idealism. Hegel first conceived the concept of civil society and 
provided (by building on Kant's theory of law and rights) the right-theoretical apparat LIS 
to conceptualize the relationship between civil rights, the law and the State: 
Above ail the modern age stood under the sign or subjective 
Creedom. This was realized in society as the space secured by civil 
law l'or the rational pursuit of one's own interests ; in the state, as 
the in principle equal rights to participation in the formation of 
political will; in the private sphere, as ethical autonomy and self-
realization ; finally, in the public sphere related to this private 
realm, as the formative process that takes place by means of the 
appropriation of a culture that has become reflective.200 
200 Habermas, 1., The Philosophical Discourse olModernily, MIT Press, Cambridge (Massachussets), 1987, 
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But Nietzsche successfully criticized absolute Idealism and its dialectic of 
Enlightenment. By detaching the moral object l'rom the rational object, Nietzsche 
totalized the critique of rationality according to Habermas. Nietzsche radicalized, 
through his critique 01' morality and metaphysics, the legitimation crisis that Habermas 
writes about. Habermas condemns this radicalization of the legitimation crisis as the fact 
that the normative content ofmodernity is missing. Modernity is thus at a cross-roads. 
For Habermas, modernity generates its normativity out of itself. But at the same time the 
legitimation crisis risks to jeopardize the normative posits ofmodernity. 
The "problem" with Habermas' interpretation of Nietzsche is that it focuses on 
two aspects or phases ofNietzsche's thought: 1) ln Erkenntnis und Interesse, Habermas 
focuses on the positivistic and historicistic aspects ofNietzsche's thought. In 
Philosophieal Diseourse of" Mode rnity. Habermas' reading focuses almost exclusively on 
Nietzsche's romantic period surrounding the publication of the Birth ol.Tragedy. 
Habermas' main criticism of Nietzsche in The Philosophieal Diseourse of" Modernity, is 
that he confuses validity claims with claims to power. In order to understand this critique 
by Habermas we have to examine the later writings. It is true that for Nietzsche, in the 
later writings, truth is connected to power. For Nietzsche, every increase in truth pre-
supposes an increase in power. Truth is the kind of error a certain living species (the 
human one) cannot live wilhout. Truth is one of the fundamental values that has lost its 
value in the narration Nietzsche gives or European nihilism. The cause ofnihilism is 
according to Nietzsche the faith in the categories of reason. 
Habermas believes, following Weber, that modernity is dilTerentiated in terms of 
three validity domains or spheres: the aesthetic sphcre, the scientific sphere and the moral 
p.82. 
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sphere. Habermas believes that he can hold these three spheres apart in order to put forth 
and describe his project ofmodernity. Habermas writes: 
Nietzsche's "theory of knowledge," although formulated in 
aphoristic apercus, consists in the attempt to comprehend the 
categorial framework orthe natural sciences (space, time, event), 
the concept oC law (causality), the operational basis of experience 
(measurement), and the rules or logic as the calculation as the 
relative a priori or a world of objective illusion that has been 
prodllced for the purposes of mastering nature ant thus preserving 
existence .... 201 
Habermas believes that ideal speech situations contain within themselves the 
normative potential to resolve conllicts and come to an understanding (sich 
verstdndigen). Habermas' notion oftruth is dialogical and consensus-based. Habermas 
believes, following Peirce (at least as far as Erkenntnis und Interesse is concerned, his 
position likely evolves across the habermasian corpus) that trllth is achieved at the end of 
long and cumulative learning processes. Given enough time and resources two 
independent sllbjects will arrive at the same conclusion at the end of an inquiry. 
In The Philosophical Discourse oj'Modernity, Habermas locllses on Nietzsche's 
development starting from the early texts: the Second Untimely Meditation and the Birth 
oj'Tragedy. Habermas contrasts Nietzsche's attempt to create a ncw myth in the figure of 
Dionysos with the valorisation or mythology in the A/testes Syslel11]7rogramm des 
Deutschen Idealis/11us, in Schelling's System des Transzendenta/Idea/isl11us and in lena 
Romanticism (who se main representative Habermas takes to be Friedrich Schlegel). For 
Habermas ail the se attempts can be contrasted with Nietzsche's insofar as the y attempt to 
regenerate the Westerns philosophical tradition's understanding of itselr. This is the case 
because according to Habermas. Nietzsche does not want, through his philosophical 
attempts, to regenerate the Western philosophical tradition but rather to dismiss il. 
201 Habermas, J., Knowledge and Human Inferesfs, l3eacon Press, Boston, 1971, p.295. 
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ln order to make good on this claim, Habermas has to affirm that Nietzsche gives 
up on the emancipatory potential of reason. Habermas summarizes Nietzsche's position 
in Philosophical Discourse 01 Modernit y as follows: 
In the end he [Nietzsche, P.C.] oscillates between two strategies. 
On the one hand Nietzsche sees the possibility of an artistic 
contemplation of the world carried out with scholarly tools but in 
antimetaphysical, antiromantic, pessimistic, and skeptical attitude. 
Because it serves the philosophy of will to power, a historical 
science ofthis kind is supposed to be able to escape the illusion of 
belief in truth. 'l'hen of course, the validity of that philosophy 
would have to be presupposed. That is why Nietzsche must, on the 
other hand, assert the possibility oF a critique of' metaphysics that 
digs up the roots of metaphysical thought without, however, itsel f' 
giving up philosophy. He proclaims Dionysus a philosopher and 
himsel r the last disciple and initiate of this god who does 
h'l 1 202 P 1 osop ly. 
However, Habermas' reading leaves too many things about Nietzsche's 
philosophy unresolved. On the one hand, Habermas does not distinguish enough between 
the different phases of the development ofNietzsche's thought. It is true that there is a 
Nietzsche that is an esthete and a romantic and who, under Wagner's influence, develops 
a polarity between Dionysos and Apollo. It is also true that bit by bit, Nietzsche maintains 
and radicalizes the importance of the figure of Dionysos arriving at what we could calI a 
Dionysian "monism" which comes to replace the Dionysos-Apollo dialectic that was 
prevalent in the Birlh of Tragedy. But the idea that Nietzsche dismisses altogether the 
Western project known as modernity in order to replace it by a precocious post-
modernism is far too polcmical.This claim, that Nietzsche can be read as the inaugurator 
of'post-modernism, a claim shared by Nehamas and Derrida, has been taken to task in 
recent Anglo-American scholarship.203 
202 Ibidem, p.97. 
203 See Brian Leiter, Roulledge Philosophy Guidebook 10 Nielzsche on Moralify, Routledge, London, 2002, 
ChaRter 1, Nietzsche, Naturalist or Post-Modernist. 
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Traditional Nietzsche scholarship distinguishes bctween the early phase of 
Nietzsche's philosophy (ail ofNietzsche's writings up to Human, All-Too-fluman), a 
middle phase (ail of the writings starting from Human, All-Too-flul11an and up to the Gay 
Science) and a late phase (ail the writings including and following the publication of Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra). This distinction cannot be taken to be too rigid but should be 
considered as a heuristic. The distinction is not taken along strictly temporallines (i.e. 
according to the dates of publication ofNietzsche's works) but according to a thematic 
distinction. ln the first phase of his thought, Nietzsche is taken to be a romantic and 
metaphysical esthete. In the second phase of his thought, Nietzsche is taken to be an 
Aufk/arer and a positivist (and Habermas subscribes to this interpretation at least in part 
in Erkenntnis und Interesse). In the third phase of his thought, Nietzsche is interpreted 
ambiguously as construing a metaphysics ofwill to power (Heidegger) thus regressing in 
a certain way to thc first phase orhis thought, or as completely renouncing metaphysical 
)()4 
truth as correspondence.-
1 believe that Nietzsche both gives up on metaphysical correspondence and that he 
does construe something like a metaphysics although this metaphysics is not one of the 
will to power but is a metaphysics ofBecoming and of Being-interpreted. However, it is 
clear that Habermas' interpretation has not done justice to the differentiated aspect of 
Nietzsche's philosophy. The artist's metaphysics does attempt to create a new myth in 
the figure of Dionysos, and it is perhaps the case that Nietzsche believes in metaphysical 
truth as early as the "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", but it is likely that 
Nietzsche gives up this merely aesthetic position in his second and third phase. 
èlJ"Clark, M., Nietzsche on 7i'uth and Phi/o.\'ophy. See Section 4, in ChaRter 6: The !\scetic Ideal 
,Cambridge, England. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
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As to the emancipatory potential ofNietzsche's philosophy it is true that this 
potential is not construed in terms of the validity claims of a modernity rationally 
dilTerentiated into Weber's three value spheres. But through his de-transcendentalization 
orthe world ofmetaphysics, Nietzsche does operate an emancipation of the world or 
Becoming. This emancipation it is true is not done according to the principle of 
subjectivity discovered and described by Hegel, but through a radicalization of this 
subjectivity principle. This radicalization is one of the aspects that Heidegger is right 
about in his Nietzsche interpretation. 
1 do not agree with I-Ieidegger's reading however when, by claiming that 
Nietzsche radicalizes the subjectivity principle present in Hegel's philosophy, he goes 
l'(uther, essentializes will to power and reduces it to the absolute subjectivity of German 
ldealism. Nietzsche radicalizes the subjectivity principle and at once dismisses it and 
takes his distance from it. But this is not do ne through a support or and a cleansing of a 
modern aesthetic conscience that is purified or any theoretical and practical connection to 
reason. Nietzsche's aestheticism is represented by the claim that: "existence is justified 
only aesthetically." But this does not mean that Nietzsche is a supporter of l'or! pour 
,'or!. His aestheticism could be understood in the light of the romantic estheticism of 
Schlegel who writes that "The world is a work ofart that constantly gives bil1h to itself." 
Habermas erroneously claims that Nietzsche was a supporter of "ar! pour' 'or!. 
This is plain false as the following guotes testify.205 lt is true that Nietzsche's 
appreciation of' 'art pour l'or! was ambivalent insofar as Nietzsche admired Baudelaire 
who can be taken to be one of the main representatives or that movement (following the 
reading of an essay by Paul Bourget). 
205 .JCB, 208 (KSA 5, pp.13 8-139) . .JC /3, 254 (KSA 5, pp.198-199), 24, (KSA n, pp.I27-128), KSA Il, 26 
[352] KSA 12,7 [10]. KSA 12,9 [1261. KSA 13, 1411201. 
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Nietzsche has provided tools for criticizing modernity as his genealogical project 
testities. It is perhaps the case that this project cannot evade the logical paradoxes of self .. 
reference. But this argument against self .. reference is ulidone by its own formality. 
Nietzsche did not think very highly of formai (and formal .. pragmatic extensions of) logic 
and its inherent limitations and he provides an immanent critique ofthis formallogic. 
Tt is a fact that genealogy can be used locally as a tool to criticize modern, 
economic, political and religious institutions. Habermas is right that genealogy cannot 
provide a total or global critique of modernity but it is not clear that this was Nietzsche's 
intention. It does seem that it is Habermas who is in fact totalizing the aspirations of 
modern reason by claiming that a total reconstruction ofmodernity can be achieved and 
detached [rom its historical roots through the universality of a theOl·y 01' communicative 
action and through the universaljustiJication of discourse ethics. 
ln reading Nietzsche and Habermas on Nietzsche, one has to distinguish between 
redemption and emancipation. Heidegger claims in Was heiss/ Denken that it is 
Nietzsche's goal to redeem hum ans from metaphysical revenge. This redemption of man 
l'rom revenge that is also alluded to by Nietzsche in Thus Spoke Zara/hus/ra, should be 
understood as a condition for emancipation. It is only if humanity is redeemed that it can 
also be emancipated. One can thus see that Habermas mis .. interprets Nietzsche's 
philosophy when he claims that Nietzsche wants to merely dismiss the Western 
philosophical project known as metaphysical rationality. 
If Heidegger is right (and 1 bclieve That he is) that Nietzsche wants to redeem 
humans From metaphysical revenge, then this redemption could prove to be the source of 
a regeneration (which could in turn lead to an emancipation ofman by man) orthe 
origins of the Western philosophical project known as metaphysical rationality. This 
aspect is completely missed by Habermas in his interpretation ofNietzsehe. 
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ln order to connect Habemas' reading of Nietzsche to the concept of8ecoming 
that is the theme of my dissertation, 1 would like to add that Habermas' thesis that 
Nietzsche totalizes reason is not well-founded. If one takes reason to be grounded in 
8ecoming that is in perpetuai transformation and change, then one has to grant 1.hat the 
ground is not a totality but that it is both totality and fragment. Here Habermas has 
perhaps understood the implications of reading Nietzsche with Schlegel but he 
polemicizes too much against this Nietzschean Romanticism. 
It can be shown that the absolute, eternal and infinite aspects of 8ecoming are 
precisely those elements which ground modern rationality and which make for the f'act 
that modernity is an un-finished project. The inl'inity, un-determinacy and openness of' 
1110dernity is precisely what is grounded in Nietzsche's eternal, absolute, inlinite and 
universal Becoming. In this sense, Nietzsche is both the last of the great Romantics and 
the deepest ironical modernist. He has provided the post-modernists with their concepts 
or linguistic representationalism, but through the richness and depth or his l.hought 01' 
Becoming he has also shown a way out orthe "Sackgasse" orpost-modernity. 
viii) Wolfgang Müller-Lauter 
Wolfgang Müller-Lauter has provided a very strong interpretation ofNietzsche. 206 
Working for a long time as the editor of Nietzsche-Studicn, Müller-Lauter has carried on 
the tradition of great Nietzsche interpretation in Germany in the rootsteps or such people 
as Heidegger, Jaspers, Lowith and Fink. [n l'act, Müller-Lauter e!Ticiently argues with 
Heidegger just as Deleuze does, but Müller-Lauter's critique is stated differently. 
206 Müller-Lauter, W., Nietzsche. I-lis Phitosoph\i o(Contradictions and the Contradictions o/His 
Phitosophy, De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1999, Über Werden und Witte wr Macht 
(De Gruyter, Berlin, 1999), Über Freiheit und Chaos (De Gruyter, Berlin, 1999), Heidegger-Nietzsche (De 
Gruyter, Berl in, 2001). 
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Müller-Lauter writes: 
Heidegger attributes a special significance to Nietzsche's 
philosophy within the history ofmetaphysics. He interprets 
Nietzsche's philosophy as the comptetion of Western philosophy, 
insolar as the inversion ol'metaphysics performed in it supposedly 
exhausts its essential possibilities. But even more occurs in 
Nietzsche's thinking: the destruction ofmetaphysics by its own 
resources. It can be shown Ihat Nietzsche's philosophy precisely as 
the highest peak of the "metaphysics of subjectivity" this 
subjectivity plunges in the bottomless pit. The metaphysical "will 
to the will", in the form ofwill to power that sees itself as itself, 
becomes willed will that no longer refers back to one willing 
entity, a single will, but rather merely to the comptex ofwilling 
that interrogates itsel f concerning its ultimate actual givenness and 
withdraws into the undeterminable. 207 
Müller-Lauter is still inlluenced by Heidegger insofar as he claims that: "For example, 
the repeated allegation that the theory of will to power, or that of the overman, is 
incompatible with eternal recurrence wilI be shown to be merely apparent ... " As 1 have 
stated in section 2.1 Critique of I-Ieidegger's Nietzsche Interpretation, Heidegger has 
argued for the essential unit y of the thoughts of the eternal recurrence and will to power. 
Thus, it would seem that Müller-Lauter has not really advanced, l'rom this perspective at 
least, beyond Heidegger. 
According to Müller-Lauter,208 Heidegger essentializes Nietzsche's thought of 
will to power. In his opinion there are only wills to power in the plural. Müller-Lauter's 
reading is very interesting and along with Gilles Deleuze he has perhaps provided the 
most important critiques to I-Jeidegger"s reading oJ'Nietzsche. 
The Deleuzian and Müller-Lauterian readings are characterized by different 
interpretations of will to power. Heidegger sees in will to power the culmination of 
207 Nie/7.sehe, His Philosophy o!Con/radie/ions ond the Con/radie/ions ofHi.\·l'hilosophy, Berlin, New 
York, Universityofillinois Press, 1999, p.122. 
20H ln Nie/7.sche, His Phi/osophy o!Con/radic/ions and the Con/radie/ions of His Philosophy, Berlin, New 
York, Universityofillinois Press, 1999. 
metaphysical rationality. This culmination happens in two different ways: on the one 
side from Plato and on the other side l'rom Hegel. 
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Müller-Lauter's position is that in Nietzsche the metaphysical will-to-will sees 
itsclf and posits itself as a total will, but that at the same time this will is referred to a 
multiplicity of wills to power that decenter will to power as a purcly metaphysical 
principle. Thus, metaphysics destroys itself from within metaphysics in Nietzsche's 
thought, according to Müller-Lauter. Müller-Lauter did not rule out that Nietzsche's 
philosophy is metaphysical as some might think. He points out that Nietzsche and 
Heidegger have di fferent understandings 0 f "metaphysics" . For Nietzsche, metaphysics is 
ultimately related to the two-world conception, to the dualismthat is inherited from Plato 
between the ldeas and the particulars. For Heidegger, however, metaphysics is related to 
the question of Being. Nietzsche's philosophy is metaphysical, according to Heidegger, 
because it asks the question of Being and it posits Being as will to power. It is with this 
construal ofNietzsche's philosophy that Müller-Lauter has a problem: for him the will to 
power cannot be essentialized into Being and into a metaphysical principle that somehow 
transcends the contexts in which it is given. 
But this thesis does not take into account what makes Heidegger's reading so 
interesting: the idea ofa conti nuit y in the history ofmetaphysics from Hegel to 
Nietzsche: the inversion of absolute subjectivity (Hegel) into the consummate 
subjectivity ofwill to power (Nietzsche). An additional aspect of Heidegger's Nietzsche 
reading is the continuity established t'rom Plato to Nietzsche. 
What Müller-Lauter has shown, contra Heidegger, is that there is no unit y of 
Nietzsche's thought. The will to power is not a metaphysical principle as Heidegger tries 
to argue but a play of multiple force-centers, power-centers, power-wills and will-
punctuations. This multiplicity and plurality ofNietzsche's thought has not received a 
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just treatment in Heidegger's intent to reduce the will to power and eternal recurrence of 
the same to a unity. 
According to Nietzsche, Becoming and the Whole that is constituted by Being and 
13ecoming is radically plural, Iragmented, inconsistent and even in-coherent. The Whole 
that returns, recurs as fragment and as a-diaphory and chorismos. This radical in-
determinateness ofNietzsche's thought has been identified by Müller-Lauter, following 
Jasper's great reading of Nietzsche. By contrast, Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche 
continually tries to determine, to fix and de-limit Nietzsche's thought. This essential de-
limitation occurs when Heidegger attempts to claim that Nietzsche completes the Western 
metaphysical tradition. Heidegger further dctermines and over-determines Nietzsche's 
thought when he claims that it can be sub-sumed and totalized under the principle of the 
unit y of the will to power. 
But if, following Müller-Lauter, we admit that there are wills-to-power and 
multiple contradictions in Nietzsche's thought, then we have to reject the idea of 
Nietzsche as the last metaphysician of the West. Instead, we have to conceive this move 
by Heidegger as a rhetorical move that allows him to de-limit and to fix Nietzsche's 
position on Becoming. However, Nietzsche's thought on Becoming, at the same time as 
it is a-diaphoristic and chorismatic, evolving at the limits of coherence and in-coherence, 
also focuses on the infinite, absolute and eternal aspects or Becoming. 
[t is perhaps these aspects which Müller-Lauter has s011lewhat neglected since he 
claims that any "givenness" pre-supposes the stability and persistence of self-
consciousness. Bere, Müller-Lauter has perhaps missed an essential aspect ofNietzsche's 
analysis of consciousness in terms of drives and will to power. There is only stability and 
permanence because we pre-suppose this stability and permanence in our consciousness 
and then "project" it onto the outside world, then 11l0ving back and inferring inner 
stability and permanence From the stability and permanence of the outside world. This 
circle or self-contradiction of consciousness is something that Müller-Lauter seems to 
miss in his deep and thorough reading orNietzsche. 
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The inconsistency and in-coherence of Becoming is th us a result orthe 
inconsistency and in-coherence of the human ego or conscience which is perpetually in 
movement, attempting to "seize" and "grasp" itself in the movement and passage of each 
time-instant. Each instant that passes transforms our conscience and we try to grasp both 
ourse Ives and the surrounding world in an essential yet un-seizable identity that 
continually vanishes and disappears. This /low of l3ecoming that is identical to the /low 
of our conscience is ultimately un-fathomable despite the appearance of consistency, 
unit y, stability and permanence that first appear to be given to it 
The inconsistency and un-reality of Becoming can thus be understood in the 
contradictory and sel f-contradictory relationship that Becoming has towards both Being 
and the human conscience, ego or psyche. Becoming is contradictory in its perpetuaI 
self-effacement and going-under. The thought of Becoming is the thought of a broken, 
un-articulated and in-coherent totality. What returns in the eternal recurrence is the 
Becoming of force-points, power-points, power-wills and will-punctuations of the will to 
power. LJltimately, taken to their limit, these points and punctuations have no tangible, 
material reality. They exist as fictions and falsifications of the supreme will to power that 
is effectuated starting from both our senses and our spirit, to use Nietzsche's language. 
Müller-Lauter has brought to light both the physicalism (Lange, Fechner, 
Büchner) and the vitalism (Wilhelm Roux, Virchow) ofNietzsche's philosophy of 
Becoming. [n this, he has done a great service to Nietzsche scholarship. He has pcrhaps 
missed the more ironie, a-diaphoristic and chorismatic aspects 01' Becoming in 
Nietzsche's philosophy. 
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It is the se aspects that tie Nietzsche to the ironic and infinite Romanticism of 
Schlegel, Tieck and Novalis. This is especially apparent in the early writings that are 
inlluenced by Schopenhauer and J-1eraclitus. There, Nietzsche emphasizes the infinite, 
absolute and eterrial aspects of Becoming. It is difficuIt to reconcile these aspects with the 
in-consistent, contradictory, fragmented, non-totalizable, non-articulated and in-coherent 
aspects of the concepts ofBecoming which Nietzsche has also emphasized. How can 
something (Becoming) be both infinite, absolute, eternal and in-consistent, contradictory 
and ultimately, in-coherent? This contradiction in Nietzsche's thought may ultimately 
never be resolved, but it is also what gives his thought, its lasting, enduring and selr-
perpetuating power. 
x) Gianni Vattimo 
Gianni Vattimo introduces an innovative reading of Nietzsche in his 1974, Il 
sogello et ta maschera. Vattimo's reading is characterized by an emphasis on the concept 
orthe Übermensch. There are certain ideological reasons for Vattimo's inclination 
towards Nietzsche's concept of the Übermensch. Vattimo is interested in doing a 
synthesis or Nietzsche and Marx and he is very critical of Lukacs' reception or Nietzsche 
in Destruction ofReason. But what is perhaps most original in Vattimo's reading of 
Nietzsche, in Il sogello et ta maschera at least, is his identification of a Nietzschean 
classicism. By contrasting Nietzsche's understanding of Iking and appearance with 
I-Iegcl's dialectical conception ol'both thcse concepts, Vattimo throws a new light on the 
relationship between Hegel and Nietzsche. Vattimo c\aims that Nietzsche does not l'ully 
emancipate himselffrom Hegel's phenomenologico-dialectical understanding ofhistory 
until Thus spoke Zarathuslra. It is only with the combined teachings of the Übermensch 
and the eternal recurrence of the same, that a break is achieved l'rom the recuperative 
reading of history that is so characteristic of Hegel 's philosophical system. 
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ln his most recent book on Nietzsche, Dialogue wilh Nietzsche, Vattimo makes an 
interesting remark about Lubies' reading of Nietzsche. 1 cite this remark because it is 
pertinent to the debatc whether Nietzsche should be interpreted as a philosopher having a 
polilical philosophy. Vattimo writes: "Second, unlike other interpreters who are careful 
to stay within purely philosophical and theoretical bounds, Lukâcs takes seriously 
Nietzsche's (not in the least "literary") claim to be the prophet ofa humanity that is 
meant to be realized historically, hence to forge new social relations and new political 
structures [ .... ].,,209 It seems that Vattimo agrees with this claim by Lukacs that Nietzsche 
wanted also to "forge new social relations and new political structures". 1 am also in 
agreement with Yattimo's thesis: Nietzsche cannot be read as a pure metaphysician and 
theologian. There are political implications to Nietzsche's philosophy. But Nietzsche 
raises the important question oC wh ether the political or the metaphysical aspects of 
philosophy have priority. 
According to me, Vattimo's most important contribution in 1/ sogello e la 
maschera consists in bringing to light a Nietzsche that is both, somehow a classicist and a 
Romantic in his conilict with modern civilization. Nietzsche's problcm with modernity 
consists in its absence of balance between form and content. Comparing modernity to the 
Classical Greeks, Nietzsche bemoans the absence of stylistic coherence between inside 
and outside, between form and content. 
But Nietzsche's classicism is inherently different from that of Winckelmann as is 
correctly pointed out by Vattimo. For Nietzsche it is the tragic, romantic aspects of 
êO<J Vattimo, G., Dialogue lVi/h Nie/:sche, New York. Columbia University Press, 2006. 
Greece that we can leam from as modems. The irrational stratum that exists under the 
formai Apollonian aspects of Greek civilization are what Nietzsche is interested in. 
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For Nietzsche, the Apollonian is but the Dionysian 13ecomes. By connecting the 
myth of Dionysos with the philosophies of Heraclitus and Schopenhauer, Nietzsche 
intends to to do justice to the irrationality and incoherence of Becoming. This does not 
mean as l have argued in the section on Habermas, that Nietzsche wishes to dismiss the 
Western philosophical tradition. One can look at his un-masking (in Vattimo's and 
Foucault's sense) ofreason as a prelude to a deeper grounding ofreason. Becoming is 
both adiaphoris/ic and chorisma/ic. It is inconsistent, finite and incoherent. But it also 
contains within itself the infinite, eternal and absolute potential of human reason. lt is by 
un-earthing the roots of modernity as grounded in an eternal and infinite Becoming that 
Nietzsche attempted to re-generate and redeem humanity and the Western ideal of human 
rationality. 
xi) Günter A bel 
Abel's reading of Nietzsche is both powerful and influential. His position has 
been characterized by critics such as I-lofman as that of interpretationist. This position 
should not be conlused with that of"philosophical hermeneutics to which Abel's position 
is critically and polemically opposed. 
Abel has a sophisticated theory of interpretation. He distinguishes between the 
fàmous hermeneutical circ\e and a circle of interpretation (Zirkel der Interpretation). The 
circ\e of interpretation a\lows a "rapprochement" between Nietzsche and Hegel. This is 
thc case because the circle of interpretation is related to the "logicality" that is pre-
supposed by any interpretative activity. Abel is quick to make the precision that this 
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logicality is not a formaI one and that it is, in Nietzsche's thought, the generallogicality 
of life. Abel also mentions that Nietzsche's critique or logic has only focused on the 
formaI aspects of logica and has not taken into account the "Iogic" or interpretation that 
fundamentally destroys and overcomes any form of metaphysical rationality. 
An important aspect of Abel's reading of Nietzsche is his treatment of the concept 
of eternal recurrence. Abel manages to show that even though eternal recurrence is not a 
purely scientific doctrine (rather he claims that it is a pre-logical doctrine that is pre-
supposed by ail scientilic thought), the scienti ric advances 0 r twentieth-century science 
do not contradict and have not rendered obsolete the thought or recurrence. 
Referring to modern astrophysical theory, relativity theory and particle theory, 
A bel shows that there are concepts in these theories that support the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence. This allows Abcl to increase the Iegitimacy of recurrcnce that depended 
previously and according to Nietzsche's own selr-understanding, on the basic laws or 
thermo-dynamics. 
ln clarifying the concept of eternal recurrence, Abel has to explain how he 
understands the concept of Becoming. For Abel, it is clear that Becoming must be 
understood in terms of the mature concepts of power and force-centers that dynam ically 
interact to create increases and disgregations of power. This allows Abel to claim that 
Nietzsche's philosophy in general and his understanding or Becoming and eternal 
recurrence in particular is "relativistic". Here a terminological ambiguity must be 
avoided: "relativism" in terms or Einstein's theory ofrelativity must be distinguished 
l'rom the problem of philosophical relativislll that is as old as Protagoras and the 
Sophistical school. This ambiguity is not totally dispelled in Abel's own usasge of the 
term "relativism" and this is a possible criticism that may be inveighed against him. 
Abel's great achievement is to have clarilied and re-defined the relationship 
between facticity and interpretativity (fnterpretativitdt) in Nietzsche's thought. In this 
sense, Abel writes the following: 
In diesem Sinne ist von dem vollstandigen Ineinanderstehen von 
Faktizitat und Interpretation auszugehen. Vom Interpretations-
Zirkel gilt, dass aus ihm und in ihm alles, was ist, wird. Er selbst 
aber hat weder einen Anfang noch ein Ende, gar ein Endziel. Es 
gibt in ihm kein Erstes und kein Letztes, keine Teleologie oder 
I~ 1 l' l' ]210 ~:nte ec lie ... 
Abel's position is an extremely interesting one. He follows the author of Lange 
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and Nietzsch/" (George J.Stack) insofar as he understands Nietzsche to overcome both 
mechanism and atomism. Abel recognizes that under the influence of 13oscovich, 
Nietzsche attains a form of dynamic power and force-relativism. In claiming that the 
thought of eternal recurrence is the interpretation of interpretations, Abel attempts to 
overcome Müller-Lauter's position who had claimed that Nietzsche's philosophy was an 
interpretation of interpreting (eine Interpretation des interpretierens). 
1 will make mine the critique that Müller-Lauter has made against Abel in Über 
Freiheitund Chaos. 212 Müller-Lauter claims that Abel tries to bring to the fore the logical 
aspects ofNietzsche's philosophy too much. In so doing, Abel over-interprets the 
relationship between Nietzsche and Hegel and brings them into a closeness that the texts 
do not warrant. Furthermore, for Müller-Lauter, by developing the relationship between 
l'acticity and interpretativity, Abel does not focus enough on the difference between 
perspectivity and interpretativity (a tault that Alexander Nehamas is also guilty of as 1 
claim in the next sub-section ofthis chapter). By melting, facticity, perspectivity and 
211l Abel. G., Nietzsche, Die Dynamik der Wi//en zur Machl und die ewige Wiederkehr, p.I73, de Gruyter, 
Berl in, New York, 1984. 
211 Stack. G. J., Lange and Nietzsche, pp.224-261 , de Gruyter, l3erl in, New York, 1983. 
èl2 Müller-Lauter, W .. pp.269- 309, Nietzsehes Wiederkllnftsgedanke in Gunter Abels Philosophie der 
InterQretation,j"reiheil und Chaos, de Grllyter. Berl in, New York, 1999. 
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interpretativity into one, Abel forsakes a certain rational potential that is still available to 
these concepts even ifthis is not directly extractable from Nietzsche's philosophy. 
xii) Johann Pigl 
Figl was the urst to propose a Nietzsche interpretation that would take 
interpretation seriously in his thought and that could eventually retrieve him for the 
project of philosophical hermeneutics. Figl follows Mi.iller-Lauter's lead in claiming that 
the will to power is a plurality and not a unity. By referring to Fink's Nietzsche 
interpretation, Figl claims that Nietzsche interprets Being as Becoming and thus 
overcomes the chorismos that the Western metaphysical tradition attributed to Being and 
Becoming. Figl attracts attention to Will 10 Power 617 (KSA 12,7 [54]) in which the 
"stamping (Prdgung) of the character of Being onto Becoming" is mentioned. That the 
stamping is a falsification means that Being cannot be seen as fundamental with respect 
to Becoming. Being is only one aspect 01' Becoming: the linguistic and conceptual aspect 
that allows for predication. 
J-Jofmann (to whom 1 rclcr in the next entry in this section) has claimed that "Figl 
will am 'Wahrheitszusammenhang zwischen Zeichen und Sache' l'csthalten, wo 
Nietzsches Bestrebungen ganz darauf gerichtet sind, einen solchen Zusammenhang 
aufzulosen und zu verIlUssigen ... ,,213 Il is perhaps this attempt by Nietzsche to dissolve 
the relationship between sign and thing (Sache) that makes it difficult to retrieve him for 
the project of philosophical hermeneutics. 
Hermeneutics, in my understanding of this concept, attempts to re-attach and re-
connect the lived and spoken contexts or the thing with the symbolical abstraction or the 
213 Hofmann, J., Wahrheit, Perspektive, Interpretation, Nietzsche und die philosophische Hermeneutik, 
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sign. If Hofmann, is right, in his assessment of the way Nietzsche sees the relationship 
between sign and thing, then Nietzsche cannot be retrieved as an advocate of 
philosophical hermeneutics. The dissolving of the relation between sign and thing makes 
sense from the point ofview ofa philosophy ofBecoming that wants to re-activate the 
lived and instinctive elements of the activity of philosophical interpretation. 
This problem of the relationship of the concept ofBecoming to the project ofa 
philosophical hermeneutics is important. Philosophical hermeneutics, following 
I-Ieidegger's lcad in the twentieth century believed that 13eing and eternity are derived 
from a finite temporality of Dasein. The hermeneutics of factical lire consisted in the 
interpretation of the facticity of Dasein that rejected the concept of Being as absolute, 
anhistorical and eternal. 
But we have seen that following my interpretation of Becoming, Nietzsche 
seemed to want to restore some of the attributes that the tradition had ascribed to Being to 
13ecoming. We were thus faced with the paradox ofhaving a concept ofBecoming, which 
was traditionally associated to time and change, that could suffer the attributes of eternity, 
absoluteness and infinitude. 
Furthermore, what makes problematic the tacking of Nietzsche onto any project 
of philosophical hermeneutics is the problem that is so central to that tradition of thought 
ofmeaning, totality and coherence. For Nietzsche, Becoming is both absolute and finite, 
coherent and in-coherent. Becoming is both totality and Iragment. The best way to 
characterize it is to claim that it is in-determinate (adiaphorislic) and broken apart 
(chorismalic). For these reasons Nietzsche's philosophy of Becoming stands at 
irreconciliable odds with the project of philosophical hermeneutics. 
p.186, de Gruyter, I3erlin, New York, 1994. 
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xiii) Johann Nepomuk Hofmann 
}-}ofmann takes Nietzsche into consideration with relation to the problem of philosophical 
hermeneutics. He asks the question: why has Nietzsche been so neglected in the project 
of twentieth-century philosophical hermeneutics. For Hofmann, the future of 
hermeneutics as a philosophical movement depends on understanding the critical 
challenge that Nietzsche poses to philosophical hermeneutics. It is clear that Bofmann 
wants to pull Nietzsche within the orb of the hermeneutical movement. In this sense he 
polemically charges against Lukacs that Nietzsche does not destroy reason but that he 
inaugurates another type of interpretative (in/erpretatorische) reason. This whole debate 
over the status of interpretation has been the rage in more recent Nietzsche studies. 
Günther Abel himself claims that the thought of eternal recurrence is the interpretation of 
interpretations (Interpre/a/ion der In/erpre/a/ionen) and in this sense he wants to go 
beyond Müller-Lauter who claims that Nietzsche's philosophy amounts to an 
interpretation of interpreting (In/erpre/a/ion des in/erpre/ierens). 
'l'he claim that Nietzsche is a philosopher ofreason is difficult to sustain. There 
are many passages in his work that polemicize with the concept of reason. However, the 
opposite claim that Nietzsche is a philosopher of un-reason has perhaps also reached a 
certain point of conceptual exhaustion. The model of Nietzsche as a philosopher of post-
modcrnity (an entry-point as Habermas describes him) has been effectively criticized on 
both sides of the Atlantic. The question is, where does this leaves us. Do we have to 
decide between a henneneut Nietzsche as Hofmann and Fig! try to argue or a 
"naturalistic" Nietzsche as Clark, Leiter and Richardson argue in North-America. 
Nietzsche does not seem to fit any of these categories readily. As a phoenix, Nietzsche 
appears to come to life again from his ashes, in multiple, polymorphie figures that 
miraculously seem to fit the critical mood of the day. 
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Nietzsche is clearly un-recoverable for the project ofphilosophical hermeneutics. 
This is the case because 0 l' how he sees trulh. Nietzsche is opposed to any form 0 [' truth as 
correspondence whether this correspondence is a metaphysical one or a common-sense 
one. There is no correspondence and hence the historical and linguistic horizons cannot 
e1evate truth-claims that can be redeemed in the present. History and the tradition do not 
serve li f"e. They are inimical to it. Nietzschc's ideal of sel l'-creation and of J-linlegung or 
mcaning is at irreconciliab1e odds with the hermencutical Auslegung des Sinns. 
xiv) Volker Gerhardt 
Gerhardt has produced many impressive books on Nietzsche?14 In a sense 
Gerhardt is opposcd to some or the strongest readings that have been produced after 
Heidegger, including those or Müller-Lauter and Günter Abel and George Stack. What is 
at stake is the interpretation of the concept of the will to power. For Heidegger, the wi Il 
to power had represented the Being of beings. Insofar as it was a unified essence, the will 
to power functioned as metaphysical principle for Heidegger. 
But then, Müller-Lauter discovercd that there were "wills" to power. The plurality 
orthe wills to power, de-ontologized Heidegger's strong but ultimately essentialist 
reading orthe will to power. Abel and Stack showed that the world of the will to power 
was a "force-point world". By paying close attention to the Nachlass, they showed the 
influence or Boscovich on Nietzsche and the way Nietzsche reacted to the physical and 
cosmological theories or his time. 
21'1 Gerhardt, V., Vom Willen zur Macht, Anthropologie und Metuphysik der Machl am exemplarischen Fal! 
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This "physicalist" anti-metaphysical Nietzsche did not believe in unities but only 
in organizational multiplicities (Vielheifen). These continental interpreters connected (this 
is especially clear in Abel's case) the Nietzschean "physicalism" to a theory of 
perspectivism and Interpretation. This in turn gave them credibility and gained them sorne 
leverage with respect 10 Heidegger's reading that does not really account in a strong way 
for Nietzsche's perspectivism.215 
ln a way, Gerhardt is opposed 10 these readings. Employing the concepts of 
mediation (Vermilliung) and purpose (Zweck), he claims that Nietzsche was attempting to 
atlain 10 unities (Einheifen) in Becoming. I-Ie also believes that power and will to power 
act as ontological and epistemological principles although he believes that they do not 
estahlish a Nietzschean fundationalism. 
Gerhardt's reading is interesting but 1 think that he is fundamentally wrong on 
sorne counts. First, the cIaim that power is somehow mediated in Nietzsche just does not 
stand the scrutiny of the texts. Tt is ablatant Hegelianization of Nietzsche and this also in 
a way is a regression onto Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche. Second, J believe that 
Gerhardt confuses the epistemic, ontological and politicnl levels of discollrse in 
Nietzsche. [t is clear that Nietzsche was not opposed to unities in ail senses and 
applications of the concept. In fact, Nietzsche admired Napoleon because of his ability to 
act as a political L1nity that could yoke the contradictions of prance (and even Europe for 
a while) LInder his mIe. 
But in metaphysics and epistemology, Nietzsche did not believe in unities but 
only in 111111tiplicities or configurations or power: he believed in force-centers, power-
Friederich Nielzsches, de Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1996. 
215 Heidegger does deal with the concept of perspective but only to cn-circle and sub-sume it under the 
concept of horizon. Sec Nietzsche /.Through the concept of horizon 
that will be appropriated by Gadamer in Trufh and Mefhod, Heidegger essentializes Nictzsche's radically 
mu Itip le concept 0 r perspective, 
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centers and power-wills and in thc chaos of thcir interactions. 1 bclicve that many 
interpreters confuse the political, metaphysical and epistemological levels of discourse. 
xv) Didier Franck 
Franck is an important interpreter ofNietzsche's thought in France. His Nietzsche 
et l'ombre de Dieu216 is an original interpretation of Nietzsche. Starting l'rom an analysis 
oC Luther and I-leidegger, Franck attempts to interpret Nietzschc's Auseinandersetzung 
with Christianity by working through St-Paul 's doctrine of the resurrection of the bodies. 
The concept of justice plays a key role in Franck's interpretation. Franck is influeneed by 
l-leidegger's interpretation of truth as justice and by I-Ieidegger's claim that Nietzsche 
romanizes aletheia into veritas and thus makes possible the completion ofmetaphysics. 
Although, 1 find franck's work làscinating and erudite (especially with respect to 
the founding texts of the Judeo-Christian tradition), 1 lind that he focuses too mueh on the 
theological aspects ofNietzsche's thought. Franck claims that : 
Si la resurrection des corps et lajustice de Dieu constituent 
le Condement de la Révélation et que l'être, la logique, la 
connaissance ct la technique reposent sur des valeurs 
réactives auxquelles la moralité judéo-chrétienne a donné 
leur plus haute expression, alors seule une 'transvaluation' 
des valeurs sacerdotales, ordonnée à une nouvelle justice, 
donnant lieu à la creation d'un corps actif et supérieur, 
permettra de soustraire la philosophie à toute forme de 
théologie, c'est-à-dire de réduire le nihilisme?'7 
I-lowever despite this claim, franck consistently interprets eternal recurrence 
theologically by recurring lirst to Luther and then to Paul. 
Furthermore, under the influence of Heidegger, Franck also takes Will t() Power 
617 (KSA 12, 7 [54]) to mean that " ... penser la volonté de puissance comme éternel 
èlb franck, D., Nietzsche el / 'omhre de Diell, PUF, Paris, 1998. 
217 Idem, backcover note. 
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retour signifie assurer au devenir la constance de l'être.,,218 For Nietzsche the highest will 
to power stamps the character of Being onto Becoming but it creates through this 
stamping a falsi fication, a fictionalization of Being. Being is a fiction, a superstratum 
added on top of the perspectives of Becoming. Permanence and permanent presence as 
the metaphysical ground of Being are already undone by Nietzsche even though he does 
not attain to the thinking that thinks Being in terms of the horizon of time. 
m Ibidem, p.39. 
b) The Anglo-American Interpretations of Nietzsche 
i) Arthur C. Danto 
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Arthur Oanto presented an early (1957) interpretation of Nietzsche in Anglo-
American scholarship. His thesis is that Nietzsche anticipates through his linguistic 
analyses the project of Logical Positivism. For Oanto, the fact that Nietzsche was 
skeptical with respect to truth and that he thought that the only truc propositions were the 
ones that could be derived fj'om the senses and the ones that possessed "signi l'icance", 
brings him into the proximity of Logical Positivism. What Danto, in fact, claims is that 
Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics is what he has in common with the project of Logical 
Positivism. 
ln a re-worked version that also appears at the end or his initially published book 
(Nietzsche as Philosopher), Oanto claims the title ofsemantic nihilist for Nietzsche. Ir 
Wittgenstein is a semantie realist, one who believes (in his early position in the 
Traclalus) in the adequation of facts and linguistic propositions, Nietzsche's position is 
radically opposed to the correspondence (or adequation) theory oftruth. Oanto's claim 
that Nietzsche does not support the correspondence theory of truth has been taken to task 
by Maudemarie Clark and John Richardson. 
1 think that Oanto' s position with respect to the correspondence theory is correct. , 
will not rehearse here the argument that 1 have provided elsewhere in my thesis. (Sec 
section 3.4) '-Iowever, 1 disagrcc with Danto's claim that Nictzsche's project is close to 
the project of Logical Positivism. Danto has brought out intercsting parallels to be sure. 
13ut 1 ravour a reading that makes more of the metaphysical aspects of Nietzsche. 
Although 1 have attempted to criticize I-leidegger's reading ofNietzsehe as mueh as 
• 
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seemed appropriate, 1 still think that he has shown that Nietzsche's critique 01' 
metaphysics is ambiguous and that it also reveals him as a great metaphysical thinker. 
ii) Richard Schacht 
Schacht has developed an interesting reading of Nietzsche that attempts to 
translate Nietzsche in the philosophical language of empiricism and Logical Positivism. 
ln this sense, he follows Danto's lead, and takes Wittgenstein to be the model (although 
Schacht compares Nietzsche to the Wittgenstein of the Philosophicallnvesligalions and 
not of the Tractalus) that can be retroactively appl ied to Nietzsche in order to understand 
him. 
Schacht relates the problem of thc correspondence theOl'y of truth to the issue of 
l3ecoming that is so central to my thesis in the following way: 
Nietzsche further holds the correspondence theory of truth (as 
traditionally understood) to be wanting in that, on his view, it 
cannot be the case, that the 'truth' of any such propositions-and 
indeed of any propositions at all-is a matter of their standing in a 
correspondence-relation to a reality that has an intrinsic structural 
articulation and ordering, since there is no such reality for 
propositions to correspond to. The world as hec conceives it, has 
the character of 'becoming' rather than being of' Ilux' rather th an 
'structure' ... 219 
By distinguishing between three levels oftruth, however, Schacht hopes to show that 
Nietzsche's theory oftruth is more complex than it apparently seems. Ultimately, Schacht 
bclieves that there is a correspondence theory at play in Nietzsche's thought. This 
correspondence occurs within the linguistic games and lire-fOl'ms within which 
something is asserted of a state of aflàirs. Although this conceptuallanguage is that of 
Wittgenstein and not Nietzsche, Schacht hopes to show that there is a foreground 
21<) Schacht, R., Nietzsche, pp.61-62, Routledge and Kcgan Paul, London, Boston, Melbourne, Henley, 
1983. 
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correspondence theory operating in Nietzsche's thought and that this is combined with a 
background coherence theory of truth. 
1 do not believe that by lodging the corresponde nec theory oftruth within the 
linguistic games that wc practice and the fonns or life that wc are, that wc can escape the 
claim that Becoming conditions knowledge and truth. The fonns of lire and the linguistic 
games that we practice are themselves subject to the law of Becoming. There is no fixity 
aceording to Nietzsche not even a relative one: it has been my position throughoUl 1his 
thesis that because teleology is removed From withing Becoming, this dislodges fixity and 
ultimately impacts the epistemology of correspondence theories of truth. Thus 1 am 
rorced to disagree with Schact on the issue of how he sees truth in Nietzsche. 
iii) Alexander Nehamas 
Nehamas wrote perhaps the most famoLls Nietzsche book in Anglo-American 
Nietzsche scholarship of the 1980's. Under the inlluence of intcrpreters sueh as Derrida 
and Kofman, Nehamas decides to foc us on the stylistic and literary aspects ofNietzsche's 
philosophical writings. Nehamas' Nietzsche reading functions as a paradigm of the post-
modern rcadings that have come under criticism through the more rccent evolution of' 
Anglo-American scholarship which tries to push the idea of a naturalist Nietzsche. 
lnterestingly, Nehamas' reading a1so focuses on a central doctrine ofNietzsche's, 
that ofperspectivism, that is still ofinterest for the more recent Anglo-American readings 
of Richardson, Leiter and Clark. The most important aspect ofNehamas' reading is his 
defense ofNietzsehean perspectivism. Il must be said, ta begin with, that Nehamas does 
not diffcrentiate enough betwccn the concepts of interpretatioll and perspective. This 
allows him to claim that Nictzsche's perspectivism is delensible even though Nietzsche 
claims that his perspectivism is only one perspective (or interpretation, here again 
Nehamas' lack of precision re-occurs) among many. 
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Nehamas claims, rightly 1 believe, that Nietzschc's philosophy orperspectivism is 
plagued or might be seen to be plagued by the paradoxes or self-referentiality. !-le affirms 
that the claim that P, where P, stands for Nietzsche's claim is ail truth is only an 
interpretation could be taken to be a variation of the liar's paradox. IfP means that ail 
truth is only an interpretation and if P is true then this would mean 1hat P also is also only 
an interpretation and it would undermine the truth-value or P. But, claims Nehamas, this 
pre-supposes that P is necessarily and always j'aIse and not that it could be j'aIse. 
This is an interesting argument in itself and it has made Nietzsche's argument 
about perspectivism more palatable, but 1 believe that it stems from a logical fallacy. It 
rests on the fallacy or inconsistency that pre-supposes that interpretations could be 
attributed truth-values such as "true" or "l'aIse". Certainly the claim "Ail truths are 
interpretations" has a truth-value il' it is taken to be a well-formed statement, but this does 
not mean that ail interpretations take the form of well-formed statements and hence that 
ail interpretations can be attributed the value "true" or "ralse". Consequently, the claim 
"Ali truths are interpretations" il' it is taken to claim that ail well-rormed statements with 
the truth value "true" are interpretations does undermine and contradict itselr. 
This shows the weakness orNehamas's reading. Another weakness is Nehamas' 
locus on the more literary aspects ofNietzsche's thought. Arter I-Ieidegger's major effort 
to show that Nietzsche is a conceptual thinker and not a "mere" poet-philosopher, this 
definitely seems like a step back in criticism. 
Finally a positive point with respect to Nehamas' reading isthe fact that he has 
shown that we must distinguish between perspectivism and relativism. There is definitely 
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a difference here, even if only a verbal one. The task for future Nietzsche criticism will 
be to clarify this distinction. 
iv) Maudemarie Clark 
Maudemarie Clark has provided an iniluential interpretation of Nietzsche in the 
field of Anglo-American scholarship.22o Her thesis is that Nietzsche ultimately rejects a 
metaphysical correspondence theory in l~lvor of a common sense correspondence theory 
based on cognitive interests. This correspondence replaces the traditional correspondence 
to the thing-in-itself. Focusing on Nietzsche's development, Clark claims that Nietzsche 
was still influenced by Schopenhauer's representationalism in the early text Trulh and Lie 
in an Extra-Moral Sense (Wahrheit und Uige ;/11 Aussermoralischen Sinne). According 
to Clark's reading, Nietzsche delends a correspondence between the thing-in-itselfand 
appearance in this early text. As Nietzsche's philosophy evolves, he comes to reject this 
early metaphysical understanding of truth. Clark interprets The History of an Error in its 
last stage ("The real world has disappeared what is left the world of appearances. No. The 
world ofappearances has vanished as well.") as providing evidence that Nietzsche has 
renoullced the world of the thing-in-itsel l' but also the distinction between thing-in-itsell' 
and appearances. What is left according to Clark is a world of empirical evidence that we 
can interpret in virtue of a "common sense" correspondence between the empirical facts 
and truth. 
According to me, this reading is highly problematic. Clark writes: "Nietzsche's 
characterization or truths as illusions or lictions amounts to calling the empirical world. 
the world accessible through common sense and science, illusory or fictitious. His 
history of the 'true' world indicates that he gives up ascribing reality to any world other 
220 Clark, M., Nietzsche on Truth and Philo.l'ophy. Cambridge, England, New York, Cambridge University 
Press. 1990. 
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than the empirical world (stage 5), and that he recognizes that this requires him to 
relinquish his claim that the empirical world is illusory (stage 6). That he puts the logical 
consequence of stage 5 in a separate stage gives strong evidence that Nietzsche later 
recognized his initial Jàilure to appreciate the consequences of denying the thing-in-itself, 
which means that he himselfwent through a period in which he denied the thing-in-itself, 
but continued to characterize the empirical world as mere appearance or illusion,,22 1 
1 interpret The History of an Error precisely as the fact that Nietzsche de-
constructs the distinction between the thing-in-itself and appearanccs. This precludes a 
regression to the philosophy of empiricislll or or Neo-Kantianism, as Clark claims. 
Nietzsche is more radical than that. He claims that the fact that thcrc is no more 
transcendental ground for the world of appearances makes this world and its perception 
problematic. What is left is an eternal Becoming that is shot through with interpretation, 
perspective and contradiction. This world of J3ecoming has as principle the an-archic 
principle of willto power. Will to power is the last fact to which wc come. There are no 
empirical facts according to Nietzsche but only interpretations that stem Irom wi Il to 
power and its moral valuations. 
v) John Richardson 
John Richardson has written two important books on Nietzsche: Nietzsche 's 
System and Nietzsche 's New Darwinism. 222 1 will Cocus on the first book since in my 
opinion it has provided the most interesting stimulus to Anglo-American research. For 
Richardson, as for most Anglo-American readings of Nietzsche (including Clark), the 
221 Clark, M., op.cit., p.114. 
èè2 Richardson, J., Nietzsche '.1' System, New Y ork, Oxford University Press, 1996 and Nietzsche '.1' New 
Darwinism, New York, Oxford University Press, 2004. 
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highest stakes in reading Nietzsche is to rescue him l'rom the danger 01' rclativism. That is 
oncn perceived as the most dilTicult problem that any rcading of Nietzsche faces. 
Richardson begins by stating the problcm as follows: Nietzsche has a power 
ontology in the sense that he claims that at bottom everything is will to power. According 
to this understanding ofNietzsche's philosophy (heavily indebted to Heidegger even if 
this is not always acknowledged), the essence of beings is will to power. But, continues 
Richardson, Nietzsche also has a second teaching which consists in what many cri tics 
have called "perspectivism". Perspectivism is not exactly relativism but in practice it is 
often hard to differentiate one position t'rom the other. As an example of Nietzsche's 
perspectivism, Richardson points to the rollowing passage in which Nietzsche retorts to a 
possible cri tic that will to power is only an interpretation: "Gesetzt, dass auch dies nur 
Interpretation ist-und ihr werdet ei l'rig genug sein, dies einzuwenden ?-11lIn um so 
besser.',223 
So it seems that Nietzsche here grants that will to power and the power ontology 
associated with it is only an interpretation, a perspective and not something that can be 
rationally defended by giving causes. This in turn points to the danger of falling prey to a 
full-l1edged relativism if we 1'0110w Nietzsche literally. 
Richardson is right to Ihink that this is a major problem in Nietzsche interpretation 
and he is not alone. So how does he solve the problem? Richardson, not unlike 
Maudemarie Clark, believes that ultimately Nietzsche functions with a correspondence 
theory oftruth. He believes that the power ontology somehow trumps Nietzsche's 
perspectivism in the end. In order to show Ihis, Richardson appeals to another text given 
by Nietzsche that many other Anglo-American commentators seem to pick up on 
(including Nehamas, Schacht and others): 
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Es giebt nur ein perspektivisches Sehen, nur ein perspektivischcs 
"Erkennen" und je mehr Affekte wir über cine Sache zu Worte 
kommen lassen, mehr Augen, verschiedne Augen wir uns für 
dieselbe Sache einzusetzen wissen, um so vollstandiger wird unser 
"B . j'p' d' S h "Ob' k' ' .. " . 224 egn" leser" ac e, unsre' .le tlvltat sem. 
Using this text and a Quinian reconstruction orthe web ofbeliefs, Richardson 
attempts to show that the power ontology lies at the core ofNietzsche's epistemology 
whereas the perspectivism lies at the edges of his theory of knowledge. Richardson has an 
interesting 
Despite its interesting aspects, this reading is ultimately untenable in my opinion. 
It does not make enough or the onto-theological relation between the will to power and 
the eternal recurrence and or Nietzsche's attempt to de-construct onto-theology, 
Nietzsche's attempt to redeem humanity From revenge is a metaphysieal goal as 
Heidegger has pointed out. Richardson himself is aware ofthis redeeming aspect of 
Nietzsche's philosophy when he writes: 
But in him this nostalgia is increasingly ruled by a Dionysian urge 
to show his love for past and present by destroying and remaking 
them, thercby 'redeeming' them. This Dionysian aspect is thus also 
Nietzsche's messianic and revolutionary strain; it explains his great 
1 f 225 stress on t le uture. 
But Richardson is more interested in the epistemological aspects ofNietzsehe's 
metaphysics. This is evident in his way of framing the problem of metaphysics: he asks 
whether Nietzsche offers "a systematic truth about essence,,22fi. In the end, Richardson's 
thesis about the existence of truth as correspondence in Nietzsche seems predicated lIpon 
the existence or holistic "truth as coherence" that 1 ies al the root of Quine 's web of 
beliefs. 1 am not sure if Richardson's reading is quite consistent on this point since il does 
225 Jensei/s von GU/lind Bose, 22, (KSA 5, p.37). 
~~4 lu/' Genealogie der Moral. Drilte Abhandlung, 12 (KSA 5, pp.364-365). 
__ 5 Richardson, J., Nietzsche's System, New York, Oxford University Press, 1996, p.117. 
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seem like the web ofbeliefs which presupposes a notion oftruth that is both empirical 
and hypothetical (i.e. open to revision) depends on a notion of truth as coherence. In fact 
it is not so much whether a "fact" corresponds to a truthful statement or representation 
that matters for Quine's web of beliefs but what matters is how much and how weil the 
totality of the web of statements or representations will map onto reality as a whole. 
A further point on which 1 disagree with Richardson, and this point is crucial 
since it allows Richardson to re-construct Nietzsche' s thought From an epistemological 
perspective, is the interpretation 01' the correspondence theory of truth in Nietzsche's 
philosophy. Almost aIl Anglo-American interpreters starting with Clark (and Schacht 
does something similar which pre-dates Clark's reading) interpret Nietzsche's concept of 
truth as possessing sorne sort of correspondence structure. 1 think there is something 
fundamental which aIl attempts of establishing truth as correspondence in Nietzsche's 
work miss. Truth as correspondence pre-supposes (as Scheler was already aware in 
1926227 ) that there is a divine (active) intellect in which the reprcsentation of the lact or 
the thing exists: that is, the correspondence is about lacts or things in the world and a 
representation that exists in the mind of God (H is as classically stated by Aquinas: 
adequatio inlelleclus ad rem). But once one has given up on God as one might think 
Nietzsche had, the truth as correspondence vanishes as weIl. 
The previous claims may be moderated a bit when we notice that it is true that 
many scientists today believe that their representations are "adequate" and correspond to 
reality and this is the case ev en though they do not believe in God. This is a strong point, 
but the correspondence theory of truth does seem to be undermined by Nietzschean 
perspectivism. Sorne philosophers like Rorty have argued that perspectives are 
226 Idem, p.284. 
227 Scheler, M., L 'homme el {'histoire, Paris, I~ditions Montaigne, 1955, p.36. 
"incommensurable". On this reading of perspeetivism rather than a more charitable 
reading that believes that perspectives may be harmonized, the belief on truth as 
adeqllation does seem to depend on a "point ol'view lî·om nowhere" or an the point of 
view of an ideal, "divine" observer. 
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By reducing Nietzsche's thought to epistemology, Richardson despite his attempt 
to describe the Nietzschean perspectival ontology, misses the crucial metaphysical and 
theological core ofNietzsche's philosophy. Although 1 do not delend a metaphysical 
reading of Nietzsche, but posit, contra Heidegger, the l'act that Nietzsche emphasized 
Becoming over and against Being, 1 still think that the anti-metaphysics of Becoming 
cannot be reduced to an epistemology of claims relating to a web of beliefs as Richardson 
does. 
Richardson has provided an interesting reading of Nietzsche and 1 am 
fundamentally in agreement with him insofar as he points a way out of the purely post-
modern readings ofNehamas and Derrida (and to a certain extent Vattimo). 
vi) Brian Leiter 
Another important commentator in Anglo-American scholarship is Brian Leiter. 
!-le gives an inlluential analysis of Zur Genealogie der Moral in his Nietzsche on 
Morality.228 Leiter distingllishes between the post-modern reading of Nietzsche 
(Habermas, Derrida, Nehamas) and a naturalist reading of Nietzsche. This naturalist 
reading of Nietzsche depends on proving that "Nietzsche belongs not in the company of 
m Lciter, G., Nietzsche on Mora/ily, New York, Routledgc, 2002. 
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post-modernists like Foucault and Derrida, but rather in the company of naturalists like 
Hume and Freud - that is among broadly speaking, philosophers o{hul71onnOlure.,,229 
Leiter's reading is heavily dependent on Clark's interpretation of the concept oftruth in 
Nietzsche. 
ln fact, Leiter claims that Clark put an end to purely post-modern readings in 
Nietzsche studies and established Nietzsche interpretation on a surer footing. While 1 
believe that Clark's interpretation is interesting and has contributed to the progress of 
Nietzsche studies, 1 do not think that we can simply decide between a naturalist and post-
modernist Nietzsche. But the problems with Leiter's reading of Nietzsche do not stop 
here. Leiter makes another controversial claim: he affirms that Nietzsche does not have 
any political theories or that he is an apolitical esolericol moralist. In my opinion, Leiter 
focuses too much on the mature writings where it is true that Nietzsche does not expound 
any explicit political theory. 
22<) ILeitcr's cillphasis, P.c.1, ihidem, pp.2-3. 
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Conclusion 
In general the Continental interpretations of Nietzsche are much more 
physicalistic, vitalistic and anti-metaphysical reacting in great part to Heidegger's 
metaphysical reading of Nietzsche. Foremost among the most recent Continental readings 
is Müller-Lauter's interpretation of Nietzsche. Müller-Lauter challenged Heidegger's 
deep thesis of the unit y of the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the same. For 
MüUer-Lauter, this unit y of the will to power and eternal recurrence laid too much stress 
on the identification ofwill to power with essenlia and eternal recurrence with exislenlia. 
But Müller-Lauter went further, he claimed that the will to power was not a 
(unitary) principle as Heidegger had claimed. By affirming the unitary nature of the will 
to power as a principle under which aIl ofNietzsche's metaphysics could be subsumed, 
Heidegger made Nietzsche into the last metaphysician of the West. l-Iere again, Müller-
Lauter objected: for him metaphysics as metaphysics was taken apart within Nietzsche's 
thought. 
Il seems that this view of Nietzsche as metaphysician has effectively been 
challenged in both the Continental and the Anglo-American readings of Nietzsche. 
Heidegger's reading has become to a large extent untenable. 
But the reasons for rejecting Heidegger's interpretation are different on the 
continent and in the world of Anglo-American philosophy. Il seems as though both agree 
nonctheless that Heidegger sought to make Nietzsche into a metaphysician in order to 
show how he himself had stepped beyond his own idiosyncratic understanding of 
metaphysics. 
In the Anglo-American tradition more emphasis has been laid on the tact that 
Nietzsche can be understood as a pragmatist-naturalist philosopher. This ean be seen in 
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Clark and Leiter's readings. The Anglo-American readings are essentially 
epistemological. They attempt to read Nietzsche in contrast or in conti nuit y with Hume, 
Wittgenstein and Quine. There is a great interest in establishing that Nietzsches functions 
with a theory oftruth as correspondence: this is the case in Richardson and Clark's 
readings. 
Although 1 am defending an anti-metaphysical reading of Nietzsche, it does not 
mean that 1 believe that his thought can be full re-constructed from the epistemological 
point ofview. In l'act the position 1 am defending is ambiguous from the point ofview of 
metaphysics: 1 believe that Nietzsche does possess something like a metaphysics of 
l3ecoming. 
The concept ofBecoming, though traditionally anti-metaphysical, possesses 
something like a metaphysical structure: it does so in virtue ofbeing a finite/infinite 
totality. Becoming is eternal, infinite and abso\ute. But at the same time it is finite, in-
coherent, inconsistent and rragmentary: it is adiaphoristic and chorismatic. Becoming 
mediates between the will to power and eternal recurrence of the same. What recurs is the 
eterna\ recurrence of the Becoming of the will to power. 
1 think that it is correct to affirm from Nietzsche's point ofview that he was 
combating what he understood as the Western project of metaphysics that was being 
perpctuated in the tradition of Platonism. But there are elements in the young Nietzsche's 
phi\osophy which are close to affirming a J-\eraclitean eternity and absoluteness of 
Becoming. What is eternal then is not an other-world\y abstract world of Being, but the 
concreteness of the senses and the opposites that engage themselves in perpetuai 
struggles only to come-into-being, to pass-away and go-under. What is eterna\ and 
abso\ute is change, movement, transformation and transfiguration. 
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Aristotle's Account ofBecoming in Light of Nietzsche 
ln this section 1 will compare Nietzsche's understanding of Becoming to that of 
Aristotle. Aristotle's analysis or Becoming is fundamental to Western metaphysics. It 
founds the discourse on Becoming in Western metaphysics. Although Plato had begun to 
describe the concept of Becoming through his genesis eis ousian,230 this concept is not 
l'ully developed until Aristotle's treatment of the concept ofBecoming in the Physics and 
the Metaphysics. Some might say that the philosopher who discovered Becoming is 
I-Ieraclitus. 1 agree with this assessment, but for me, Heraclitus' doctrines on Becoming 
are at best fragmentary and we do not have a J'ully developed, rational treatment 0 f 
Becoming until the work of Aristotle. A comparison between Aristotle's understanding 
of Becoming and Nietzsche's could be very fruitful. 1 would assert that even though 
Becoming in Nietzsche is perhaps not as rigorous a concept as in Aristotle, Nietzsche 
does progress with respect to this thinker in his analysis of Becoming. r will claim that 
Nietzsche de-ontologizes Becoming and that he does this by removing the objective 
teleology that Aristotle, and later Hegel, still incorporate into their concept ofBecoming. 
In this way, Nietzsche will transform an objective teleology into a subjective teleology . 
This section ofmy dissertation can best be summarized in the following manner. 
ln order to understand Aristotle's account ofBecoming, we must understand where 
Becoming takes place. Il is safe to as sert that Becoming takes place for Aristotle within 
metaphysical substance (ousia). Thus, in order to understand Aristotle's account of 
Becoming we must understand what exactly he means by substance. Aristotle considers 
this carefully in the Melaphysics. For Aristotle the concepts of Being and of substance 
are inherently linked. This Ieads Aristotle to famously assert in book Zeta of the 
230 Plata, Philebus, 26 d 8. 
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Melaphysics (1028b4) that the age-old question "What is Being T' could be solved iflhe 
answer to the alternative question "What is substance ?" were round. 
ln order to understand and c1arify the question "What is substance ?", we must 
differentiate between primary substance and secondary substance. Aristotle does this in 
the Categories. There, he distinguishes between the individual substances and the 
genuses and kinds. The genuses can function as both subjects and predicates as in they do 
in the rollowing examples respectively: "Man is mortal" and "Socrates is a man". 
"Socrates", on the other hand, cannot be predicated of anything. He constitutes an 
individual substance and this is what Aristotle caBs primary substance. Genuses and 
kinds are, accordingly, secondary substances. In the Melaphysics, there is an evolution 
with respect to the conception oC substance. The conception of substance is laid out in 
books Z, H and 8. 
The attempt to answer the question "What is substance ?" is complex. What is 
involved here is a tension in the Aristotelian corpus between subjects of change and 
subjects of predication. In the Categories, Aristotle considers subjects of predication, 
things or objects of which things are said. [n the Physics, Aristotle comes to be interested 
in objects in which change occurs (subjects of change). But according to him, there is a 
connection between subjects of change and subjects or predication. A subject of change 
can have one predicate belonging to it at one time that does not belong to it at another 
time. Subjects of change, that is, are also subjects of predication. 
For Aristotle, actuality has priority over potentiality. This is important because 
we are attempting to understand how ente1echeia, actuality and potentiality are related in 
Aristotle's complex account ofBecoming. Next, 1 will give an account ofhow Aristotle 
describes change and Becoming, in terms of the relationship between his concepts of 
matter and form/species. 1 will explain why for Aristotle the relationship between 
• 
• 
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actuality must be explained in terms of final (entelechical) causation. This will bring us 
back to the beginning of the section where 1 had discussed Aristotle's account of 
Becoming in terms of the relationship between actuality, potentiality and entelecheia. 
Finally, 1 will to cxplain what Nietzsche's progress with respect to Aristotle consists in 
when it cornes to the explanation of Becoming. My thesis will be that through the 
elimination ofteleology or entelechy from Becoming, Nietzsche also removes 
permanence and permanentization from metaphysics. This removal of permanence from 
within the metaphysical tradition amounts to a de-construction of metaphysics as onto-
theology. 
A process derives its meaning l'rom the làct that it has a beginning or initial state, 
a direction, and an end or final state. Without the final state, there is no closure to the 
process and this lack of closure prevents the process from possessing any meaning. The 
final or end state is projected according to Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism onto a beyond. 
This final state becomes the true world or Seing that is devoid of any 13ecoming. This 
beyond has been differently interpreted whether in the Platonic or the Christian tradition. 
lt could mean the realm of the Ideas, heaven or the Godhead of the divinity itself. Thus, 
according to Nietzsche, we derive from the world of appearances a concept of purpose 
which is then stabilized, cleansed of the notion of change inherent in it and then projected 
it onto the beyond, thus splitting the world of phenomena into two: a true world of Being 
and a world of appearances and Secoming. 
The concept of purpose or of entelechy that is derived from the world of 
Becoming (and this understanding has been strongly determined by Aristotle's 
understanding of 8ecoming in the Western metaphysical tradition) is what allows the rirst 
stabilization and permanentization of a world of Being. It is only through the positing or 
purpose within Becoming, that permanence and stability within Being are achieved. 
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However, through this positing of purpose within Becoming, the stability and 
permanence necessary to "project" the concept oF God is also achieved. 
ln Nietzsche's narration orThe I-listory oran Error, the problem is that the world 
of appearances and of Becoming disappears as weil. By eliminating the dichotomy 
between the world of appearances and the world of essences or ofBeing, Nietzsche 
eliminates teleology from Becoming and this is what constitutes his progress with respect 
to Aristotle and Hegel. Here the notion of progress must be not be understood as a re-
introduction of teleology in the line of evolution From Aristotlc and Hegel to Nietzsche. 
Progress means just that: change and evolution, but a directedness and a meaning-schema 
From Aristotle and Hegel to Nietzsche that could again re-interpret a progressive 
movement of clarification orthe concept ofBecoming From these philosophers to 
Nietzsche is ruled out. 
Aristotle's analysis of lllovement and Becoming is divided into a l3ecollling that 
occurs according to nature (kafa phusin) and a Becoming that occurs according to fechne. 
1 will c\arify at the end ofthis section of my dissertation what exactly is the difference 
between Becoming and movement. Aristotle defines and describes the concept of 
movelllent in term of the sub-categories ofactuality and potentiality. As Ernesto Berti 
puts it: "La definizione dei lllovilllento in termini di potenza ed alto dimostra pertanto che 
nella cosa che si muove deve esistere qualche forma di molteplicità ... ,,2JI Aristotle's 
"starting point" is a critique oFPannenides' position on Becoming. lt is useful to recall 
what Parmenides had c\aimed with respect to Becoming. For Parmenides there is no 
possibility of a Becoming either starting from Being, because it is eternal and unmoved, 
or starting from non-l3eing, since non-Being cannot be in any way. Aristotle opposes to 
231 [The definition of movement in terms of potency and act demonstrates nevertheless that in the thing that 
moves there must exist a form of multiplicity, my translation, P.c.] Serti, E., Aris/o/e/e: dalla dia/el/ica 
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Parmenides the claim that Becoming may occur both with respect to Being, conceived as 
matter or with respect to non-Being, conceived as the absence (privatio) of form. As 
Pierre Aubenque puts it: 
Il est à la fois vrai de dire que l'être provient du non-être et qu'il 
provient de l'être, à condition de n'entendre pas deux fois le mot 
être dans le même sens; l'être en acte ne vient pas de l'être en acte, 
. d l' , . 1 l ' 732 mais e 'etre en pUissance, eque est un non-etre en acte.-
We now arrive at a problem that is of the utmost importance for the investigations 
we have pursued here. The problem consists in giving a proper definition of Aristotle's 
term of entelecheia. This problem is of importance to us because it was our claim that 
Nietzsche eliminates entelecheia f1'om his account of Becoming in favor of the terms 
dunamis and energeia. However, it turns out that entelecheia proves a difficult term to 
define in Aristotle's complex account of movement and Becoming. Sorne have claimed 
that: "".tout en signalant cette différence d'origine et de sens entre energeia et 
entelecheia, Aristote n'y attache guère d'importance: en fait il emploie indifférement les 
d " 233 eux termes: ... 
Others, such as Thomas Aquinas, have attempted to define entelechy as the 
"actuality ofpotentiality in relation to that which itselfmust actualize itself.,,234 But 
Aristotle defines motion, and this is important for our investigation, in terms of entelechy: 
"motion is the entelechy orthe movable qua movable, the cause of the attribute being in 
contact with what can move.,,235 
In book Theta of the Metaphysics, Aristotle describes the relationship between 
actuality (energeia) and potentiality (dunamis). For Aristotle, actuality is higher than 
al/a filosofia prima, pA19, Bompiani, Milano, 2004. 
232 Aubenque, P., Le problème de l'être chez Aristote, pA45, PUF, Paris, 1962. 
m Leblond, J. M., Logique et Mélhode chez Aristote: étude sur la recherche des principes dans la physique 
arislotélicienne, pA29, Paris, Librarie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1973. 
234 Aquinas, Comm. /n OCIO Libris Physica ArislOtelis, Lib IlL Cap.l, Lect II, nl1.3 et 5. 
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potentiality as 1 have pointed out. Thus Aristotle writes : "From our discussion of the 
various senses of'prior', it is clear that actuality i~ prior to potency." (1049b) With respect 
to the temporal relation Aristotle claims that actuality is prior to potentiality in one sense 
and in anolher it isn 't. (l 049b 1 0). Aristotle makes a distinction between priority in logos. 
in time, and in substance. 
Actuality is prior to potentiality with respect to time for the following reason. At 
first it might seem as if potentiality were prior to actuality; that is, it might seem that the 
tlower is developed From a seed 1hat potentiaHy contains the f10wcr and its development 
within it. But this is wrong according to Aristotle. For him, the individual or particular 
secd comes From an actual 110wer and th us the actual flower precedes the potential seed 
both logically and temporally. Logically, according to logos, the actual 110wer gives rise 
to an actual seed. Thus we must refer to the tlower as an actuality in order to describe its 
potentiality which is the seed. As Aristotle puts il: 'visible' means 'capable of being 
seen'; 'buildable' means 'capable orbeing bui/((1049b14-16) 
Temporally, the sa me pattern is rcpeated, wc need an actualllower to give birth in 
a temporal development to an actual seed. From this seed the flower is again reproduced 
and this is the movement of potentiality. Again, in the words of Aristotle: "the actual 
which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is 
prior to it" (1 049b 1,8-19). 
The final reason why Arist011e claims that actuality has priority over potentiality 
has to do with the nature of substance. There are two reasons why Aristotle gives 
actuaIity priority over potentiality with respect to substance. The first has to do with his 
account of final causation. Thus Aristotle writes: "the actuality is the end, and it Îs lor the 
mArislOlle, Physics, 202 a7. 
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sake ofthis that the potentiality is acquired ... animais do not see in order that they may 
have sight, but they have sight that they may see ... matter exists in a potential state, just 
because it may come to its form; and when it exists ac/ually, then it is in its [orm" 
(1050a9-17). 
By claiming that actual substance is more fundamental than potential substance, 
Aristotle consolidates the priviledge of the eternal, the permanent, the stable and the 
immutable within Western metaphysics. This priviledge had already been established by 
Plato when he had conceived ol'the idea orthe Good as [king. But Aristotle reinforces 
the Platonic onto-theological armature by introducing the notion of entelecheia into 
Becoming and showing more clearly how the eternal (actual) and the perishable 
(potential) are interconnected. Becoming is conceptualized in Aristotle as a movement 
l'rom actuality to potentiality but this occurs through the introduction of a purpose that 
links actuality to potentiality. En/elecheia is sometimes itself translated as actuality. In 
l'act purpose or entelecheia is closer to actuality th an to potentiality. This privilege of 
actuality and permanence is effectively criticized in Nietzsche's philosophy. Becoming 
is conceived from the side ofpotentiality and im-permanence. Nietzsche removes from 
Aristotle's account of Becoming the notion or purpose. But it was purpose that created 
the stability between potentiality and actuality and ultimately within actuality itself. By 
removing purpose From within Becoming, Nietzsche effectively deconstructs the onto-
theology that experiences one of its key transitions in Aristotle's philosophy.236 1n50far, 
236 My claim that onto-theology begins with Plato is substantiated by I-Ieidegger's understanding ofthis 
concept. Onto-theology begins in Plato's thought ofBeing as Idea of the Good and as permanent presence. 
It is completed once in the first beginning 0 f Western thought in Aristotle 's melaphysics which identi fies 
Iking with the highest ausia orthe the(Jl/s. The noesis l1oeseos of Aristotlian onto-theology already closes 
the circle of the first, Greek, onto-theological beginning. The identity ofthought thinking itselras thought. 
is the second important hinge al1er the identification of 13eing as the idea of the Good as permanent 
presence. But onto-theology, although complete for the first time in Aristotle, begins anew in Philo's and 
Augustine's interpretations of Plato and in Augustinc's identification orthe God of the Scriptures, of the 
Ancient and New Testaments, with the Greek logos/nous of Seing. 
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however, as Nietzsche still conceives the "deatb of God" in terms of the disappearance 
(or "forgetfulness" to anticipate Heidegger's language) of Being, he is still caught within 
onto-theology. This is the case because, Nietzsche thus accepts the Western tradition's 
identification of God and Being as permanent presence and lack of movement. 
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Hegel's Account ofBecoming in Light of Nietzsche 
ln the following 1 will establish thc rudiments ora comparison between Hegel's 
understanding or Becoming and Nietzsche's. This is neccessary because after Aristotle, 
Hegel has perhaps given us the strongest and most rigorous analysis of Becoming. 
Hegel's understanding ofBecoming is radically conditioned by that of Aristotle, but 
Hegel also develops an original understanding of Becoming with respect to Aristotle. For 
these reasons, 1 take Hegel as my second interpretative guide against which to 
characterize Nietzsche's radical understanding ofBecoming. 
For Hegel, Becoming has a direction. Hegel decomposes t3ecoming (Werden) in 
the Logic into Enfsfehen and Vergehen. But the directionality ofBecoming is reduced to a 
simple transition between pure Being and pure non-Being. One must nevertheless be 
precise at this juncture. ln !~1ct, some argue that Hegel never speaks of a transition 
bctween Being and Nothing. Rathcr Hegel claims that "was die Wahrheit ist, ist weder 
das Sein noch das Nichts, sondern dass das Sein in Nichts und das Nichts in Sein - nicht 
übergeht, sondern-übergegangen ist".237 One could thus argue that the transition between 
Being and Nothing and between Nothing and Being has always already taken place. In 
relation to this Gadamer writes in the Idea of Hegel's Logic: 
Wenn wir uns also den Fortschritt vom Wcrden zum Dasein 
klarmachen wollen, so wird der Sinn von Hegels dialektischer 
Ableitung über das allgemein Einleuchtende hinaus zu beschreiben 
sein: Da der Unterschied von Sein und Nichts inhaltlos ist, ist auch 
die Bestimmtheit des 'von' und des 'zu', die das Werden 
ausmachen, nicht vorhanden. Lediglich das ist da, dass es 
jedenfalls ein 'von-zu' ist und das jedes 'von-zu' aIs ein 'von-her' 
oder ais ein 'auf-hin' gedacht werden kann. Was ist, ist also die 
. .. 73R 
reme Struktur des Ubergangs selbst.-
è37 Quoted by Gadamer in Die Idee der Hegelsc17en Logik, ew 3, p.78, ln /-Iegel's Dialectic. Five 
Hermeneutical Sludies, translation P. Christopher Smith, New Haven, London, Yale University Press, 
1976. 
238 Gadamer, H.-G., Ibidem, p.79. 
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This transitional role of Becoming is what allows Hegel to aHirm that Becoming 
rather than Being and non-Being (Nichls or Nichfssein), is the tirst truth of the Lagic. 
Becoming is the mediated synthesis between pure l3eing and pure non-Being and this 
allows a differentiation between these states, but this conceptualization ofBecol11ing is 
not radical. A thought of pure Becoming like that of Nietzsche conceptualizes Becoming 
as haying no dircctionality, no felos. For Nietzsche, l3ecoming moyes but it does not aim 
at anything and it does not fultiJI anything. This is not the same as claiming that 
l3ecoming moyes from determinate Being to determinate non-Being (Nichls or Nichlsein) 
as Hegel would affirm. 
In "The Idea ofI-Iegel's Logic", Gadamer makes the following claim: 
Alles Werden ist Werden yon etwas, das dann durch sein 
Gewordensein 'da ist'. Das ist die alte Wahrheit, die schon 
Plato im 'Philebos' lormuliert ais die gegenemene ausia 
bzw. genesis eis al/sian. Es liegt im Sinne des Werdens 
selbst, das seine Bestimmtheit in dem l'indet, was da am 
E d d · 239 ., n e gewor en ISt. 
I-Ioweyer, the determination of Becol11ing into determined non-Being is not a 
determination of Becoming but a determination of Being. In the face of [king, 
Becol11ing moyes but does not deterl11ine itself. In the introduction to.the Logic, Hegel 
analyzes Kant's critique of the ontological proof of God. ln the process of this analysis, 
Hegel claims that "Also enthalte, fahrt er [Kant, P.c.] das Mogliche nicht mehr ais das 
Wirkliche; hundert wirkliche Taler enthalten nicht das mindeste mehr ais hundert 
mogliche"?40 This positing of possibility as stronger th an reality (actuality), or at least as 
equiyalent to it, in God, is combated by Hegel. Hegel is a good Aristotelian insofar as for 
hil11, reality (actuality) is higher than possibility (potentiality). Hegel concludes his 
2]9 Gadamer, f-I.-G., idem, p.76. "Ail becoming is a becoming of something which exists as a result of 
having become. That is an ancient truth, one already formulated by Plato in the l'hi/ebus as the gegenemene 
ol/sia or the genesis eis Dl/sian respectively. lt lies in the very meaning of Becoming itselfthat it reaches 
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discussion of Kant's critique orthe ontological proof of God: "die abstrakte Definition 
Gottes ist dagegen eben dies, dass sein Begriff und sein Sein ungetrennt und untrennbar 
sind".241 
The elimination ofteleology from Becoming operated by Nietzsche's philosophy 
leaves us with a pure potentiality that potentializes itselfand projects itselfonto an 
actuality that actualizes itself without teleological middle term. Hegel recuperates the 
concept ofteleology from Aristot!e's philosophy (and from the way this concept is 
e1aboratecl in Kant's third Crilique). In Hegel, teleology is the constant movement of 
l3eing towards a fui 1er determination of itsel r. The Logic begins with what is the leas1 
detenninate: Seing and non-l3eing. 
But Hegel quickly concludes 1hat the representation of the beginning is nothing 
(/\/ïchIS). Not only that. Hegel claims that in order to think analytically the representation 
of the beginning one has to think that the beginning is eonstituted by the movement from 
nothing to something (Etwas). But if this idea of something is present in the 
representation orthe beginning, this implies that l3eing is also incillded in the 
representation of the beginning, since something must have a [king. Thus, Hegel arrives 
al the conclusion that Being and Nothing are both present in the representation of the 
beginning. In this way, Hegel believes that he has answered the objection that Science 
must begin with the representation of the beginning. I-Ie believes that ifwe start with such 
a representation, it is equivalent to starting with [king and Nothing or Nothing and Being 
which both are the simplest, 1110st general and indeterminate concepts. 
But the concept of pure Being is unsatisfactory for Hegel. Being is that which 
must determine itself. This is the case because, as we have seen, pure Being turns out to 
dctcrminacy in tha! which has become," 
240 Il 1 (' W l" l 'k 1 90 . cgc, J,- ,-' " "ogl , p, , 
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be equivalent to pure nothingness (Nich/s). Before passing to the concept of Dasein 
(existence), which is the first concept that Hegel treats in the Logic of Being arter pure 
Being, we must consider something that is of utmost importance for this dissertation. The 
first synthesis of Being and Nothing is nothing other than the central concept ofthis 
dissertation: Becoming. In order to understand why Becoming is so important for Hegel 
we must refer to a book that he had previously published in 1807 and to a concept that 
was central in that book: Die Phdnomenologie des Geis/es and the concept of Geis/. 
ln the Phdnomenologie, the various figures ol'Geis/ aIl "go under" untillhe final 
stage of absolute knowledge is attained. [-lence the figures of Geis/ must constantly 
transform themselves, moving to new embodiments while at the same time negating and 
preserving (in the sense of lIufhebung) their previous embodiments. This perpetuaI 
movement and transformation is what Hegel calls Werden. An important question for 
Hegel scholarship is whether Hegel arrests the development and movement of Becoming 
in the Phdnomenologie by introducing the stage of absolute knowledge. There have been 
many interesting attempts to claim that the l-Iegelian system could be reconstructed by 
eliminating the absolute end-point and claiming that the movement of rational Becoming 
never stops. 
The problem of the transition l'rom Being to Becoming in the Logic hinges on the 
relationship between the Logic and the Phdnomenologie des Geis/es. This problem has to 
be clarified in tenns of Hegel 's concept of the dialectic. In relation to this, Gadamer 
writes: 
241 Ibidem, p.92. 
Hegel selbst hat in seiner Einleitung in die' Logik' die Dialektik 
der Phanomenologie aIs ein erstes Beispiel seiner dialektischen 
Methode zitiert. Insofern besteht gewiss kein volliger Unterschied 
zwischen der in der 'Phanomenologie' und in der 'Logik' 
vorliegenden Dialektik. Die frühere Meinung, die durch die spatere 
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'Enzyklopadie' gepragt war, wonach die phanomenologische 
Dialektik noch nicht die reine Methode der Dialektik darstelle, ist 
also nicht haltbar. 242 
Others, like Charles Taylor claim that the transition between Being and Becoming 
in the Logie lacks the proper grounding. Taylor claims elsewhere that the derivation of 
Becoming from Being is perhaps convincing for those who allow themselves the 
conclusions of the Phenomenolo,l,')1. Taylor claims that I-Iegel's dialectic as exposed in the 
Phenomenology cannot be held to be of a strict nature. In this sense, Taylor splits the 
notion of the dialectic into two: a historical dialectic that is what operates mainly in the 
Phenomenology and an ontological dialectic that operates in the Logie. 
Taylor elaborates on this distinction between a historical dialectic and an 
ontological dialectic in the following passage: 
And we in fact we find dialectics of these two sorts in Hegel. His 
historical dialectics are of the first form: certain historical fonns of 
life are prey to inner contradiction, either because they are doomcd 
to frustratc the very purpose for which they exist (e.g., the master-
slave relation), or because they are bound to generate an inner 
connict between different conditions which are equally essential to 
the fulfillment orthe purpose [ ... ] But Hegel also presents 
dialectics orthe other kind, which we can cali 'ontological'. We 
have an example in the opening section of the Phenomen%gy of' 
Spirit and also in the Logie. I-Iere we arc not dealing with historical 
change, or at least not primarily. Rather we are deepening our 
conception of a given standard and the reality which meets it. And 
essential to the dialectical argument is the notion that the standard 
is already met. Tt is because we know this that we know that any 
conception of the purpose or standard which shows it as 
unrealizable must be a faulty conception; and it is this which takes 
us from stage to stage of the dialectic. 243 
242 Idem, p.72, "In the introduction to the Logie, Hegel h imsel f cites the d ialectic 0 r the Phenomenology as 
a first example ofhis dialectical method. Thus there is certainly no ultimate difrerence between the 
dialectic present in the Phenomenology and the Logie. The beliefbased on the subsequent Eneyc/opedia, 
that phenomenological dialectic did not yet represent the pure method of dialectic, is thus untenable." 
W Taylor, Hegel, c., Cambridge Uninversity Press, Cambridge (England), p.131. 
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The traditional critique that had been addressed to Hegel's Logic by Schelling to 
cite only the most illustrious critic, asked how it was possible for movement to be 
inserted into thought or Being. Was it not the case that the movement that Hegel claimed 
was implicit in the categories orthought was only in je ct cd from the outside and that the 
Logic 's beginning in fact lacked a proper grounding? Yet, as has been argued by 
Gadamer among others, the movement does not get into 13eing as something that is 
merely exterior to it. Being and Nothing are not existences that can be conceptllalized 
independently of thought. They do not take place at ail outside the movement of thought. 
'l'hus Gadamer writes: 
Wer fragt: wie kommt das Sein in Bewegung ?, sollte si ch 
eingestehen, dass cr damit von der Bewegung des Oenkens, in der 
er sich so fragend befindet, abstrahiert [".] Aber wenn auch nichts 
anderes ais ein leeres Anschauen oder Denken da ist, ist in 
Wahrheit die Bewegung des Sichbestimmens, also das Werden da. 
"Es ist ein grosse Einsicht, die man darin hat, dass man erkannt 
hat, dass Sein und Nichtsein Abstraktionen ohne Wahrheit sind, 
das erste Wahre nul' das Werden ist" 244 
'l'he problem with arguments that try to re-construct Hegel's system with reference to the 
concept ofBecoming is the following: if wc rem ove the end-state or end-point of 
absolllte knowledge in the Phenomenology and of the absolute concept in the Logic, then 
it seems that wc have to remove the problem 01' making an absolute beginning which 
seems crucial to Hegel. What wc lhen have are the se purely transitional states wilhout 
beginning or end. Of course, the historical dialectics that Taylor talks about make sense 
in the sense that they function as good "interpretations" of history. However, what wc 
have to ask ourselves is the grounding of the ontological dialectic. Ifwe agree with 
Gadamer that there does not seem to be a difference between the ontological dialectic and 
the historical dialectic, but that there is only one kind of "phenomenologicaldialectic", 
then the problem of grounding the ontological dialectic does not seem to cause such a 
great problem. 
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In Hegel's philosophy Becoming runctions as a form of mediation. What mediates 
the immediate in Hegel is Becoming. But this Becoming is essentially characterized by 
its dialectical and teleological natures. This Becoming is the the Becoming of the 
Absolute that is concept and that wants to be bey uns. Insofar as Becoming is still 
conceived teleologically by Hegel, he is the inheritor of the onto-theological tradition 
which Nietzsche completes. Nietzsche completes this tradition because he accepts the 
identification between God and Being as permanent presence. But this identification pre-
supposes the identity philosophy that is at work in German philosophy in general and in 
Hegel's philosophy in particular. The logical and metaphysical identity principle is 
deeply criticized by Nietzsche in his reception of German Idealism. By removing 
teleology from within Becoming and by criticizing logical and metaphysical identity, 
Nietzsche goes beyond Hegel and onto-theology. In doing this he radicalizes Becoming 
and allows thought to conceive of onto-theology non-teleologically. 
Hegel's ultimate point is that what is, is determined and determinate Becoming. 
But this is precisely what Nietzsche's philosophy of Becoming combats. For Nietzsche 
what is more fundamental th an 8cing is 8ecoming. [king is the undarslellbar, 
unreprcscntable not unlikc for the German Romantics. Becoming is both fundamental and 
in-dcterminate and it is this in-dcterminacy that allows thought and reality to exist. 
"4·1 Gadamer, H.-G., Gesammelte Werke, Band 3, p.79, J.C.S Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen, 1987. 
SECTION 3 Becolning in Context 
3.1 The Problem of Becoming and the Critique of Metaphysics, Truth and 
Morality 
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ln this chapter, 1 would like to highlight the suspicion that Nietzsche harbors 
toward the substance/subject metaphysics. This is in part due to an original understanding 
of language by Nietzsche to or his conception of Becoming. Pure Becoming makes the 
existence of substance impossible. This is the case because change, here, goes ail the 
way down in a manner of speaking. Nietzsche eliminates aIl forms of permanence and 
stability that were associated with traditional substance/subject metaphysics. This 
elimination occurs through the dislodging of teleology l'rom within Becoming. 1 l' 
Becoming aimed at something ultimate as a point of stability, an Archimedean point 
could be established l'rom which to derive rational discourse. But ultimately Nietzsche 
denies us such a stable perspective. 
Nietzsche develops a deep critique of metaphysics and logic. In the middle period 
ofNietzsche's writings, that is mainly constituted by the writings Human. AII-/oo-
Hl/man, Dawn and The Gay Science, Nietzsche begins to develop a critique of 
metaphysical and logical causality, identity, subjectivity and substance. This critique is 
pursued throughout the rest of the m iddle period, into the period of maturity and extends 
to the unpublished fragments corresponding to what later became known as the Will/a 
Power. The critique is a sophisticated one. It rests essentially on a rejection of the 
principles of consciousness, identity and causality. 
The first major step undertaken in the rejection 0 l' the metaphysical and logical 
principles of consciousness, identity and causality is the connection established by 
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Nietzsche between them and the problcm of language. As Nietzsche says in Human, All-
loo-Human: 
Die Bedeutung der Sprache für die Entwickelung der 
CuItur liegt dari n, dass in ihr der Mensch cine eigene Welt 
neben die andere stellte, einen Ort, welchen cr für so Fest 
hielt, um von ihm aus die übrige Wel1 aus den Angeln zu 
heben und sich zum Herrn derselben 'lU machen. Insofern 
der Mensch an die Begriffe und Namen der Dinge aIs an 
aelernae veritales durch lange Zeitstrecken hindurch 
geglaubt hat, hat cr sich jenen Stolz angeeignet, mit dem cr 
sich über das Thier erhob: er mcinte wirklich in der 
Sprache die Erkenntnis der Welt zu haben.245 
For Nietzsche, the subject and substance are linguistic inventions. We exist in a world of 
linguistic fictions. The greatest fictions of ail are those of metaphysical and logical unit y 
and identity. They are linguistic creations. The Indo-european languages have a subject-
predicate structure that explains the constructions Inherent in Western metaphysics. 
Substance, which is whatever remains when ail the physical attributes have been 
methodically removed from a subject (Aristotle), is itself derived from the grammatical 
structure of Indo-european language. That a sentence has a subject-predicate structure is 
what determines, according ta Nietzsche, the rellection on substance and the ensuing 
mctaphysics that is associated with sllch a reflection. 
Berc a precision must be made on the nature of the term "predicate". In grammar 
and in logic the usage of the term "prcdicate" differs. ln the sentence "Men are morta1", 
"Men" is the subject and "arc mortal" is the predicate according ta a grammatical 
analysis of the sentence. According ta a logical analysis of the scntence "Men" is the 
subject and the predicate is "mortal". Logic thus separates the verb and the attributes or 
objects wihin the grammatical predicate. Nietzsche's thesis is that the grammatical 
structure that pre-exists and makes possible the logical-metaphysical analysis is what 
2,15 MA l, Il, (KSA 2, p.30). 
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determines the development of a substance-metaphysics. The connection between the 
grammatical subject and the substance metaphysics might not be obvious here. It must be 
rcmembered that l'or Aristotle (in the Categories at least), metaphysicaJ substance (ousia) 
was a subject of which all attributes could be predicatcd but which could not itsel f be 
predicated of anything else. Thus, this might vindicate Nietzsche's thesis that substance 
is obtained through a reflection on the subject-predicate (this time understood 
grammatically) structure of language. But is not Nietzsche's position a l'onn of linguistic 
idealism? Docs Nietzsche not pre-suppose that objects are fllndamentally lingllistic and 
do not possess any existence outside of language? The removal of attributes l'rom a 
subject suggested by Aristotle might occur realiter and not just im'ide a system of 
Iinguistic signs.246 The removal of atlributes from a subject is analytic but this analysis 
might occur through the medium of thought and not through the medium of language. 
13ut Nietzsehe has probably made an advance hcre that anticipates the philosophies or 
language orthe twentieth century. These philosophies claim tha1 thought incarnates i1self 
in language and that language is the medium ofthought. 
There is an ambiguity in Nietzsche's reasoning. At times it seems that the 
substance-metaphysics is purely derived from the grammatical structure of language. At 
other times when Nietzsche claims 1hat the substance-concept is derived 11'0111 the subject-
concept and n01 the other way around, il seems lhat Nietzsche wishes to derive substance 
Irom an "inner" psychological sense 1hat would have been projected onto the outside 
world. However, the inner-outer distinction is heavily criticized by Nietzsche. He claims 
1hat we do not have privileged access ta the world of inner sense. 
:;'16 This prob lem of the interiority and exleriority of something to a system of linguistic signs has been 
brilliantly analyzed by Derrida in De la grammalologie, pp. 46-96 Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1967, in 
particular the chapters and Le dehors [next ward is crossed out, an allusion ta 
Heidegger, P.C.I est le dedans. 
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The world or inner sense is as much an illusion for Nietzsche as the world of outer 
sense. The problem for Nietzsche is how it would be possible to know our inner sense 
and our outer sense. Ir must be recognized that this is a fundamentally epistemological 
way of putting the problem. Nietzsche is in this sense repeating Kant's problem of the 
conditions ofpossibility ofknowledge, but he will arrive at radically different 
conclusions. rWe might be inclined to ask whether this repetition or quasi-repetition or 
the critical project after the advances of German Idealism (Schelling, Hegel) in the 
critique of the purely epistemological point ofview of Kant, does not make Nietzsche's 
project a bit regressive. The knowledge that Nietzsche possessed of natural history, of 
Darwin and Lamarck, certainly introduced fresh ideas into this understanding of the 
process of knowledge and cognition. 
It is pretty sare howevcr to affirm that Nietzsche was not too familiar with 
j-Iegel's critique of Kant's epistemology. This is true because Nietzsche was in part 
bl indcd by the Schopenhallerian interpretation of Kant and Hegel and that the se 
interpretations were rather incomplete and even poor at least as rar as Schopenhauer's 
assessmcnt of Hegel is concerned. 
Nietzsche overcomes Hegel and this is due to two factors. The faculty of 
knowledge is re-directed in Nietzsche to its physiological origins and there is thus a 
deepening in Nietzsche of the understanding of the unconscious. 11 must be 
acknowledged though, that the notion of the unconscious is already present obliquely in 
Hegel l'or whom the labor or the concept in the Phenomenology o/Spiril consists in 
teaching natllral consciousness for which trllth is still latent or unconsciolls how to 
become conscious of itself. Nevertheless, there is a deepening of the concept of the 
unconscious in Nietzsche insofar as it cannot be dialectically recuperated by 
consciousness as in j-legel's philosophy. 
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The second advance of Nietzsche with respect to Hegel consists in a radicalization 
of Secoming. Hegel affirms that he is a Heraclitean and that there is not a sentence of 
Heraclitus that he has not taken up in his Science of Logic, but we are forced to admit 
l.hat, by comparison to Nietzsche, Hegel is much closer to Parmenides. We may illustrate 
this by noticing that in the Science ofLogic it is Seing and not Becoming that determines 
itse1f and fills itself with content. But this determination of Being is at the same time the 
determination ofthought that completes itse1fwhen substance is identified with subject. 
Hegel thus operates with the identity of Seing and thought characteristic of Parmenides' 
ph i losophy. 
For Nietzsche, there is no causality because the cause is always introduced arter 
the fact. An event occurs: somebody wills to move his foot and the foot moves. For 
Nietzsche these two events are not connected by a cause and effect relationship. Rather, 
thc Inct that the foot moved is only an interpretation of the will that tried to express itsel f 
in action. Nietzsche claims: 
Wir haben unser Willens-Gefühl, unser 'Freiheits-Gefühl', unser 
Verantwortlichkeits-Gefühl und unsere Absicht von einem Thun in 
?e~ Begri fI' 'U rsache' Z:lSaI~~ne~~7efasst: causa efficie ns und finalis 
lSt In der GrundconceptlOn L:ins.-
T'he problem ofcausality needs to be examined in terms ofthree aspects. First, the 
causality of objects upon objects, second the causality of thought upon objects, and third, 
the causal ity of thought upon thought. The problem is that ultimately, for Nietzsche, the 
lirst two causalities are reducible to the third type of causality. 
According to Nietzsche, the intellect is not made in such a way as to be able to 
perceive and conceive Becoming: 
247 KSA /3,14198]. 
• 
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Unser lntellekt ist nicht zum Begrei Fen des Werdens eingerichtet, 
er strebt die allgemeine Starrheit zu beweisen, Oank seiner 
Abkunft aus Bildem. Alle Philosophen haben das Ziel gehabt, 
zum Beweis des ewigen 8eharrens, weil der Intellekt darin seine 
. 1~ d W' k r"hl 2'18 elgcne 'orm un Ir ungu 1. .. 
What expresses itsel F in a human subject is will to power according to Nietzsche. 
This notion is made up of sorne fundamental logical components. Before undertaking a 
description of will to power and what that notion means for Nietzsche, certain 
preparatory remarks are in order. The critical part ofNictzsche's project, the one that 
destroys and deconstructs metaphysics avant la lettre is inextricably bound up with thc 
positive part of his project. Will to power is a positive teaching. As Heidegger has 
J'amously asserted it is part of a "Nietzschean metaphysics". So an important question for 
the understanding ofNietzsche's philosophy is how the more critical or sceptical aspects 
or his tcaching connect to the positive perhaps more "metaphysical" aspects of his 
philosophy. In short, we will have to explain how Nietzsche can bc both the most 
perspicacious cri tic or metaphysics since Kant and perhaps a metaphysician in his own 
right. We will have to decide what this apparent incoherence in Nietzsche's philosophy 
means. 
Let us return then to will to power. The aspects connected to this concept that we 
need to explain arc truth, play of forces, conditions of enhancement and preservation, life 
and art. Nietzsche claims that: "Wille zur Macht ist das letzte Faktum zu dem wir 
hinunterkommen.,,249 Will to power is conceptually linked to truth and will to truth. For 
Nietzsche, truth exists only insorar as it is posited by will to power. Truth is a vital error. 
"'18 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA 9,11 [153] . 
249 Quoted by Heidegger, M., Nietzsche, Erster Band, Verlag Günther Neske, Prullingen, 1961, p.12, 
(Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol.l, Translation Krell, p.4, hereafter this book will simply be quoted as Nietzsche 
Vol. 1-4 depending on the volume orthe English translation given by Krell), from now on this book will be 
sil1lply quoted as Nietzsche 1. 
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It is the type of error without which human beings cannat live. This leads ta the 
discussion of what Nietzsche means by life. 
Life is characterized as a multiplicity of forces. 250 This multiplicity of forces is a 
play of forces. This play or forces constitutes life and it cannat in the last analysis be 
grounded or justified. Inherent ta the notion of lire is vaJue-positing. Each form of life 
which is the result of a play of forces, establ ishes certain values that are posited in such a 
way as to preserve and enhance that form of life. 
Nietzsche c1aims that forces interact, struggle with each other and come ta a 
certain equilibrium. But this eqllilibrium is ephemeral and to think of it as something 
eternal amounts to deceiving oneself. The equilibrium is destroyed anew by the 
appearance of different configurations of forces. Because of changes occurring in the 
configurations of forces, new struggles enslle. Therefore, we understand will to power as 
the movement of beings whereby they engage in struggles with themselves. The struggle 
comcs about because each being, as an instantiation of will to power wants to enhance 
itselr and becomc more powcrful. Truth is the apparent equilibrium reached by the forces 
in their strllggle with one another. According to Nietzsche, the philosophical tradition 
has named truth this apparent equilibrium, this petrification of the perspectival, force-
laden interpretations of things. For Nietzsche, 
250 KSA 10,24 rt41. 
"[Wahrheit ist] ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, 
Mctonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz eine Summe von 
menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch gesteigert, 
Ubertragen, geschmückt wurdcn, und die nach langem Gebrauche 
cinem Volke l'est, canonisch und vcrbindlich dünken: die 
Wahrheiten sind 11l11sionen, von denen man vergessen hat, dass sie 
welche sind, Metaphern, die abgenützt und sinnlich kral1los 
geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren haben und nun aIs 
Metall, nicht mehr aIs Münzen in Betracht kommcn. 251 
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Very early on, Nietzsche examined in his works the importance of the concept of 
truth namely in On Trulh and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense. Nietzsche's relationship to 
the concept of truth is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, Nietzsche makes Zarathustra 
utter the truth in a quasi-prophetic tone. On the other hand, Nietzsche holds that truth, 
like Being is a fabrication and a lie. Nietzsche's conception of'truth is thus diverse and 
multi-leveled. He conceives of truth as lie, as vital error and as self-deception or illusion. 
1 choose to discuss Nietzsche's concept oftruth because it closely relates to the problem 1 
have already alluded to of distinguishing between Nietzsche's positive teachings and his 
more sceptical or critical teachings. 
The critique of the traditional concept of'truth belongs to Nietzsche's more 
sceptical teachings. Nietzsche rejects all theories of truth as adequation or 
correspondence. For Nietzsche, the l'etct that the thing can correspond or be adequate to 
the intellect is insufficient to account for what we understand as truth. Nietzsche has a 
radically pragmatist understanding of the truth. According to him, we only perceive what 
our sense organs pick out among the variety in the sensuous world. What is true is thus 
radically determined for Nietzsche by the nature of our organs. If our senses were 
structured differently, we would perceive a different truth. Truth is also for Nietzsche a 
l'unction of will to power. Nietzsche identifies in the Western tradition a will to truth 
which he explains in terms 01' his own, allegedly more fundamental, will to power. 
There are configurations of truth that last for a while, but incvitably, he believcs, 
the y must go under. The changes that occur take place in virtue oftwo conditions: 
preservation and enhancement ofwill to power. There is no change in the configurations 
oftruth unless there is also either a preservation or an enhancement of wi 11 to power. 
:'51 "Über Wahrheil und Lüge il11 ausserl110ralischen Sinne". KSA /,880-881. 
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Enhancement has priority over preservation and there will be change in the 
configurations of power ifwill to power is enhanced rather thanjust preserved. 
We·can see l'rom this account orthe interpenetration oftruth and will to powcr in 
Nietzsche's thought, that there is no matrix that allows for an explanation oftruth in 
terms of a correspondence or an adequation. Will to power is radically plural.252 Truth 
as correspondence and as adequation supposes a unit y of the intellect. But it is this unit y 
that is radically challenged by Nietzsche. Will to power is not unitary but plural. 
Nietzsche rejects the ideal of a hum an or sllper-hllman intellect whose unit y could be 
conàived. For Nietzsche the entity called will to power operates within the human 
intellect and divides this intellect into a plurality of drives and configurations of truth and 
power. 
Truth certainly plays an important role in Nietzsche's philosophy, since it 
amollnts to the preservation of certain interpretations and hence to the preservation of li fe 
(through value-positing). I-Iowever, according to Nietzsche, preservation is not the most 
important drive ofbeings understood as will to power. On the contrary, beings always 
want to enhance and overcome themselves. It is important to understand that Nietzsche's 
notion of the play of forces does not apply only to the relationship that exists between 
beings. Rather, the play of forces is both interior and exterior to beings. It governs not 
only the relationship between beings as sllch, but it occurs also within every being. 
Nietzsche considers Plato's understanding of the relationship between art and 
trllth as essentially tlawed, because it is based on a valuation of the supersensible, over 
and above the sensible. Indeed, we could expand on this claim by adding that, for 
252 l-leidcgger's attcmpt to think will to power as the Bcing ofbeings has been takcn to task becausc it has 
becn accused of being an essentialization ofN ietzsche's thought. This critique, mainly elaborated by 
Müller-Lauter, is valid but it probably neglects the fact that a certain plurification ofwill to power already 
occurs in the fourth of Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures. (See Seinsgeschichtliche Bestimmung des 
Nihilismus in Heidegger, M., Nietzsche, Zweiter Band). 
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Nietzsche, this higher valuation of the supersensible and the positing of categories of 
reason grounded in the supersensible realm is nihilistic. 253 While Nietzsche's use of the 
word "nihilism" is in itself a complex issue, in this context it can be taken to mean 
"against life".254 Accordingly, the Platonic higher valuation of the supersensible realm is 
against litè because it cannot account for life's play of forces that takes place in the 
sensible realm. Plato's higher valuation of the superscnsible rejects the bodily, finite 
existence of the senses in favor of an ascetic contemplation of the Ideas. In this Platonic 
move, Nietzsche sees the roots of the Christian world-view that he so strongly criticizes 
throughout his oeuvre. The notion of the supersensible realm is itself a fabrication, which 
is based on the perspectival aspect of life. This is the case because one perspective 
among many is selec/ed, evalua/ed and posi/ed as above and beyond ail other 
perspectives that life makes available to us. For Nietzsche, insofar as Plato and the 
tradition have associated truth with the supersensible realm, they have been deceitful 
fabricators and have misunderstood or disregarded the instinctual and playful aspect of 
li IC. 2S5 
m KSA /3, Il [991,2. 
25,1 lt is complicated because Nietzsche distinguishes between at least two senses ofnihilism: an active 
nihilism and a passive one. Nietzsche associates passive nihilism with decadence whereas active nihilism 
is a way ofovercoming decadence and going beyond the affection that is constituted by nihilism. 
Heidegger distinguishes between at least five meanings ofnihilism: nihilism proper, classical nihilism, the 
essence ofnihilism, ecstatic nihilism and incomplete nihilislll. Nihilism proper seems to be what 
Heidegger takes to be the position associated with Nietzsche's philosophy to be. Incomplete nihilism 
follows (Iogically and chronologically) nihilism proper and consists in the fact that even though the highcst 
values have devalued themselves, there is an attempl made 10 revalorize them in Ihe same supersensib/c 
locus where they had becn situated before. In this sense, elassieal nihilism go es beyond incomplete 
nihilism and eonstitutcs a type of"completion" and overcoming ofthat position. Classieal nihilism is also 
assoeiated with Nietzsche's philosophy and corresponds to a way out ofnihilism through the transvaluation 
of values (Umwer/ung aller bisherigen Wer/e, see f-foh:wege, p.208). The essence of nihi lism constitutes 
I-Ieidegger's own appropriation ofnihilism for the purposes ofarticulating his own project. Nihilism 
eonstitutes according to this reading the inner law of history and of the history of Seing. The main 
principle ofthis history of Seing is the fact that in it Being is forgotten and "there is nothing to [king". 
255 The higher valuation of the supersensuous is nihilistic for political reasons as weil as metaphysical 
ones: it is against the life of the here and now because it elaims that this life can only be understood 
through princip les that transcend it and by the contemplation of something that turns us away l'rom this 
world. But this also means that we do not need to concern ourselves with the con crete empirical, economic, 
political situations that we lind Olll·seives in. In short, the Platonie move seems to be a form ofescapism but 
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As l have argued above, Nietzsche's approach 10 truth seems at times to be 
pragmatist and naturalistic. Truth is the kind of error without which a certain species of 
living being cou Id not live. ft is the value for life that ultimately decides if a given truth 
is 10 hold sway. ln this sense, truth is related to will 10 power. A configuration oftruth 
lasts for a certain period ortime but this is only temporary and the given configuration 
will "go under" depending on wh ether it preserves or enhances will to power. Here the 
critical and the positive aspects ofNietzsche's philosophy meet. Nietzsche has a . 
notoriollsly sceptical position vis-à-vis truth, but at the same time he believes 1hat truth is 
connec1ed 10 will to power and lhat will to power is both a physiological, psychological 
and perhaps (pace Heidegger) an ontologicalfàctum. 
The Western metaphysical tradition has created a connection between the 
concepts of Being, truth and good. This connection culminates in the medieval unit y of 
esse, verum and bonum. This unit y of Seing, the truc and the good is onto-theological. 
Onto-theology is the hidden destiny orthe West that prepared itselfin the Greek world of 
Plato and Aristotle. With the transposition of the Greek logos that culminates in Plotinus' 
philosophy into Christian theology by Augustine, onto-theo-Iogy makes one of its most 
important transitions256 . Onto-theology will be re-articuJated at least twice: in St-
Thomas' Summa The%giae and in Hegel's system of absolute knowledge. Although 
Heidegger is the lirst one to have pointed explicitly to the concept of onto-theology, 
Nietzsche had already problematized the Western metaphysical and rationalistic tradition 
thal culminates in onto-theology. 
a dangerous one, since it limits the potcntialitics orenhancement and growth oran embodied humanity that 
is grounded and involved in a multiplicity of imillanent situations. Il might bc argued that this is not thc 
case Irom the Platonic perspective. "Sceing the idea" Illight precisely bc according to this metaphysical 
perspective the ultimatc fulfillment and attainment that can bc achieved by hUlllan beings. 
256 The imputation orthe charge ofonto-theology to Augustine's philosophy has becn challenged by the 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur. 
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The belief in the true and in truth-fullness is posited by Christian morality and this 
emphasis on truth will eventually lead to the deconstruction or Christianity from within 
itself as truth is transformed, according to Nietzsche, into a vital lie. The positing of 
trllth, of the good and ofBeing as fundamental values that transcend the here and now is 
nihilistic. Insofar as Nietzsche combats nihilism through his critique oftranscendence, he 
has already identified the connection between ontology, theology and the logos, and 
already begins to deconstrllct onto-theology. The critique or Platonico-Christian 
transcendence in Nietzsche's philosophy is carried out through the withdrawal or 
te1eology from within Becoming. Platonism and Christianity both devalue the life and 
Becoming by reducing them to something higher, to a beyond. In the Timaeus, Plato 
claims that truth is to opinion, what Being is to Becoming. Thus Becoming is stigmatized 
as having less value and being less true than l3eing. Similarly l'or Christians, the lire or 
the here and now, what we experience in this world of Becoming, has less value, and is 
only justified in the beyond, in the hereafter, in what traditional Christian doctrine calls 
Paradise. 
The problem of Christian morality and transcendence is related to the problem of 
the will to truth in Nietzsche. It is in this metaphysical will to truth that value judgments 
of originate. The will to truth has a Christian origin according to Nietzsche: this will 
nnds its origin in the Christian value of honesty (Redlichkeit) that gives birth to the 
intellectual rigor orthe scientific and the over-evaluation of the truth orthe 
metaphysician. But Nietzsche commits certain distorsions in his critique of the 
metaphysical in itsel f (an sich) or transcendence. He unites the Platonic concept of truth 
and transcendence (the world of ldeas) with Christian psychology. Nietzsche operates a 
synthesis: according to his famous expression, Christianity is Platonism for the masses. 
But in this synthesis Nietzsche unites two different tendencies: the Christian desire of 
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transcendence, the belief in a beyond (the realm or kingdom or God or of heaven) that 
could replace the hic el nunc. and transcendence as it was conceived by Plato, that is, 
starting from the ideas (the realm of ideas or of the intelligibles). 
Nietzsche does not sim ply invert Platonism as Heidegger affirms sometimes: he 
operates a synthesis between Platonism and Christianity257 in order to thereafter attempt 
to invert that synthesis. But to undcrstand Nietzsche's thought weil, it must be seen that 
the critique of Platonism and Christianity cannot be uniform. Christianity attacks the life 
of the here and now by proposing a beyond capable ofredeeming the injustices and 
iniquities suffered in the here and now. Nietzsche replies that Christianity is against life, 
that it devaluates the liCe of the here and now, that it is nihilistic because it posits values 
that de-valuate the lire of the here and now in Cavor ofa beyond. However, Platonism 
posits a notion of truth that transcends the here and now. This truth of the Ideas allows 
us, according to Plato, to understand the life orthe here and now. It is only by orienting 
ourselves towards the world of the ldeas, a world that transcends our world that we can 
understand our own immanent world. This lime, it is in the domain of Platonic 
cpistemology that Nietzsche identifies nihilistic tendencies. 
According to him, it is necessary to understand the worldliness of our lower 
world starting from itself and without referring to transcending entities such as the 
Platonic ideas. Nietzsche thus accuses Plato in the same way as Christianity ofbeing 
nihilistic since the ideas are said by Nietzsche to be against life. Every time we attempt 
to understand the lower world (the here and now, the ici-has, the Diesseilige) starting 
from a transcending entity, we reduce the immanent potentialities ofthis lower world. 
257 Perhaps this synthesis had already been operated by Augustine and by the historical embedding of the 
language and concepts ofChristianity \Vith those of Platonism. but Nietzsche re-articulates the unily 
betwecn Platonisll1 and Christianity only to radically undo il. 
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The physiological, animated potential of a living being can only be reduced if an 
attempt is made to understand it starting from the Platonic Idea. The Platonic Ideas are, 
in the same sense as the Christian beyond, against life according to Nietzsche. But a 
distinction must be made between the psychological nihilism of the Christian and the 
cpistemological nihilism orthe Platonist, which Nietzsche seems to want to reduce ta the 
samc thing. 
Nietzsche a/so criticizes the overvaluation of the notion of the Good in the 
Platonic and Christian ethics. The values of altruism, self-denial, charity and disinterest 
are not natural according to Nietzsche but rather against nature and against liCe. By being 
against the affects of force, cl'lIelty and violence that take root in willto power, the affects 
that are positively evaluated by the Christian and Platonic moralities are also 
correspondingly accllsed of being nihilistic.The "bad" affects of force, cruelty and 
violence are at the origin of the bad conscience that is analyzed by Nietzsche in the 
Genealogy of Morais. Nietzsche hopes to overcome nihilism by, among other things, 
"naturalizing "the "bad affects" and dissipating the illusion of conscience (in the sense or 
Bewusslsein and Gewissen) 1hat exists by exhibiting the sub-stratum of the bad 
conscience and the bad affects that constitute this conscience.25R 
Nietzsche does not believe in the existence of identical (gleiche) objects in nature. 
This rejection of the principle ofidentity is paired with Nietzsche's sccptical stance 
towards metaphysical logic. Ifwe take objects in nature (two trees or two 1l0wers), we 
notice that they are different: there is never an object that is absolutely identicalto 
another. But this presupposition of identity is what (metaphysical) logic functions with: 
the principle of identity claims that A is A or A is not -A. From this principle a great 
25S On a Genea/of::,'Y oj'Mora/s, last paragraphs. Translated by Walter Kaurmann and RJ. 
Hollingdale, Randol1l House, New York, 1967. 
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part of the structure of Jogic can be deveJoped. Along with the principle of non-
contradiction, the principle of identity grounds logic. But this is precisely the opposite of 
whal Nietzsche wants to c1aim: for him, 10gic and ilS categories are not grounded. 
Nietzsche's naturalism and pragmatism are most apparent here: starting l'rom differences 
in nature, he attempts to disprove the possibility of grounding logic in an absolute way. 
Nietzsche believes that error, injustice and illogieality (das Unlogische) are 
neeessary conditions of/ife. One of the fundamental questions orNietzsehe's philosophy 
is the question of value. This question of value has repereussions in many domains. 
Nietzsche fundamentally asks what the value of existence (Daseil1) is. But the question 
of value is c10sely related to morality. Nietzsche famously writes (in a prerace to the 
Genealogy o/Morals) that he started to enquire about values and then progressed to ask 
the question orthe value ofvalues. Nielzsche's skepticism about metaphysics and 
metaphysicallogic is paired with his critique of morality and of Christian morality. 
A strong case could be made to the effeet that Nietzsche's fundamental adversary 
is Christianity and Christian morality, but this being said, Nietzsche is also interested in 
the more general phenomenon of morality as bis interest in Epicurus and the Stoics 
demonstrates. This is particularly apparent in the works l'rom the middle period J-/uman, 
A//-Ioo-Human and Dawn in which Nietzsche starts to develop his reflections on morality 
as the morality of customs. There, the rel1ection concerns the general phenomenon of 
moràlity, and Christianity has not yet been identified as the principal opponent it will 
become in the later works such as the An/i-Chris/, 
ln the middle period or his writings, then, Nietzsche has alrcady thematized 
Christian morality as the main embodiment ofmorality. In Dawn, Nietzsche focuses on 
traditional morality. He attacks this traditional morality for two main reasons: traditional 
morality functions without clarifying the presuppositions on whieh it rests. Second, the 
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phenomenon of morality taken in its full generality is something 1.hat prevents human 
beings from attaining greatness or excellence. A theme that will recur in the later 
writings is the fact that, for Nietzsche, human beings do not act freely. In Dawn. the 
problem of agency and moral responsibility is problematized by Nietzsche from the 
perspective of a naturalistic view of persons as determined in their actions by 
fundamental physiological and psychological facts about them. 
ln Nietzsche's later writil1gs, the problem of agency is recognized as a theological 
problem. In the Anti-Christ, agency and moral responsibility are uncovered by Nietzsche 
as being grounded in Saint-Paul 's doctrine of the last judgment. Men are made equal and 
free before God so that they can better be made responsible for their actions. But in 
Dawn, Nietzsche is still interested in clarilying the presuppositions oftraditional 
morality. 
The phenomenon ofmorality is central to an understanding ofNietzsche's 
philosophy and this is perhaps an aspect that is a bit neglected by I-Jeidegger's great 
interpretation of Nietzsche. It is true that Heidegger does Ilot completely neglect this 
moral aspect, notably in his discussion ofRache. 2S9 The problem ofmorality is weil 
exemplified in the famous Nietzschean critique of the two worlds: the true (platonic) 
world and the false world of appearance (Becoming). And of course, the dichotomy that 
Plato establishes between the true and the apparent worlds is also moral in nature. The 
idea orthe Good has to be preserved fro111 Becoming and the change tllat occurs in it. 
The Good does not become but is. But once the difference and dichotomy between the 
true world and the world of appearance is de-constructed, the Good no longer has a place 
where and in which it can be preserved l'rom change. The Good must become. But this 
èS<J Scc thc passages on thc spirit of revcngc (Rache) in Who is Nictzsche's Zarathustra, pp. 221-229, at the 
end 0 f ]-leidcggcr, Nielsche 2. 
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Becoming of the Good means that it can no longer be purely distinguished from its 
opposite: evil. Good does not become evil and evil good, but the taking apart of the 
distinction between the two worlds makes the differentiation and discrimination of good 
l'rom evil problematic . 
. We thus see that the moral problem cannot be detached l'rom the purely 
metaphysieal problem. Nietzsche is the first philosopher and this is what his originality 
consists in to render problematieal the connection established by Plato between Seing 
and the Good, between metaphysics and morals. Nietzsche thus overcomes a thinker like 
Hegel for whom absolute knowledge still consisted in willing the Good. Nietzsche is the 
first thinker that allows us to think Being "beyond good and evil". But it is not obvious 
that for Nietzsche there still is a problem ofBeing as there was for Plato. For Nietzsche, 
Being is associated with the idea of the Good and we must according to him give up . 
Being. Nietzsche is a thinker of Becoming and or the innoncence of Secoming. 
Related to the problem or morality is the problelll or values. Valuations are far 
Nietzsche moral valuations. What stands at the root of a moral value is a moral 
judgement or a moral estimation. For Nietzsche, values have a natural-evolutionary 
origin as weil as a transcendental meaning. Values have a transcendental component 
because they are also historical in origin. Values are social-political-metaphysical 
constructs as weIl as natural-pragmatic concepts. Through value-positing (We/'Iselzung) 
certain evaluations are lifted [rom the stream of Becoming and posited as if, in Being. 
This positing is thus a judgment, an evaluation that something is so and so, thus and not 
otherwise. 
The positing is a thesis (OÉ;mç), a positioning of something as holding sway over 
something else. The question that must be asked is what the relationship betwccn value, 
thesis and phusis is. Values are posited (OÉ;mç) but they also bclong to the realm of nature 
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(qruO"iç). There is a double history ofvalues: an ideal history and a genealogical history. 
The genealogical history focuses on values as nalural and as making lUe possible for a 
certain species of living beings: the human species. The ideal history focuses on the fact 
that values have a transcendcntal, historicized nature. The ideal history of values 
concerns the fact that when values become the supreme objects of thought, when values 
become the highest values (the upward movement that is presupposed by the downward 
slope of nihilism), values de-historicize themselves. Historical values thus have the 
ability ta de-historicize themselves and become the supreme objects or thoughl. 
Nietzsche's effective critique ofmorality begins in Human, All-!oo-Human. 
AIthough there are prefigurations ofNietzsche's stance towards morality in The Bir!h of 
'l'ragedy, the critique of morality is not made explicit there. We can recall that in The 
Bir!h o(Tragedy, the Dionysian and the Apollonian aspects of art and culture were 
opposed to a scicntilic and Socratic culture. The Socratic culture was characterized as 
decadent with respect to the instinct and affect-driven world of the Dionysian. Socrates is 
the one that brought about the moral revolution in philosophy. Before his appearance, 
philosophers such as Anaximander and Thales but also Heraclitus, Parmenides and 
Pythagoras, preoccupied themselves mostly with the study of nature. This is the reason 
why Aristotle characterizes them as the Phusiologoi. 
With Socrates something changes radically. Human beings are no longer 
concerned so much with understallding what is under the earth and above the skies as 
they are in understanding what is the Good and the good life. Nietzsche's relationship to 
Socrates is ambiguous. He recognizes in him a great mind but he claims that this great 
mind has been granted unto the body of a monster. As Habermas has pointed out, 
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Nietzsche's relationship to Socrates is highly stylized. 260 Nietzsche's emphasis on 
Socrates' ugliness is a rhetorical device. The technique of the ad hominem is effectively 
used by Nietzsche against Socrates to re-establish the situated nature of ethics and 
morality. Socrates is precisely the one that had attempted to detach morality l'rom its 
embodied nature and derive a universal definition orthe Good. Now, though, Socrates 
does not explicitly propose a universal definition or the Good, he does begin the 
movement that will be completed by Plato of detaching the concept and word "good" 
l'rom its concrete contexts and universalizing it. In Plato, the Good will become central 
and the idea of the Good will rule high above ail others including Seing. 
It can be seen l'rom the discussion above that the theme of the critique of morality 
is already present in The Bir/h oj'Tragedy. I-Iowever we maintain that this theme gains 
clarity and l'ocus only in Human, Aff-/oo-Human. In the domain of morality, Nietzsche is 
in a constant struggle with his master Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer had been greatly 
inllueneed by Kant's the ory ofmorality that he takes up in a critical way. For 
Schopenhauer, the motivation or dut y that is given by Kant as the only valid motivation 
depends on an incorrect analysis of the phenomenon ofmoral motivation. We are not 
motivated by dut y, but by compassion. However, Schopenhauer does not wholly reject 
the Kantian scheme. He admits that moral motivation does not come from the 
phenomenal world of appearances, but l'rom the noumenal world of the thing-in-itself. 
Schopenhauer re-interprets the Kantian thing-in-itself in a decisive way. For 
Schopenhauer the thing-in-itselfis the will. This positive characterization orthe thing-in-
itself allows Schopenhauer to qualify moral action. Pace Kant, Schopenhauer admits that 
we cannot be motivated or impelled by phenomenal motives, but only by noumenal ones. 
èW See Habermas, J., 7'he Phi/osofJhica/ Discourse of Modernily, Lecture IV, note 33, MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachussets, 1987. 
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I-Iowever Schopenhauer asserts that only a compassionate act has moral worth and that 
this act is an act of the will because it emanates [rom the thing-in-itself understood as 
will. Thus Schopenhauer sees a connection between ethics and metaphysics as is clear 
l'rom the following quote: "It is undeniably recognized by ail nations, ages and creeds and 
even by ail philosophers (with the exception of the materialists proper), that the ethical 
significance of hum an conduct is metaphysical, in other words, that it reaches beyond this 
phenomenal existence and touches eternity.,,261 
Nietzsche starts where Schopenhauer leaves us. For Nietzsche, the 
spiritualization or un-egoistic, compassionate action and its projection upon a 
metaphysical beyond is unacceptable. Nietzsche writes: 
Wahrend Schopenhauer von der Welt der Erscheinung aussagt, 
dass sie in ihren Schriftzügen das Wesen des Dinges an sich zu 
erkennen gebe, haben strengere Logiker jeden Zusammenhang 
zwischen dem Unbedingten, der metaphysischen Welt und der uns 
bekannten Welt geleugnet: so dass in der Erscheinung eben 
durchaus nicht das Ding an sich erschiene. Von beiden Seiten 
scheint mir übersehen, dass es verschiedene irrthümliche 
GrundaulTassungen des Intellectes sind, welche den Grund 
abgeben, weshalb Ding an sich und Erscheinung in einem 
unausfüllbaren Gegensatz zu stehen scheinen: wir haben die 
Erscheinung eben mit Irrthümern so umsponnen, ja sie so mit 
ihnen durchwebt, dass niemand mehr die Erscheinungswelt von 
ihnen getrennt den ken kann. Also: die üblcn, von Anrang an 
vererbten unlogischen Gewohnheiten des Intellcctes haben erst die 
ganze Klul1 zwischen Ding an sich und Erscheinung aufgerissen; 
diese Kluft besteht nur insofern unser Intellect und seine Irrthümer 
bestehen. 2(,2 
In Human, All-too-Human and in Dawn, Nietzsche has not yet found his 
vocabulary but in the later works he will qualify the projection of unegoistic and ethico-
moral values on a beyond as nihilistic. As Maudemarie Clark argues, there is a difrerence 
261 Schopenhauer, A., Die beidcl1 Grundproblemc der Ethik, lranslaled by E.F. J. Payne as On the Basis of 
Morality, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Mcrrill, 1965, p.54. 
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in the positions that Nietzsche adopts in !-!lIman, AlI-Ioo-Human and in Dawn. 263 ln 
]-hl/l1 an. All-loo-Human, Nietzsche did not admit that such a thing ~IS unselfish, 
unegoistical action was possible: " Nie hat ein Mensch Etwas gethan, das allein für 
Andere und ohne jeden personlichen Beweggrund getan ware; ja wie sollte er Etwas thun 
konnen, das ohne Bezug zu ihm ware, also ohne innere Nothigung (welche ihren Grund 
doch in einem personlichen Bedürfniss haben müsste) ? Wie vermochte das ego ohne ego 
Zll handeln ? ,,264 Ali action including the love of parents, wife and children was 
determined as motivated by the enjoyment orthe personal passion that it inspired within 
human beings. This position is close to that of La Rochefoucauld for whom the ground of 
moral action is falsely attributed to altruistic motives. As LaRochefoucauld puts it "si on 
. '. d'Il b' , ,,2(,5 CroIt aImer sa maItresse pour amour e e, on est len trompe. 
With Dawn, there is a shift in Nietzsche's position. This shift is exemplified in 
the following guote: 
'Die Sittlichkeit leugnen' das kann einmal heissen leugnen, dass 
die sittlichen welche die Menschen angeben, wirklich zu ihren 
Handlungen getrieben haben-es ist also die Behauptung, dass die 
Sittlichkeit in Worten bestehe und zur groben und feinen 
Betrügerei (namentlich Selbstbetrügerei) der Menschen gehore und 
vielleicht gerade bei den durch Tugend Berühmtesten am meisten. 
Sodann kann es heissen: leugnen, dass die sittlichen Urtheile auf 
Wahrheiten beruhen. Hier wird zugegeben, dass sie Motive des 
I-landelns wirklich sind, dass aber auf diese Weise Irrthümer, aIs 
Grund alles sittlichen Urtheilens, die Menschen zu ihren 
moralischen Handlungen treiben. Dies ist mein Gesichtspunkt. 266 
Here Nietzsche admits that there might be morally motivated action but claims 
that these motives rest on errors and deceptions. 
262 KSA 8,23 [125]. 
263 See Introduction to Dawn, XX, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997. 
2M MA 1,133, (KSA 2, p.127). 
265 La Rochefoucauld, Réflexions ou Sentences el maximes morales et réflexions diverses, Maxime 374, 
Paris, Honoré Champion, 2002. 
266 M, 103, (KSA 3, p.91). 
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The problem of morality is related to the problem of agency and moral 
responsibility. An important question in Nietzsche scholarship is whether Nietzsche 
thinks that we are purely determined by our physiological and psychological drives 
(Triebe).267 Nietzsche emphasizes that in order for there to be free action and free will, 
conscience must be taken as fundamental and determining. But lor Nietzsche, conscience 
is only a layer, a skin that rests on top of the wound that is constituted by the struggle that 
occurs between many drives. When we become conscious of a drive, it is not we as 
conscious beings, that become conscious of it. Nietzsche explains: 
dass man überhaupt die Heftigkeit eines Triebes bekampfen will, 
steht nicht in unserer Macht ebenso wenig, auf welche Methode 
man veriàllt, ebenso wenig ob man mit diesel' Methode Erfolg hat. 
Vielmehr ist unser Intellect bei diesem Vorgange ersichtl ich nur 
das blinde Werkzeug eines anderen Triebes, welcher ein RivaL 
dessen ist, der uns durch seine Heftigkeit quiilt: sei es der Trieb 
nach Ruhe oder dic Furcht vor Schande und andercn bosen Folgen 
oder die Liebe. Wahrend "wir" uns also über die Heftigkeit eines 
Triebes zu beklagen meinen, ist es im Grunde ein Trieb welcher 
über ein anderen klage68 
The terminology of Triebe is probably mechanistic and materialistic and this shows the 
inlluence on Nietzsche of Lange (Geschichte des Mater;aLismus), Ludwig Büchner (Krafi 
und Staff) and Fechner (ELemente der P.sychaphysik).269 
Nietzsche's critique ofmorality must be understood as an attack on metaphysics 
as weIl. The rejection of a metaphysical beyond begins to dawn on Nietzsche through his 
267 for a good Ircatment or Instinkt and Trieb in Nietzsche (with a comparison with Freud's treatmcnt or 
rrieh) sec Assoun, P Freud and Nietzsche, pp.53-69, Translated by Richard L.Collier Jr., Ath!onc 
Press, London, 2000. 
268 M, 109, (KSA 3, pp.98-99) . 
269 For the eonneetion between Lange and Nietzsche see Stack's book Lange und Nietzsche (De Gruyter, 
Berlin, 1983) especially and V. Materio-Idealism. For the connectÎon between Fechner and 
Nietzsche see same book by Stack, pp. 38, 174, 176, 180, 224, 226. for the connection between Büchner 
and Nietzsche, see Angèle Kremer-Marielti, Nietzsche: The Critique of Modern Reason, pp.87-1 0 l, n.50, 
in Nietzsche, Theories ojKnOlvledge. and Critical TheO/y. Nietzsche and the Sciences l, Edited by Babette 
E. Babich, in collaboration with Robert S. Cohen, Dordrecht, Boston, Kluwer Academie Publishers, 1999. 
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explorations of materialism (Lange), physiology and psychology. It is by looking at 
human moral action that Nietzsche cornes to observe conscience and to question the 
motives that move it to action. The rejection of the metaphysical and the adoption of a 
pragmatist and naturalistic attitude in his explanation orthe moral make Nietzsche a 
precursor to twentieth century critiques or metaphysics understood as onto-theo-logy. 
Nietzsche does identify avant la lettre the connection between ontology and theology. J-Je 
does not have a grand historiai account to propose like Heidegger of the forgetfulness of 
Being, but the history of European nihilism has sOl11ething of a historiai structure, as 
Heidegger himself recognized. 
The historiai structure of European nihilism is connected to Nietzsche's 
metaphysics of Becoming. The problem is whether this metaphysics cannot be 
recuperated by traditional ontology and metaphysics as its other. This thinking of the 
other is achieved through the concepts of Being and the proper. What has content is for 
metaphysics is Being and the proper. Becoming is indeterminatc and purely fonnal. 
Becoming is the in-determinate, the metaphysical infinite or apeiro/1 in the Greek sense 
orthe word. To the finitude of Being is opposed, albeit not formally, the in-finitude and 
non-determination or Becoming. lt is this in-finitude in-determinacy that Nietzsche 
sought to think. 
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Conclusion 
In this section 1 have sought to present Nictzsche's critique oC language, morality and 
mctaphysics. 1 do not belicve that the se aspects are essentially distinct in Nietzsche's 
thought. Rather, the critique oflanguage, of morality and metaphysics is essentially 
intertwined in Nietzsche's philosophy. 1 have sought to make this critique explicit From 
the point orview orthe concept of Becoming. Becoming is perspectival and it lacks a 
lelos. This perspectival aspect or Becoming allows Nietzsche to claim that when humans 
try to grasp the world through language, they create a second apparent world. The 
creation of a distinction between an apparent and rcal world lies at the basis orthe 
platonic mctaphysical theory, according to Nietzsche. Il is worthwhile to notice that this 
distinction between the rcal and the apparent world is also moral. This is the case because 
the truc world, the world or the idea of the Good, is wilat is ultimately worth striving l'or 
according to Nietzsche's reconstruction oCPlato. The le/os of the apparent world is the 
truc world. Nietzsche eliminates this telos From the truc world, From the world ofBeing. 
But he does not stop there. He goes further by removing the le/os From within Becoming. 
When the truc world disappears, so does the apparent world. 
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3.2 The Relationship Between the Problem ofBecoming, the Will to Power, 
Eternal Recurrence, Nihilism, and the Übermensch 
In the following section, 1 will examine the connection between the concept of 
Becoming and the more traditional rubrics ofNietzschean thought that are represented by 
will to power, eternal recurrence, nihilislll and the Übermensch. Il is Illy thesis that it is 
l'ruitJ'ul to think through a unit y of ail the traditional rubrics in terms of the concept of 
Becoming. Will to power and the eternal recurrence can be seen to eonstitute a unit y as 
Heidegger has argued. This unit y is perhaps the more important one in Nietzsche's 
thought as 1 try to argue. But nihilism and the Übermensch also cohere with the concepts 
ofwill to power and eternal recurrence. 
Nihilism is what occurs when the le/o,l' is removed l'rom Bccoming. Up until 
Nietzsche, and this includes Hegel's thought, an aim had always been posited l'or thought 
and for Becoming. This aim is what kept the world of thought from sinking into chaos. 
But with nihilism a dialectic is established that saps faith in truth and morality. This 
entails that stability is eliminated l'rom within thought, Becoming and reality. With the 
concept of the Übermensch, Nietzsche attempts, partly, to reverse this destabilizing 
movement of nihilism. Through the Übermensch, Nietzsche attempts to find a new telos 
that can replace the te/os oftruth, the Good, and the metaphysical beyond. 
The same back and forth between concepts occurs between will to power and 
eternal recurrence. Will to power destabilizes Becoming and eliminates teleology l'rom 
within it, but eternal recurrence seeks to preserve and stabilize a point that could perhaps 
transcend the flux of Becoming. The relationship between the eternal recurrence and 
Becoming is difficult to understand. Is eternal recurrenee a thought about Being or about 
Becoming? This is not clear. 1 will try to c1arify this issue. 
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Will to power is a thought that is about Becoming because it posits perspectives 
of power that are constantly transformed and re-established in the flow ofBecoming. 
Nihilism is what occurs when we realize that perhaps there is no such thing as Being (that 
Seing is a fiction). The Übermensch, is Nietzsche's original perspective on Becoming. 
the possibility to Jind a eentre within Becoming, something to strive for. As 1 will try to 
argue, these traditional Nietzschean rubrics can aU be re-thought in tenns of the concept 
ofBecoming. 
Eternal recurrence can also be conceived as the synthesis between the temporality 
of Bcing (eternity) and of Becoming (moment). This synthesis alTords the thought of 
recurrence a dialectical quality that is not present in an obvious way in Nietzsche's other 
concepts. Heidegger writes in connection with freedom, understood as a relationship 
between Being and Becoming: 
Das Wesen des Seienden ist das Werden, aber das Werdende ist 
und hat Sein erst in der schalTende Vcrklarung. Das Seiende und 
das Werdende sind zusammengeschlossen in dem Grundgedanken, 
dass das Werdende ist, indem es seiend wird und werdend ist im 
Schaffen. Dieses Seiendwerden aber wird zum werdenden 
Seienden im standigen Werden des Festgewordenen aIs seines 
Erstarrten zum Festgemachten aIs der befreienden Verklarung. 27o 
The thought of eternal recurrence represents a dialectic of contingence and 
nccessity. The thought of cternai recurrence allows each individual that is capable of this 
thought to understand his particular life as a necessary part of a greater totality, of a 
cosmos. Each moment out ofwhieh the life of an individual is eonstituted, including the 
most diffieult moments (and perhaps these moments more so than others sinee they lead 
10 the thought of eternal recurrence by forcing us to go through the experience of 
270 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche /, pp.465-466 (Nietzsche, Vol.3, ppol00-l0 1). 
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nihilism) are felt and understood as necessary parts ofhis self, ofwhat he is and what he 
has become. 
The experiences of a subject return, recur and this happens in part in a way that is 
independent of the will of this subject: the tlow of experiences returns. But there is also a 
subjective component that is associated with the thought of eternal recurrence, the "also 
wollte Ich es" (th us l willed it) that inverts the temporal tlow and its "es war" (there was). 
A subjective will wants to invert the experiences that occur for a subject of this will in a 
contingent way and this will wills the necessity of these experiences by \Villing their 
return. But this is only possible ifthere is an identity between these two movements: the 
flow of contingent experiences and the conscious and necessary wi Il that inverts the 
contingency of the tlow of cxperiences. It is clear that in order to think these two 
l110vel11ents together we cannot think them as essentially dift'erent From one another. 
There is an identity that is pre-supposed From the start between these two movements. 
This constitutes the hidden "Hegelianism" (at least with respect to the eternal recurrence: 
it is clear that in general Nietzsche is not a Hegelian but rather overcomes Hegelianism) 
of Nietzsche that Heidegger has sought to emphasize in his Nietzsche lectures. fn the end 
however, Heidegger's claim constitutes a strategy ofreducing Nietzsche to Hegel, in 
order to make room for his own overcol11ing orboth thinkers. 
Freedom is constituted by the fusion of Seing and Secoming. Sccause of the 
difference between Seing and Becoming, a certain form of freedom can be established. ln 
order l'or freedom to exist, there is a need for things to be stable in existence (Being) but 
also for the possibility or change in the world (Becoming). Seing and Becol11ing are fused 
together yet remain di fferentiated. The fusion or imbrication of Seing in Becoming is not 
an act of subjective will but it must also be that in a sense. This is the case because, as an 
act of subjectivity, the imbrication of Being in Becoming could find an immanent site 
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l'rom which it could make itsell' possible. Becoming runs and passes its course. 
Becoming can be conceived (not without a certain reduction) as the Ilow of subjective 
experiences that exists l'or a conscience. In order for Being to be, this subjective 
conscience must will the return or experiences. This is how Heidegger understands 
eternal recurrence orthe same by claiming that it is: "The supreme triumph ol'the 
metaphysics ol'the will that eternally wills its own willing.,,271 But this understanding is 
insufficient. There is a subjective moment of eternal recurrence that is a moment of 
permanentization/constantification ofBecoming. This might perhaps lead to a 
psychologization of the will. ]-jowever, it is important to understand that insofar as the 
will pertains to time and to 8ecoming, the will is conceived metaphysically by Nietzsche. 
The moment of permanentization/constanti fication or Becoming corresponds to 
will to power, although in an undetermined way. j-Iowever there is an objective side to 
the thought ol'recurrence that is completely independent of the will and that makes ol'the 
thought ofrecurrence a certain làtality for ail conscience and ail will that could 
correspond to it : the Whole returns. It is only starting l'rom this return that the Whole 
can have Being. Nietzsche is categorical about this : whether we will the eternal 
recurrence or not, this recurrence occurs anyway, independently of our will. 
1 believe there is support for my interpretation if we turn away [rom the passages 
that talk directly of the eternal recurrence and consider Nietzsche's philosophy in its 
totality. This philosophy taken in its totality speaks of Becoming. The Nietzschean 
"system" (if it is at alliegitimate to speak in the se terms) does not possess a principlc or 
transcendence. This principle ol'transcendence can be understood as the ability to 
achieve independence l'rom historical determinations. This is perhaps very conscious and 
willed on Nietzsche's part but it remains a great aporia ofhis system and we may criticize 
271 Heidegger, M., Whol is Called Thinking. I-Iarper-Row, New York, 1968, p.1 04. 
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him in a legitimate way in this case. However, this transcendence is not something that I 
superimpose on the Nietzschean conceptuality and text : the transcendence l am referring 
to exists implicitly in the specific loci of Nietzsche 's corpus. Jt remains to be resolved 
whether Nietzsche's mens aue/oris, his intended meaning on the question of 
transcendence, is relevant to this issue or not. With Gadamer and Heidegger, we might 
want to say that the Sache ofNietzsche's text speaks oftranscendence even though 
Nietzsche never had any intention to do so. 
There are hints that show us that wi II to power and eternal recurrence of the same 
are thoughts that are strongly connected for Nietzsche. One ofthese hints is aphorism 
1067 of the of the collection of fragments that became known as the Will 10 Power, in 
which Nietzsche claims that "Diese Welt ist die Wille zur Macht und nichts anders». In 
an older version of this aphorism Nietzsche had stated the following: 
ein Ring guten Willens ist, auf eigncr alter 8ahn si ch immer um 
si ch und nur um sich zu drehen: diese meine Welt, - wer ist hel! 
genug dazu, sie zu schauen, oh ne si ch 81indheit zu wünschen 7 
Stark genug, diesem Spiegcl seine Seelc entgegen zu halten ? 
Seinen eignen Spiegel dem Dionysos-Spiegel ? Seine eigne 
Losung dem Dionysios-Rathsel ? Und wer das vermochte, müsste 
er dann nicht noch mehr th un ? Dem Ring der Ringe sich sel ber 
anverloben ? Mit dem Gelobniss der eignen Wiederkunft? Mit 
dem Ringe der ewigen Selbst-Segnung, Selbst-8ejahung ? Mit dem 
Willen zum Wieder-und-noch-ein-Mal-Wollen ? Zum zurück-
Wollen aller Dinge, die je gewesen sind? Zum hinaus- Wollen zu 
Allem, was je sein muss? Wisst ihr nun was mir diese Welt ist ? 
Und was icl~ will wenn ich diese Welt-will 7272 
It can clearly be deduced that when Nietzsche writes: "Do you know what this 
world is to me? And what l am willing when 1 will/his world?" he is referring to the 
eternaJ recurrence of the same. The rhetoricaJ structure of the passage is similar ta the Jater 
version orthe aphorism which talks about will to power so that wc may assume that will to 
power came to replace eternal recurrence as the t'undamentalfac/u/1/ [hat characterizes the 
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world for Nietzsche. Thus the two l.houghts could be taken as practically interchangeable 
in the weight that Nietzsche accorded them for his thought. 
Will to power is a concept that Nietzsche uses in an explicit way to show the 
inexistence of free will (but an un-free will is not a consequence of the inexistence of free 
will: Nietzsche does not believe in a free will just as he does not believe in an un-free 
will. He only believes in strong wills and weak wills, as he asserts in Beyond Good and 
Evi/.) The entity that Nietzsche calls will to power is opcrational within subjectivity and 
this precludes the will to will a single thing or to will in a single direction. j-lowever, this 
effect of will to power is counter-balanced by the concept of Übermensch in Nietzsche's 
thought. The Übermensch is the goal of the will that only wills the Übermensch and its 
advent. 
The thought of eternal recurrence plays a crucial role as a counter-movement to 
nihilism. The thought of eternal recurrence is said to throw the one who thinks it into a 
great abyss because of its depth. If everything we undertake as finite human beings will 
repeat itself again and again, then everything seems to occur in vain. If the same thing 
repeats itself infinitely and idefinitely then everything is indiflerent. The fatalism of 
eternal recurrence seems to block ail possibility of establishing a center, or establishing 
values that can serve as principles for lire. Eternal recurrence seems to make everything 
vain and indifferent. But this tiredness with life, the devaluation of ail values is in fact 
only an illusion. Against the great illusion ofnihilism, a strong thought is necessary. 
Nihilism as understood by Nietzsche bas at least two aspects. There is an 
individual and psychological aspect that is conceived as the arlection of the will of an 
individual that cannot williife. The will thus becomes a decadent will. The other aspect 
is the more historical aspect of nihilism identified by Heidegger. Conceived in this way 
m KSA /4,727. 
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nihilism is the motor of History. However, it can be observcd that this movemcnt is the 
inverse of the movement of actualization and progression of freedom in History 
proclaimed by Hegel. But if nihilism has a history and a development it is not the exact 
inverse of the Hcgelian movement of freedom through History. Nihilism lacks the 
teleological nature ofl-Jegel's 1I11dcrstanding of historical Becoming. 
For Nietzsche, "in einer ganz bcstimmtcn Ausdeutung, in der christlich-
moralischen, steckt der Nihilismlls.,,273. The moral-Christian interpretation of existence 
is sti Il operational in Hegel 's philosophy. History as tetos and as narrative possessing a 
beginning and an end is an Aritstotelian-Christian heritage. Aristotle did not possess a 
concept of history comparable to the modern one but he certainly possessed the concept 
of enlelecheia and (en-)telos. It is difficult to reduce the notion or teleological history to 
its Christian origins. But my thesis is that the notion of a telcological historical narrative 
makes its appearance in the history of ideas with the advent of Christianity.274 
Thus, Nietzsche's thesis is precisely that the kind of narrative history or theory of 
history that is projccled 01110 Ihe life of cach individual in order 10 explain the meaning of 
each individuallife has become untenable. For Nietzsche, Christian morality self-
destructs because of the value that it accords to truth. It is the faith in truth and in 
truthfulness (Wahrhqfiigkeil) that is presupposed by Christian morality that leads to 
nihilism. The belief in a super-sensible ideal and in the truth that is attached to Ihis ideal 
results ultimately in a non-truth and a transformation of the truth into a 1 ie. For Nietzsche 
this constitutes the culmination of decadence and nihilism. Even though Nietzsche 
173 KSA /2,2[127]. 
m Umbcrto Eco writcs to cardinal Carlo Maria Martini in a letter of Mareli 1995: "not only Augustine, but 
the Church Fathers in their totality orrcr to the world the idea of l-listory as a forward march, an idea that 
was foreign to the pagan world lIntilthen. Even Hegel and Marx were innuenccd by this rundamental idea, 
rollowed by Teilhard de Chardin. Christianity has invcnted history .... '· Carlo Maria Martini, Umberto Eco, 
Beliej or Non-belie/,J, Arcade Publishing, New York, 2000. 
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considers that a continuo us and teleological historical narrative is impossible, it still is the 
case that nihilism is constituted by the historical event that consists in the fact that the 
Christian-moral interpretation of existence and of History (which could be construed to 
culminate in Hegel's philosophy) has become untenable. Nietzsche also calls this 
historical event the history of which was to be constituted according to him by the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the "death of God". 
One of the most famous passages in which Nietzsche interprets the "death of 
God" is in The Gay Science, aphorism 125 275 . There are other important references in the 
Nietzschean corpus such as the Zarathustra Prologue and many passages in the Anti-
christ. What is amazing however, in The Gay Science, and this testifies to Nietzsche's 
ambivalence vis-à-vis atheism, is the fact that the story that is told by the madman (der 
toile Mensch) who announces prophetically the death of God, is not, infact, so dilTerent 
l'rom the Christian story of the crucifixion. Formally, the story is similar insofar as it is 
humans who kill a "living" God not unlike Christ. Of course, this is a parodistic repetition 
by Nietzsche, but it does not rule out an unconscious or tacit acceptance of sorne of the 
original elements of Christian story. 
The story of the death ofCiod is related to Nietzsche's notion orthe dialectic and 
of nihilism. Nihilism, the positing of God's existence and of a religious morality are 
dialectically interconnected. lnitially it is morality itself that cultivates truthfulness as an 
in-itself, something that transcends the here and now. But this will to truth of the moral 
man turns against morality itselr,276 Truth becomes a lie when the moral man realizes 
that truth conceived as an ideal and as a beyond passes judgment on life. In fact nihilism 
'75 
- KSA 3, pp.480-482. 
276 KSA /2,5 [71],2. 
215 
(as psychological state) can also be characterized by the fact that the meaning of events, 
of the world and oflife is amiss. Nietzsche speaks ofit in this way: 
Jener Sinn konnte gewesen sein: "die Erfüllung" eines sittlichen 
hochsten Kanons in allem Geschehen, die sittliche Weltordnung; 
oder die Zunahme der/Liebe und Harmonie im Verkehr der Wesen; 
oder die Annahrung an einen allgemeinen G1ücks-Zustand; oder 
selbst das Losgehen aufeinen allgemeinen Nichts-Zustand - ein 
Ziel ist immer noch ein Sinn. Das Gemeinsame aller diese 
Vorstellungsarten ist, dass ein Etwas durch ein Prozess selbst 
erreicht werden solI: und nun begreift man, das mit dem Werden 
nichts erzielt, niehts erreicht wird ... 277 
Nihilism, inasmuch as it constitutes a disappearing of the true world as a 
I-linterwelt, is a liberation. The disappearance ofa world ofBeing Crees Becoming. 
Being as a supersensible value contributes to a moralisation and an ontologization or 
existence and or History. With the acknowledgement that Seing corresponds to 
nothingness and to negation, the nihilistic conscience is transformed into a l'ree will-Cor-
Becoming. Will to power as will to nothingness becomes free in order to will Becoming. 
This freeing of the will is dialectical insofar as the supreme will to power is «to imprint 
onto Becoming the character of Being». 
If the old values, being, unit y, goal, supersensible, moraIity, are decadent, this is 
only t'rom the historical perspective in which we are situated and that is constituted by 
nihilism. The positing of values is always, and this is not dependent on the historical 
context of this positing, an act or rreedom. This act of freedom is not only the act of a 
subjectivity. T'he positing of values is a subjective act but the content of what is posited 
as value is not subjective; but it precedes the subject-object division. Values are posited 
and obtain Being and this is true ev en of the value "Being". 
7.77 KSA /3, Il r99]. 
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But the values posited by Nietzsche will one day beeome decadent. This is due to 
the nature of the historical process that posits values, lets them hold sway and rule for a 
given period of time and then destroys them. For example, the l'ounding values of 
Western philosophy that are represented by the Platonic philosophy dominate and rule for 
a while before the y are dethroned by other values or systems. This problem of how 
historical systems and values l'rom other epochs can still be val id or still have value 
across epochs Îs lantamount to the problem ofhistoricism. Tt is clear that there is no Ilow 
of systems that harmoniously rule and then become sim ply de-throned by other ruling 
systems. The historical reality is much more intricate than that, and two systems can 
fight for supremacy, one that is much older and one that is contemporary. This problem 
of ruling values and of the value of values is intrinsically related to the problem or 
historicism, which we will address in detail in the third chapter of the first part of this 
dissertation. 
Man, as the being that represents and posHs values, is conceptualized as the 
fulfilment of the absolute and consummate subjectivity ofwill to power. But the notion 
of man is radicalized in itsel1'when it is thought in terms of the will to power. As the pure 
exercise of will to power, man beeomes what Nietzsche caBs the Übermensch. Thus, the 
Übermensch is the man that realizes that each one of his actions, as contingent as it may 
seem i5 necessary and filled with meaning. What seems to distiguish the Übermensch 
[rom the man who precedes him is the realization that neces5ity, historical and existentiaL 
is o1'his own making. The Übermensch finally acknow1edges and realizcs the divinity 
that i5 potentially present within him. As Nietzsche puts it: 
Ail die Schonheit und Erhabenheit, die wir den wirklichen und 
eingebildeten Dingen geliehen haben, will ich zurtïckl'ordern ais 
Eigentum und Erzeugnis des Menschen: ais seine schonste 
Apologie. Der Mensch ais Dichter, ais Denker, ais Gott, ais Licbe, 
ais Macht-: oh über seine konigliche Freigiehigkeit, mit der el' die 
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Dinge beschenkt hat, um si ch zu verarmen und sich elend zu 
fühlen! Das war bisher seine grosste Selbstlosigkeit, dass er 
bewunderte und anbetete und sich zu verbergen wusste, dass er es 
war, der Das gescha l'Fen hat, was er bewunderte. 278 
It is only within the perspective opened by the concept of the Obermensch lhat the 
thought of eternal recurrence becomes slIstainable. This is true because the overcoming 
that is intrisic to the thought of eternal recurrencc must find a l'ocus, a fulfilment in the 
world and nol in a beyond as il was the case with the preeeding metaphysical and 
religious systems. 
Deleuze has forceflll1y argued, that the eternal recurrence is a selective and 
transformative thought. 279 1 do not fully agree with this view of the thollght of 
recurrenee. 1 believe that eternal recurrence is transformative but, this transformation is 
the lot of every man by the mere fact that he is human. There is evidencc however, that 
Nietzsche himselfbelieved cternal recurrcnce to be selective (auswah!endes).28o 
According to this reading, the difficulty of such a thollght makes a selection as to who is 
capable ofthinking this thought. [t only allows the high-minded, the noble nature to 
absollltely affirm his apparently absurd and contingent existence throllgh the affirmation 
of the recurrence of every single act-experience as necessary. The "weak", the "sickly", 
the proponents orthe slave morality are those who succlImb or are themselvcs 
transformed and transfigured into something highcr when faced with the possibility of the 
return. 
But why should the focus and the fulfillment of the transformation be the 
Obermensch? This is the case because the Obermensch is the pure exercise of will to 
power. The depth of the eternal rccurrcncc is that ihis thought reinvcsts with 
278 Nietzsche, F., Epigram zum Buch 11 der Wi//e zur Machl , 1887-1888. 1 could Ilot locate this citation in 
the KSA. 
279 See Deleuze, Nietzsche el la philosophie, PUF, Paris, 1973, Chapter Il, Section 14. 
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transcendence the immanent world. The Übermensch is the locus or an inversion that 
allows the world of Being to be transformed into a world or Becoming. But the logic of 
retllrn and recurrence needs a culmination and a guideline. This is offered by the concept 
of the Übermensch. The Übermensch offers a stable direction and a goal towards which 
the eternal recurrence may progress. The concept of Übermensch offers a goal that does 
not resemble the Christian and Platonic beyond. The Übermensch seems to be an ideal 
(althollgh we know that Nietzsche detested this word) towards which man could tend but 
that would be sitllated in the con crete and immanent world. This concept 0[' the 
Übermensch thus participates in Nietzsche's project of an inversion of Platonism. 
The Übermensch is another way in which Nietzsche attempts to think 
transcendence and in this way the concept orthe Ühermensch possesses an essentiallink 
to the concept orthe eternal recurrence orthe same. Ifwill to power abolishes the 
transcendence of the supersensible world, then the Übermensch preserves the possibility 
of transcendence although in a horizontal, non-vertical plane of immanence. 
On the one hand, the Übermensch is the inheritor of the bourgeois-socialist notion 
of progress inasmuch as it posits a form of teleology within the essence or man: man can 
improve himself, he can go beyond his illlmediate conditions, historical and social and 
attain to a finality, to an eschafon. On the other hand, the notion of Übermensch is 
attached in an inherent way to the malleability of man that is made possible by modern 
science. Man is capable ofmanipulating himselfand the nature that surrounds him: he 
can split the atom, he can understand and maniplliate his genetic code and he can 
manipulate (and perhaps create) his emotions through the applications ofpsycho-
pharmacology. 
280 KSA 10, 24 [8]. 
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The notion of Übermensch is attached in an essential way to the concepts ofwill 
to power, eternal recurrence and nihilism. The Übermensch overcomes nihilism by 
willing the eternal recurrence ofwill to power. The willirees itselfthrough the thought 
of eternal recurrence for the possibility of the Ühermensch, which is a pure possibility 
insolàr as he represents the pure powering or will to power. Ce11ain COl11mentators have 
spoken of the (~lCt that the Ühermensch might represent an Al~fhebul1g ofman as he has 
existed hitherto.281 This way or putting the problem seems to distort Nietzsche's 
philosophy by misunderstanding the radicalism of the thought of the Übermensch. 
The relation of the Übermensch to the eternal return of the same can be 
understood starting l'rom the categories ofpossibility and actuality. The eternal 
recurrence of the same is a circular movement that frees possibilities. Through the 
eternal circularity of return new possibilities are liberated or freed. Man projects himself 
onto these possibilities which constitute the possibility of a liberation that must procure 
the actualization of the Übermel1sch. Thus, we see that the Übermensch has deeper ties to 
the concept or eternal reeurrence than to the concept 01' will to power. This is not one or 
my main theses, but sorne groundwork has already been laid down by Heidegger and 
Muller-Lauter who have attempted to eonceptualize the faet that the thought of the 
Übermensch is rooted in the thought of the eternal reeurrence of the same. This is c1ear in 
èSl "In the first place the constrictive and reductive perspective or the history or metaphysics imposes the 
point orview that the ideas orNietzsche establish themselves on the basis oran inversion-conservation 
(Aufhebung) orthe metaphysical positions that immediately precede him in time or, that, according to 
Heidegger, of Hegel. The Ùbermensch will have to be understood, arter that, as an A ujhehung or the 
Hegelian thought orthe absolute subject." 
"En primer lugar, la perspectiva constrictiva y reductora de la historia de la metafisica impone el punto de 
vista de que las ideas de Nietzsche se establecen sobre la base de una inversi6n-conservaci6n (Aufhebung) 
de las posiciones metafisicas que le preceden inillediatamente en el tiempo, 0 sea, seglin Heidegger, de las 
de I-Iegel. El superhombre debera entenderse, pues, como Aufhebung dei pensailliento dei sujeto absoluto 
de Hegel. 
Diego Sanchez Meea, Perspeclivas aClua/es de inlcrprelacion dei Übermensch niel:::scheano, Publieado en 
ER. Revista de filosofia, Sevilla, no. 14, 1999/1. 
220 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where Zarathustra is both the teacher of the Übermensch and of 
the eternal recurrence of the same. 
The man of the present is a representation ofactuality. The Übermensch is pure 
possibility as pure exercise ol·will to power. But the possibility ol'actualization orthe 
Übermensch is made possible or facilitated through the permanentization of Becoming 
that is represented by the eternal recurrence of the same. The eternal recurrence frees 
actual man from his actuality and frees him for the pure possibilities represented by the 
Ohermensch. The Übe,.mensch as agent of the overcoming ofnihilism, must reconfigure 
the relationship between Being and Becoming, between actuality and possibility. 
Nihilism is characterized by the immediate disappearance ofBeing into 
Becoming. The Übermensch is what makes possible a Becoming that has been purified 
of ail Being. The inversion ofBeing as idea (Plato) into Being as value (Nietzsche) 
presupposes the disappearance and abolition orBeing as supersensible, and the 
structuring value orthe here and now. But the Obermensch represents the possibility 01' a 
new position and creation of values. 
1 have tried to show in this section that the basic rubrics ofNietzsche's thought, 
will to power, eternal recurrence, nihilism and Übermensch can be made to cohere in 
terms orthe concept of Becoming. Other rubrics attempt to remove teleology ["rom 
within Becoming. This is the case with will to power and nihilism. Some other rubrics 
like eternal recurrence and the Übermensch attempt to re-establish a form of 
transcendence once the world of Being has been aboli shed (this abolition happens fully 
according to Nietzsche, only in his philosophy2x2). It is for this reason that the se two last 
rubrics, eternal recurrence and the Übermensch. are far more complex. Eternal 
è82 The best example of where Nietzsche argues for sllch a belief is the famolls passage of the "H istory of 
an Error". 
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recurrence seems to possess a le/os and this le/os is the repetition or recurrence that must 
be eternally willed. As to the Übel'mensch, he seems to be a le/os that is radically placed 
within Becoming rather than in the beyond. 'l'hus our examination has complexified our 
thesis. On the one hand, Nietzsche, through the rubrics of will to power and ni hi li sm 
removes a certain form ofteleology (an objective teleology perhaps) from within 
Becoming and on the other hand, through the rubrics of eternal recurrence and the 
Ohermensch he re-establishes a forl11 ofteleology but by referring only to a world of 
Becoming and no longer to a world of Being. 
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Conclusion 
1 have attempted to show that ail of the main rubrics ofNietzsche's thought (will to 
power, eternal recurrence of the same, nihilism, Übermensch and "death of God") can be 
related to the concept ofBecoming. Somc ofthcse rubrics are more dynamic and they 
emphasize Becoming more than the others: this is the case with will to power, nihilism 
and the "death of God". But even the more static rubrics such as the eternal recurrence of 
the same and the Übermensch, are inherently related to the concept of Becoming. In fact 
it is my thesis that the eternal rccurrence of the same and the Übermensch can best be 
thought ofin tenns of the concept of Becoming. What returns in the eternal recurrence is 
thc pure and impermancnt !lux of Secoming. Evcn though it is possible to stamp 
Becoming with the character of Seing, the stamping is a Fdlschung. 
Similarly the Übermensch is characterized by Nietzsche as being in a perpetuai 
movement of se(f~overcoming. This self-overcoming occurs in thc configurations of 
lorce-ccnters, power-centers and power-wills that constitute the constellations of 
Becoming. Thus, ail the principal, l11etaphysica\ rubrics ofNietzsche's thought can be re-
articu\ated in tenns of the key-concept of Becoming. 
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3.3 Nietzsche, Becoming and Historicism 
ln this section, 1 will look at how Nietzsche approaches the problem of history and 
historicism. To do so, 1 will confront Nietzsche's theses about history with Gadamer's. 1 
think this is worthwhile endeavor becallse Gadamer's Trulh and Melhod has made 
decisive contributions to the understanding of historicism and history in general. But 
how does this relate to the main thesis of my dissertation, namely that Nietzsche removes 
teleology l'rom within Becoming? 1 will show in this section that by removing teleology 
l'rom within Becoming, Nietzsche also removes teleology l'rom within history. Nietzsche 
achieves this by providing a genealogical and genetic account of history that rejects the 
idea of history as an essential process or essentialized Becoming. Nietzsche, and this 
constitutes his originality with respect to Hegel (and perhaps with respect to Gadamer as 
weil, for whom the historical horizons are lIltimately dialectically sllbsllmed into a 
unified, essential horizon), removes the le/os of reason l'rom within history. 
lt is Gadamer's thesis that Nietzsche's philosophy did not grow up on the soil 01' 
G Id 1· h" G h'" 283 N' h d' Jerman ea Ism as mue as 111 reaetIOn to erman Istonelsm. letzsc e Iseusses 
historicism in his famous Second Unlime/y Medilalion (Zweile Unzeilgemâssene 
Be/rach/ung). There, Nietzsche identifies history and the study of history as an illness 
that prevents man l'rom acting. Action is opposed to knowledge as in l-lamlet's classical 
dilemma. 284 To know the state and true nature ofBeing entails being opposed to the 
action that is assoeiated with Beeoming. As Nietzsche puts it in the Birth ofTragedy: 
ln diesem Sinne hat der dionysiehe Menseh Ahnlichkeit mit 
Hamlet: beide haben einmal einen wahren Bliek in das Wesen der 
Dinge gethan, sie haben erkann/, und es ekelt sie zu handeln; denn 
ihre l-landlllng kann niehts am ewigen Wesen der Dinge andern, sie 
èB.1 See rootnote 229 in Wahrheit und Methode, p.130. 
28-1 "Thus conscience does make cowards or us ail; and thus the native hue or rcsolution is sick 1 ied 0' er with 
the pale cast ofthought; And enterpriscs orgreat pith and moment, With this regard, their currents turn 
awry, And lose the name or action." Shakespeare, W., Hamlet, Prince of Den mark, Act 111, Scene 1. 
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empfinden es ais lacherlich, dass ihnen zugemuthet wird, die Welt, 
die aus den Fugen ist, wieder einzurichten. Die Erkenntnis tadet 
das Handeln ... 2X3 
History and knowledge of history are opposed to action because in order to act, man has 
to forget. Essential to acting is an ability to forget one's past. Nietzsche describes in this 
way a man who would have lost the ability to forget: 
Denkt euch das aüsserste Beispiel, einen Menschen, der die Kraft 
zu vergessen gar nicht besasse, der verurthei It ware, überall ein 
Werden zu sehen: ein Solcher glaubt nicht mehr an sein eigenes 
Sein, glaubt nicht mehr an sich,sieht alles in bewegte Punkte 
auseinander tliessen und verliert sich in diescm Strome des 
Werdens ... 2X6 
For Nietzsche, acting is a projection onto Becoming and Becoming in its turn 
represents the immediacy of the moment as opposed to the sediments ofhistorical Seing. 
ln order to project oneself onto Becoming, one must forget his pa st and the weight with 
which the pa st bears down, on the present and throw himself into the present moment. 
The problem of historicism is related to the awareness that we have of being 
historical beings through and through. The two extreme positions of Dilthey and 
Nietzsche can be contrasted when trying to understand history. Diltheyapproached 
history through his concept of Verslehen. History would have to be understood according 
to Dilthey as the expression of a lived interiOl·ity. This 'expression' as given in the 
hermeneutic of Verslehen is to be contrasted to what Di Ithey ca1ls Erkldren and that 
represents the mode of understanding that is dominant in the natural sciences. 
Ultimately however, Dilthey l'ails back on an objectivistic understanding of both 
history and the human sciences. This understanding tends to eliminate the radical 
historicity that characterizes the hermeneutical experience of history. The problem or 
history is reduced by Dilthey to the search for a method of objectification or the 
understanding of history. Nietzsche's generalized perspectivism can be contrasted to 
285 cr, 7, (KSA l,56-57). 
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Dilthey's positivism. Thus, this perspectivism is understood in relation to the probJem 01' 
historicism. The aporia or contradiction generated by the problem 01' historicism can be 
expressed as follows. Human beings are aware that they are historical and that they live 
in dil'ferent historical epochs. But the understanding ol'dilTerent historical epochs can 
only be achieved through the deforming Jens of our own present epoch. This means that 
wc can have no objective understanding orpast historical epochs, since we only perceive 
them through the lens or our present. Put this way, historicism can be understood to lead 
to relativism. The dilemma can also be put otherwise. We are historical beings, therefore 
wc inhabit a particular historical epoch but, in virtue of inhabiting that particular 
historical epoch, we have no access to the past epochs that are constitutive of our 
historicity. 
Another important way of putting the problem 01' historicism is related to 
Nietzsche and the perspectivism that characterizes his philosophy. Each historical epoch 
alTords a perspective on the past, but there is no objective standpoint l'rom which to 
reconcilc aIl perspectives and gain an objective view or history. It is important to see that 
Nietzsche's view ofhistory is consistent with his skepticism vis-à-vis metaphysical truth. 
For Nietzsche there is no truth but only interpretations. Infinity is for Nietzsche the 
infinite play or interpretations. Becoming is shot through not with truth but with 
interpretation. So Nietzsche's position in relation to history is comparble to his position 
in relation to traditional metaphysics. 
I-listory is presented as Becoming in the last great attempt to understand it 
philosophically which is represented by ]-Icgel's Idealism. But I-IegeJ's Becoming is 
understood as processuality, development and teleological movement. Nietzsche 
èH6 ln, 1 (KSA l, 250). 
r 
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probably has Hegel in mind when he writes in the Second Untimely Meditation about the 
historical man: 
Wir wollen sie die historischen Menschen nennen; der Blick in die 
Vergangenheit drangt sie zur Zukunft hi n, feuert ihren Muth an, es 
noch langer mit dem Leben aufzunehmen, entzündet die Hoffnung, 
dass das Rechte noch komme, dass das Glück hinter dem Berge 
sitze, auf den sie zuschreiten. Diese historischen Menschen 
glauben, dass der Sinn des Daseins im VerlauCe eines Prozesses 
immer mehr an Licht kommen werde, sie schauen nur deshalb 
rückwarts, um an der Betrachtung des bisherigen Prozesses die 
Gegenwart zu verstehen und die Zukunft heftiger begehren zu 
1crnen; sie wissen gar nicht wie unhistorisch sie trotz aller ihrer 
Historie denken und handeln, und wie auch ihre Beschaftigung mit 
der Geschichte nicht im Dienste der reinen Erkenntnis sondern des 
Lebens steht. 287 
A look at Nietzsche's and I-Iegel's philosophies shows c1early that history cornes 
down to the old metaphysical problem of Being and Becoming. History is not possible 
without the movement of Becoming, but there are sediments, there are necessities: the 
tlow of Becoming is constantified in Seing. The place where the dia1cctical play oC 
Being and Becoming occurs is precisely this I-listory that we have been, that we have 
become, and 1hat we do not cease to become. 
For Nietzsche, history is archaic, critical or monumental but it is also 
genealogica1. Genealogy consists in the study of origins. The origin or history is not 
hypostasized but studied concretely in terms of its natural origins. The strugg1c between 
the master and the slave moralities is to a certain extent the motor or history. The 
problem is that there is more than one motor ofhistory. To want to understand history 
solely in terms of a larger, essential process that occurs within it is already to distort 
history for Nietzsche. Another possible motor ofhistory could be nihilism as Heidegger 
has claimed. But the problem with this description or nihilism is that it is part of the 
I-leideggerian strategy which consists in claiming that Nietzsche merely inverts the 
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progress and actualization of freedom in history that is characteristic ofHegel's Idealism 
by proposing a negative development that may be called the history of nihilism. This 
Heideggerian strategy is ultimately unsatsifactory and untenable. 
Historicism leads to contradiction and paradox. Contradiction plays a central role 
in Nietzsche's philosophy whether in relation to his understanding ofhistory or not. 
Nietzsche inteprets contradiction as the real that ironizes itself by showing itself and 
hiding itself simultaneously. In this way, contradiction functions di lïèrently in 
Nietzsche's philosophy than in I-Jegel's. For Hegel, contradiction is the seriousness orthe 
labor of the concept. It is the motor that propels history forward. For Nietzsche there is 
no forward movement, no absolute progress of reason and freedom in History. Every time 
we become aware of a progress, this progress eludes us in a way that is both ironical and 
tragic. 
Some have argued that the paradoxy that characterizes historicism !eads to its 
selr-destruction. The problem with historicism is that even though it recognizes the 
organicity ofhistoricity it still attempts to find a perfectly objective grounding for its 
understanding of the past. The question of historicism can be reformulated as the 
question or whether history elevates a claim to truth. For Nietzsche, the question is 
whether history can serve life. We sec here, prefigured, a theme that is Camiliar for 
Nietzsche: the greater importance of life and the value of an evaluation l'or life than of 
truth. Thus, Nietzsche's pragmatism and naturalism is present in his analyses of history. 
History is for Nietzsche the history ormond values. 
Nietzsche does not explicitly apply the concept of force to his understanding of 
history but the translation of this concept into the realm of history is perhaps appropriate. 
lt is probable that Nietzsche's lisage of the concept of play of forces is owed to Fechner 
"H7/-1L, l, (KSA /,255). 
228 
(Elemente der Psychophysik) or to Büchner (Krafi und Staff). ln this sense, Nietzsche is 
thinking of forces as physiological and physical entities that have a material application. 
But the play of forces is also what constitutes the essence ofwill to power and in this . 
sense these forces can be taken as a metaphysical substrate as weil as a material one. 
Heidegger's reluctance to explain will to power in terms of the play of forces might 
indicate his awareness of the materialistic implications of such a concept. 
But in Ranke's and Hegel's explanations ofhistory, forces are c1early understood 
as spiritual and metaphysical entities. In Hegel force is related to its exteriorization. This 
exteriorization is in turn related to interiorization. Hegel shows that this play of 
exteriorization and interiorization that is the essence of sel f-consciollsness can be 
sllbsllmed under the concept or lire. Interiorization (Er-innerung) is given priority in this 
description of self-consciousness and life, but the rclationship between exteriorization 
and interiorization is neverthe1ess dialectical. 
For Nietzsche also, life is related to force but Nietzsche's analysis of force does 
not lead to a dia1ectic 01' life. The interiorization 01' force that is the essence of life for 
Hegel is deconstructed by Nietzsche. The interior interiorization and the exterior 
exteriorization of force cannot be seized dialectically. Rather, the essence of force 
precedes and destroys the still metaphysical opposition between interior and exterior, 
between inside and olltside. I-listory is understood in historicism as something that hélS 
meaning and that makes sense. There is a lInity, a continllity, and a necessity of history. 
For Nietzsche, these three grounding concepts of the unit y, continuity and necessity of 
history have become prob1ematical. I-listoricisill is polemicized in Nietzsche's Second 
Untimely Meditation. At t~e same time it may be argued that Nietzsche is himselfstill 
intluenced by historicism in that Meditation. It is 110t lIntil Nietzsche reaches his more 
mature concept of history in texts such as Human, All-too-Human and in the Genealogy 
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of Marals that Nietzsche may be said to have freed himself from the aporias of 
historicism. The basic problem ofhistoricism consists for Nietzsche in the relationship 
between history and lire. If history is bound to serve lire, it must not create mere scholars 
and scientists of the historical proccss. I-listory must educate man to be [ully himselfand 
to be both a man of action and a contemplative being. Historyand li fe must be both 
intertwined in a dynamic interaction. 
Ha'ns-Georg Gadamer has been an acute scholar of historicism. It has been 
argued that he was both one of the last representatives orhistoricism as weil as a great 
polemicist against historicism. For these reasons, a comparison between the theses of 
Nietzsche and Gadamer concerning history is appropriate here. The main difference 
between Gadamer' s understanding of history and Nietzsche' s may be seen when we 
examine what fundamentally characterizes Gadamer's hermeneuticaI. project: the 
historical conscience and conscience of the history of efficiency (wirkunggeschichtliches 
Bewusstsein). The appearance of the historical conscience is deemed by Gadamer to be 
the most important development that has occurred in the last centuries of Western history. 
As he writes in the introduction to Truth and Method: 
So folgenschwer und bis auf den Grllnd gehend die Umformungen 
des abendlandischen philosophischen Denkens auch gewesen sind, 
die mit der Latinisierung der griechischen Begriffe und der 
Einformung der lateinischen Begriffssprache in die nelleren 
Sprachen vor sich gingen - die Entstehllng des geschichtlichen 
Bewllsstseins in den letzten Jahrhunderten bedeutet ein Einschnitt 
von noch tieferer Art. 288 
The historical conscience is formed first of al 1 with the appearance of the historical 
school in Germany. The works or Droysen and Ranke are representative in this regard. 
But the historical conscience does not gct t'ully developed until the emergence or Dilthey. 
288 Gadamer, H.-G., op.cil., XXX/XXXI. 
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Dilthey sought to ground the problem of historicity by providing it with an 
epistemological foundation. In this way he criticized the projcct of the historical schoo1. 
As Dilthey wrote: 
Anstatt in die erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzungen der 
historischen Schule und die des Idealismus von Kant bis Hegel 
zurückzugehen und so die Unvereinbarkeit dieser Voraussetzun~en 
zu erkennen, haben sie diese Standpunkte unkritisch verbunden. 89 
Dilthey's analyzes rest on a concept of liCe understood as inner expression. Life is 
conceptualized as a unit y that exteriorizes itself according to Dilthey. This formulation is 
very close to that of Hegel, as Gadamer notes. 
In order to continue the comparison between Gadamer's and Nietzsche's theses 
concerning history, it is useflll to look at how Gadamer understands the contributions of 
Ranke and Droysen to the understanding of history. The problem of the historical 
conscience must remain our guiding thread when trying to establish a basis of comparison 
between Nietzsche and Gadamer. Gadamer notes Ranke's admiration for "constants", 
but he comments that Ranke did not possess an accurate understanding of the historical 
conscience. In accordance with his famous claim that there is more Sein th an 
Bewussfsein in the Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein, Gadamer puts more emphasis 
on the historical process than on the awareness that we as finite consciousnesses can 
develop of it. In this sense he writes: 
Dass die Weltgeschichte in kontinuerlicher Entwicklung diese 
abendlandische Kulturwelt heraufgeführt hat, ist abermals keine 
blosse Erfahrungstatsache, die das historische Bewusstsein 
feststeJJt, sondern eine Bedingung des historischen Bewusstseins 
290 
selber ... 
The meaning ofhistory or the possibility of the question ofthis meaning is raised 
2Hl) Dilthey, W., Gesammelte Schrifien VII, 281, quoted by Gadamer on p.223 orthe German edition of 
hl/th and Method, 3 erweiterte Aunage, Tübingen, Mohr, 1972. 
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by the constance and the continuity of the evolution of the historical world process and 
not by an experience that is undergone by the historical conscience. Gadamer's thesis is 
strong insofar as he affirms a unit y ofhistory of the world: "Insofern ist es nicht beliebig, 
dass die Einheit der Weltgeschichte auf der Einheit der abendUindischen Kulturwelt 
beruht, zu der die abendUindische Wissenschaft im ganzen und die Geschichte ais 
Wissenschaft im besonderen gehoren.,,29 1 We thus see that a unit y of the history of the 
world is envisaged by Gadamer and that this unit y rests on the fact that Western science 
and history as science can be deemed to be part of the unit y of the Western cultural 
world. 
For Nietzsche history is not conceived as science, rather Nietzsche argues with 
such an understanding of history as science. In the Second Untimely Meditation, history 
is conceived in relation to art and as edification i.e., as the right kind of education that can 
lead to the fonnation of men of action (Polybius). History is conceived by Nietzsche 
esthetically in the early writings as a consoling power. An understanding ofhistory is 
developed organically by absorbing the many historical documents. I-Iistory and the 
understanding of history are conceived on the model of a Kunsllehre. An artistic tact and 
not a rigorous method is what allows one to move through and understand the 
multi !àceted aspects of history. 
Gianni Vattimo makes an interesting point with respect to Nietzsche's relation to 
historicism in his 1974 book of essays Il sogello el la maschera.292 His comments are 
use fuI, since he approaches Nietzsche from a "linguistic-hermeneutic" perspective, 
precisely in the footsteps of Gadamer. Vattimo argues that there is a dialectical-
290 Gadamer, H.-G., op. Cil. , p.212. 
291 Ibidem, p.213. 
292 Vattimo, G., /1 sogetto e la l71aschera, Nietzsche e il problel71a della liberazio/Je, pp.78-79, Mi lano, 
Bompiani, 1974. This thcsis permeates all of Il sogetto e la maschera, but the cssay Mctalisica c 
smaschcramento in Il soggetto e la maschera, pp.71-93, is particularly relcvant for this thcme. 
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phenomenological (in Hegel's sense) moment to Nietzsche's philosophy. For Vattimo, 
these dialectical-phenomenological elements are only l'ully overcome in Nietzsche's 
mature work Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Vattimo sees a parallelism between the 
developments of Nietzsche and Hegel regarding their understanding of the history of the 
West. 
In relation to this Western history, in the Second Untimely Meditation. Nietzsche 
delines culture as "the stylistic unit y of the artistic expressions ora people". This unit y 
alluded to by Nietzsche is present throughout the Second Untimely Meditation. Nietzsche 
identifies the dichotomy between substance and form, between inner and outer as the 
problem that affects modern culture. One needs to distinguish Nietzsche's classicism 
l'rom that of Hegel's as it is most clearly expressed in his Lectures 0/1 Aesthetics. Hegel 
still operates with the balance between form and content, Seing and appcarance that is 
characteristic of ancient Greek culture. In Nietzsche, there is a tragic rupture between 
Being and appearance, between form and substance. In the early writings, and this 
includes the Second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche still experiences the loss of balance 
between form and substance as a tragic rupture and a problem. 
Historicism can be understood as the effacement of a present culture in the face of 
the past cultures that constitute its history. In this sense, the Second Untime/y Meditation 
has a historicist moment. The monumental aspect ofhistory described by Nietzsche 
presents the danger of leading to an overvaluation of the past with respect to the present. 
There are also Hegelian-dialectical accents to the Second Untimely Meditation with its 
insistence on a German spiritual unity. Nietzsche, although differing l'rom Hegel, is also 
a classicist insofar as he takes antiguity and more precisely the tragic age preceding Attic 
classicism as a model that can educate and criticize the present. 
233 
Nietzsche is influenced by Schopenhauer in his rejection of j-Iegel's thesis of the 
idcntity between Being and appearance. This dichotomy between Seing and appearance 
pushes Nietzsche to reject classicism and the idea of antiquity as a model. For Hegel, 
antiquity is classical insofar as it consists in a perfect coincidence between inner and 
outer, essence and manifestation, thing in itself and phenomenon. For Nietzsche, 
l'ollowing Schopenhauer, the classical consists in the powerlessness to achieve the 
balance, unit y and identity between inner and outer, essence and manifestation. As 
Gianni Vattimo has pointed out, classicism is not simply rejected by Nietzsche when he 
Comes into contact with Schopenhauer, it is reinterpreted as "a specific form of mask". 
Thus, antiquity still functions as a model in Nietzsche, albeit as a model characterized by 
rupture and imbalance. 
A question that needs to be answered is whether Nietzsche and Gadamer Cunction 
with the same concept of historicism. For Gadamer, historicism consists in the fact that 
we believe we can full y abstract from our present epoch and transpose ourselves into a 
past epoch (by "co-geniality" as in Schleiermacher's understanding of herl11eneutics). As 
Gadal11er puts it: 
Das war vie lmehr die naïve Voraussetzung des 
Historismus, dass man sich in den Geist der Zeit versetzen, 
dass man in deren Begriffen und Vorstellungen denken 
solle und nicht in seinen eigenen und auf diese Weise zur 
historischen ObjektiviUit vordringen konne. 293 
For Nietzsche, the problel11 with the stlldy ofhistory is that it methodologically 
attempts to conceive history as scicnce. ln Cact, Gadal11cr is right when he claims that 
Nietzsche is not so mllch opposed to the consciousness or history as he is to conceiving 
history purely as objective science. It is when history is conceived as objective science 
that it becomes detrimental to action and to 1 Ife. 
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In order to compare Nietzsche and Gadamer's concepts ofhistory, we have to 
elucidate Nietzsche's concept ofhistory as it is developed and evolves throughout the 
Nietzschean corpus. Nietzsche's concept ofhistory is differentiated across his oeuvre. 
This has been correctly pointed out by Gianni Vattimo. 294 In the carly period of the 
Second Untimely Meditation and of Human, All-too-Human, history is still conceived 
along phenomenologico-dialectical 1 ines (in Hegel' s usage of the term). In the Second 
Untimely Meditation, the emphasis on the need for a unit y between form and substance, 
between inner and outer is still reminiscent or the l-legelian synthesis. 
In the later writings, history is conceived genealogicaIly and as de cadence or 
nihilism. Heidegger has attempted to show that nihilism conceived historially is the 
inverse of the Hegelian movement of actuaIization of freedom in history. Ultimately this 
[-Ieideggerian move must be seen as untenable and as a purely strategic technique that 
attempts to step beyond the philosophical projects of both these thinkers. But let us 
return to Nietzsche's concept or history. In the Genealogy of'Morals, a genealogical 
concept of history is developed by Nietzsche by referring to the concepts of origin 
(Ursprung, Herkunft and Ents/ehung).295 History, conceived as genealogy, is essentially 
pluralistic. There is no grand narrative of history as in Hegel. Genealogical history 
undermines the possibility ora world-historic, universal History. According to the 
genealogical conception, there is no History, only histories. The unit y that was 
bemoaned by Nietzsche in the Second Untimely Meditation is radically undermined by . 
h 1 · 1 . f' h' 296 t e genea oglca conception o' lstory. 
293 Gadamer, H.-G., op.cit., p.302. 
2~ V' . 79 attlmo, op. CIl. p. . 
295 See Michel 17oucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, I-listory, in Language. Counler-Memory, f'ractice: Selecled 
Essays and Interviews, Translated l'rom the French by Donald F. l30uchard and Sherry Simon, Ithaca, 
N.Y.,Cornell University Press, 1977. 
296 fiL, 4, (KSA 1, p.278). 
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Genealogical history functions by analyzing the hidden, protracted roots of a 
historical phenomenon. It seeks what lays dormant and what is covered over as the origin 
of the manifestation of the historical phenomenon. A historical phenomenon is explained 
in the German historical school as being the function of a unit y and continuity of the 
Western world that manifests itself in history. For genealogical thought the origin of a 
historical phenomenon is neither manifest nor unitary. A genealogical account of history 
consists in a genetic account of an event that al ways seeks a plural and pluri-shaped 
ongm. 
ln the Genealogy of Marals, Nietzsche eoneeptualized history as the struggle 
between the slave and the master moralities. This ean be seen as a covert polemic with 
Hegel roI' whom the master-slave dialectic constitutes a fundamental figure in the 
architectonie of the Phenomenology o/,Spirif. For Hegel, il is ultimately the slave that 
wins the struggle for recognition because by laboring and staying in touch with the earth, 
he becomes more nalural than the master. For Nietzsche, the master is more active, as 
opposed to the slave who is deemed to be reactive. Nietzsche and Hegel both agree that 
the history of the West must be understood in terms of the struggle between the master 
and the slave figures and moralities. But their visions ofthis history are fundamentally al 
odds. The struggle between the master and the slave moralities can be re-translated, for 
Nietzsche at least, and in the Genealogy, as the struggle between Rome (master) and 
Judea (slave). For Nietzsche, the relationship between the master and slave moralities 
does dctermine thc history of the West fundamcntalll 97 , but this determination is not 
conceptualized through a dialectic of recognition. The master does not need the 
recognition of the slave, he does not desire the desire of the slave in order to be 
297 This is implicit in Nietzsche's theses about the master and slave moralities that are developed in the tirst 
essay of On a Genea/ogy of MoraIs. 
236 
essentially that which he is: active. Rather the being-active of the master is not defined in 
terms of a consciousness that opposes him and against which this master must risk his 
own life. The master is free and active because he does not possess the moral conscience 
of the slave that determines the slave's essential reactivity. 
1 will now turn to an cxamination ol'Gadamer's concept ofhistory in order to be 
able to establish a comparison with Nietzsche's concept ofhistory. Gadamer conceives 
of history as a fusion of horizons; the concept of horizon that had already had a certain 
valence in the works of Nietzsche and Husserl. The horizon is what surrounds us and 
beyond which we cannot sec. Il is in virtue ofbeing surrounded by a horizon that we are 
historical and perceiving beings. Gadamer recognizes his debt towards Husserl and 
N· h h . h l' 1 . 298 letzsc e w en lt cornes to t e concept 0 10nzon. 
The relation to Nietzsche is more implicit than the one that links Gadamer to 
Husserl. Thus Gadamer will write: 
Es ist keine richtige l3eschreibung des historÎschen BewLlsstseins, 
wenn man mit Nietzsche von den vielen wcchselnden Horizonten 
spricht, in die es sich zu versetzen lehrt. Wer dcrart von sich selber 
wegsieht, hat gerade keinen historischen Horizont, und Nietzsches 
Aufweis des Nachteils der Historie für das Leben trifft in Wahrheit 
nicht das historische Be\\'1lsstsein ais so1ches, sondern, die 
Selbstentfremdung, die ihm widerHihrt, wenn es die Methodik der 
moderncn historischcn Wissenschaft fUr sein eigentliches Wesen 
halt.299 
ln the Problem olthe !-Iis/orlcal Conscience, Gadamer defines the historical conscience 
in this way: "Nous comprenons par conscience historique le privilège de l'homme 
moderne d'avoir pleinement conscience de ) 'historicité de tout présent et de la relativité 
de toutes les opinions.,,30o 
298 Ibidem, p. 307. 
Z9l) Idem. p. 310. 
JOO Gadamer, H I.e problème de la conscience hi.l'lOrique. 1&uroblèmcs épistémologigues des scienccs 
~.!.!""-"~, Publications Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain, 1963, p.S. 
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There is thus a decisive tension between Nietzsche's vision and Gadamer's. 
Nietzsche writes: 
.Je starkere Wurzeln die innerste Natur eines Menschen hat, um so 
mehr wird er auch von der Vergangenheit sich aneignen oder 
anzwingen; und dachte man sich die machtigste und ungeheureste 
Natur, so ware sie daran zu erkennen, dass es für sie gar keine 
Grenze der historischen Sinnes geben würde, an der er 
überwuchernd und schüdlich zu wirken vermüchte; alles 
Vergangene, eigenes und fremdestes, würde sie an sich heran, in 
sich hineinziehen und gleichsam zu Blut umschaffen. Das was 
eine solche Natur nicht bezwingt, weiss sic zu vergessen; cs ist 
nicht mehr da, der Horizont ist geschlossen, ... Und dies ist ein 
allgemeines Gesetz: jedes Lebendige kann nur innerhalb eines 
Horizontes gesund, stark und fruchtbar werden; ist es 
unvermbgend einen Horizont um sich zu zichen und zu selbstisch 
wiederum, innerhalb eines fremden den eigenen 131ick 
einzuschliessen, so siecht es matt oder überhastig zu zeitigen 
Untergange dahin." 301 
The tension between Gadamer's vision and that of Nietzsche lies in the f'act that 
for Gadamer, contra Nietzsche, the fact that the lines of horizon move and displace 
themselves is something positive. Furthermore, for Gadamer, the horizon that surrounds 
us and cannot be fully closed, as is the case sometillles lor Nietzsche, but must always 
retain a certain mobility and porosity. Thus Gadamer ho Ids that the possibility of a 
completely closed horizon is an abstraction of the historical conscience. 
There arc traces of a dialectic in Gadamer's concept of history. This dialectic is 
subtle and it can be argued that, for Gadalller, history is conceived not so much 
dialectically as dialogically. The horizons that constitute our human historicity are in 
constant movement and, in fact, Gadamer claims that we are carried by a single, unique 
historical horizon. Thus, ultimately 10r Gadamer there is something like an ontological 
unit y and conti nuit y of history. This affirmation must be Illoderated of course. There is a 
tension between the second and third parts of l'ruth and Method. The second part of 
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Trulh and Melhod places a lot more emphasis on the determination ofhuman 
consciousness by history. We are, in virtue of being human and al ive, inescapably 
determined by our historical nature. There is a unit y ofhistory that is affirmed by 
Gadamer in the elaboration of his concept of history of efficiency (Wirkungsgeschichle). 
But this unit y ofhistory is also dialectical and dialogical. There is a unique, unitary 
horizon that dialectically determines our historical being. J-Jowever this unique horizon is 
made up of a plurality of horizons that can "speak" to each other across the Ilow oftime 
and history. The historical horizons are co-extensively linguistic horizons. The historical 
horizons self-mediate and sublate each other and this occurs dialcctically. But, as has 
been pointed out, the dialectic is for Gadamer, primordially dialogue. Through his 
notion of dialogue, Gadamer introduces a nexibility in his concept of history that 
prevents it 1'rom being simply reduced to the views ofI-Iegel or of the German historical 
school. With respect to Nietzsche, however, Gadamer's concept of history lacks the 
genetic and genealogical aspect. There is still a sense in Gadamer that there is one 
History that deploys itselfthrough a unitary horizon that reveals itselfto humanity. This 
notion is thoroughJy given up in Nietzsche. 
As alluded to above, there is no History for Nietzsche but there are histories. For 
Gadamer, there is still something like a lelos of history as the horizons sublate and 
imbricate themselves into a unique horizon that essentially reveals itselfto humanity. 
This is the case even though there is a dialogue between the horizons and between the 
interpreter and the tradition. History still possesses its lelos in the understanding in 
Gadamer and in the elevation of a truth claim. By comparison for Nietzsche, history has 
to be operationalized and made useful for life. History for Nietzsche is radically plural, 
genealogical and genetical and this differentiates him importantly from Gadamer. 
JOI KSA /, p.251. 
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The problem of the c10sure and opcnness of horizons must be related to the 
Gadamerian notion ofhistorical consciousness. Historical consciousness "replaces itself" 
(si ch versetzt) in the pa st historical horizons, but this (re)placement is at the same time an 
elevation to the universal that overcomes the particularity of the historical conscience at 
the same time as it overcomes the particularity orthe sublated horizon. This reading of 
the fusion of horizons goes in the direction of a possible liquidation ofhistoricism rather 
than ils accomplishment in the Gadamerian hermeneutic, and is not without controversy. 
Of course, Gadamer's position with respect to the historical consciousness is essentially 
ambiguous. On the one hand, he believes that this consciousness represents a recent and 
radical development of Western history. Elsewhere, Gadamer asks himself i f the 
h· . 1 . . . 'd 1 1 d" 1 f 302 Istonca consclousness IS not a utOplC 1 ea t lat contra IctS Itse. 
30è Idem. p. 235. 
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Conclusion 
We have argued in this section that Nietzsche's elimination ofteleology from 
within Becoming and this entails that he also eliminates purpose from within history. 
Nietzsche provides a genealogical and genetical account ofhistory. He pluralizes the 
essentialized concept of history that is present in Hegel (and this essentialized concept of 
history is the one that Gadamer still uses). The elimination of a rational te/os from 
history can be understood in terms ofNietzsche's naturalism and pragmatism. The 
Second Untime/y Meditation is still operating to a certain extent with a historicist concept 
of history with its great emphasis on a historical consciousness. It is only with 
Zarathustra and the Genealagy of Marals and that Nietzsche evolves beyond historicism. 
The conscience of history is re-worked in the Genealagy as the tension between slave and 
master moralities. Through this move, Nietzsche goes beyond Hegel's mere integration of 
the master-slave dialectic into the movement of consciousness and self.-consciousness. By 
re-conceptualizing the relationship between slave and master moralities in terms orthe 
concepts of reactive (slave) and active (master), Nietzsche advances beyond the merely 
dialectical conception of history that Hegel possesses. This is the case because for Hegel 
history embodies a purposive, unitary te/os whereas as 1 am arguing throughout this 
thesis, Nietzsche climinates teleology J'rom within Becoming (and thus l'rom history). 
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3.4 Nietzsche, Epistemology and Becoming 
Nietzsche eliminates teleology From Becoming and this is due in part to his 
"naturalism". The concept of rational and natural teleology which was still prevalent in 
I-Iegel's logical Idealism, came under severe criticism with the appearance ofDarwin's 
Origin ofSpecies. The idea ofa purpose in nature, ofa divine Providence and design 
came under fire with the proposai of the hypothesis of natural selection. lt is not cJear 
however that by eliminating ultimate purpose From nature, Nietzsche has clearly 
understood Aristotle's doctrine of Becoming, which is at once physical and metaphysical. 
To remove teleology From nature is one thing but to remove it from Becoming is another. 
Becoming is a central concept in Nietzsche and in modern philosophy in general since it 
mediates between History and nature. ln Aristotle, Becoming explains how an entity 
called substance can sulTer the existence of different attributes at different times. But for 
us modems, Becoming also has a historical component. This is the case in Hegel where 
Becoming is understood rationally as the self-development and self-actualization of the 
Idea in History. For Nietzsche it is this type of discourse about History that treats it as an 
over-arching principle and teleological process that has become impossible to preserve. 
Teleology is removed by Nietzsche from within nature and From within !--[istory, from an 
epistemological and a metaphysical point ofview. 
In the elimination ofteleology From within Becoming, what has to be 
distinguished is the existence of an objective teleology and a subjective teleology. It 
might be the case that Nietzsche reduces the objective teleology to a subjective teleology 
through his concept of will to power. On this reading, the "objective" teleology would be 
a mere side-effect of will to power. But there might remain a subjective teleology that 
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cannot be l'ully dispensed with, even in the face of the "factuality" ofwill to power. The 
question that needs to be answered is what this subjective teleology might be. 
The influence ofnaturalism on Nietzsche can scarcely be minimized. His 
epistemology is naturalistic through and through. T will show this by examining some of 
the posthumous fragments that had been grouped under the title the Wifllo Power as 
Knowledge (Wille zur Macht ais Erkenntn;!)). An important fragment is the following: 
Der Intellekt kann sich nicht selbst kritisiren, eben weil er nicht zu 
verglcichen ist mit andersgearteten Intellekten und weil sein 
Vermogen zu erkennen erst Angesichts der "wahren Wirklichkeit" 
zu Tage treten würde d.h. weil, um den Intellekt zu kritisiren, wir 
ein hoheres Wesen mit "absoluter Erkenntniss" sein müssten. Dies 
setzte schon voraus, dass es, abseits von allen perspektivischen 
Arten der Betrachtung und sinnlich-geistiger Aneignung, etwas 
gabe, ein "An-sich"-Aber die psychologische ableitung des 
G1aubens an Dinge verbietet uns von "Dingen an sich" zu reden. 303 
This idea of the intellect as an instrument that supposes erroneously that it could criticize 
itself is an obvious reference to the Critique af'Pure Reason, in which Kant claimed that 
reason could, by restricting its scope, criticize itselfand establish itselfon a sound and 
coherent footing. This idea of knowledge as instrument is repeated by Hegel in the 
Introduction to his Phenomenology of' Spirit when he claims that the absolute is like a 
bird that could be captured by the instrument represented by knowledge. But Hegel 
refuses to [ol1ow Kant's way ofputting the problem l'rom an epistemlogical perspective 
and he is followed in this by Nietzsche. 30l1 
However, Nietzsche takes a different tack than Hegel as the f'ollowing citation 
shows: 
,rD KSA 12, 5 ri 1]. 
Dass zwischen Subjekt und Objekt eine Art adtiquater Relation 
stattfinde; dass das Objekt etwas ist, das von Innen gesehen 
30·1 See Habermas, 1., l~rkenl7lnis und Inleresse, 12, Nietzsche's Reduktion der menschlichen Interesse. 
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Subjekt ware, ist eine gutmüthige Erfindung, die, wie ich denke, 
ihre Zeit gehabt hat. Das Maass dessen, was uns überhaupt 
bewusst [wird], ist ja ganz und gar abhangig von grober 
Nützlichkeit des Bewusstwerdens: wie erlaubte uns diese 
Winkelperspektive des Bewusstseins irgendwie über "Subjekt" und 
"Objekt" Aussagen, mit denen die Realitat berührt würde!"JO:i 
Here, Nietzsche refers to the analysis in the Phenamenalogy afSpirit, in which 
consciousness of the object becomes self-consciousness through a movement of 
interiorization and reflexion. Hegel's brilliant analysis is relativized by Nietzsche 
through the problematization or the concepts of "consciousness" and "becoming-
conscious". Both the subject and the object, both consciousness and sel f-consciousness 
are epi-phenomenal for Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, we do not have privileged access to 
our inner sense. The inner sense is j ust as problematical for Nietzsche as the outer sense. 
Thus, Nietzsche eliminates from within post-Hegelian epistemology what remains of 
Cartesian certainty. For Nietzsche, wc cannot have certainty about our inner sense sincc 
the lastfacfum that can be reached is will to power. We ourse Ives are will to power and 
so is ail reality that surrounds us. With respect to this discussion, Giorgio Colli has 
attracted attention to an important fragment in Nietzschc's Nachlass: "Exoteriseh-
esotcriseh/l.-alles ist Wille gegen Willen 2 Es giebt gar kcinen Willen/ 1 Causalismus 2 
1_, . b . h . U hW' k .. JOIi ::s glc t me ts wle rsac e- Ir ung ... --
Nietzsche also mentions this distietion of an exoteric meaning and an esoterie 
meaning in his published writings. 307 I-Iow should we understand this relationship 
between estoric and exoterie teachings in Nietzsche's thought ? The exoterie is generally 
understood as a public teaehing directed outwards, towards everyone. The esoterie, on the 
305 KSA 13, Il [120]. 
306 KSA 12, 1 [9]. 
307 See Nietzsche, F., Beyond Good and Evil, Section 30, Translated by R.J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 
London, 1973. 
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other hand is understood as a secret teaching that destined to the fèw, to a secret elite that 
can l'ully cOl11prehend the teaching. While Nietzsche himselfalludes to this distinction in 
his thought, [ believe that it is ultimately not so fruitful to distinguish between a public 
teaching and a private, secret teaching in Nietzsche's thought. I believe this to be the 
case because, even though Nietzsche might have thought that he was operating in this 
way, by attracting the masses to his teaching through the exoteric and teaching the elites 
something altogelher different through the esoteric, this self-interpretation ofNietzschc's 
does not stand to scrutiny. Philosophy distinguishes itsel frrom mysticisl11 by positing 
itselfas a public and scientific endeavor. lfwe are to read Nietzsche seriously as a 
philosopher we must abandon the conception of a "secret" teaching. 308 
Ail of the Nietzschean corpus is open to scientific scrutiny and this can only mean 
that the distinction between the esoteric and exoteric teaching must vanish. This might 
not resolve ail the problems we are faced with when trying to understand what Nietzsche 
tries to articulate with respect to the will. What can it mean that the will does not exist 
and that at the same time ail is will against will? Perhaps what is sim ply meant by 
Nietzsche here is that we cannot regress onto Schopenhauerism and Romanticism. 
l-Iowever, why explain this through the ultimately mysterious difference between exoteric 
teachings and esoteric teachings? Isn't that distinction political whereas Nietzsche's 
objections to Schopenhauer and Romanticism are more aesthetical in naute? 
lJltimately we might not be able to resolve these questions. Nietzsche's thought 
is one that functions by the positing of contradictions and by progressing through 
contradictions as has correctly been identified by Müller-Lauter. We cannot explain the 
contradictions away bec au se Nietzsche's thought struggles at the limits of coherence. ft 
308 The scholar who is crcdited with re-activating the exoteric-esoteric reading is Leo Straus in his 
Persecution and the Art of Writing, albeit for reasons different from intellectual hubris as such. 
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expresses itself in contradictions, and creates tensions through these contradictions but it 
reproduces through these tensions the contradictory nature of existence. How does death 
come From lire and life From death? These are questions whose answers involve us in 
contradictions and perhaps the only way orexplaining the contradictions in Nietzsche's 
thought is by changing the subject and claiming that existence itscll~ is contradictory and a 
thought that is rooted in existence must of necessity contradict itself. 
A consequence ofNietzsche's radical pragmatico-naturalistic epistemology can 
be glossed From the following quote: "Es gibt weder 'Geis!', noch Vernunft, noch 
Denken, no ch Seele, noch Wille, noch Wahrheit: alles Fiktionen die unbrauchbar 
sind.,,309 This can be taken as a purely pragmatic assertion on Nietzsche's side ifwe 
agrec that the preceding concepts '''spirit', reason, thinking, consciousness, soul, will, 
truth" are not experimentally "discoverable" in the world. Another quote that is directly 
related to naturalism is the following. "Anders: das Mass des Erkennenwollens hangt ab 
von des Mass des Wachsens des Willens zur Macht der Art:eine Art ergreift so viel 
R 1'" . b . LI d . . O' h ,,310 '1'1' h ca Ital, um Li cr SIC 1 err zu wer en, UI11 sIe 111 lenst zu ne men Ils quote s ows 
something that 1 argue for later in this section: that the metaphysical elements of 
Nietzsche's thought are intertwined with the epistemological threads ofhis thought. The 
desire for knowledge is tied to the growth of will to power. But as Heidegger has 
successfully showed, Nietzsche constructs a metaphysics of will to power. An important 
question is how this metaphysics of will to power coheres with the naturalistic 
epistemological explanations that also make use of the concept of will to power and of 
Becoming. 
,(1<) KSA /3. 14 r1221. 
JIO KSA /3, 14 [1221. 
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Twill now examine how Heidegger interpreted certains aspects ofNietzsche's 
epistemology with respect to Descartes' epistemology. This makes sense because it 
brings to light the naturalistic and pragmatic elements in Nietzsche's epistemology. 
Heidegger claims that Nietzsche misunderstood Descartes' position and that his 
understanding of truth and subjectivity is still very much indebted to Descartes. The 
nature ofwhat Nietzsche describes as will to power is somehow still related to Descartes' 
positioning of the locus ofknowledge within the subject. Heidegger takes partieular 
, olTense at Nietzsche's c1aim that when individuals engage in logie or speculative 
phi losophy, the concept of substance that is used is derived from the subject-concept and 
not the other way around. "Der Substanzbegriff eine Folge des Subjektbegriffs: nicht 
umgekehrt ! ,,311 
Historieally, the subject has been developed From the Aristotelian concept of 
substance, through a scholastic-Cartesian development. But Nietzsche is articulating 
something about logic, grammar and psychology when he is making substance originate 
in the concept of the subject. 312 Heidegger argues that Nietzsche's notion ofperspectival 
truth only apparently overeomes the traditional notion ol'truth as adequation-
representation. Heidegger's argument is rather obscure at this point. He claims that since 
Nietzsche believes that trulh is a necessary error: "Wahrheit ist die Art von Irrthum, olme 
welche eine bestimmte Art von lebendigen Wesen nicht leben konnte. Ocr Werth für das 
Leben entscheidet zuletzt.,,313 and sinee truth is the foundation of logie, then logic should 
stem from a will to truth. But because Heidegger finds a quote in which Nietzsche claims 
precisely the opposite C[ ... ] die Logik stammt nicht aus dem Willen zur Wahrheit,,314, he 
]11 KSA 12,10 [19]. 
]I~ See Haar, M., La maladie native du langage in Nietzsche et la métaphysique, Gallimard, Paris, 1993. 
m KSA 1 1,34 [253J. 
31 '1 KSA 1 l, 40 [1 3]. 
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believes that he is entitled to claim that Nietzsche's concept oftruth as vital error and 
illusion is based on the traditional concept of truth as adequation of knowledge with 
things and reality. Heidegger gives a pithy summary ofhis understanding ofNietzsche's 
position: "Wenn Nietzsche sagt: der Begriff des "Ich" und damit des "Subjekts" ist eine 
Erfindung der "Logik", dann müsste er die Subjektivitat ais "Illusion" zurückweisen, 
1 wenigstens dort, wo sie aIs Grundwirklichkeit der Metaphysik in Anspruch genommen 
wird."] 15 
It must be understood that Heidegger reads Nietzsche as a hyper-Cartesian. I-Ie 
believes that will to power is the culmination of the metaphysics of subjectivity that 
eternally wills its own will. Although this reading is compelling, it sounds at least 
cOllnter-intllitive when we think that Nietzsche was very suspicioLis of subjectivity and 
consc lOusness. 
But let us return back to our main thesis which is constituted by the cIaim that 
Nietzsche eliminates teleology from within Becoming. One hypothesis that l am working 
with is the following: Nietzsche eliminates teleology From his metaphysical account since 
he believes the lelos to be linked to optimism and to a rationality that has been rendered 
problematic in the wake of Oarwin's account ornatural history. But Nietzsche was not a 
straight-out Oarwinist despite the deep influence of Oarwinism on his thought. Il is clear 
that l'or Nietzsche the intellect is an "instrument" and an "organ" l'or knowledge. And it 
is also clear that sllch an instrument satisfies pragmatic and natural needs. Irthe 
pragmatic and natural necds that determine us, our society and natural environment, were 
difTerent, then so would our organs for knowledge be, according to Nietzsche and our 
knowledge would ultimately be different as weil. As Nietzsche puts it: 
315 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche Il, S.186. 
• 
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Die Art zu kennen und zu erkennen ist sel ber schon unter den 
Existenz-Bedingungen: dabei ist der Schluss, dass es keine anderen 
Intellekt-Arten geben koennte (für uns selber) aIs die, welche uns 
erhalt, eine Übereilung: diese thatsachliche Existenz-Bedingung ist 
vielleicht zufallig und vielleicht keineswegs nothwendig. 316 
Nietzsche shows that the intellect qua will to power must also and predominantly 
work towards the enhancement of a form of life and not only to its preservation as 
Darwin might claim. By seeing this notion of enhancement as the dominant 
characteristic of ail forms of life, Nietzsche radically parts ways with Darwin's 
naturalism. This is the first moment of disagreement of Nietzsche with Darwin: 
enhancement is the fundamental feature of life and not preservation. 
But Nietzsche also disagrees more l'undamentally with Darwin when it comes to 
the process of natural selection.This is the case because for Nietzsche, contra Darwin, it is 
the weak who win the struggle for existence against the strong. This is true because the 
strong are solitary and isolate themselves, whereas the weak unite together and manage to 
destroy the strong. This can be glossed l'ro111 the following quote ['rom Twiligh/ of/he 
Idols in section 14 of Skirmishes of an Untimely Man, ;'Anti-Darwin"; 
Gezetzt aber, es giebt diesen Kampf-und in der That, er kommt 
vor-, so laüft er lei der umgekehrt aus aIs die Schule Darwin's 
wünscht, aIs man vielleicht mit ihr wünschen dürfte: namlich zu 
ungunsten der Starken, der Bevorrichtigten, der glücklichen 
Ausnahmen [ ... ] Die Gattungen wachsen nicht in der 
Vollkommenheit: die Schwachen werden immer über die Starken 
Herr - das macht, sie sind die grosse Zahl, sie sind au ch klüger r ... ] 
The tendency of the weak to congregate and or the. strong to separate or isolate 
themselves from the masses is further explored by Nietzsche in the following paragraph 
of On the Genealogy of MoraIs, he notes that: 
31(, KSA Il,261127]. 
Denn man übersehe die nieht: die Starken streben ebenso 
naturnothwendig auseinander, aIs die Schwachen zu einander; 
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wenn erstere sich verbinden, so geschieht es nur in der Aussicht 
auF eine aggressive Gesammt-Aktion und Gesammt-Befriedigung 
ihres Willens zur Macht, mit vie lem Widerstande des Einzel-
Gewissens; letztere dagegen ordnen sich zusammen, mit Lust 
gerade an dieser Zusammenordnung,-ihr Instinkt ist dabei ebenso 
befriedigt, wie der Instinkt der geborenen "Herren" (das heisst der 
solitaren Raubthier-Species Mensch) im Grunde durch 
Organisation gereizt und unberuhigt wird.J 17 
Thus, although influenced by Darwin in the conception ofhis epistemology with the talk 
of the connection between the "organs of knowledge" and our perception, Nietzsche 
rejects Oarwinisl11 's central tenet of natural section, or rather he inverts il by claiming that 
there is a struggle For existence but that it is, for the most part, won by the weak and not 
the strong. The problem oftruth is connected for Nietzsche to the concept of values. 
Nietzsche "discovers" that the relation between the true and apparent worlds must be 
related back to problems of value: 
die Wer/hschâlzung "ich glaube, dass das und das so ist" ais Wescn 
der "Wahrhcit" in den Werlhschèilzungen drücken sich Erhaltungs-
und Wachstums-Bedingungen élUS aIle unsere Erkenntnisorganc 
und -Sinnc sind nur entwickclt in Hinsicht au!' Erhaltungs und 
Wachstums-Bedingungen das Vertraucn zur Vernunft und ihren 
Kategorien, zur Dialektik, also die Werthschatzung der Logik 
beweist nur die durch Erfahrung bewiesene Nützlichkeit derselben 
für das Leben [ ... ] Also dass etwas mr wahr gehaIten werden 
muss, ist nothwendig; nicht dass etwas wahr ist. "die wahre und 
die scheinbare Weil" - dieser Gegensatz wird von mir 
zurückgemhrt au!' Werthverhal1nissc. Wir haben unsere 
Erhaltungs-J3edingllngen projicirt aIs Pradikate des Seins 
überhalipL dass wir in unserem Glauben stabil sein müssen um 'lU 
gedeihen, daraus haben wir gemacht, dass die "wahre" Welt keine 
wandelbare und werdende, sondern eine seiende ist.318 
The previous citation is important because it establishes the connection 1 noted earlier, 
between Nietzsche's epistemology and his metaphysics. Value is a both a moral and a 
metaphysical concept. But by relating the concept or truth (the das.\' dos und das so Îsl 
and the elwasjlir wahl' halten) to conditions or preservation and growth (Erhallungs und 
317 GM, Dritte Abhandlung, 18, (KSI1 4,384). 
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WachSlums-Bedingungen), Nietzsche in r~\ct both l110ralizes and on/ologizes 
epistemology. 
In fact, it has been my argument that we cannot successfully disconnect 
Nietzsche's epistemology from his metaphysics. As has been correctly identified by 
Heidegger, there are significant metaphysical elements in Nietzsche's thought. 319 These 
metaphysical elements stand side by side with a powerful critique of metaphysics. This is 
what makes Nietzsche's thought so difficult to seize. The skeptical clements in 
Nietzsche's thought stem from his original naturalistic epistemology, but they are 
intertwined with the "positive" metaphysical clements. These positive elements are the 
teachings of the will to power, eternal recurrence, Übermensch and nihilism 
We can say that for Nietzsche, l3ecoming radically conditions knowledge. This 
is the case because Becoming lacks a point of anchorage, a point of stability from within 
which to establish a stable theory of knowledge. This is where the previous quote 
becomes interesting. lt connects the talk of organs of knowledge with the distinction 
bctween the real and apparent worlds. Thus it makes the connection between Nietzsche's 
cpistemology, his theory oftruth, and the rcal and apparent worlds which constitute 
Nietzsche's critique ofmetaphysics. Furthermore, the quote connects Nietzsche's theOl'y 
of values to the epistemology and the metaphysics. In fact, for Nietzsche metaphysics is 
understood as a series of value relations. But the logic and epistemology that are alluded 
to by Nietzsche arc reconstructed l'rom a naturalistic point of view. In the following 
quote Nietzsche re-emphasizes that the categories or reason are conditions of life. Thus, 
hcre again, Nietzsche wants to redirect, knowledge and epistemology to a vitalistic, 
318 KSA /2.9 [38] . 
319 This is a well-known facl. The most obvious reference to it is the fact that Heidegger claims in Nietzsche 
/ (p.362, this is the title ora section) that Nietzsche has a fundamental metaphysical position 
(metaphysische Grundste//ung). 
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naturalistic consideration that reminds us of Darwin. Reason is considered to be a mere 
idiosyncrasy of a species of animal. That is, we only have reason as a feature of our 
species. Ifwe had been a different kind ofspecies we could have existed devoid ofreason 
or we could have existed furnished with a different kind ofreason. This is Nietzsche's 
relativization of epistemology and of knowledge in terms of naturalistic categories: 
Die Kategorien [der Vernunft, P.c.] sind "Wahrheiten" nur in dem 
Sinne, ais sie lebenbedingend für uns sind: wie der Euklidische 
Raum eine so1che bedingte "Wahrheit" ist. (An sich geredet, da 
Niemand die Nothwendigkeit, dass es gerade Menschen giebt, 
aufrecht erhalten wird, ist die Vernunft, so wie der Euklidische 
Raum eine blosse ldiosynkrasie bestimmter Thierarten und eine 
neben vicie anderen ... )320 
The preceding citation is interesting. It is important because like this one it makes 
the connection between the principles of logic (the law or contradiction) and the 
dichotomy that is so central to Nietzsche's thought between the real and apparent worlds. 
If, as Nietzsche claims, the law of contradiction belongs to the apparent world and the 
apparent world disappears as weil when the true world disappears, then, Nietzsche has 
successfully relativized the world of the "in itself' or of logic. Nietzsche's point is 
subtle, the world of Being and of logic possesses pre-suppositions. If the principle of 
non-contradiction is the ultimate principle of logic, Nietzsche proposes that one could 
step behind this ultimacy and consider what the actual pre-suppositions ofthis principlc 
arc. There are then only two possibilities. Either the principle possesses sorne pre-
suppositions and then it is not absolutely necessary: opposite things cou/d be posited of 
the same things at the same time. Or, the principle is really afundamcntum but then it 
conditions a11 the other logical principles that follow from it and in Ihis sense acts like an 
imperative: opposite things shou/d not be posited of the same things at the same time. 
320 KSA /3,14[1521. 
• 
• 
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But if the second consideration is the true one ( and this is what is implied by Nietzsche 
following Aristotle), then we would have to admit that the world ofBeing and oflogic is 
to a certain extent put together by us, constructed by us according to our practical needs: 
Wenn, nach Aristoteles der Satz yom Widerspruch der Gewisseste 
aller Grundsatze ist, wenn er der letzte und unterste ist, auf den aile 
Beweisführung[en] zurückgehen, wenn in ihm das Princip aller 
anderen Axiome liegt: um so strenger sollte man erwagen, was er 
im Grunde schon an Behauptungen voraussetzt. Entweder wird 
mit ihm etwas in Betreff des Wirklichen, Seienden behauptet, wie 
ais ob er dasselbe anderswoher bereits kennte: namlich dass ihm 
entgengesetzte Pradikate zugesprochen werden k6nnen. Oder der 
Satz will sagen: dass ihm entgegengesetzte Pradikate nicht 
zugesprochen werden sollen? 321 
Nietzsche's original epistemology is composed of an analysis that is both naturalistic and 
linguistic. The pragmatic elements ofNietzsche's analysis have been pointed out by 
Jürgen Habermas in Erkenntnis und Interesse. Ultimately Habermas concludes that 
Nietzsche's reduction of knowledge is not tantamount to a form of pragmatism even 
though it might share some of the features of pragmatism. 
As 1 have claimed in Section 1.1, Nietzsche does not believe in the existence of 
identical objects in nature. 1t is only if we believe in the possibility of identity and 
identification that synthetic judgments are possible. Bu,t as pointed out in KSA 7, 19 
[242], Nietzsche argues that at the heart of synthetic judgment lies metonymy or, as he 
puts it, a false identification ({alsche Gleichung). From this, Nietzsche concludes that 
synthetic deductions (Schlüsse) are illogical (Unlogisch). The epistemology of the early 
Nach/ass (1869-1874) is also connected to the notions of perception (Empflndung) and 
pleasure (Lus!). Nietzsche does not yet possess the concept 01' lorce (Krafi) and power 
(MachO, however. In KSA 7, 19 [159], Nietzsche claims that the causal effect (Stoss: hit) 
of one atom upon another pre-supposes perception. Nietzsche strugg1es with the idea that 
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everything might have perception. But he believes that ifeverything has perception, then 
there is a mixture (Durcheinandel' which is the same word he uses to describe 
Anaxagorean mixture in Philosophy in the Tragical Age (?fthe Greeks) ofvery small and 
very small perception-centers (Empflndungscentren). Nietzsche then claims that 
perception-complexes (Empfindungscomplexen) are to be called will (Wille). What we 
are witnessing here is the genesis of the concept of will to power. The 
Empjindungscentren will become the Krajicentren that make up the consteallation of will 
and wills to power. Nietzsche seems to be inJluenced in these early epistemological 
reJlexions by Empedocles' conception of love and hate as binding forces in nature. This 
is the case because Nietzsche claims that if "Lust Unlust Empfindung, Gedachtniss, 
Rellexbewegung" belonged to the essence of matter, then hum an knowledge would reach 
much deeper into the essence or things with respect to how "die erste Empfindung bringt 
bereits diese Kausalitatsempfindung hervor". 
Nietzsche continues his Iinguistic analysis of knowledge by claiming that "Tropen 
sind's, nicht unbewusste Schlüsse, auf denen unsre Sinneswahrnehmungen beruhn.,,322 
Nietzsche's analysis of epistemology is at once linguistic, naturalistic and psychologistic 
(this last psychologistic [eature has been weIl identified by Habermas in Erkenntnis und 
Interesse) and this too is what the makes this analysis that constantly shifts between 
levels of discourse and conceptual domains so difficult to grasp. Nietzsche goes on to 
clailll in KSA 7, 19 [228] th3t there is no knowledge without llletaphor. According to hilll 
the error lies in the belief in a truth of sense impression (Sinneseindrucks). 
Nietzsche asserts that a kind of stability could be achieved if we had a criterion 
(Massstab). But at the same time the worth (Werthe) of our knowledge depends on this 
321 KSi! /2,9[97]. 
322 KSA 7, 19 r2151. 
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stability of the criterion. This citation is reminiscent of the passage in which Nietzsche 
claims that our faculty of knowledge is an object that needs to be criticized but that it 
needs to take the standards or the criteria (the Massstab) of the criticism from within 
itselfand that hence it cannot elTectively criticize itselr. Here again, Nietzsche also claims 
that in order to determine the value of knowledge we must step beyond our faculty 0[' 
knowledge in order to find a criterion that could validate this knowledge. This quote is 
thus consistent with Nietzsche's skepticism in the realm of epistemology. 
Nietzsche's naturalism (and perhaps one could also cali it a form of) utilitarianism 
is apparent insofar as he claims that the eternal natural laws can be summarized as to an 
attempt to grasp pleasure and flee from pain: This previous passage seems to confirm a 
certain naturalism on Nietzsche's side. He claims that "Die ganze Logik in der Natur lost 
sich dann auf in ein Lust und Unlustsystem." This can be understood in the utilitarian 
sense that we each seek to increase our pleasure and diminish our pain and this position 
wOllld cohere with a I"onn of naturalism at this early stage in Nietzsche's Nachlass. 
The next passage is important becallse it shows the importance ot'the concept ot' 
metonymy in Nietzsche's early writings: 
)è) KSA 7,19 [215]. 
Alles Erklaren und Erkennen ist eigentlich nur ein Rubriziren. 
Nun mit kühnem Schwung: die Vielheit der Dinge wird unter einen 
}-Iut gebracht, wenn wir sie gleichsam ais unzahlige Handlungen 
einer Qualitat betrachten z.B. ais I-landlllngen des Wassers, wie bei 
Thales. Die Qualitat "wasserig", ,Jeucht". Die ganze Welt ist 
feucht, also ist feuchtsein die ganze Weil. Metonymia! Ein 
falscher SchluB. Ein Pradikat ist verwechselt mit einer Sllmme von 
Pradikaten (Definition). Das logische Denken wenig geübt bei den 
Ioniern, entwickelt sich ganz langsam. Die falschen Schlüsse 
werden wir aber richtiger ais Metonymien d.h. rhetorisch poetisch 
fassen. Alle rhetorischen Figuren (d.h. das Wesen der Sprache) 
sind logische fehlschlüsse. Damit fangt die Vernunft an!323 
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For Nietzstche the activity of rational explanation and recognition is assimilated to a 
rubrification. Starting from qualities such as watery, wet, philosophers (Nietzsche has 
l'hales in mind) derive a substantive water or wetness. Nietzsche claims that this is 
metonymy and a tàlse conclusion.324 The critique of truth as metaphor and as metonymy, 
and the related critique of metaphysical and logical identity have an important impact on 
Nietzsche's philosophy ofBecoming. By criticizing identity, Nietzsche manages to 
deconstruct the di fference between the real and apparent worlds and to remove teleology 
and permanence l'rom within Becoming. The concept or identity that is radically 
criticized by Nietzsche is what allows permanence and teleology to be introduced within 
Becoming. By criticizing identity, Nietzsche already pre-figures the Heideggerian 
critique of metaphysics as permanent presence. 
But let us get back to Nietzsche's citation. This citation is important because it 
constrasts logic with rhetoric. Rhetoric and logic developed around the same time in 
Greek civilization, but Nietzsche has an interesting conception of the contrast between 
rhetoric and logic since he claims that the rhetorical figure or what he calls the essence of 
language are logical fallacies. Nietzsche goes on to claim ironically that this is how 
reason begins, i.e. by distinguishing between rhetorical figures and logical fallacies. An 
alternative interpretation of the passage could be that reason begins by developing logical 
l'allacies through the use ofunconscious rhetorical and linguistic figures. 
This passage is important because it explores and shows further Nietzsche's 
association between concepts and metaphors, and logic and figures of speech. There can 
be no knowledge without metaphor, according to Nietzsche at this early stage in the 
324 A short reminder about metonymies might be in store here. A metonymy is the association ora linguistic 
term with with another in tel'ms orcontiguity and not throllgh similarity as is the case with metaphor. For 
example irwe say "Ottawa has issued a change on its roreign policy." wc actllally mean that the Canadian 
government or more specifically the cabinet that is sitllated in Ottawa has made a change in its roreign 
policy. 
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Nachlass. Furthermore, the concept kills the intuition (Eindruck) by capturing, limiting 
and slabilizing it. This quote is important because it continues the association and 
reduction of conceptual knowledge to knowledge through metaphors. This is also the 
position adopted by Nietzsche in the early and unpublished "Über Wahrheil und Lüge im 
aussermoralischen Sinne p. Thus knowledge cannot achieve truth and this is Nietzsche's 
position at least in this early stage of his workS. 325 
Nietzsche writes in the l'ollowing passage that truth is a metaphor of which it has 
bcen forgotten that it is a metaphor. lt is through repetitive and common usage of the 
same metaphor that we Forget that it is a metaphor and hypostatize it into truth: 
Unter "wahr" wird zuerst nur verstanden das, was usuell 
die gewohnte Metapher ist also nur eine Illusion, die durch 
haufigen Gebrauch gcwohnt worden ist und nicht mehr aIs 
Illusion empfunden wird: vergessene Metapher, d.h. eine 
M 1 b · d . d rl . . 32(, etap er, el er vergessen ISt, al.) es eme ISt. 
This quote continues the criticism of knowledge and truth in tenns of the metaphor. This 
forgetfulness of metaphor qua metaphor and its confusion with truth is brought about by 
the fact that we use metaphors ail the time in our ordinary commerce with each other and 
with our language. This ordinary usage of metaphors makes us forget that they are only 
metaphors and we believe, according to Nietzsche, that we have achieved something 
higher than metaphor and illusion, such as tru1.h. 
The following citation is reminiscent of my thesis in section 3.1. There, 1 claimed 
that Nietzsche did not believe in the existence of identical cases or types in nature. 
Knowledege occurs through a deformation, that is, through an identification of non-
identical cases. This passage goes weil with a1l the passages that we have been examining 
J25 Sorne scholars such as Maudemarie Clark have argued that Nietzsche in his early phase rejects the 
possibility oftruth at least in such texts as "Über Wahrheil und Lüge im aussermora/ischen Sinne··. But 
later, and as part 0 f h is development, Nietzsche wi 1\ accept according to Clark a non-metaphysical 
correspondence theory oftruth. 1 have said more about this in the section 2.2 The Status of Nietzsche 
Scholarsh ip where 1 deal more explicitly with Clark' s interpretation ofN ietzsche. 
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in this context, which show that Nietzsche both estheticizes knowledgc and naturalizes it 
to a certain extent in his early works. 
Another important passage that is worth cxamining is the following: 
Der J3egriff entsteht aus einem Gleichsetzen des 
Nichtgleichen: d.h. durch die Tauschung, es gabe ein 
Gleichcs, durch die Voraussetzung von Idel1lilOfen: also 
durch l'alsche Anschauungen. Man sieht einen Menschen 
gehen: nennt es "gehen" . .Jetzt einen Affen, ]-Iund: sagt 
h h " 327 auc "ge en . 
The last quo te and the previolls one are important, sinee Nietzsche again mentions that 
every knowledge is an identilication of the non-identical, of what is similar. 1 have 
already mentioned this in section 1.1. Nietzsche does not believe in the existence or 
idcntical objects in nature. From Ihis inexistence of identical objects, he develops a 
critique of Western logic and epistemology which, according to him, rests on the 
principle of identity and non-contradiction. 
:>è6 KSA 7, 19 [229]. 
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Conclusion 
We have seen in this section that Nietzsche's concepts ofBecoming and ofwill to 
power allow us to claim that there is an intrinsic connection between Nietzsche' s 
epistemology and his (anti-metaphysical) metaphysics. On the one hand, Nietzsche 
constructs a naturalistic and pragmatic epistemology and, on the other hand, with the 
concepts of Becoming and will to power he also construes a positive metaphysics. 
Nietzsche's epistemology is skeptical and it rejects certainty as the goal of knowlcdge. 
Nietzsche eliminates Cartcsian certainty that was still a l'cature oF Hegel's philosophy. At 
the same time, Nietzsche affirms that will to power is the last factum that can be reached. 
So will to power possesses a certain metaphysical positivity. But this contrasts with the 
l'3ct that Nietzsche does not believe in the "real" existence of centers of force that exist 
tcmporarily and that are periodically replaced. Insofar as these centers of force act with 
respect to the principle oFthe enhancement oewill to power, they must have a certain 
reality. But this l'eality is given only in the exteriorization of l'oree which occurs 
dynamically. These centers of force lack a lelos. The ultimate character orthe world is 
thus chaos that is coordinated with a fugacious order. 
Enhanccment occurs, but one never rcaches a point ofstability. Change is 
permanent l'or Nietzsche and thcre is no point when the movement of enhancement oF 
will to power and Becoming ever reaches permanence or slability. Thus we come back to 
our principal thesis, Nietzsche constructs a naturalistic and pragmatic epistemology but 
what allows him to do this is the elimination orteleology from within Becoming. 
327 [Nietzsche's emphasis, P.c.], KSA 7,23 [11]. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has argued that Nietzsche's most important achievement was his 
attempt to free Becoming from teleology and thus from the taint of ontology. Through 
this moYe he manages at once to complete and to de-construct metaphysics as onto-
theology. But this stilileaves certain issues unresolved in his thought. Chief among them 
is the question of transcendence. 1 r God is dead, th en there is no more transcendence. 
A few questions have guided my investigations surrounding the concept of 
Becoming in Nietzsche's philosophy. 1 had wanted to know how the more skeptical and 
critical aspects ofNietzsche's philosophy could be integrated with the more metaphysical 
aspects that have been identified by some commentators such as Heidegger. What 
quickly became clear was that Nietzsche was not a thinker orthe I3eing ofbeings but of 
Becoming. Nietzsche develops the equivalent of a metaphysics of Becoming. However, 
this metaphysics is one of a peculiar kind insofar as it lacks the consistent, non-
contradietory, coherent and articulated aspect of a classic metaphysics. One might cali 
Nietzsche's metaphysics a Romantic, ironie metaphysics in the sense of Schlegel and 
Novalis. 
The concept of Becoming was traditionally analyzed by Aristotle in terms of 
potentiality (dunamis), actuality (energeia) and teleology (enlelecheia). But, by claiming 
that actual substance is more fundamental th an potential substance, Aristotle consolidates 
the priviledge of the eternal, the permanent, the stable and the immutable within Western 
metaphysics. This privilege had already been partly conferred by Plato when he had 
conceived of the idea of the Good as Being. However, Aristotle re-inforces the Platonic 
onto-theological armature by introducing the notion of entelecheia into Becoming and 
showing still more clearly how the eternal (actual) and the perishable (potential) are 
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interconnected. Becoming is conceptualized in Aristotle as a movement from actuality to 
potentiality, but this occurs through the introduction of a purpose (telos) that links 
actuality to potentiality. En/elecheia is sometimes itselftranslated as actuality. In fact 
purpose or en/elecheia is cl oser to actuality than to potentiality. This privilege 01' actuality 
and permanence is effectively criticized in Nietzsche's philosophy. 
Nietzsche's contribution is to have purged Becoming of its ontological implications, 
and liberated metaphysics [rom the field ofmorality in which the metaphysical has 
always been grounded. By deconstructing Plato's link between the 111etaphysical object 
and the moral object, Nietzsche effects a historicization or morality and metaphysics. 1 r 
the withdrawal from tàith in morality is in fact a moral decision,J28 it follows that his 
critique dissolves both the metaphysical and the moral. Nietzsche works this 
deconstruction of the two, detaching one l'rom the other, in order to establish the priority 
orthe moral over the metaphysical. 
1 r Nietzsche was a great 111etaphysician in Heidegger's assessment, he was no less 
eminent as a dialectician. Heidegger identifies dia\cctical connections in Nietzsche's 
metaphysics (primarily between the will to power and eternal recurrence), but it is 
through the extraction of the Platonic dialectic ofBeing and Becoming and good and evil 
that Nietzsche effects this inversion ofPlatonism. Heidegger's claim that this inversion 
is accomplished solc1y through the affirmation that Becoming is nothing but an 
entrenchment in Platonism can be contested by the attribution of precedence to Secoming 
over Being. 
Nietzsche "deconstructs" and destroys the distinction between Seing and 
l3ecoming, as a careful reading of the His/ory of an Error shows ("The true world -- we 
m Nietzsche, Dawn, Prelace, Section 4. (KSA 3, 16). 
• 
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have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the 
true world we have also abolished the apparent one. ") 
Heidegger has presented the most powerful, seductive and interesting reading of 
Nietzsche of the 20lh century. But the question remains: can we progress with respect to 
this impressive interpretation? My claim is that we cano In fact, Heidegger has not done 
justice to Nietzsche's deep doctrine of Becoming. He has tried to fix, de-limit and 
permanentize (bring-to-perl11anence) Becoming in Nietzsche's philosophy. As a rcsult, 
the in finite, absolute and etcrnal Secom ing 0 [' Nietzsche' s thought remains un-thought. 
By unifying and identifying the will to power and the eternal recurrence of the 
same, Heidegger has injected a taint ofteleology into Nietzsche's concept ofBecoming. 
But as Nietzsche often reminds us, Becoming has no goal, purpose or telos. Becoming 
aims at nothing. 
Yet, Seing becomes: Being is Becoming. There is no truth greater than that and 
Nietzsche has also reminded us or this. However, we must take into account the làct that 
Nietzsche's thought is not a unit y: it is not a totality: it is an adiaphory. By this J mean 
that it is both in-determinate and in-differcnt. The system, which Nietzsche gives us in 
aphorisms is inliniteJy and rragmented. Like Becoming, it is not unitary but seJf-
contradictory. This self-contradiction 0[' f3ecoming, ofthought and lire must be acceptcd 
and em braced. There is no greater truth than contradiction and sel [-contradiction. 
Nietzsche takes this truth to its absolute limit. He univocally and irrevocably 
deconstructs the unit y between will to power and eternal recurrence, between Being and 
Becoming. Being and Becoming cannot be unified in the last instance: this is what 
constitutes their essential adiaphory, their in-detcrminateness and in-dirrerence. Seing 
and Becoming remain unequivocally separated, chorismatic. What becol11es, is the will to 
power. What is, is the eternal recurrcncc of the sal11e. But we do not commit an injustice 
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to Nietzsehe's thought if we claim that what is, is the will to power and what becomes, is 
the eternal recurrenee of the same. Will to power and eternal recurrence are given in an 
infinite, ironical play that plays itself out in the various configurations of Being and 
Becoming. The configurations of Becoming transform and transfigure themselves into 
configurations of Being. 
However, in this way no stability and permanence or Being and Becoming is 
established: what becomes is the cternal recurrence of the will to power. In order to think 
this even more fundamentally, we must realize that what returns or recurs is the cternal 
recurrence orthe Becoming orthe will to power. Becoming mediates and synthesizes 
Nietzsche's fundamental concepts orwill to power, eternal recurrence, Ühermensch and 
nihilism. The power-quanta and power-centers or the will to power are in perpetuaI 
Becoming. What recurs in the eternal recurrence of the same is Becoming as im-
permanence. 
The Übermensch is the man that understands that he is nothing else but 
Becoming. He accepts his essence as Becoming and will l'ully projects himselfonto 
possibilities by transforming and transfiguring himself into what he essentially is. The 
Übermensch is the man who becomes who he is. However, in this way he lets the 
possibilities ofhis existence be. He does not fix, de-limit and perni.anentize his 8ecoming 
in Bcing. Rather the Übermensch accepts his passing and finite nature as what it truly is. 
But in this passing or Becoming, he also glimpses the inlinite, absolute and eternal 
aspects o[Becoming. Il is these aspects which he cannot re-concile with the 
contradictory, inconsistent and in~coherent aspects of Becoming, but which he must 
nevertheless affirm as irrevocable aspects ofhis Being and Becoming. 
Finally, nihilism is the faet that Becoming aims at nothing. lt has no te/os. 
Throughout this dissertation, 1 have argued that Nietzsche leaves behind a certain rorm of 
metaphysics by eliminating teleology [rom within Becoming. By removing teleology 
From within Becoming, Nietzsche in-finitizes and removes the limits of Secoming and 
Seing which Heidegger had sought to restore. ln this way Becom ing is conceived as 
perpetuai, infinite, absolute, eternal and un-limited nux. 
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In Nietzsche's philosophy, the will does not will the eternal recurrence orthe will 
and wc cannot agree that Nietzsche's philosophy is the ultimate triumph of the 
philosophy of the will. The will wills Becoming and the infinite, eternal and absolute 
Becoming of the will to power. 
The who\e ofNietzsche's thought is not totalizable as a metaphysics of the will to 
power. The non-totalizable totality ofNietzsche's thought is only totalizable as a 
metaphysics ofBecoming. This metaphysics, is itselfa metaphysics that contradicts and 
undoes itself From within itsel f. It is a center-less, atelological metaphysics that infinitely, 
absolutely and eternally becomes. Its nuidity, !lux and im-permanence prevent it l'rom 
resting in Being and presence. lt has become, it is, and it will never cease to become. 
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